Opinion No. (1997)

CourtNebraska Attorney General Reports
DecidedJanuary 7, 1997
StatusPublished

This text of Opinion No. (1997) (Opinion No. (1997)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Attorney General Reports primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Opinion No. (1997), (Neb. 1997).

Opinion

REQUESTED BY: Senator Stan Schellpeper Nebraska State Legislature You have requested our opinion on several questions concerning the qualification of the Horsemen's Benevolent and Protective Association ["HBPA"] to conduct licensed horseracing in Nebraska. You state that the Nebraska State Racing Commission ["Commission"] is to consider an application by the HBPA for a license to conduct a live thoroughbred horse race meeting at Fonner Park in 1997. Your questions concern whether the granting of such a license to the HPBA is consistent with various existing statutes governing the conduct of race meetings. If we conclude that it is not, you indicate that you may consider amendatory legislation to address the questions presented.

Initially, you direct our attention to Neb. Rev. Stat. §2-1204 (1991), which sets forth the requirements for applicants seeking a license to conduct horseracing in Nebraska. Section2-1204 provides, in part:

The State Board of Agriculture, or any county society for the improvement of agriculture organized under section 2-201 or 2-221, or any corporation or association of persons organized and carried on for civic purposes, or which conducts a livestock exposition for the promotion of the livestock or horse-breeding industries of the state, and which does not permit its members to derive personal profit from its activities by way of dividends or otherwise, may apply to the State Racing Commission for a license to conduct horseracing at a designated place within the state. (emphasis added).

Your question is, assuming the HBPA is organized as a nonprofit entity, "does the fact that its members win purses which are generated through its activities violate the provision of this statute which forbids permitting the members of the organization from deriving personal profit from its activities?"

A fundamental principle of statutory construction is to attempt to ascertain legislative intent and to give effect to that intent. County of Lancaster v. Maser, 224 Neb. 566,400 N.W.2d 238 (1987). A statute should be interpreted in such a manner as to give effect to the purpose and intent of the legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute in its plain and ordinary sense. NC+ Hybrids v. GrowersSeed Ass'n, 219 Neb. 296, 363 N.W.2d 362 (1985).

An examination of the language of § 2-1204 reveals that the Legislature intended to limit the type of entities which could obtain licenses to conduct horseracing to the following: (1) The State Board of Agriculture; (2) A county society for the improvement of agriculture organized under § 2-201 (county agricultural society) or § 2-221 (county fair); (3) A corporation or organization organized and carried on for civic purposes; or (4) a corporation or association which conducts a livestock exposition for the promotion of the livestock and horse-breeding industries in the state. With respect to these last two classes of entities (corporations or associations organized and carried on for civic purposes, or corporations or associations which conduct livestock or horse-breeding expositions), the Legislature added a further requirement. An entity of this type may be licensed to conduct horseracing only if its members are not permitted "to derive personal profit from its activities by way of dividends or otherwise, . . . ."

The prohibition against an entity of this nature obtaining a license if its members derive "personal profit" from its activities "by way or dividends or otherwise" appears to be intended to ensure that only entities which are "non-profit" in nature are licensed by the Commission to conduct horseracing. The term "dividend", in its usual and ordinary sense, refers to a distribution of earnings or profits to shareholders out of or attributable to a corporation's earnings or profits. Cohen v.Dept. of Revenue, 197 Colo. 385, 593 P.2d 957, 960 (1979); seealso Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 1973) (Dividend is "a pro rata distribution out of corporate earnings and profits."). The payment of dividends is, of course, associated with "for-profit" corporations; "non-profit" corporations, by definition, are corporations "no part of the income of which is distributable to its members, directors, or officers." Black's Law Dictionary 953 (5th ed. 1979).

Section 2-1204 not only prohibits personal profit by members through the receipt of "dividends", but expands on the prohibition by precluding personal profit "by way of dividendsor otherwise." (emphasis added). While this language is susceptible of a broad interpretation, it appears that, in the context used, it is meant to prohibit direct monetary gain to members of corporations or associations seeking a license to conduct horseracing. This construction is consistent with the common understanding of a non-profit corporation as one which hinges on "whether the corporation is being exploited for direct monetary gain." People ex rel. Meiresonne v. Arnold,37 Colo. App. 414, 553 P.2d 79, 81 (1976). Moreover, it seems to comport with the Legislature's intent to prohibit members from receiving direct financial gain amounting to "personal profit." Cf. In reDonald Sheldon Co., Inc., 186 B.R. 364, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (Holding that, under New York law, "personal profit or advantage" under illegal personal gain exclusion in officers' and directors' liability policy required existence of "direct benefit" to officers.).

In light of the foregoing, we cannot say that the HBPA, as a non-profit entity, is definitely precluded from obtaining a license under § 2-1204 because its members may benefit from purses awarded at licensed horserace meetings.1 The potential for members to receive such purse monies constitutes an indirect, contingent financial benefit which does not appear to fall within the prohibition against direct financial gain to members in §2-1204.2 As there is, however, some uncertainty concerning the HBPA's qualification for a license under § 2-1204, you may wish to propose amendatory legislation addressing this issue.

You next direct our attention to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 2-1205 (1991), which provides, in part:

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Related

William F. And Gwendolyn Wright v. United States
482 F.2d 600 (Eighth Circuit, 1973)
In Re Marriage of Nichols
553 P.2d 77 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1976)
County of Lancaster v. Maser
400 N.W.2d 238 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1987)
NC + Hybrids v. Growers Seed Ass'n
363 N.W.2d 362 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1985)

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