Spencer, J.
This is a labor case brought by plaintiff association as representative of the certificated teachers employed by defendant, School District of Seward. The Court of Industrial Relations, hereinafter referred to as court, ordered the defendant to negotiate with plaintiff on wages and conditions of employment. The parties negotiated all of the issues to settlement except a salary schedule. After trial, the court established a salary scale by increasing the 1970-71 base pay $100. Defendant perfected this appeal.
Defendant principally raises the question of the constitutionality of the legislation. Additionally, it questions the court’s authority over administrative matters which may be included as conditions of employment; the compelling of negotiation and arbitration; and the right to set wages for school employees.
The provisions of the Constitution of Nebraska which could be pertinent are as follows:
Article I, section 4, provides in part: “* * * it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass suitable laws * * * to encourage schools and the means of instruction.”
Article II, section 1, provides: “The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct [775]*775departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons being one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.”
Article III, section 1, provides in part: “* * * the legislative authority of the state shall be vested in a Legislature * * *.”
Article VII, section 6, provides: “The Legislature shall provide for the free instruction in the common schools of this state of all persons between the ages of five and twenty-one years.”
Article VII, section 14, provides in part: “The State Department of Education shall have general supervision and administration of the school system of the state and of such other activities as the Legislature may direct.”
Article VII, section 15, provides in part: “The State Board of Education shall he composed of eight members, * * *. * * * Their duties and powers shall be prescribed by the Legislature * * *.”
Article XV, section 9, provides: “Laws may be enacted providing for the investigation, submission and determination of controversies between employers and employees in any business or vocation affected with a public interest, and for the prevention of unfair business practices and unconscionable gains in any business or vocation affecting the public welfare. An Industrial Commission may be created for the purpose of administering such laws, and appeals shall lie to the Supreme Court from the final orders and judgments of such commission.”
The first question requiring consideration herein is the meaning of Article XV, section 9, Constitution of Nebraska. Was it intended to operate as an exception to Article II, and does it create a commission with legislative, executive, and judicial powers? In Engelmeyer v. Murphy (1966), 180 Neb. 295, 142 N. W. 2d 342, we [776]*776said: “In construing constitutional amendments, consideration should be given to the circumstances leading to their adoption and the purpose sought to be accomplished.”
Article XV, section 9, came into our Constitution in the Constitutional Convention of 1919-1920. An examination of the proceedings of that Convention suggest that the implementation of the amendment by the legislation being questioned is in accord with the intention of its architects.
Substantially all of the work on the judicial article had been completed before Proposal No. 333, which became this section, was presented on the floor of the Convention. The Convention had altered the judicial article to permit the Legislature to establish courts inferior to the Supreme Court. The Committee on Industrial Conditions presented a substitute proposal for the four proposals originally introduced at the Convention. The substitute proposal was considered on the floor of the Convention, and then referred back to a joint committee of the Industrial Courts Committee and the Miscellaneous Subjects Committee for combination with the trade regulation proposal. This joint committee submitted Proposal No. 333. In submitting the proposal, the committee report states: “It is our judgment that a tribunal in the form of a commission with combined administrative, legislative and judicial powers, is the proper governmental agency to be entrusted with the powers and duties to be granted, and prescribed, the judicial power to extend to making findings and orders, leaving measures of enforcement by penalties or summary process with the judicial department of the state government.”
In School Dist. No. 8 v. State Board of Education (1964), 176 Neb. 722, 127 N. W. 2d 458, we held: “It is the general rule that the Legislature may not lawfully delegate its legislative powers to an administrative agency. An exception to the rule obtains when a [777]*777delegation of legislative power is authorized by the Constitution.
“Article VII, section 14, of the Nebraska Constitution authorizes the grant of administrative and legislative powers to the State Department of Education, subject to implementation and limitation by the Legislature in accordance with Article VII, section 15, of the Constitution.”
In Anderson v. Tiemann (1967), 182 Neb. 393, 155 N. W. 2d 322, after holding the Legislature had not made an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, we said, discussing the matter of separation of powers: “Basically the same issues are involved with respect to delegation of judicial power. Article V, section 1, of the Constitution, vests judicial power in the tribunals therein named but also gives to the Legislature the power to create other courts inferior to the Supreme Court. However, L. B. 377 does not create a court but does grant to a state official or administrative body quasi judicial powers. Powers of the same general nature and character are conferred upon many administrative' bodies. Such duties are of a quasi judicial nature and yet such bodies are almost invariably held to be administrative. See Dawson County Irr. Co. v. McMullen, 120 Neb. 245, 231 N. W. 840. The conferring upon state, agencies or officers, of executive or administrative functions requiring the exercise of quasi judicial powers, does not conflict with the constitutional provisions regarding officers and bodies upon whom judicial power may be conferred. This is particularly true where such powers and duties relate to matters which are peculiarly affected with a public interest and where provision is made for appeal from decisions of such officers or agencies to the courts.”
In Anderson v. Tiemann, supra, we further said: “This' court has also recognized the principle of constitutional interpretation that each and every clause in a constitution has been inserted for some useful purpose. Con[778]*778stitutional provisions should receive even broader and more liberal construction than statutes, and constitutions are not subject to rules of strict construction. Carpenter v. State, 179 Neb. 628, 139 N. W. 2d 541.”
In State ex rel. Meyer v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment (1970), 185 Neb. 490, 176 N. W.
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Spencer, J.
This is a labor case brought by plaintiff association as representative of the certificated teachers employed by defendant, School District of Seward. The Court of Industrial Relations, hereinafter referred to as court, ordered the defendant to negotiate with plaintiff on wages and conditions of employment. The parties negotiated all of the issues to settlement except a salary schedule. After trial, the court established a salary scale by increasing the 1970-71 base pay $100. Defendant perfected this appeal.
Defendant principally raises the question of the constitutionality of the legislation. Additionally, it questions the court’s authority over administrative matters which may be included as conditions of employment; the compelling of negotiation and arbitration; and the right to set wages for school employees.
The provisions of the Constitution of Nebraska which could be pertinent are as follows:
Article I, section 4, provides in part: “* * * it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass suitable laws * * * to encourage schools and the means of instruction.”
Article II, section 1, provides: “The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct [775]*775departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons being one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.”
Article III, section 1, provides in part: “* * * the legislative authority of the state shall be vested in a Legislature * * *.”
Article VII, section 6, provides: “The Legislature shall provide for the free instruction in the common schools of this state of all persons between the ages of five and twenty-one years.”
Article VII, section 14, provides in part: “The State Department of Education shall have general supervision and administration of the school system of the state and of such other activities as the Legislature may direct.”
Article VII, section 15, provides in part: “The State Board of Education shall he composed of eight members, * * *. * * * Their duties and powers shall be prescribed by the Legislature * * *.”
Article XV, section 9, provides: “Laws may be enacted providing for the investigation, submission and determination of controversies between employers and employees in any business or vocation affected with a public interest, and for the prevention of unfair business practices and unconscionable gains in any business or vocation affecting the public welfare. An Industrial Commission may be created for the purpose of administering such laws, and appeals shall lie to the Supreme Court from the final orders and judgments of such commission.”
The first question requiring consideration herein is the meaning of Article XV, section 9, Constitution of Nebraska. Was it intended to operate as an exception to Article II, and does it create a commission with legislative, executive, and judicial powers? In Engelmeyer v. Murphy (1966), 180 Neb. 295, 142 N. W. 2d 342, we [776]*776said: “In construing constitutional amendments, consideration should be given to the circumstances leading to their adoption and the purpose sought to be accomplished.”
Article XV, section 9, came into our Constitution in the Constitutional Convention of 1919-1920. An examination of the proceedings of that Convention suggest that the implementation of the amendment by the legislation being questioned is in accord with the intention of its architects.
Substantially all of the work on the judicial article had been completed before Proposal No. 333, which became this section, was presented on the floor of the Convention. The Convention had altered the judicial article to permit the Legislature to establish courts inferior to the Supreme Court. The Committee on Industrial Conditions presented a substitute proposal for the four proposals originally introduced at the Convention. The substitute proposal was considered on the floor of the Convention, and then referred back to a joint committee of the Industrial Courts Committee and the Miscellaneous Subjects Committee for combination with the trade regulation proposal. This joint committee submitted Proposal No. 333. In submitting the proposal, the committee report states: “It is our judgment that a tribunal in the form of a commission with combined administrative, legislative and judicial powers, is the proper governmental agency to be entrusted with the powers and duties to be granted, and prescribed, the judicial power to extend to making findings and orders, leaving measures of enforcement by penalties or summary process with the judicial department of the state government.”
In School Dist. No. 8 v. State Board of Education (1964), 176 Neb. 722, 127 N. W. 2d 458, we held: “It is the general rule that the Legislature may not lawfully delegate its legislative powers to an administrative agency. An exception to the rule obtains when a [777]*777delegation of legislative power is authorized by the Constitution.
“Article VII, section 14, of the Nebraska Constitution authorizes the grant of administrative and legislative powers to the State Department of Education, subject to implementation and limitation by the Legislature in accordance with Article VII, section 15, of the Constitution.”
In Anderson v. Tiemann (1967), 182 Neb. 393, 155 N. W. 2d 322, after holding the Legislature had not made an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, we said, discussing the matter of separation of powers: “Basically the same issues are involved with respect to delegation of judicial power. Article V, section 1, of the Constitution, vests judicial power in the tribunals therein named but also gives to the Legislature the power to create other courts inferior to the Supreme Court. However, L. B. 377 does not create a court but does grant to a state official or administrative body quasi judicial powers. Powers of the same general nature and character are conferred upon many administrative' bodies. Such duties are of a quasi judicial nature and yet such bodies are almost invariably held to be administrative. See Dawson County Irr. Co. v. McMullen, 120 Neb. 245, 231 N. W. 840. The conferring upon state, agencies or officers, of executive or administrative functions requiring the exercise of quasi judicial powers, does not conflict with the constitutional provisions regarding officers and bodies upon whom judicial power may be conferred. This is particularly true where such powers and duties relate to matters which are peculiarly affected with a public interest and where provision is made for appeal from decisions of such officers or agencies to the courts.”
In Anderson v. Tiemann, supra, we further said: “This' court has also recognized the principle of constitutional interpretation that each and every clause in a constitution has been inserted for some useful purpose. Con[778]*778stitutional provisions should receive even broader and more liberal construction than statutes, and constitutions are not subject to rules of strict construction. Carpenter v. State, 179 Neb. 628, 139 N. W. 2d 541.”
In State ex rel. Meyer v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment (1970), 185 Neb. 490, 176 N. W. 2d 920, we said: “ ‘We are indebted to the suffrage of the people for the adoption of all amendments submitted and indeed for the adoption of the original Constitution which such amendments changed. From this fact it is patent that, where the language employed is plain, the courts should accord to it the meaning which obviously would be accepted by the layman.’ ”
Article XV, section 9, Constitution of Nebraska, obviously was intended to be an exception to Article II of the Constitution. The language of the amendment, “Laws may be enacted providing for the investigation, submission and determination of controversies,” coupled with the designation “An Industrial Commission,” indicates a commission with administrative powers. The last sentence providing for appeals from its final orders and judgments means a commission with some judicial powers to determine controversies. The report of the joint committee that it was authorizing a commission with combined administrative, legislative, and judicial powers clearly indicates the type of commission or agency the Constitutional Convention was authorizing. In this respect, it is in the same category as Article IV, section 20, which created the Railway Commission. We have heretofore held that the Railway Commission has legislative, executive, and judicial powers as an exception to Article II. See, In re Lincoln Traction Co. (1919), 103 Neb. 229, 171 N. W. 192; Swanson v. Sorensen (1967), 181 Neb. 312, 148 N. W. 2d 197. The same is true with the Court of Industrial Relations. In adopting the constitutional provision authorizing an Industrial Commission, it was made an independent part of the [779]*779Constitution of Nebraska, and not as an amendment to Article II.
Article VII, section 14, Constitution of Nebraska, establishes a State Department of Education, and gives it general supervision and administration of the school system of the state. Section 15 of the same Article, however, provides that the State Board of Education shall be composed of eight members, and provides that their duties and powers shall be prescribed by the Legislature. The general supervision and administration of the school system of the state granted to the State Board of Education, while a constitutional grant of power, is dependent upon implementing legislative action. School Dist. No. 8 v. State Board of Education (1964), 176 Neb. 722, 127 N. W. 2d 458. In State ex rel. School Dist. v. Board of Equalization (1958), 166 Neb. 785, 90 N. W. 2d 421, which involved a Class III school district, as does the instant case, we said: “A school district in this state is a creature of statute and possesses no other powers than those granted by the Legislature.”
In Campbell v. Area Vocational Technical School No. 2 (1968), 183 Neb. 318, 159 N. W. 2d 817, we said: “A school district is a creation of the Legislature. Its purpose is to fulfill the constitutional duty placed upon the Legislature ‘to encourage schools and the means of instruction’ * *
The Legislature has plenary power and control over school districts, including provision for the appointment or election of governing bodies thereof. Consequently, - it may provide limitations on any authority to be exercised by a school board. If the Legislature has such complete control over public school districts, it follows, by the enactment of L. B. 15, Laws 1969, chapter 407, page 1405, it was exercising that control.
Upon application of the plaintiff, the court ordered the school district to conduct negotiations. This presents a two-pronged question. First, does the court have the power to order the district to negotiate about [780]*780anything; and second, does it have the power to order negotiations about professional associations, noon duty, dress code, and school calendar?
Section 48-837, R. S. Supp., 1969, provides: “Public employees shall have the right to form, join and participate in, or to refrain from forming, joining, or participating in, any employee organization of their own choosing. Public employees shall have the right to be represented by employee organizations to negotiate collectively with their public employers in the determination of their terms and conditions of employment, and the administration of grievances arising thereunder; Provided, that any such agreements with the State of Nebraska or any agency thereof shall cover a biennial period coinciding with the biennial budgeting period of the state and shall be subject to approval by the Legislature.”
Section 48-810, R. S. Supp., 1969, provides: “All industrial disputes involving governmental service, service of a public utility, or other disputes as the Legislature may provide shall be settled by invoking the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations; Provided, such court shall have no jurisdiction over any persons, organizations, or school districts subject to the provisions of the Nebraska Teachers’ Professional Negotiations Act, sections 79-1287 to 79-1295, Revised Statutes Supplement, 1967, until all provisions of such act have been exhausted without resolution of the dispute involved.”
Section 48-810.01, R. R. S. 1943, provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the State of Nebraska and any political or governmental subdivision thereof cannot be compelled to enter into any contract or agreement, written or otherwise, with any labor organization concerning grievances, labor disputes, rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions of work.”
Section 48-818, R. S. Supp., 1969, provides: “The findings and- order or orders may establish or alter the [781]*781scale of wages, hours of labor, or conditions of employment, or any one or more of the same. In making such findings and order or orders, the Court of Industrial Relations shall establish rates of pay and conditions of employment which are comparable to the prevalent wage rates paid and conditions of employment maintained for the same or similar work of workers exhibiting like or similar skills under the same or similar working conditions. In establishing wage rates the court shall take into consideration the overall compensation presently received by the employees, having regard not only to wages for time actually worked but also to wages for time not worked, including vacations, holidays, and other excused time, and all benefits received, including insurance and pensions, and the continuity and stability of employment enjoyed by the employees. Any order or orders entered may be modified on the court’s own motion or on application by any of the parties affected, but only upon a showing of a change in the conditions from those prevailing at the time the original order was entered.”
In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. City of Hastings (1965), 179 Neb. 455, 138 N. W. 2d 822, we held that a public agency or governmental employer had no legal authority to bargain with a labor union in the absence of express statutory authority, and further that the Court of Industrial Relations had no power to compel a public utility operated by government in its proprietary capacity to bargain or negotiate with a labor union. Subsequent to this case, in 1967, the law was amended to give the court authority to order bargaining when the public corporation was acting in a proprietary capacity, as defined in section 48-801, R. R. S. 1943. L. B. 15 amended section 48-816, R. R. S. 1943, to eliminate “when acting in a proprietary capacity as defined in section 48-801” from the statute, but left the provision permitting the court to order bargaining unchanged, although several other additions were [782]*782made to section 48-816, R. R. S. 1943.
L. B. 15 amended sections 48-801, 48-804, 48-810, 48-811, 48-816, and 48-818, and repealed sections 48-810.02, 48-820, and 48-824 to 48-836, R. R. S. 1943. It did not repeal or amend section 48-810.01, R. R. S. 1943, which came into the law in 1967. The question for our consideration, therefore, is whether or not there is a conflict between section 48-810.01, R. R. S. 1943, and section 48-818, R. S. Supp., 1969. Section 48-810.02, R. R. S. 1943, provided that in cities having a population of more than 5,000, or in cities under civil service, the court had jurisdiction to order discussion on the application of either party. Section 48-820, R. R. S. 1943, provided that any industrial dispute not within the jurisdiction of the court could by mutual consent be referred to the court for arbitration. Sections 48-824 to 48-836, R. R. S. 1943, covered arbitration for cities of more than 5,000, or a city under civil service, but any decision or report would be advisory only. It is obvious that by eliminating these sections, the Legislature intended to eliminate advisory arbitration reports, and by L. B. 15 attempted to give the court authority to order bargaining.
Section 48-810, R. S'. Supp., 1969, provides that all industrial disputes involving governmental service shall he settled by invoking the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, but limits the jurisdiction of the court where sections 79-1287 to 79-1295, R. S. Supp., 1967, are involved, until those provisions have been exhausted without a settlement of the dispute. It may be argued that section 48-810.01, R. R. S. 1943, was inadvertently left in the law. We do not accept this premise, but assume the Legislature acted with full knowledge that it was leaving this section in the statute. Consequently, the section must be given some meaning in relation to the other sections, because all statutes in paid materia must be considered together and construed as if they were one law, and, if possible, effect given to [783]*783each provision. City of Grand Island v. Ehlers (1966), 180 Neb. 331, 142 N. W. 2d 770. The court construed section 48-810.01, R. R. S. 1943, to mean that while the court could not order a school district to enter into a contract, the court had the power to settle any controversy pursuant to sections 48-816 and 48-818, R. S. Supp., 1969. In doing so, it was not forcing the district to enter into a contract with the union but was exercising its power to settle a dispute under section 48-818, R. S. Supp., 1969. There is no other construction which would harmonize the sections.
Defendant’s position is indicated by the following from its brief: “Whatever jurisdiction the Court of Industrial Relations may have, this much is certain that notwithstanding any other provision of law the School District cannot be compelled to enter into any contract or agreement with any labor organization concerning rates of pajr. The Court’s judgment is in direct violation of this statute.” This, of course, is premised on its interpretation of section 48-810.01, R. R. S'. 1943. We have indicated our interpretation.
There have been many dire predictions relative to the possible ramifications of L.B. 15 if we do not find section 48-810.01, R. R. S. 1943, specifically prevents the court from entering a binding order on wages and conditions of employment. As we interpret the Constitution, the Legislature has complete control of the actions of school boards. Whether or not the Legislature has acted wisely in the premises is not a matter for judicial determination. The courts are not arbiters of legislative wisdom, but function as a check upon unauthorized and unconstitutional assumptions of power. If the situation is as critical as defendant and the amici curiae believe, we can only observe, as we did in State v. Workman (1971), 186 Neb. 467, 183 N. W. 2d 911: “* * * defendant is making his contentions in the wrong forum. They might appropriately be addressed to the Nebraska Legislature, but it is the duty of this court [784]*784to interpret and enforce laws passed by the Legislature if constitutionally valid, which this one is.”
The next question raised involved an interpretation of the language “conditions of employment.” While the issue may be moot because the parties did reach agreement on all points referred except wages we do feel some observations are pertinent. Generally, teacher organizations have given the term “conditions of employment” an extremely broad meaning, while boards of education have tried to restrict that term to preserve their management prerogatives and policy-making powers. While there are many nebulous areas that may overlap working conditions, boards should not be required to enter negotiations on matters which are predominately matters of educational policy, management prerogatives, or statutory duties of the board of education. Kansas, by statute, has defined conditions of employment to include hours of work, vacation allowances, sick and injury leave, number of holidays, and wearing apparel. K.S.A. 1971 Supp., § 75-4322(s). Without trying to lay down any specific rule, we would hold that conditions of employment can be interpreted to include only those matters directly affecting the teacher’s welfare. Without attempting in any way to be specific, or to limit the foregoing, we would consider the following to be exclusively within the management prerogative: The right to hire; to maintain order and efficiency; to schedule work; to control transfers and assignments; to determine what extracurricular activities may be supported or sponsored; and to determine the curriculum, class size, and types of specialists to be employed. The public policy involved in this legislation is expressed in section 48-802, R. R. S. 1943. With this public policy in mind, school districts and teacher associations should negotiate in good faith within the ambit of their respective responsibilities.
One of the amici curiae raised the point that the court had not complied with the Administrative Pro[785]*785cedures Act. The point was not raised by defendant, and there is nothing in the record to indicate noncompliance with the Act. Because the question may be raised in the future, we hold the Court of Industrial Relations is an agency within the purview of the Administrative Procedures Act.
The Court of Industrial Relations does not come within the definition of a court as used in section 84-901, R. R. S. 1943, nor has it been specifically excepted from the operation of the Act. In this respect, it is in the same situation as the Nebraska Railway Commission. In Yellow Cab Co. v. Nebraska State Railway Commission (1963), 175 Neb. 150, 120 N. W. 2d 922, we held the railway commission to be an agency within the definition in section 84-901, R. R. S. 1943. That section provides, so far as material herein: “Agency means each board, commission, department, officer, division, or other administrative office or unit of the state government authorized by law to make rules, except the Adjutant General’s office, as provided in Chapter 55, the courts, including the Nebraska Workmen’s Compensation Court, and the Legislature; * * Section 48-809, R. R. S 1943, grants the court full power to adopt all reasonable rules and regulations.
The following from Yellow Cab Co. v. Nebraska State Railway Commission, supra, is pertinent herein: “The fact that the commission has certain legislative and judicial powers which may distinguish it in certain respects from other agencies which exercise purely administrative powers does not prevent it from being an agency of the state in a broad sense.”
For the reasons enunciated, the judgment of the court is correct and is affirmed.
Affirmed.