Hunter, J.
This is an action for damages resulting from the alleged sexual molestations of a 5-year-old girl, Maria Argo, by a 15-year-old boy, Reed Christensen.
The action was instituted by Dorothy Schurk, the mother, and Richard Schurk, the stepfather, of Maria Argo, as guardian ad litem for Maria, and in behalf of themselves to recover damages from Reed Christensen and the parents of Reed Christensen, for alleged damages sustained by Maria 'and to the Schurks resulting from the sexual molestations of Maria by Reed Christensen.
This appeal is from an order granting a summary judgment. All facts alleged are therefore deemed to be true at this stage of the proceeding.
The Schurks and Christensens were neighbors in Seattle. Mrs. Schurk had three children by a former marriage and needed assistance in their care while she was working as a waitress at the Black Angus Restaurant. On occasions, Mrs. Christensen babysat for Mrs. Schurk commencing in December, 1967. During the month of May, 1968, Mrs. Christensen told Mrs. Schurk that her son, Reed Christensen, was a good 'and capable babysitter and, as a result, he was hired by Mrs. Schurk to take care of her children as a babysitter, commencing at that time.
The record shows, however, that Mrs. Christensen knew her son had a lengthy history of having sexually molested young girls; that one of the children with whom he was known to have taken liberties was his own 6-year-old sister, Carla. This information was never disclosed to the Schurks.
The record shows that some time between May and September, 1968, Reed Christensen molested Maria Argo two to five times, taking liberties upon her person, attempting vaginal penetration, and forcing her into acts of sodomy. None of these occurrences were discovered by the Schurks [654]*654until late in September, 1968. Prior to that time there was nothing from Maria’s appearance or conduct, observed by Mrs. Schurk, to indicate this was going on or that anything Was wrong. The initial discovery was made when the 6-year-old Carla Christensen told Mrs. Schurk of these occurrences when she had been left in the care of Mrs. Schurk. Thereupon, Mrs. Schurk interrogated Maria, who then gave her version of what had happened.
Mrs. Schurk immediately became ill and suffered severe emotional distress which required treatment by a physician, hospitalization and psychiatric care. The effects of the molestations have also required medical and psychiatric care for Maria. Expert opinion indicates that future treatment for both is quite likely to be necessary.
This action for damages followed. The Schurks sought recovery against the Christensen parents and their son, Reed Christensen, for mental anguish iand distress, and for their medical and psychiatric expenses incurred and to be incurred. Further, for recovery of loss of wages by reason of their care for Maria and their expenses incurred and to be incurred, present and future, in behalf of Maria, as a result of the sexual molestations. Also, claims as guardian ad litem in behalf of Maria Argo were sought against the Christensen parents and their son, Reed.
The defendants interposed a motion for summary judgment for dismissal of all claims of the plaintiffs Schurks individually. The motion was granted by the trial court, dismissing the Schurks’ claims against the Christensen parents, and denying the motion for dismissal of their claims as against Reed Christensen. The claims of Maria Argo, through her guardian ad litem, against the Christensen parents and Reed, are not involved in this appeal.
The plaintiffs Schurks appeal from the judgment dismissing their claims against the defendant Christensen parents. The defendant, Reed Christensen, cross-appeals from the failure of the trial court to grant a dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims against him.
The Schurks’ primary contention is that the trial [655]*655court erred in dismissing their claims relating to mental anguish and distress. By a long line of decisions in this state, we have, as a general rule, denied recovery for mental anguish and distress in cases not involving malice or wrongful intent, unless there has been an actual invasion of a plaintiff’s person or security, or a direct possibility thereof.1 We recently reiterated and adhered to this rule with a review of our cases and authorities in Smith v. Rodene, 69 Wn.2d 482, 418 P.2d 741 (1966), and also in the case of Murphy v. Tacoma, 60 Wn.2d 603, 374 P.2d 976 (1962). This is the general rule in the majority of jurisdictions in this country.
The recognized policy considerations, for the general rule limiting recovery for mental distress under the conditions previously enumerated, is premised upon the policy considerations aptly stated by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509, 519 (1970):
Two primary considerations underlie the present limited scheme of protection: (1) the likelihood that courts will be flooded by fraudulent claims and (2) the defendant’s potentially unlimited liability for every type of mental disturbance.
The courts, in cases departing from the general rule, having in mind these policy considerations, have done so with caution, on a case-by-case basis, circumscribed with guidelines and conditions.
The leading case upon which the plaintiffs rely is Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). In that case the mother witnessed the injuries to her child, resulting in the child’s death caused by the defendant’s negligent operation of his motor vehicle. The mother was out of the field of danger and was not in apprehension of her own safety. No malice or wrongful intent was involved. Yet the court allowed the mother to recover for mental anguish and distress suffered from the [656]*656shock of observing her daughter’s serious injuries in the accident from which the daughter died. That court stated at page 740:
We note, first, that we deal here with a case in which plaintiff suffered a shock which resulted in physical injury and we confine our ruling to that case. In determining, in such a case, whether defendant should reasonably foresee the injury to plaintiff, or, in other terminology, whether defendant owes plaintiff a duty of due care, the courts will take into account such factors as the following: (1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.
The evaluation of these factors will indicate the degree of the defendant’s foreseeability: obviously defendant is more likely to foresee that a mother who observes an accident affecting her child will suffer harm than to foretell that a stranger witness will do so.
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Hunter, J.
This is an action for damages resulting from the alleged sexual molestations of a 5-year-old girl, Maria Argo, by a 15-year-old boy, Reed Christensen.
The action was instituted by Dorothy Schurk, the mother, and Richard Schurk, the stepfather, of Maria Argo, as guardian ad litem for Maria, and in behalf of themselves to recover damages from Reed Christensen and the parents of Reed Christensen, for alleged damages sustained by Maria 'and to the Schurks resulting from the sexual molestations of Maria by Reed Christensen.
This appeal is from an order granting a summary judgment. All facts alleged are therefore deemed to be true at this stage of the proceeding.
The Schurks and Christensens were neighbors in Seattle. Mrs. Schurk had three children by a former marriage and needed assistance in their care while she was working as a waitress at the Black Angus Restaurant. On occasions, Mrs. Christensen babysat for Mrs. Schurk commencing in December, 1967. During the month of May, 1968, Mrs. Christensen told Mrs. Schurk that her son, Reed Christensen, was a good 'and capable babysitter and, as a result, he was hired by Mrs. Schurk to take care of her children as a babysitter, commencing at that time.
The record shows, however, that Mrs. Christensen knew her son had a lengthy history of having sexually molested young girls; that one of the children with whom he was known to have taken liberties was his own 6-year-old sister, Carla. This information was never disclosed to the Schurks.
The record shows that some time between May and September, 1968, Reed Christensen molested Maria Argo two to five times, taking liberties upon her person, attempting vaginal penetration, and forcing her into acts of sodomy. None of these occurrences were discovered by the Schurks [654]*654until late in September, 1968. Prior to that time there was nothing from Maria’s appearance or conduct, observed by Mrs. Schurk, to indicate this was going on or that anything Was wrong. The initial discovery was made when the 6-year-old Carla Christensen told Mrs. Schurk of these occurrences when she had been left in the care of Mrs. Schurk. Thereupon, Mrs. Schurk interrogated Maria, who then gave her version of what had happened.
Mrs. Schurk immediately became ill and suffered severe emotional distress which required treatment by a physician, hospitalization and psychiatric care. The effects of the molestations have also required medical and psychiatric care for Maria. Expert opinion indicates that future treatment for both is quite likely to be necessary.
This action for damages followed. The Schurks sought recovery against the Christensen parents and their son, Reed Christensen, for mental anguish iand distress, and for their medical and psychiatric expenses incurred and to be incurred. Further, for recovery of loss of wages by reason of their care for Maria and their expenses incurred and to be incurred, present and future, in behalf of Maria, as a result of the sexual molestations. Also, claims as guardian ad litem in behalf of Maria Argo were sought against the Christensen parents and their son, Reed.
The defendants interposed a motion for summary judgment for dismissal of all claims of the plaintiffs Schurks individually. The motion was granted by the trial court, dismissing the Schurks’ claims against the Christensen parents, and denying the motion for dismissal of their claims as against Reed Christensen. The claims of Maria Argo, through her guardian ad litem, against the Christensen parents and Reed, are not involved in this appeal.
The plaintiffs Schurks appeal from the judgment dismissing their claims against the defendant Christensen parents. The defendant, Reed Christensen, cross-appeals from the failure of the trial court to grant a dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims against him.
The Schurks’ primary contention is that the trial [655]*655court erred in dismissing their claims relating to mental anguish and distress. By a long line of decisions in this state, we have, as a general rule, denied recovery for mental anguish and distress in cases not involving malice or wrongful intent, unless there has been an actual invasion of a plaintiff’s person or security, or a direct possibility thereof.1 We recently reiterated and adhered to this rule with a review of our cases and authorities in Smith v. Rodene, 69 Wn.2d 482, 418 P.2d 741 (1966), and also in the case of Murphy v. Tacoma, 60 Wn.2d 603, 374 P.2d 976 (1962). This is the general rule in the majority of jurisdictions in this country.
The recognized policy considerations, for the general rule limiting recovery for mental distress under the conditions previously enumerated, is premised upon the policy considerations aptly stated by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509, 519 (1970):
Two primary considerations underlie the present limited scheme of protection: (1) the likelihood that courts will be flooded by fraudulent claims and (2) the defendant’s potentially unlimited liability for every type of mental disturbance.
The courts, in cases departing from the general rule, having in mind these policy considerations, have done so with caution, on a case-by-case basis, circumscribed with guidelines and conditions.
The leading case upon which the plaintiffs rely is Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). In that case the mother witnessed the injuries to her child, resulting in the child’s death caused by the defendant’s negligent operation of his motor vehicle. The mother was out of the field of danger and was not in apprehension of her own safety. No malice or wrongful intent was involved. Yet the court allowed the mother to recover for mental anguish and distress suffered from the [656]*656shock of observing her daughter’s serious injuries in the accident from which the daughter died. That court stated at page 740:
We note, first, that we deal here with a case in which plaintiff suffered a shock which resulted in physical injury and we confine our ruling to that case. In determining, in such a case, whether defendant should reasonably foresee the injury to plaintiff, or, in other terminology, whether defendant owes plaintiff a duty of due care, the courts will take into account such factors as the following: (1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.
The evaluation of these factors will indicate the degree of the defendant’s foreseeability: obviously defendant is more likely to foresee that a mother who observes an accident affecting her child will suffer harm than to foretell that a stranger witness will do so. Similarly, the degree of foreseeability of the third person’s injury is far greater in the case of his contemporaneous observance of the accident than that in which he subsequently learns of it. The defendant is more likely to foresee that shock to the nearby, witnessing mother will cause physical harm than to anticipate that someone distant from the accident will suffer more than a temporary emotional reaction. All these elements, of course, shade into each other; the fixing of obligation, intimately tied into the facts, depends upon each case.
(Italics ours.)
In Dillon the mother was near the scene of the accident. She observed her daughter being injured and did not learn the facts from others.
•In the instant case, the mother was not near the scene of •the molestations; she did not observe these injuries occurring to her daughter, and learned of the occurrences at a [657]*657later date from a third person. We do not believe the facts of the instant case even come within the guidelines of Dillon to indicate a degree of foreseeability by the defendant parents, sufficient to predicate recovery by Maria Argo’s mother for mental anguish and distress.
We have examined all of the cases cited by the plaintiffs, and find no case that has departed from the general rule, to the extent as would be required in this case to allow recovery for mental anguish and distress by the Schurks against the Christensen parents.
We do not hold that the strict application of the general rule against recovery for mental anguish and distress in tort liability cases should not be reexamined. We hold this is not the case for consideration of a change of this long established rule since it would be of no avail to the plaintiffs.
The Schurks further contend they are entitled to recover on the theory of breach of contract. This contention is without merit. The facts in this case do not disclose the existence of a contract between the Christensens and the Schurks for the care of their daughter by the defendant son, Reed Christensen.
The plaintiffs Schurks furthei contend the trial court erred in dismissing their claim for expenses incurred, and to be incurred, in behalf of Maria Argo, and for loss of wages resulting from their care for her. We agree. These claims do not come within the ambit of the restrictive rule in proof of damages for mental anguish and distress, and are compensable if established at the trial to be reasonably necessary and the proximate result of the parents’ negligence.
The defendant’s cross-appeal is without merit. The plaintiffs’ claims against the defendant, Reed Christensen, are a result of willful and intentional sexual molestations of their daughter. See Smith v. Rodene, supra; Murphy v. Tacoma, supra; Jensen v. Lawrence; 94 Wash. 148, 162 P. 40 (1916); Eckhart v. Peterson, 94 Wash. 379, 162 P. 551 (1916); Magnuson v. O’Dea, 75 Wash. 574, 578, 135 P. 640 (1912); Pickle [658]*658v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650, 72 A.L.R. 842 (1930); Prosser, Torts, § 103 at 693-95 (2ded. 1955).
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, except that it is reversed as to the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims against the Christensen parents for recovery of reasonable and necessary expenses incurred, and to be incurred, for the benefit of the minor child, and for loss of wages of the Schurks, all resulting from the sexual molestations by the defendant, Reed Christensen.
The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with our holding in this opinion. Costs will abide the final determination of the cause.
Hale, Neill, Stafford, and Wright, JJ., concur.