Scott v. Crawford

9 Ohio Law. Abs. 146
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 15, 1930
DocketNo 1755
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 9 Ohio Law. Abs. 146 (Scott v. Crawford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scott v. Crawford, 9 Ohio Law. Abs. 146 (Ohio Ct. App. 1930).

Opinion

LEMERT, PJ.

Under this contract the Andrews Asphalt Raving Company agreed to furnish, and was obligated to furnish Warrenite-Bitulithic Pavement mixtures manufactured by Warren Brothers Company and to furnish to the County of Licking, in connection with the. laying of said mixtures,\ the expert advice, inspection and laboratory supervision of Warren Brothers Company.

The County Commissioners of Licking County, the City of Newark, who were paying one-third of the costs of this improvement, and the property owners, who were to be assessed for one-third of the costs of the improvement, all had a right to expect that they were to receive the genuine Warrenite-Bitulithic mixtures and pavement, safeguarded by the exeperience and technical ability of the Warren Brothers Company and its engineers. That is what the contract plainly and distinctly calls for.

The uncontradicted testimony in the record shows that Warrenite-Bitulithic Pavement is covered by the trade-mark and patents owned by Warren Brothers Company and that Warrenite-Bitulithic Pavement must necessarily be manufactured under the trademark and patents of Warren Brothers Company and by Warren Brothers Company or under its direction, inspection and laboratory supervision.

The reeard discloses, and in fact the defendant admits that it did not procure the genuine Warrenite-Bitulithic Paving mixtures from Warren Brothers Company and that it did not furnish the direction, inspection and laboratory supervision of Warren Brothers Company in connection with the construction of this work.

In other words, the contention of the defendant the Andrews Asphalt Paving-Company is that it furnished a pavement which complied with that part of the specification which determines the proportions of all materials to be used and the quality of materials and that it laid the material on the street in accordance with the provisión of the specifications setting forth the method of laying — that is, the defendant claims that it furnished something just as good as Warrenite-Bitulithic, but it does not claim that it furnished the genuine article which its contract with the County Commissioners of Licking County called for.

[149]*149So the question presents itself, did such failure in this respect constitute a material breach of the contract with the Board of County Commissioners of Licking County?

An examination of the records disclosed that the defendant company, to-wit, the Andrews Asphalt Paving Company, did not furnish the engineering supervision, inspection and laboratory service of Warren Brothers Company nor any other engineering inspection or laboratory service.

The County Commissioners of Licking County, the City of Newark and the propetry owners, were entitled under the terms of the contract to the engineering inspection and laboratory service of Warren Brothers Company, an no other. The Andrews Asphalt Paving Company had no right to take upon itself the right to waive a requirement of its contract with Licking County calling for the engineering experience and ability of Warren Brothers Company, the originators and inventors of the pavement called for by the contract and deprive the County, City and property owners, of this protection.

Such failure of Andrews Asphalt Paving Company to furnish the engineering supervision, inspection and laboratory service, in our opinion constitutes a material breach of its contract with the Board of Commissioners of Licking County, or, in other words, the paving mixtures which Andrews Asphalt Paving Company furnished as a pretended compliance with its contract did not, as a matter of fact, comply with the contract or specifications.

It is admitted by the defendañt company, to-wit, the Andrews Asphalt Paving Company that they did not furnish the engineering direction, laboratory supervision and inspection of Warren Brothers Company, which it plainly agreed to furnish in its contract with the County Commissioners of Licking County. The Andrews Asphalt Paving Company, however, seeks to excuse itself in this failure by saying that the work was inspected by the Columbus Testing Laboratory, which inspection took the place of the Technical inspection of the Warren Brothers Company, which it agreed to furnish.

The contract before us plainly provides that the engineering direction, laboratory supervision and inspection of Warren Brothers, and no other, shall be furnished, and the failure of Andrews Asphalt Paving Company to furnish this direction, Laboratory supervision and inspection, eonstitutes a material breach of_its contract with the Board of Commissioners of Licking County. -

The Board of County Commisisoners did not, neither had they the right, to, waive the requirements of the contract that th,e Andrews Asphalt Paving Company procure the Warren Brothers Company, and th'at the Warren Brothers Company supervise the construction.

A further examination of the record before us discloses’ the fact, that the breach of contract on the part'of Andrews Asphalt Paving Company was intentional, wilful and premeditated and precludes them from recovery on the theory of substantial performance, even if substantial performance' was established.

Williston on Contract, Vol. 2, paragraph 842, page 1613.

We believe it to be the law that substantial performance, as has been well defined by various cases, permits only such omissions or deviations from the contract as are inadvertent or unintentional, not due to bad faith, which do not impair the structure ,as a whole and which are remedial without doing material damage to others parts of the improvement in tearing up and reconstructing, and which may without in-/ justice be compensated by deductions from the contract price.

“In order that an exception to the general rule requiring strict performance may be recognized in any event, there must have been an attempt in good f,aith to perform; there must be no wilful or intentional departure, and the defects must not prevade the whole or be so material that the object which the parties intended to accomplish, to have a specified amount of work performed in a particular manner, is not accomplished, and the material or services must have been accepted or retained. The non-performance of a material part .of the contract will prevent the performance from amounting to a substantial performance.”
13 Corpus Juris, 692.
“Where a contractor commits wilful default and yet claims the contract price, he in effect claims that he has’a right to break his contract, but he has no such right. If the failure to perform ^ the express contract be intentional, it is such bad faith he can recover nothing.”
190 Mass., 43; 29 Minn., 146;

[150]*150134 N. Y., 45; 81 N. Y. 211;

42 Minn., 414; 80 Texas, 23.

• It has even been held in different jurisdictions and in our own state that one can not recover on a contract if he intentionally has failed to perform a part of it, ai'though the part which he has failed to perform may not be of the essence of the contract.

39 Oh St, 1; 190 Mass., 43;

88 Me., 237; 146 Penn St., 492;

51 W. Va., 416.

Again,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
9 Ohio Law. Abs. 146, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scott-v-crawford-ohioctapp-1930.