Per Curiam.
This original action in quo warranto brought by the State of Nebraska through the relator, Robert M. Spire, its Attorney [767]*767General, challenges the right of the respondent, Sen. Gerald A. Conway, to hold a position as an assistant professor at Wayne State College while simultaneously serving as a member of the state’s Unicameral Legislature.
The college is a state institution under the government of the Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State Colleges, pursuant to Neb. Const, art. VII, § 13, and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 85-301 (Cum. Supp. 1988). The State contends that because he is a senator, respondent’s assistant professorship violates the distribution of powers clause found in Neb. Const, art. II, § 1, which reads:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons being one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.
(Inasmuch as the quoted language is the only section this article has ever contained, we hereafter refer to the provision simply as article II.)
Respondent became a member of the Legislature, representing the 17th legislative district, in 1985. He was reelected to this position on November 8, 1988, and took his oath as a legislator in early January 1989. The unsuccessful competing candidate for the seat contested the reelection, contending that respondent was not eligible to hold the office. However, the Legislature determined otherwise and dismissed the contest.
Respondent has been teaching in the business division of the college since 1975, first as an instructor and then, upon obtaining tenure in 1979, as an assistant professor. His appointment is renewed each year, and he accepted a renewal on July 14, 1989, for the 1989 academic year. This action was commenced on January 17,1990.
While the employment policy manual of the Nebraska state colleges does not specify the rights attendant to tenure, it does provide that of “all rewards and recognitions offered by a college to its faculty members the offer of tenure is the most significant of all,” demonstrating success in “satisfying the college — its faculty, administration, and board — during a [768]*768rigorous probationary period that he/she is worthy of becoming a recognized member of the faculty with full rights and privileges.” Although the policy does not detail how the employment of one having tenure may be terminated, it does provide that those not having such status “shall assume they are serving in a probationary capacity,” and specifies that, with certain exceptions, “ ‘[probationary faculty may be terminated for any reason without right of grievance or hearing....’ ”
As an assistant professor, respondent serves under the direction of the division chairperson, who assigns respondent’s duties and responsibilities. Respondent prepares syllabi, prepares and delivers lectures, and presides over classroom activities for the courses he teaches. Subject to the approval of his division chairperson, respondent may select the books to be used in his classes. He determines the required reading for his classes and assigns those readings, along with other course-related assignments, as he deems appropriate. He also prepares or selects testing materials, grades those tests, and assigns his students their overall grade for each of his courses.
The college does not provide respondent with either a secretary or administrative staff, and respondent has no administrative duties. Although he may advise as to course offerings, he does not determine the courses to be offered by the business division. The record does not indicate whether he chooses or is assigned the classes he is to teach. The number of class hours respondent teaches is set by the division chairperson.
Although respondent is responsible for maintaining control over his classroom and students during class sessions, he cannot directly or formally discipline any student except through established college disciplinary procedures, and he has no authority over the selection of his students. He is not involved in setting the budget of the college, nor does he have any official duties off campus unless such are specifically assigned to him by his superiors.
Respondent’s position with the college does not require him to take an oath of office. His salary is set through collective bargaining, but he is not a dues-paying member or officer of the [769]*769collective bargaining unit. At the time this action was commenced, respondent’s salary for the 8-month academic year ending in May 1990 was set at the highest level since his employment.
After becoming a senator, respondent requested and received from the Board of Trustees unpaid leaves of absence for the periods in which the Legislature was in regular session. The board’s policy manual on leaves of absence provides that “[n]ormally, with the exception of political leaves, a leave without pay will not be granted more often than once very [sic] four years.” The policy also declares that “[w]ith the exception of political leaves, unless there is an unforeseen reason, a leave of absence must be arranged at least one semester before the leave is granted.” Political leaves are available to state college employees who are elected or appointed to state or national office, or who are candidates for such offices.
During his leaves of absence, respondent received no pay, insurance, retirement, or other employment benefits. However, the board did not give him a formal leave of absence during the occasions he attended several special sessions of the Legislature. Instead, the college administration removed him from the payroll for all but the November 1989 special session. The record is silent as to whether respondent received insurance, retirement, or other benefits for those periods. The record does, however, demonstrate that he has participated in interim legislative studies while on the college’s payroll and that he has available to him on a year-round basis a Capitol Building office and a two-person staff housed in that building.
APPROPRIATENESS OF REMEDY
As a threshold question, we must determine whether quo warranto is an appropriate means to challenge the right of an assistant professor at a state college to hold his position. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,121 (Reissue 1989) permits the filing of an action in quo warranto “against any person unlawfully holding or exercising any public office or franchise within this state .. . or when any public officer has done or suffered any act which works a forfeiture of his office . . ..” This court’s jurisdiction, then, depends upon whether an assistant professor at a state [770]*770college holds or exercises a “public office” within the meaning of § 25-21,121.
The cases from other jurisdictions respondent cites in support of his position that an assistant professor is not an officer of the executive department dealt with constitutional prohibitions on dual office holding and not with quo warranto. The applicability of those cases to the dual services question is discussed later, but the preliminary question regarding the applicability of quo warranto is resolved under the law of this jurisdiction.
In Eason v. Majors, 111 Neb. 288, 196 N.W. 133 (1923), we held that Eason, a teacher serving as head of the English department of the state normal school at Peru, was a public officer and thus could maintain an action in quo warranto to test the validity of his ouster and replacement. In determining that Eason exercised some portion of the sovereign power and that he thus was a public officer within the meaning of the quo warranto statute, this court stated:
When a position based upon a provision of law carries with it continuing duties of public concern which involve some exercise of the sovereign power in their proper performance, the position may be said to be an office public in character. Perhaps a better definition is that given by the New Jersey court in Fredericks v. Board of Health, 82 N. J. Law, 200:
“An office is a place in a governmental system created or recognized by the law of the state which, either directly or by delegated authority, assigns to the incumbent thereof the continuous performance of certain permanent public duties.”
111 Neb. at 291, 196 N.W. at 134.
Arguing that subsequent decisions in State, ex rel. O’Connor, v. Tusa, 130 Neb. 528, 265 N.W. 524 (1936), and Home Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Carrico, 123 Neb. 25, 241 N.W. 763 (1932), defined “office” more narrowly, respondent suggests that Eason was an aberrant decision.
In Home Savings & Loan Ass’n, supra, Home Savings sought to garnish money owed Carrico for defending an indigent in the Adams County District Court. Home Savings’ [771]*771ability to reach the funds via garnishment was dependent upon finding Carrico either an employee or an officer of the county. This court addressed the question of whether an attorney assigned by the district court to defend an indigent accused of a felony was, by virtue of that assignment, an officer or employee of the county in which the court sat. We concluded that he was neither an officer nor an employee, and stated that “a public officer is an incumbent of a public office, which is the right, duty and authority conferred by law, by which, for a given period, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government for the benefit of the public.” Id. at 30, 241 N.W. at 765.
In State, ex rel. O’Connor, supra at 535-36, 265 N.W. at 528, office was defined as
“a public station or employment, conferred by the appointment of government; and embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties.” United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 385, 18 L. Ed. 830.
“The words ‘office’ and ‘officer’ are terms of vague and variable import, the meaning of which necessarily varies with the connection in which they are used, and, to determine it correctly in a particular instance, regard must be had to the intention of the statute and the subject-matter in reference to which the terms are used.” [Citation omitted.]
It may be said that the almost universal rule is that, in order to indicate office, the duties must partake in some degree of the sovereign powers of the state. The rule is laid down in 22 R. C. L. 374, sec. 4, as follows: “One of the most important criteria of a public office is that the incumbent is vested with some of the functions pertinent to sovereignty, for it has been frequently decided that in order to be an office the position must be one to which a portion of the sovereignty of the state, either legislative, executive, or judicial, attaches for the time being.”
Contrary to respondent’s suggestion, Eason is not an anomaly; in reality, the foregoing three cases are in complete agreement as to the definition of public office: It is a governmental position, the duties of which invest the [772]*772incumbent with some aspect of the sovereign power. As noted in Eason at 291-92, 196 N.W. at 134:
The teacher has a special place by the nature of things in the governmental system, so far as it provides for education. He is appointed and paid by the state. His place — we may well say his office — is created by the state because only through him can its free education be transmitted. Nor is he a mere conduit. Quite the contrary. For education can not be poured out to people like water from a pitcher. It must be carried to them in such a way as to engage their interest and reach their understanding, a labor involving knowledge of method, exercise of authority, and wide use of discretion. A teacher must prescribe courses, establish discipline, convince, lead. In the due performance of his duty he not only engages in a work of public concern, but wields a portion of the sovereign power.
There is nothing of record which demonstrates that a teacher is less important to our society today than he or she was in 1923 when Eason was decided. Indeed, in one of the more important and relatively recent judicial pronouncements in the field of education, the U.S. Supreme Court said: “Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.” Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954). It is the teacher in the classroom who has the most effect upon the students, and it is through the teacher that the educational policies of the state are executed.
The normal schools which were at issue in Eason are now the state colleges. See State ex rel. Spire v. Beermann, 235 Neb. 384, 455 N.W.2d 749 (1990). Although respondent does not choose the courses offered, he has considerable discretion in how he teaches the subject matter. He prescribes the course materials. He is responsible for establishing classroom discipline and mental discipline in his students. He must challenge, convince, and lead his students, and he evaluates their performance. Respondent’s position at the college is every bit as much a public office as was Eason’s position at Peru, and his position of assistant professor at the college therefore is one [773]*773which may be challenged by quo warranto.
EFFECT OF LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION
Further exploration of the issues must begin with the recognition that the Legislature has decided that respondent’s position at the college does not prohibit him from taking his seat in the Unicameral. Because the Legislature is the sole judge of the qualifications of its members, Neb. Const, art. Ill, § 10, we must determine what effect, if any, that decision has upon our ability to consider this case. The same principle of the separation of powers which is at the heart of this controversy prevents us from hearing a matter the determination of which the Constitution entrusts to another coordinate department, or branch, of government.
We are not being asked, however, to determine whether respondent may retain his legislative seat; rather, we are being asked to determine his right to his position at the college. Unlike the question answered by the Legislature, this is not one which the Constitution has entrusted to another branch of government. Regardless of our decision in this case, respondent’s right to sit in the Unicameral is as secure as that of any other member. The doctrine of separation of powers does not, therefore, prevent our adjudication of this matter. See, State v. Evans, 735 P.2d 29 (Utah 1987); Monaghan v. School District No. 1, 211 Or. 360, 315 P.2d 797 (1957).
NATURE AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLE II
We thus reach the central issue. The language of article II prohibits one branch of government from encroaching on the duties and prerogatives of the others or from improperly delegating its own duties and prerogatives. See, e.g., State ex rel. Meyer v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 185 Neb. 490, 176 N.W.2d 920 (1970); McDonald v. Rentfrow, 176 Neb. 796, 127 N.W.2d 480 (1964). This is its institutional aspect, which serves as the beam from which our system of checks and balances is suspended.
Article II also prohibits certain persons from serving two branches of government concurrently. This is its personnel, or individual, aspect. This aspect serves as a check against the concentration of power, and guards against conflicts of interest [774]*774which arise when one serves two masters. It has been said that “ ‘[t]he maintenance of a strict prohibition upon dual membership of the legislative and executive branches has no doubt been the most significant aspect of the doctrine [of separation of powers] in forming the special character of American governmentMatheson, Eligibility of Public Officers and Employees to Serve in the State Legislature: An Essay on Separation of Powers, Politics, and Constitutional Policy, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 295, 306 (quoting M. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 134 (1967)). The aspect with which we are presently concerned is this second, personnel aspect of the distribution of powers clause.
Meaning of “being one of these departments”
The specific question we must answer is whether respondent, because he is both a state senator and an associate professor at a state college, is a “person . . . being one of these departments” who exercises “any power properly belonging to either of the” other departments. Respondent does not dispute the fact that, as a senator, he exercises the powers of the legislative branch. Rather, he contends that an assistant professor at a state college is not an executive officer and does not exercise any power properly belonging to the executive and that, therefore, holding the two positions does not offend the dual services prohibition of article II.
While, as discussed earlier, the officer-employee distinction is relevant to the question of whether quo warranto is applicable, it is not determinative of the issue now under consideration, for article II does not speak in terms of officers or employees; it speaks of persons “being one of” the branches of government.
This is the first time we have been asked to determine the scope of the dual services prohibition. Our determination is dependent in part upon the meaning of the phrase “being one of these departments.” In conducting our study we are bound by the cardinal rule that courts must apply and enforce the Constitution as it is written. Moreover, constitutional provisions are not open to construction as a matter of course; construction of a constitutional provision is appropriate only [775]*775when it has been demonstrated that the meaning of the provision is not clear and that construction is necessary. In re Application A-16642, 236 Neb. 671, 463 N.W.2d 591 (1990). If a constitutional provision must be construed, its words are to be interpreted in their most natural and obvious sense, although they should receive a more-liberal construction than statutes and are not subject to rules of strict construction. State ex rel. Spire v. Public Emp. Ret. Bd., 226 Neb. 176, 410 N.W.2d 463 (1987).
The unusual expression “being one of these departments” is mot clear; accordingly, construction is necessary. One thing that is clear, however, is that “being one of these departments” is not intended to be synonymous with “exercising any power of” a branch. Had such identity of meaning been intended, identical language would surely have been used. That is what was done by the framers of the Constitutions of Colorado (Colo. Const. art. III), Idaho (Idaho Const. art. II, § 1), Montana (Mont. Const, art. Ill, § 1), New Mexico (N.M. Const, art. Ill, § 1), Virginia (Va. Const, art. Ill, § 1), West Virginia (W. Va. Const, art. V, § 1), and Wyoming (Wyo. Const, art. II, § 1). The Oregon Supreme Court has refused to read the terms “functions” and “duties” in the separation of powers provision of that jurisdiction’s Constitution as being synonymous for the same reason. See Monaghan v. School District No. 1, 211 Or. 360, 315 P.2d 797 (1957).
The language of a constitutional provision is to be interpreted with reference to established laws, usage, and customs of the country at the time of its adoption, but its terms and provisions are constantly expanded and enlarged by construction to meet the advancing affairs of humankind. In re Application A-16642, supra. With this in mind, we turn to the historical record and examine the evolution of the relevant provisions of our Constitution.
Article II was adopted as part of the Constitution of 1875. Normally, we would turn to the debates of the relevant convention as part of our search for clarification of ambiguous constitutional language. Unfortunately, the proceedings of the 1875 Constitutional Convention are lost. See, 1 Neb. Const. Convs. 7 (1906); Jaksha v. State, 222 Neb. 690, 385 N.W.2d 922 [776]*776(1986); State ex rel. Johnson v. Chase, 147 Neb. 758, 25 N.W.2d 1 (1946). We thus cannot avail ourselves of the debates of that convention and must look elsewhere to determine the intent of the framers of the phrase at issue.
Notwithstanding that the journal of the 1875 convention has survived, it is of little help. It merely indicates that article II was the last provision to be adopted by the convention, apparently with little or no debate. 3 Neb. Const. Convs. 672 (1913). A provision identical to article II, however, was a part of the proposed Constitution of 1871. Although that Constitution was rejected by the people, many of its provisions, including what was to become article II, found their way unchanged into the 1875 Constitution. The drafters of the Constitution of 1871 were influenced by the Constitution recently adopted by Illinois, see, e.g., 1 Neb. Const. Convs. 522 (1906) and 2 Neb. Const. Convs. 359 (1907), and some provisions, including that which was to become article II, appear to have been taken verbatim from that document. Compare, e.g., Neb. Const. 1871 Preamble; art. I, §§ 3, 7, 9, 10, 14-17, and 24; and art. II with Ill. Const. 1870 Preamble; art. II, §§ 3,7,9,10,14-17, and 20; and art. III.
Saxby v. Sonnemann, 318 Ill. 600, 149 N.E. 526 (1925), determined that the Illinois provision prohibited a member of the state Legislature from receiving compensation for acting as a deputy and assistant to the Attorney General. In so ruling, the Illinois Supreme Court stated at 604-06, 149 N.E. at 528:
By this provision the people intended to provide, and did provide, a complete separation of the branches and completely deprived a member of one branch of authority to exercise any power properly belonging to the other two branches. Under the constitution of 1818 nearly all the important offices of government were filled by an election on joint ballot of the two houses of the legislature, alone. This system gave rise to injurious combinations affecting legislation and combining the departments of government. In forming the constitution of 1848 one of the things sought was to prevent the performance of duties and exercise of powers in one department of government by members of either of the other departments. In order [777]*777that this might be brought about there was inserted in that constitution, as article 2, a provision in effect the same as article 3 of the present constitution [the provision identical to our own article II]....
. . . The language is plain that no person of one department shall exercise any power properly belonging to another department of the State government....
The appellant contends that the above provision [article 3] can apply only to cases where a member of one department acts as an officer in another department, and not to one acting in a purely ministerial capacity. There is no language in the article which limits the application of it to persons of one department acting as officers of another department. The language is, “no person” shall exercise “any power” properly belonging to another department, and the simple question arises here, Did the appellant, in the service performed, exercise any of the powers of the executive department of the State government?
Thus, Illinois considered the phrase “being one of these departments” to mean “being a member of one of these departments,” and the distinction between “officer” and “employee” was not relevant to that portion of the inquiry. This reading is not, however, the interpretation Illinois has since given Saxby.
In 1960, Illinois held that article III of that state’s Constitution did not apply to legislators performing purely ministerial duties. See The People v. Capuzi, 20 Ill. 2d 486, 170 N.E.2d 625 (1960). The Capuzi court focused on the following language in Saxby and apparently ignored the language we quoted earlier:
“It may readily be conceived that one who serves as an investigator merely, collecting facts, and who thereby prepares himself to become a witness in a lawsuit, or who engages in similar service, is not exercising powers peculiar to the department of government by which he is employed, and is not, therefore, within the inhibition of article 3 of the constitution, though he may be a member of the different department of government. This is so because such employee exercises no powers of a [778]*778department in which he works.”
The People v. Capuzi, supra at 492-93, 170 N.E.2d at 629 (quoting Saxby, supra).
From this, the Capuzi court concluded that a member of one coordinate branch who was employed by a second branch but did not exercise the powers of the second branch did not fall within the constitutional provision. The Capuzi court did not, however, question Saxby’s reading of “being one of these departments” as meaning being a member of such a branch. The question on which it appears to have focused was whether a state legislator who also held a ministerial position under the judicial branch exercised the powers of the judiciary. The Capuzi court did not consider whether the judicial employee exercised the powers of the Legislature. Because it failed to consider this second question, Capuzi treated “being one of these departments” as synonymous with “exercising the powers” of a branch.
While we would not presume to take issue with the Illinois Supreme Court’s reading of its own .precedents or its interpretation of the Constitution of its state, we do find the Capuzi analysis unsatisfactory when applied to our Constitution. This jurisdiction requires that its Constitution, as amended, be read as a whole. Jaksha v. State, 222 Neb. 690, 385 N.W.2d 922 (1986); Elmen v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 120 Neb. 141, 231 N.W. 772 (1930). There are three provisions in the Nebraska Constitution which relate to the ability of an individual to hold more than one position under the authority of the state. The first is article II set out above. The other two are Neb. Const. art. III, § 9, and art. IV, § 2. While article II has remained unchanged since it was first adopted in 1875, over the years the people have modified the other two provisions.
Since the Constitution must be read in connection with the facts of history and development of the representational form of government, see Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, 188 Neb. 30, 195 N.W.2d 236 (1972), a brief overview of these changes is in order.
Under the Constitution of 1866, Neb. Const. art. Ill, § 15, provided: “No member of congress, or other person holding [779]*779office under the authority of this state, or of the United States, shall execute the office of governor, except as herein provided.” This provision was replaced by article V, § 2, in 1875, which expanded the disqualification to cover all executive officers, but removed the bar for federal officers. The relevant portion of the provision read as follows: “None of the officers of the executive department shall be eligible to any other state office during the period for which they shall have been elected.” In the past, we have given this provision broad application, holding that it prevented the Lieutenant Governor from seeking the nomination of his party for the post of Governor. See State, ex rel. McKelvie, v. Wait, 95 Neb. 806, 146 N.W. 1048 (1914).
The 1920 amendments to the Constitution expanded the executive branch, and the disqualification contained in article V, § 2 (which became the present article IV, § 2), was expanded correspondingly, to wit: “None of the officers mentioned in this article shall be eligible to any other state office during the period for which they have been elected or appointed.” This section was again amended in 1962, expressly permitting the Lieutenant Governor to be eligible to be a candidate for Governor.
In 1966, article IV, § 2, was amended into its present form. The exception for the Lieutenant Governor was removed, and the second sentence was changed to read: “None of the appointive officers mentioned in this article shall be eligible to any other state office during the period for which they have been appointed.” (Emphasis supplied.) This change appears to have been effected in order to permit all the elective executive officers to be eligible as candidates for other executive positions.
The strictures of article IV, § 2, operate as a prohibition against appointive executive officers’ holding other positions in the executive or any other branch of state government. In this respect, article IV, § 2, is somewhat broader than the prohibition of article II against holding positions in different branches, although, since article IV, § 2, is applicable only to appointive executive officers, it is, in that respect, narrower than article II.
The earliest predecessor of article III, § 9, which prohibits [780]*780dual office holding by legislators, was Neb. Const, art. II, § 14, of the Constitution of 1866:
No person being a member of congress, or holding any military or civil office under the United States, shall be eligible to a seat in the legislature; and if any person shall, after his election as a member of the legislature, be elected to congress, or be appointed to any office, civil or military, under the government of the United States, his acceptance thereof shall vacate his seat.
The analogous provision adopted in 1875 as article III, § 6, was much broader; the disability extended not only to those holding office under the authority of the United States, but also to those holding any lucrative office under the authority of the state:
No person holding office under the authority of the United States, or any lucrative office under the authority of this state, shall be eligible to or have a seat in the legislature; but this provision shall not extend to precinct or township officers, justices of the peace, notaries public, or officers of the militia; nor shall any person interested in a contract with, or an unadjusted claim against the state, hold a seat in the legislature.
That the framers thought it necessary to provide an explicit exception for “precinct or township officers, justices of the peace, notaries public, or officers of the militia” indicates that the disqualification of the holder of “any lucrative office under the authority of this state” was intended to have broad scope. Clearly, the framers did not envision it as applying only to constitutional officers.
In 1972, this disqualification was again expanded. The exceptions for justices of the peace, notaries public, and precinct, township, and militia officers were dropped and a new disqualification was added. The provision (renumbered as article III, § 9, in 1920) now reads:
No person holding office under the authority of the United States, or any lucrative office under the authority of this state, shall be eligible to, or have a seat in the Legislature. No person elected or appointed to the Legislature shall receive any civil appointment to a state [781]*781office while holding membership in the Legislature or while the Legislature is in session, and all such appointments shall be void.
This review of the evolution of article III, § 9, shows a continuing expansion in the disqualification placed upon legislators’ holding other government positions.
With that in mind, we return to the language of article II. If the phrase “being one of” were to be construed as if it read, “acting in the capacity of,” the relevant passage would declare that “no person or collection of persons [acting in the capacity of] one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others.” Under such a construction, a violation of the personnel aspect of article II would occur only if an individual simultaneously serving more than one branch discharged his or her multibranch duties at one and the same time. Such a reading would thus leave article III, § 9, dealing with the legislative branch, and article IV, § 2, dealing with the executive branch, as the only bans against multibranch office holding. The problem with such a construction is that there would then be no constitutional prohibition against a member of the judiciary’s serving as an elected executive officer, so long as that person did not discharge the duties arising from the two positions at the same time. This would be so because the article on the judiciary, article V, contains no provisions analogous to article III, § 9, and article IV, § 2. While article III, § 9, prohibits sitting judges from serving in the Legislature, article IV, § 2, only applies to appointive executive officers. Thus, there would be no constitutional prohibition against, for example, a single individual’s serving as both Chief Justice and Attorney General. Clearly, the framers did not contemplate such a bizarre result.
Indeed, the development of the prohibitions now found in article III, § 9, and article IV, § 2, evidences an expanding constitutional predisposition against multibranch public service. The continual expansion of these restrictions via amendments to the Constitution demonstrates the intention of both the framers and the body politic that such restrictions be interpreted broadly.
Thus, the relevant provision of article II cannot be construed [782]*782as meaning “no person or collection of persons [exercising any power of] one of these departments,” as respondent suggests, but, rather, must be read as construed in Saxby v. Sonnemann, 318 Ill. 600, 149 N.E. 526 (1925): “no person or collection of persons being [a member of] one of these departments.”
As a consequence, article II prohibits one who exercises the power of one branch — that is, an officer in the broader sense of the word — from being a member — that is, either an officer or employee — of another branch. Is respondent a member of one branch exercising the power of another? There are two formulations this question can take: (1) Is the respondent, as an assistant professor of a state college, a member of the executive branch, and does he exercise any powers of the Legislature? or (2) Is the respondent, as a state senator, a member of the legislative branch, and does he exercise any powers of the executive? If the answer to either of these formulations is yes, then respondent, by holding both positions, is in violation of article II.
Governmental Powers and Branches
It is beyond debate that a senator is a member of the legislative branch of the state and exercises the powers of that branch. The issue thus becomes: Is an assistant professor at a state college a member of the executive branch?
Respondent argues that state college assistant professors are not executive officers within the meaning of present Neb. Const, art. IV, § 1, since they are not named in the article nor are they “the heads of such other executive departments as set forth herein or as may be established by law.” In this he is quite correct. Assistant professors of state colleges are not constitutional executive officers. That does not, however, mean that they are not subject to the prohibition of article II. As noted earlier, article II is not limited in its application to officers, constitutional or otherwise, but extends to employees as well. If the state colleges are part of the executive branch, then article II prohibits respondent from maintaining his position at the college while he serves as a member of the Legislature.
When the 1875 Constitution was adopted, the executive [783]*783branch was defined in then article V, § 1, in terms of named constitutional officers: “The executive department shall consist of a. governor, lieutenant-governor, secretary of state, auditor of public accounts, treasurer, superintendent of public instruction, attorney-general, and commissioner of public lands and buildings_” (Emphasis supplied).
If article II is read in light of this language, it would appear that in 1875 a “person or collection of persons being [the executive department]” would have meant those individuals named in then article V, § 1. Had the Constitution remained unchanged since 1875, our inquiry on this question might have ended here. Our task is complicated, however, by subsequent amendments to then article V, § 1.
In 1920, article V, § 1, was amended and renumbered as article IV, § 1, and read, in relevant part: “The executive officers of the state shall be the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of the State, Auditor of Public Accounts, Commissioner of Public Lands and Buildings, Treasurer, Attorney General, Superintendent of Public Instruction and the heads of such other executive departments as may be established by law.” (Emphasis supplied.) In this version, the executive branch is no longer defined; instead, it states who the executive officers shall be and provides that additional executive agencies may be created by the Legislature. These changes were made in order to permit the creation of new executive agencies if and when the need should arise, see Nebraska Constitutions of 1886, 1871 & 1875 and Proposed Amendments Submitted to the People September 21, 1920, at 65, 67 (Nebraska Historical and Political Science Series Bull. 13, 1920), and appear to have been adopted in response to opinions announced by this court to the effect that the Legislature was without authority to create new executive agencies. See, e.g., In re Railroad Commissioners, 15 Neb. 679, 50 N.W. 276 (1884); State v. Porter, 69 Neb. 203, 95 N.W. 769 (1903); Iams v. Mellor, 93 Neb. 438, 140 N.W. 784 (1913). From this, it must be inferred that the old Constitution’s definition of the executive branch was considered too restrictive and failed to meet the demands of a growing state.
In 1936, the Commissioner of Public Lands and Buildings [784]*784was deleted from article IV, § 1, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction was deleted in 1952. Except for these changes, the relevant language has remained the same since 1920. In Swanson v. State, 132 Neb. 82, 271 N.W. 264 (1937), we held that the 1936 amendment omitting the office of Commissioner of Public Lands and Buildings, while depriving the office of its status as a constitutional office, did not abolish the office.
Since the composition of the executive branch is no longer expressly defined in the Constitution, we must look to case law for guidance in determining what it is.
To review, article II divides the powers of government into three distinct branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial, and provides that “no person or collection of persons being one of these” branches “shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly permitted or directed.” (Emphasis supplied). Nothing in the Constitution expressly, or even impliedly, directs that the prohibitions of article II not be applied to state senators. The inquiry thus turns to whether Neb. Const, art. VII, § 13, providing for the government of the state colleges, falls within the exception to article II.
We have determined that Neb. Const, art. XV, § 9, authorizing the Industrial Commission with administrative, legislative, and judicial powers, was within this exception to article II. See School Dist. of Seward Education Assn. v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972). We have likewise held that Neb. Const, art. IV, § 20, creating the State Railway Commission (now the Public Service Commission), which has legislative, executive, and judicial powers, is an exception to article II. See, Swanson v. Sorensen, 181 Neb. 312, 148 N.W.2d 197 (1967); In re Lincoln Traction Co., 103 Neb. 229, 171 N.W. 192 (1919). We have also found that the former State Department of Education could be given duties that were legislative in character because the constitutional provision authorizing it, Neb. Const. art. VII, § 14 (since repealed), fit within the exception. See School Dist. No. 8 v. State Board of Education, 176 Neb. 722, 127 N.W.2d 458 (1964).
[785]*785School Dist. No. 8, supra, School Dist. of Seward Education Assn., supra, and In re Lincoln Traction Co., supra, dealt with the institutional aspect of the separation of powers doctrine. These cases involved challenges to the agencies’ exercise of legislative and judicial powers and not individuals holding positions in more than one governmental branch. While we have determined that the constitutional provisions authorizing these agencies expressly direct or permit them to exercise the powers of more than one branch, nothing in the opinions indicates that members of the agencies are excepted from the personnel aspect of article II.
Like the two school district cases, Swanson v. Sorensen, supra, did not address the dual position ban of article II. In that case, Swanson, the duly elected state Treasurer, brought a quo warranto action against Sorensen, the incumbent Treasurer, who had refused to relinquish his office on the ground that Swanson was ineligible for the office because he had been a member of the railway commission when he ran for office. Sorensen’s claim was based on the prior provision of article IV, § 2, that “[n]one of the officers mentioned in this article shall be eligible to any other state office during the period for which they have been elected or appointed . . . .” The Swanson court concluded that because the constitutional amendment creating the railway commission was not adopted as an amendment to article IV but was simply inserted into that article by the compilers at a later date, the commissioners were not among the officers mentioned in article IV, § 2.
An exception to institutional application of the separation of powers doctrine does not imply an exception to the dual personnel ban. While it may be necessary for certain agencies to share attributes with the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in order for those agencies to carry out the function assigned to them in the Constitution, those needs do not require the agency to employ personnel who exercise power in another governmental branch.
Thus, we need not determine whether the government of the state colleges is free of the institutional prohibition of article II; we need merely determine whether the state colleges are properly considered to be part of the executive branch. [786]*786Although we have neither been directed to nor found any case explicitly stating that the state colleges are part of the executive branch, there are but three branches, and the state colleges clearly are not part of the judicial or legislative branches. See, Swanson v. State, supra; State v. Furse, 89 Neb. 652, 656, 131 N.W. 1030, 1031 (1911) (“the office of railway commissioner is, under the constitution, to be classed as an executive office. Of this we think there can be no doubt, as it can neither be said to be legislative, nor judicial, and the three classes are the only ones given by that instrument”).
The Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska performs a function for the university which is identical to that of the Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State Colleges. While the Board of Regents is an “independent body charged with the power and responsibility to manage and operate the University,” Board of Regents v. Exon, 199 Neb. 146, 148, 256 N.W.2d 330, 332 (1977), it is, nevertheless, an administrative or executive agency of the state, see Board of Regents v. County of Lancaster, 154 Neb. 398, 48 N.W.2d 221 (1951). As the regents are part ofthe executive branch, so, too, are the trustees.
Since the Board of Trustees, which governs the state colleges, is part of the executive branch, those who work for those colleges likewise are members of that branch. Respondent, as an assistant professor at the college, is thus a member of the executive branch within the meaning of article II.
INTERRUPTIONS OF TEACHING RESPONSIBILITIES
Lastly, we must consider whether respondent’s unpaid leaves of absence from the college during the Legislature’s regular sessions and his removal from the college payroll during most of the Unicameral’s special sessions have any legal significance.
As a tenured member of the college faculty, respondent likely possesses a legally protected expectation of continued employment. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972). However, whether he does or does not possess such a legally protected right, the fact is that his position with the college has been renewed each and every year he has been a senator. While his leaves of absence and [787]*787removal from the college payroll have permitted him to interrupt his teaching responsibilities, they have obviously not severed his continuing relationship with the college.
The actuality thus is that at all relevant times respondent has simultaneously been a state senator and an assistant professor at the college. Consequently, his leaves of absence from the college and his intermittent removals from its payroll are not material to the issues presented in this case. Respondent is therefore a member of one branch of government, the executive, exercising the powers of another, the legislative, and, as a consequence, is in violation of article II of the state Constitution.
In so holding, we are not unmindful that a division of the Washington Court of Appeals, while recognizing that a violation of the canons of judicial conduct had occurred, recently determined that an attorney who heard a criminal case as a judge pro tempore while serving as a state senator had not violated the separation of powers doctrine. In so ruling, the court reasoned that the attorney had not exercised both offices simultaneously. State v. Osloond, 60 Wash. App. 584, 805 P.2d 263 (1991). However, the Washington Constitution does not have an express separation of powers provision, and the Osloond court was thus able to base its decision on more general principles than those which we are constrained to follow.
Nor are we unmindful of State ex rel. Stratton v. Roswell Schools, 111 N.M. 495, 806 P.2d 1085 (1991), a recent New Mexico appellate court decision which held that that state’s separation of powers provision did not prohibit public school administrators and teachers from serving in the state Legislature. As we have previously noted, New Mexico’s Constitution provides that “no person . . . charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others . . . .” N.M. Const, art. Ill, § 1. In other words, it prohibits the officers (persons charged with the exercise of powers) of one branch from exercising the powers (or acting as an officer) of a coordinate branch. Thus, the personnel aspect of the New Mexico provision is limited to [788]*788prohibiting one from being an officer in different branches simultaneously. In contrast, article II of our Constitution prohibits members of one branch from exercising the powers of a coordinate branch and therefore prohibits any member of one of the three branches — whether it be an officer or employee — from being an officer in another branch. Because the New Mexico provision is narrower than that of article II, the reasoning of Stratton is inappropriate under our Constitution.
Numerous other jurisdictions have addressed similar questions under various provisions of their state constitutions. The results, as illustrated earlier, are in no way uniform, but the following decisions evince that Nebraska does not stand alone in maintaining the independence of each of the coordinate branches of government: Alaska has held that its Constitution prohibits a legislator from holding a position as a teacher or superintendent in a state-operated school district. See Begich v. Jefferson, 441 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1968). The Arkansas Constitution prohibits a state legislator from being elected to and serving on the board of directors of a school district during his term in the Legislature. See Williams v. Douglas, 251 Ark. 555, 473 S.W.2d 896 (1971). The Connecticut Constitution has been held to prohibit members of the general assembly from concurrent employment as faculty or professional staff at a state college. See Stolberg v. Caldwell, 175 Conn. 586, 402 A.2d 763 (1978), appeal dismissed, Stolberg v. Davidson, 454 U.S. 958, 102 S. Ct. 496, 70 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1981). After Oregon held that a state legislator was ineligible for employment as a public schoolteacher, see Monaghan v. School District No. 1, 211 Or. 360, 315 P.2d 797 (1957), the Constitution was amended to permit legislators to teach; however, a judge was still prohibited from teaching at a state-funded college, see In the Matter of Sawyer, 286 Or. 369, 594 P.2d 805 (1979).
Justice Sutherland, commenting on the importance of the maintenance of separate branches, stated:
If it be important thus to separate the several departments of government and restrict them to the exercise of their appointed powers, it follows, as a logical corollary, equally important, that each department should be kept completely independent of the others— [789]*789independent not in the sense that they shall not cooperate to the common end of carrying into effect the purposes of the Constitution, but in the sense that the acts of each shall never be controlled by, or subjected, directly or indirectly, to, the coercive influence of either of the other departments. James Wilson, one of the framers of the Constitution and a justice of this court, in one of his law lectures said that the independence of each department required that its proceedings “should be free from the remotest influence, direct or indirect, of either of the other two powers.” Andrews, The Works of James Wilson (1896), Vol. 1, p.367.
O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530, 53 S. Ct. 740, 77 L. Ed. 1356 (1933). The dynamics of power are perhaps best illustrated in this case by the fact that the Board of Trustees’ policy manual on leaves of absence treats employees of the state colleges who hold political offices differently from those who do not. As noted earlier, employees who hold no political office ordinarily may take a leave of absence but once every 4 years; however, employees who hold a political office routinely may take leaves as often as they wish. Nor are political officeholders required to make the prearrangements required of those who hold no political office.
CONCLUSION
The provisions of article II compel us to enter judgment for the relator and to order that respondent be, and he hereby is, ousted, removed, and excluded from his office as assistant professor at the college.
Judgment for relator.