Scott v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJune 3, 2025
DocketCivil Action No. 2022-0601
StatusPublished

This text of Scott v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (Scott v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scott v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, (D.D.C. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CAROL W. SCOTT,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 22-cv-601 (CRC)

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

On April 23, 2025, following a jury trial, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff

Carol Wild Scott against Defendant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

(“WMATA”). Judgment, ECF No. 64. Before the Court is Scott’s Bill of Costs, ECF No. 65,

which WMATA opposes, ECF No. 69.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and Local Civil Rule 54.1 provide the standards

governing bills of costs. The general rule is that “costs—other than attorney's fees—should be

allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). The bill of costs “shall specifically

itemize with supporting documentation the particular costs sought under the specific categories

set forth in paragraph (d) of” the local rules. LCvR 54.1(a).

Scott seeks a total of $5,373.28 composed of fees for deposition transcripts, videotapes of

depositions, and illustrative medical-related exhibits.

“Rule 54(d)(1) codifies a venerable presumption that prevailing parties are entitled to

costs. Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 377 (2013). Nonetheless, Rule 54(d)(1)’s use

of “the word ‘should’ makes clear that the decision whether to award costs ultimately lies within

the sound discretion of the district court. Accordingly, the losing party bears the burden of showing circumstances sufficient to overcome the presumption favoring the prevailing party.”

Harrell v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 18-cv-02472 (DLF), 2022 WL 19296991, at *2

(D.D.C. May 10, 2022) (cleaned up) (citations omitted).

WMATA raises three major objections. First, it objects to the taxing of “[d]eposition

transcripts for depositions Plaintiff did not notice and did not use on the record at trial”—

specifically, Ms. Scott’s own deposition and that of her expert, Dr. Carl Berkowitz. Opp’n at 2.

The Court will allow the costs of Dr. Berkowitz’s and Ms. Scott’s depositions to be

taxed. Local Rule 54.1(d)(6) provides that the Clerk shall tax “[c]osts, at the reporter’s standard

rate, of the original and one copy of any deposition noticed by the prevailing party, and of one

copy of any deposition noticed by any other party, if the deposition was used on the record, at a

hearing or trial.” LCvR 54.1(d)(6); see 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2) (permitting recovery of “[f]ees for

printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case.”). Contrary

to WMATA’s objection, both Dr. Berkowitz and Ms. Scott’s depositions were used at trial.

Though they were not read into the record, both depositions were used to cross-examine the

respective witnesses. See, e.g., Day 2 Trial Tr. at 253:23–25 (cross-examination of Ms. Scott);

id. at 352:3–17 (cross-examination of Dr. Berkowitz). The Court also relied on Dr. Berkowitz’s

deposition to rule on WMATA’s motion in limine to exclude him. See Opinion and Order, ECF

No. 52, at 5.

Next, WMATA objects to the taxation of videography and videoconferencing costs—

specifically, the costs of Dr. Rajkumar Rao’s and Al Emondi’s video depositions. Opp’n at 2.

The D.C. Circuit, however, has held that “the cost of taking video depositions may be awarded if

shown to be necessary for use in the case.” Harrell, 2022 WL 19296991, at *2 (citing United

States v. Halliburton Co., 954 F.3d 307, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2020)). Excerpts from Dr. Rao’s and Mr.

2 Emondi’s depositions were shown on the record at trial, so their costs were “necessary for use in

the case.” Id. Accordingly, the Court will permit the taxation of these costs.

Lastly, WMATA objects to the cost of three medical illustrations that Ms. Scott displayed

on foam boards as demonstrative aids. Opp’n at 2. The Court agrees that these costs are not

taxable.

The relevant statute permits the taxation of “[f]ees for exemplification and the costs of

making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 28

U.S.C. § 1920(4). And Local Rule 54.1(d)(8) directs the taxation of “costs of copying those

exhibits which are introduced into evidence, are used for impeachment, or are filed with the

Clerk.” Courts in this district have relied on the principle that “costs of demonstrative materials

which were merely illustrative of expert testimony, other adequate evidence, or argumentative

matter are not taxable” because these aids are not “necessarily obtained for use in the case.”

Guevara v. Onyewu, 943 F. Supp. 2d 192, 197 (D.D.C. 2013); cf. Berke v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, 942 F. Supp. 2d 71, 81 (D.D.C. 2013) (declining to award costs for a demonstrative

video). Thus, demonstrative medical images that “were merely illustrative of testimony or

argumentative” have not been found taxable. Guevara, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 197. Here too, the

medical images—used only for illustrative purposes—were not necessarily obtained for use in

the case and are not taxable. 1

1 WMATA also objected to Ms. Scott’s attempt to seek taxation of transcripts at an expedited, rather than standard, rate. Opp’n at 2. In response, Ms. Scott acknowledges that she should only have sought costs for transcripts at the standard rate and reduced her request accordingly. Pl.’s Response, ECF No. 70, at 3.

3 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that [65] Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART. Accordingly, the Court will allow costs in the amount of $4,212.55. It is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file a revised Bill of Costs on or before June 10, 2025.

Upon docketing of that Bill, the Clerk of Court is directed to tax costs.

SO ORDERED.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge

Date: June 3, 2025

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Related

Marx v. General Revenue Corp.
133 S. Ct. 1166 (Supreme Court, 2013)
Guevara v. Onyewu
943 F. Supp. 2d 192 (District of Columbia, 2013)
Berke v. Federal Bureau of Prisons
942 F. Supp. 2d 71 (District of Columbia, 2013)
Harry Barko v. Halliburton Company
954 F.3d 307 (D.C. Circuit, 2020)

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Scott v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scott-v-washington-metropolitan-area-transit-authority-dcd-2025.