F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 8 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
SONNI SCHWINN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-4140 (D.C. No. 97-CV-271-S) HUMAN AFFAIRS (D. Utah) INTERNATIONAL, INC.; MARSHA PETERS, ERIC EPPERSON, STEPHANIE BOYERS, individually and in their employment capacity with the Defendant corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , EBEL , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Sonni Schwinn began working for defendant Human Affairs
International, Inc. (HAI) as an associate proposal writer in 1994 when she was
sixty years old. Defendants Peters, Epperson and Boyers were her supervisors.
Following difficulties in the working relationship between the parties, plaintiff
resigned in July 1996. She then brought this action alleging violations of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, conspiracy
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She
also attempted to amend her complaint to add a claim of gender discrimination.
The district court dismissed the conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims, denied her leave to amend her complaint, and granted summary
judgment to HAI on her ADEA claim. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm for the
reasons stated below.
Dismissal of conspiracy claim
Plaintiff asserted a claim against the individual defendants under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) alleging that they conspired to deprive her of the equal opportunities of
her job and equal protection in her working conditions. The district court noted
that plaintiff apparently conceded that violations of the ADEA cannot support a
§ 1985(3) claim. It then held that her vague and conclusory allegations of
-2- violations of her rights to equal protection and property interests failed to
adequately state a claim under § 1985(3), noting in particular that as an at-will
employee, plaintiff had no property interest in her employment.
We review the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo,
see Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind , 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.
1999), and may affirm for any reason supported by the record, see Seibert v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Univ. of Okla. Health Sciences Ctr. , 867 F.2d 591, 597 (10th
Cir. 1989). Plaintiff contends that her § 1985(3) claim has been validated by the
Supreme Court’s determination that interference with an at-will employment
relationship is sufficient to state a claim under § 1985(2). See Haddle v.
Garrison , 525 U.S. 121, 126 (1998). Haddle , however, is irrelevant to the
principles that § 1985(3) does not create its own substantive rights but merely
provides a remedy for violation of other rights, see Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n v. Novotny , 442 U.S. 366, 376 (1979), and that § 1985(3) claims must be
based on racial or class-based discrimination, see Tilton v. Richardson , 6 F.3d
683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993). The only class on which the alleged conspiracy could
be based is plaintiff’s age, and her substantive rights in this regard are created by
the ADEA. Violation of the ADEA cannot form the basis for a § 1985(3) claim.
See Sherlock v. Montefiore Medical Ctr. , 84 F.3d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 1996).
-3- Dismissal of intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
Noting that plaintiff conceded that the Utah Worker’s Compensation Act
generally provides the exclusive remedy for job-sustained injury, the district court
rejected plaintiff’s contention that she fell within an exception for deliberate
intent to injure. On appeal, she contends only that the exclusive-remedy
provision is unconstitutional. She did not raise this argument in the district court,
and we will not consider it. See Walker v. Mather (In re Walker) , 959 F.2d 894,
896 (10th Cir. 1992).
Denial of motion for leave to amend complaint
Seventeen months after filing her complaint and four months after the
deadline for amending pleadings, plaintiff moved for leave to amend her
complaint to add a claim of gender discrimination that had not been
administratively exhausted and which was based on an incident occurring over
two years before she filed her complaint. She has not persuaded us that the
district court abused its discretion in denying her motion. See Ben Ezra,
Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online Inc. , 206 F.3d 980, 987 (10th Cir. 2000).
Grant of summary judgment to HAI on ADEA claim
Plaintiff contended that HAI denied her equal pay and promotional
opportunity and constructively discharged her in violation of the ADEA. In
-4- assessing her claims, the district court applied the McDonnell Douglas 2 burden-
shifting scheme, see Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc. , 145 F.3d 1159, 1165 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied , 525 U.S. 1054 (1998). For the equal pay and promotional
opportunity claims, the court assumed that plaintiff made her prima facie case. It
then found that HAI had met its burden of proffering facially nondiscriminatory
reasons for the challenged employment actions. Specifically, it found that
plaintiff was the only proposal writer without a college degree and that HAI’s
supervisory personnel and senior writers viewed her performance and skills as
deficient. The court then held that plaintiff had not demonstrated that these
explanations for the challenged actions were pretextual. With respect to the
constructive discharge claim, the court first held that plaintiff had failed to
demonstrate that HAI created working conditions that were sufficiently
intolerable as to be actionable as a constructive discharge and thus failed to
establish her prima facie case. Alternatively, the court held that HAI met its
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 8 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
SONNI SCHWINN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-4140 (D.C. No. 97-CV-271-S) HUMAN AFFAIRS (D. Utah) INTERNATIONAL, INC.; MARSHA PETERS, ERIC EPPERSON, STEPHANIE BOYERS, individually and in their employment capacity with the Defendant corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , EBEL , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Sonni Schwinn began working for defendant Human Affairs
International, Inc. (HAI) as an associate proposal writer in 1994 when she was
sixty years old. Defendants Peters, Epperson and Boyers were her supervisors.
Following difficulties in the working relationship between the parties, plaintiff
resigned in July 1996. She then brought this action alleging violations of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, conspiracy
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She
also attempted to amend her complaint to add a claim of gender discrimination.
The district court dismissed the conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims, denied her leave to amend her complaint, and granted summary
judgment to HAI on her ADEA claim. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm for the
reasons stated below.
Dismissal of conspiracy claim
Plaintiff asserted a claim against the individual defendants under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) alleging that they conspired to deprive her of the equal opportunities of
her job and equal protection in her working conditions. The district court noted
that plaintiff apparently conceded that violations of the ADEA cannot support a
§ 1985(3) claim. It then held that her vague and conclusory allegations of
-2- violations of her rights to equal protection and property interests failed to
adequately state a claim under § 1985(3), noting in particular that as an at-will
employee, plaintiff had no property interest in her employment.
We review the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo,
see Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind , 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.
1999), and may affirm for any reason supported by the record, see Seibert v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Univ. of Okla. Health Sciences Ctr. , 867 F.2d 591, 597 (10th
Cir. 1989). Plaintiff contends that her § 1985(3) claim has been validated by the
Supreme Court’s determination that interference with an at-will employment
relationship is sufficient to state a claim under § 1985(2). See Haddle v.
Garrison , 525 U.S. 121, 126 (1998). Haddle , however, is irrelevant to the
principles that § 1985(3) does not create its own substantive rights but merely
provides a remedy for violation of other rights, see Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n v. Novotny , 442 U.S. 366, 376 (1979), and that § 1985(3) claims must be
based on racial or class-based discrimination, see Tilton v. Richardson , 6 F.3d
683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993). The only class on which the alleged conspiracy could
be based is plaintiff’s age, and her substantive rights in this regard are created by
the ADEA. Violation of the ADEA cannot form the basis for a § 1985(3) claim.
See Sherlock v. Montefiore Medical Ctr. , 84 F.3d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 1996).
-3- Dismissal of intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
Noting that plaintiff conceded that the Utah Worker’s Compensation Act
generally provides the exclusive remedy for job-sustained injury, the district court
rejected plaintiff’s contention that she fell within an exception for deliberate
intent to injure. On appeal, she contends only that the exclusive-remedy
provision is unconstitutional. She did not raise this argument in the district court,
and we will not consider it. See Walker v. Mather (In re Walker) , 959 F.2d 894,
896 (10th Cir. 1992).
Denial of motion for leave to amend complaint
Seventeen months after filing her complaint and four months after the
deadline for amending pleadings, plaintiff moved for leave to amend her
complaint to add a claim of gender discrimination that had not been
administratively exhausted and which was based on an incident occurring over
two years before she filed her complaint. She has not persuaded us that the
district court abused its discretion in denying her motion. See Ben Ezra,
Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online Inc. , 206 F.3d 980, 987 (10th Cir. 2000).
Grant of summary judgment to HAI on ADEA claim
Plaintiff contended that HAI denied her equal pay and promotional
opportunity and constructively discharged her in violation of the ADEA. In
-4- assessing her claims, the district court applied the McDonnell Douglas 2 burden-
shifting scheme, see Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc. , 145 F.3d 1159, 1165 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied , 525 U.S. 1054 (1998). For the equal pay and promotional
opportunity claims, the court assumed that plaintiff made her prima facie case. It
then found that HAI had met its burden of proffering facially nondiscriminatory
reasons for the challenged employment actions. Specifically, it found that
plaintiff was the only proposal writer without a college degree and that HAI’s
supervisory personnel and senior writers viewed her performance and skills as
deficient. The court then held that plaintiff had not demonstrated that these
explanations for the challenged actions were pretextual. With respect to the
constructive discharge claim, the court first held that plaintiff had failed to
demonstrate that HAI created working conditions that were sufficiently
intolerable as to be actionable as a constructive discharge and thus failed to
establish her prima facie case. Alternatively, the court held that HAI met its
burden of showing legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, and that
plaintiff again failed to show these reasons were pretextual.
On appeal, plaintiff challenges all of the district court’s determinations
leading to its grant of summary judgment to HAI. Further, she contends that the
2 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
-5- court erred by not granting her motion for summary judgment on ADEA liability.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 used by the district court. See Simms v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs. , 165 F.3d
1321, 1326 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 120 S. Ct. 53 (1999). We have fully
considered plaintiff’s arguments and reviewed the record, and we conclude the
district court correctly assessed the parties’ motions for summary judgment.
Therefore, for substantially the same reasons as stated in the district court’s May
29, 1999 memorandum decision, we affirm its grant of summary judgment to HAI
and its denial of summary judgment to plaintiff.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha Circuit Judge
-6-