Santander Consumer USA Incorporated v. Spencer

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: February 12, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00422
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Santander Consumer USA Incorporated, No. CV-25-00422-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Michael Keith Spencer,

13 Defendant. 14 15 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), to remove an action from state court, a defendant 16 must file a notice of removal “containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for 17 removal.” The Notice of Removal filed by pro se Defendant Michael Keith Spencer 18 (“Defendant”) states that “this case involves a federal question under the Truth in Lending 19 Act (TILA)—15 U.S.C. § 1635, et. seq. and other consumer protections statutes, thereby 20 conferring original jurisdiction upon this Court.” (Doc. 1 at 1; id. (stating basis for removal 21 is the Court’s “original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331”). 22 The Court has an independent obligation to determine whether it has subject-matter 23 jurisdiction. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Pursuant to 24 Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]f the court determines at any 25 time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” There is a 26 “strong presumption” against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 27 (9th Cir. 1992). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks 28 subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Matheson 1 v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Where doubt 2 regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.”) “Only 3 state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to 4 federal court by the defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 5 “The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded 6 complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question 7 is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Id. “The rule makes 8 the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive 9 reliance on state law.” Id. “A right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the 10 United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” 11 Takeda v. Nw. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 1985). The defenses that a 12 defendant might raise are irrelevant. Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75–76 (1914). And 13 “[r]emovability cannot be created by defendant pleading a counter-claim presenting a 14 federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 530 F.2d 1295, 15 1303 (9th Cir. 1975), aff’d sub nom. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977). 16 Here, no federal question is presented on the face of Plaintiff’s complaint, which 17 states a single cause of action against Defendant for replevin under Arizona law. (Doc. 1- 18 1 at 3–7). In his Notice of Removal, Defendant staes that he “lawfully rescinded the 19 vehicle contract by proving written notice of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) — 15 U.S.C. 20 § 1635 due to material misrepresentations and fraudulent omissions in the agreement”; that 21 Plaintiff “as the assignee, was provided with a copy of the rescission notice, obligating 22 them to comply under TILA and Regulation Z (12 C.F.R. § 1026.23(d))”; and that Plaintiff 23 had a “statutory 20-day period to comply with the rescission, return all consideration, and 24 terminate any security interest,” but did not. (Doc. 1 at 2). To the extent that Defendant 25 attempts to present a federal question via a defense or counterclaim, this does not imbue 26 this Court with subject-matter jurisdiction. There simply is not a federal question on the 27 face of Plaintiff’s Complaint. 28 The Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and this case must be remanded. 28 1|| U.S.C. § 1447 (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks || subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”); Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Subject matter 4|| jurisdiction may not be waived, and, indeed, we have held that the district court must 5 || remand if it lacks jurisdiction.”); Amaya v. Van Beek, 513 F. App’x 652, 653 (9th Cir. || 2013) (‘Remand of [the] action to state court was required because [the] original complaint 7\| provided no basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, making removal improper.”). 8 Accordingly, 9 IT IS ORDERED that this case shall be remanded to the Maricopa County Superior Court. 11 Dated this 11th day of February, 2025. 12 13 oC. . foe □□ 14 norable’ Dian¢g/4. Hunfetewa 15 United States District Fudge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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