Sanchez v. Payes

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 VICTOR SANCHEZ, Case No.: 3:22-cv-02067-RBM-LR CDCR #F-25691, 12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 vs. (1) GRANTING MOTIONS TO 14 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

15 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); PAYES, Clinical Case Worker and 16 Psychologist, (2) DENYING MOTION FOR 17 ORDER DIRECTING ACCESS TO Defendant. LAW LIBRARY WITHOUT 18 PREJUDICE; and 19 (3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO 20 SERVE COMPLAINT PURSUANT 21 TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) 22

23 [Docs. 3, 4, 5, 6] 24 25 Plaintiff Victor Sanchez (“Plaintiff” or “Sanchez”), proceeding pro se and 26 incarcerated at California State Prison, Sacramento, filed this civil rights action pursuant 27 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 27, 2022. (See Compl., Doc. 1.) Plaintiff alleges his 28 constitutional rights were violated when he was previously housed at the Richard J. 1 Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”). (See generally Compl.) 2 I. MOTIONS TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 3 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 4 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 5 $402.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a failure to pay only if 6 the plaintiff requests and is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 7 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). If 8 the plaintiff is a prisoner seeking to proceed IFP, Section 1915(a)(2) also requires he or she 9 submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for 10 . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1915(a)(2). 12 From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 13 20% of: (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months; or (b) the 14 average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless 15 the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (4). The institution collects 16 subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month in 17 which the account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court until the entire 18 filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). In short, while prisoners may be granted 19 permission to prosecute their case without prepaying the filing fee in full and up front, they 20 are nevertheless “required to pay the full amount of a filing fee” in installments. 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915(b)(1); see also Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 22 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). 23 In support of his three IFP Motions (Docs. 3, 4, 6), Plaintiff submitted copies of his 24 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Prison Certificate, one 25

26 27 1 In addition to a $350 fee, civil litigants, other than those granted leave to proceed IFP, must pay an additional administrative fee of $52. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial 28 1 dated December 28, 2022, and another dated January 3, 2023. (See Doc. 3 at 4; Doc. 4 at 2 4.) Use of the statement closest in time to the filing of the Complaint indicates Plaintiff 3 had an average monthly balance of $78.55, and average monthly deposits of $97.50 to his 4 account at the time of filing. (See Doc. 3 at 4.) He had an available balance of $44.00 at 5 the time of filing. (See id.) 6 Based on these certified records, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motions to Proceed 7 IFP (Docs. 3, 4, 6) and imposes $19.50 initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1915(b)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be 9 prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for 10 the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial 11 filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety- 12 valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . 13 due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). The total $350 due 14 in this case will be collected by the CDCR and forwarded to the Court until the entire fee 15 is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 16 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 17 A. Standard of Review 18 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner, his Complaint requires a preliminary screening 19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court 20 must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, 21 malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 22 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 24 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous 25 or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 26 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 27 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 28 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 1 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 2 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 3 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 4 applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 6 as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 7 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 8 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 9 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 10 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 11 [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 12 experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 13 the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 14 standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 15 Courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, including “documents incorporated into 16 the complaint by reference” to be part of the pleading when determining whether the 17 plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues 18 & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d 1194, 19 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument 20 that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”). 21 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 22 On December 17, 2021, Plaintiff was seeking to “obtain counseling for suicidal 23 ideations.” (Compl. at 4.) An unnamed correctional officer placed Plaintiff in a holding 24 cell where he waited to be evaluated by Defendant Payes. (See id.) When Payes arrived, 25 Plaintiff told her he was “feeling suicidal” and wanted to hang himself. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff 26 claims Payes “started to argue” with him and told Plaintiff that he was just “trying to get 27 scratch[ed] off the bus.” (Id.) Plaintiff told her “please help me place me in a crisis bed” 28 but Payes said “you just don’t want to go to [California Correctional Institution].” (Id.) 1 Payes told the correctional officer to take Plaintiff back to his cell rather than seek further 2 mental health treatment for him. (See id.) Plaintiff later tried to commit suicide and was 3 found “unresponsive” in his cell and taken to an outside hospital by ambulance. (Id. at 10.) 4 Plaintiff suffered “nerve damage that rendered him at a loss of motor skills and use of all 5 four limbs (legs/arms) for a period of three days.” (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff suffers from 6 “neck and back spasms,” along with “pain and numbness.” (Id.) 7 Plaintiff seeks $10,000,000 in compensatory damages, $30,000,000 in punitive 8 damages, and “reasonable costs.” (Id. at 12.) 9 C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 10 “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a 11 method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 12 386, 393–94 (1989) (citation omitted). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 13 allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 14 United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 15 acting under the color of State law.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 16 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006)). 17 D. Eighth Amendment Claims 18 Prison officials act “under color of state law” when housing and providing medical 19 care to prisoners. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1988) (“[G]enerally, a public 20 employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while 21 exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.”). Therefore, in order to determine 22 whether Plaintiff has pleaded a plausible claim for relief against any named Defendant the 23 Court need only decide whether the factual allegations in his Complaint are sufficient to 24 show “each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, 25 has violated the Constitution,” and thus, may be held “liable for the misconduct alleged.” 26 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, 678. 27 Prisoners are entitled to “ready access to adequate medical care,” Hoptowit v. Ray, 28 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), and “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 1 of prisoners” violates the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 2 “A ‘serious’ medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in 3 further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin 4 v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104) overruled 5 on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997); Jett, 6 439 F.3d at 1096; Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1248 (9th Cir. 2016). “A 7 heightened suicide risk or an attempted suicide is a serious medical need.” Conn v. City of 8 Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 563 U.S. 915 (2011), opinion 9 reinstated in relevant part, 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837); 10 see also Kamakeeaina v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, No. 11-cv-00770 JMS, 2014 WL 11 1691611, at *7 (D. Haw. Apr. 29, 2014), affirmed sub nom. Kamakeeaina v. Maalo, 680 12 F. App’x 631 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding statements that plaintiff was “ready to commit 13 suicide” sufficient to show serious medical need). 14 “A prison official acts with ‘deliberate indifference . . . only if the [prison official] 15 knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 16 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 17 1187 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 18 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2016)). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only 19 ‘be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 20 harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v. 21 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). 22 “Inadvertent failures to provide adequate medical care, mere negligence or medical 23 malpractice, delays in providing care (without more), and differences of opinion over what 24 medical treatment or course of care is proper, are all insufficient to constitute an Eighth 25 Amendment violation.” Norvell v. Roberts, No. 20-cv-0512 JLS (NLS), 2020 WL 26 4464454, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2020) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–07); Wood v. 27 Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th 28 Cir. 1989); Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1 1985)). Rather, “[t]o ‘show deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that the course 2 of treatment the [official] chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and 3 that the [official] chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the 4 plaintiff’s health.’” Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 786 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting 5 Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2016)). “[A] purposeful act or failure 6 to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need” that causes harm is sufficient to 7 support a claim of deliberate indifference. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 8 2006). 9 As pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges facts to plausibly state an 10 Eighth Amendment cause of action against Defendant Payes. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; 11 Conn, 591 F.3d at 1096; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 12 III. MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING ACCESS TO LAW LIBRARY 13 Plaintiff also seeks an order from this Court directing the CDCR to “stop denying 14 him access to the law library and tools therein.” (Doc. 5 at 1.) The Court DENIES 15 Plaintiff’s request without prejudice at this time. Defendant has not yet appeared in this 16 action and there are no pending deadlines for which Plaintiff would need law library access. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 For the reasons discussed, the Court: 19 1) GRANTS Plaintiff’ Motions to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 20 (Docs. 3, 4, 6). 21 2) DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or their designee, to collect from 22 Plaintiff’ trust account the full $350 filing fee owed in monthly payments in an amount 23 equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income to the Clerk of the Court 24 each time the amount in Plaintiff’ account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 25 ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND 26 NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION. 27 3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order by U.S. Mail 28 on Jeff Macomber, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283- 1 0001, or by forwarding an electronic copy to trusthelpdesk@cdcr.ca.gov. 2 4) DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’ Complaint (Doc. 1) 3 upon Defendant and forward it to Plaintiff along with 5 blank U.S. Marshal Form 285s. In 4 addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order, a certified copy of his 5 Complaint, and the summons so that he may serve this Defendant. Upon receipt of this 6 “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete the U.S. Marshal Form 285 as completely and 7 accurately as possible, include an address where each of this Defendant may be served, see 8 S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 4.1.c, and return it to the United States Marshal according to the 9 instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying his IFP package. 10 5) ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of Plaintiff’ Complaint and 11 summons upon Defendant at the address provided by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285 12 provided, and to file executed waiver of personal service upon Defendant with the Clerk 13 of Court as soon as possible after their return. Should Defendant fail to return the U.S. 14 Marshal’s request for waiver of personal service within 90 days, the U.S. Marshal must 15 instead file the completed, but unexecuted Form USM 285 Process Receipt and Return 16 with the Clerk of Court, include the date the summons, Complaint and request for waiver 17 was mailed, and indicate why service upon that Defendant was not completed. All costs 18 of service will be advanced by the United States; however, if Defendant is located within 19 the United States, and fail without good cause to sign and return the waiver requested by 20 the Marshal on Plaintiff’ behalf, the Court will impose upon Defendant any expenses later 21 incurred in making personal service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). 22 6) ORDERS Defendant, once served, to reply to Plaintiff’ Complaint, and any 23 subsequent pleading Plaintiff may file in this matter in which she is named as Defendant, 24 within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 12(a) and 15(a)(3). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (stating that while a defendant may 26 occasionally be permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner 27 confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the 28 Court has conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1 |} 1915A(b), and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the 2 || pleading that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” defendant is 3 || required to respond). 4 7) ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been made by the U.S. Marshal, to serve 5 ||upon Defendant, or if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendant’s counsel, 6 ||a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the Court’s 7 consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must include with every original 8 ||document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the manner in 9 || which a true and correct copy of that document was served on Defendant, or her counsel, 10 || and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 5.2. Any document received by the Court 11 || which has not been properly filed with the Clerk, or which fails to include a Certificate of 12 || Service upon Defendants once they have been served, may be disregarded. 13 8) DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Law Library Access (Doc. 5) without 14 || prejudice. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 ||} DATE: June 1, 2023 17 Fe A C Xp ue ? 18 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9