Schonberg v. Federal Election Commission
This text of Schonberg v. Federal Election Commission (Schonberg v. Federal Election Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________ ) STEVE SCHONBERG, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 10-2040 (JWR-CKK-RWR) ) FEDERAL ELECTION ) COMMISSION et al., ) ) Defendants. ) _________________________)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Pro se plaintiff has filed a motion to disqualify the
attorneys representing defendant Federal Election Commission
(“FEC”), arguing principally that this suit’s purported threat to
the existence of the FEC creates a conflict of interest.1
Plaintiff claims that the FEC attorneys have a proprietary
interest in the cause of action because their continued
employment depends on the FEC obtaining a favorable judgment.
1 Plaintiff maintains that his motion should be granted as conceded because the defendant filed its opposition three days late. Plaintiff filed his motion on January 3, 2011. Local Civil Rule 7(b) provides that an opposition is due within fourteen days of the date of service of the motion. When the last day falls on a holiday, the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). Because January 17, 2011 was a holiday, the period ran until January 18, 2011. Plaintiff served his motion via the Court’s CM/ECF system, so the defendant had an additional three days from January 18, 2011 to serve its opposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(3) and 6(d); LCvR 5.4(c)(1). The defendant filed timely its opposition on January 21, 2011. - 2 -
(Pl.’s Mot. to Disqualify at 3 (citing Model Rules of Prof’l
Conduct R. 1.8 (2004).)
A motion to disqualify counsel faces a particularly high
burden where there is no “serious question as to counsel’s
ability to act as a zealous and effective advocate for the
client[.]” Koller v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 737 F.2d 1038,
1056 (D.C. Cir. 1984) vacated on other grounds, 472 U.S. 424
(1985). The rationale behind prohibiting an attorney from
acquiring a proprietary interest in a cause of action is to
prevent the attorney from placing his interest in his own payment
ahead of his efforts to achieve his client’s recovery, and from
refusing his client’s guidance on major decisions in the suit.
See Xcentric Ventures, LLC v. Stanley, No. CV–07-954-PHX-NVW,
2007 WL 2177323, at *5 (D. Ariz. July 27, 2007).
Plaintiff’s arguments lack merit. The prospect of the
plaintiff’s suit placing in jeopardy the FEC attorneys’ continued
employment would align closely the interests of the FEC and its
attorneys, as the attorneys’ livelihoods would be entirely
contingent on their client’s success. The FEC attorneys would
therefore have a greater, not a lesser, incentive to advocate
zealously for their client. No conflict of interest exists. Cf.
Springer v. Henry, 435 F.3d 268, 283 n.13 (3d Cir. 2006).
Moreover, even if judgment is entered in the plaintiff’s favor,
his complaint does not challenge the constitutionality of the - 3 -
Federal Election Campaign Act’s disclosure provisions, see, e.g.,
2 U.S.C. § 434, the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26
U.S.C. § 9001 et seq., or the Presidential Primary Matching
Payment Account Act, 26 U.S.C. § 9031 et seq. Because the FEC
has a role to play in administering these statutes, the
plaintiff’s suit does not threaten the FEC’s existence or its
attorneys’ continued employment. To the extent plaintiff seeks
“appropriate sanctions” for an alleged lack of candor by FEC
attorneys (Pl.’s Mot. to Disqualify at 3), he offers no basis for
so finding and, in any event, disqualification in these
circumstances would not be an appropriate remedy. Cf. Gordon v.
Dadante, No. 1:05-CV-2726, 2009 WL 2732827, at *8 (N.D. Ohio
Aug. 26, 2009) (noting that “[n]ot every arguable
misrepresentation [to the Court] merits the drastic sanction of
disqualification”). Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion [16] to disqualify be, and
hereby is, DENIED. - 4 -
SIGNED this 1st day of February, 2011.
________/s/_________________ JUDITH W. ROGERS United States Circuit Judge
________/s/_________________ COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge
________/s/_________________ RICHARD W. ROBERTS United States District Judge
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