Appellate Case: 23-2032 Document: 010110966292 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 11, 2023 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court RANDY SALGADO,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 23-2032 (D.C. No. 2:20-CV-00899-JCH-JFR) RICK MARTINEZ, Warden of the Otero (D. N.M.) County Prison Facility; HECTOR H. BALDERAS, Attorney General for the State of New Mexico,
Respondents - Appellees. _________________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY * _________________________________
Before EID, CARSON, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Randy Salgado, a New Mexico prisoner proceeding pro se, moves for a
certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his
28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We deny a COA and dismiss this proceeding.
I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Allegations Against Mr. Salgado
In 2004, a New Mexico grand jury indicted Mr. Salgado on six counts:
* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 23-2032 Document: 010110966292 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Page: 2
1. criminal sexual penetration of a child under age thirteen, 1 specifically,
forcing “R.S.” to engage in fellatio;
2. criminal sexual contact of a child under age thirteen, 2 specifically,
touching or applying force to R.S.’s vagina;
3. criminal sexual contact of a child under age thirteen, specifically,
touching or applying force to the vagina of R.S.’s older half-sister,
“T.R.”;
4. criminal sexual contact of a child under age thirteen, specifically,
touching or applying force to T.R.’s breasts;
5. criminal sexual contact of a child under age thirteen, specifically,
causing T.R. to touch Mr. Salgado’s penis; and
6. bribery or intimidation of a witness, 3 specifically, threatening T.R. if
she reported what Mr. Salgado had done.
The indictment alleged these offenses occurred between October 29, 2000, and
August 30, 2001. Before trial, however, the parties stipulated to a new charging
period: between March 1 and September 30, 2000. The prosecution believed this was
the timeframe in which: (i) R.S. and T.R. were both living with their mother,
Christina Trebizo; and (ii) Mr. Salgado became romantically involved with
1 See N.M. Stat. § 30-9-11. 2 See N.M. Stat. § 30-9-13. 3 See N.M. Stat. § 30-24-3. 2 Appellate Case: 23-2032 Document: 010110966292 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Page: 3
Ms. Trebizo, thus giving him access to her daughters. Given this timeframe, R.S.
would have been five at the time of the alleged offenses, and T.R. would have been
eight.
B. Trial
The case went to a jury trial in February 2005.
1. Jury Selection
During voir dire, the prosecutor asked the venire panel, “[D]oes anybody ever
remember a time in their life where they were bullied by somebody?” R. at 324.
Some panel members responded and described experiences of physical and verbal
bullying. One panel member, “A.H.,” asked to answer the question in private.
During that private session, she told the court and the attorneys,
When I was five I was abused by a boy who was twelve. I was threatened and I couldn’t tell anybody. I have never told anybody. So I’m telling you. It wasn’t a good experience. And while I’m sitting here, while you’re asking about being bullied, I’m sitting here, and I couldn’t think of anything, you know, and then I thought, Oh, no. And my heart is pounding. My palms are sweating. I mean, I was five and he was twelve. It wasn’t innocent. I didn’t know what the heck he was up to. And so from that point of view that’s how I feel.
R. at 379. The prosecutor followed up by asking A.H. if she thought she could put
aside that experience and judge the case on the facts. A.H. responded, “I think I
could probably judge what the children said. I can remember that as though it was
yesterday, and so I think that—I think I could judge if they are telling the truth.” Id.
The prosecutor then asked A.H. if she believed she could be fair and impartial, and
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she responded, “Oh, yes. This is my third, fourth, jury.” R. at 379–80. But she also
added, “[F]or ten years, if I had had a gun I would have shot [her abuser].” R. at 380.
Later, when all jurors had been excused for lunch, the court heard the parties’
objections for cause. Several jurors who had experienced sexual abuse, or whose
close relations had experienced sexual abuse, were excused for cause. This included
one juror whose daughter had been sexually abused. Speaking of this juror,
Mr. Salgado’s attorney, Mr. Donald Kochersberger, said, “I can’t imagine she would
really be able to participate without [her prior experience] affecting her. She said her
blood pressure went up and [her] heart were [sic] racing and palms were sweating.”
R. at 407. The juror in question had said nothing to that effect. The only juror who
said something similar was A.H.
No party objected to A.H., and she was seated as a juror.
2. Presentation of Evidence
Mr. Salgado’s defense theory was mistaken identity, i.e., the girls probably
had been molested, but not by him, because he had never known their mother or
either of them during the charging period. In this light, the most important witnesses
were T.R., Joe Baca (T.R.’s grandfather), 4 R.S., Tammy Borunda (a friend of
Ms. Trebizo), and Mr. Salgado himself.
4 T.R. was actually the stepdaughter of Mr. Baca’s stepson, but they referred to each other as granddaughter and grandfather.
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a. T.R.
T.R. was thirteen years old when she testified, and her testimony was
substantially as follows. She had lived with her grandfather, Mr. Baca, for most of
her life, but there was a time when she stopped living with Mr. Baca and instead
lived with her mother (and her half-sister, R.S.) at her mother’s home. At first she
did not remember how old she was at that time, but on cross-examination she agreed
she was nine.
One day, T.R. was at home, watching TV with R.S., while her mother was at
work. Mr. Salgado—whom she identified as the defendant in the courtroom—was in
the home, too, and this was the first time she had met him. Mr. Salgado called T.R.
and R.S. into their mother’s bedroom and told both to undress, which they did. He
then touched T.R.’s vagina, followed by R.S.’s vagina. After that, he grabbed T.R.’s
hand and made her “touch [his penis] up and down.” R. at 222. As he did so, “[h]e
told [the girls] not to tell or he might do it again.” Id. Eventually, he let the girls go.
Later the same day, T.R. told her mother (Ms. Trebizo) about what had happened, but
her mother did not believe her. 5
There were two more times T.R. remembered interacting with Mr. Salgado.
One was at “a [bail] bond place” where Mr. Salgado worked and where Mr. Salgado,
Ms. Trebizo, and her two daughters once spent the night (for unexplained reasons).
5 The record does not disclose how or when the event came to the prosecution’s attention, although it could have been through Mr. Baca’s wife, to whom T.R. reported the event sometime later (T.R. did not remember exactly when, and Mr. Baca’s wife had since passed away). 5 Appellate Case: 23-2032 Document: 010110966292 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Page: 6
R. at 224. The other was when they all drove in Mr. Salgado’s RV. Those were not
the days that Mr. Salgado molested T.R. or R.S.
b. Mr. Baca
Mr. Baca testified he had previously encountered Mr. Salgado only once. That
was in September or October 2000, when Ms. Trebizo was being evicted and could
not support T.R. Mr. Baca came to Ms. Trebizo’s house to pick up T.R. (but not
R.S.), and that’s when he saw Mr. Salgado—whom he identified as the defendant in
the courtroom—helping Ms. Trebizo pack up her things.
When asked on cross-examination about exactly when this event happened,
Mr. Baca repeated it was “September, October [of 2000], somewhere around there.”
R. at 280.
c. R.S.
R.S. was nine years old at the time of trial. When asked why she was there in
the courtroom that day, she answered, “For Randy” who “used to live with my mom.”
R. at 186, 187. However, although Mr. Salgado was present, she did not see the
person she remembered as Randy in the courtroom.
As to the alleged crimes, R.S. said that Randy “made [her and her sister] take
off our clothes, and he stuck his privates in my mouth.” R. at 189. She also said she
had been asleep in the living room when Randy put his privates into her mouth, after
which she went to her mom’s room, but it was in the living room where Randy asked
her and T.R. to take off their clothes.
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On cross-examination, Mr. Kochersberger (Mr. Salgado’s attorney) elicited
potential inconsistencies with a videotaped safehouse interview from eight months
earlier. During that interview, R.S. had characterized Randy as tall and skinny with
certain tattoos, whereas Mr. Salgado was 5’5” tall, weighed about 200 lbs., and did
not have the reported tattoos.
d. Ms. Borunda
Ms. Borunda was one of Ms. Trebizo’s friends. She testified she remembered
Mr. Salgado’s and Ms. Trebizo’s first meeting, which happened at a small party on
March 9, 2001. She said she remembered the precise date because her cousin got
married the next day, March 10.
e. Mr. Salgado
Mr. Salgado testified that, during the charging period (March–September
2000), he was working as a bus driver and living with a woman other than
Ms. Trebizo. Then, “around December [2000],” he began working for a bail bond
agency. R. at 244. In March 2001, he met Ms. Trebizo through a person he bonded
out of jail. He and Ms. Trebizo soon became romantically involved, but they broke
up in 2002. The only one of her daughters he ever met was T.R. She was then living
with Mr. Baca, but she came for an Easter weekend visit with her mother in April
2001.
f. Ms. Trebizo’s Prior Statement
Just before jury selection, Mr. Kochersberger informed the court that his
investigator had personally served a subpoena on Ms. Trebizo to testify, but
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Ms. Trebizo was not willing to come. Mr. Kochersberger therefore asked for a
material witness warrant, which the court issued.
On the day of Ms. Trebizo’s expected testimony, Mr. Kochersberger informed
the court that Ms. Trebizo was still refusing to appear and had gone into hiding.
Mr. Kochersberger therefore moved in limine for permission to admit an unsworn
statement Ms. Trebizo made at a bond hearing several months earlier. Over the
prosecution’s objection, the trial judge allowed Mr. Kochersberger to admit
Ms. Trebizo’s prior statement for its truth. The jury therefore heard Ms. Trebizo’s
claims that the accusations against Mr. Salgado were untrue. She said Mr. Salgado
had never met R.S. and had never been in Ms. Trebizo’s home while her daughters
were living there. She also insinuated that her ex-husband (R.S.’s biological father)
had convinced the girls to accuse Mr. Salgado, out of jealousy.
g. Other Evidence
The prosecution introduced documentary evidence from T.R.’s school and
R.S.’s daycare that they were in their mother’s care at least in August and September
2000, although T.R. returned to Mr. Baca’s care in mid-September.
3. The Verdict & Sentence
The trial judge dismissed count 4 (alleging unlawful contact with T.R.’s
breasts), but otherwise sent the case to the jury. The jury returned a guilty verdict on
all remaining counts. The court sentenced Mr. Salgado to a 25-year prison term.
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C. Direct Appeal
On appeal to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, Mr. Salgado argued, among
other things, 6 that the jury had insufficient evidence to conclude he had access to
R.S. or T.R. during the charging period. The court rejected this argument, holding
the jury’s verdict showed they accepted the prosecution’s theory of the timeline.
Mr. Salgado also argued juror A.H.’s presence on the jury violated his
constitutional right to an impartial jury. The court rejected the argument, stating it
would not presume the victim of a sex crime should be disqualified from being a
juror in a sex-crime case.
The New Mexico Supreme Court denied review of Mr. Salgado’s direct
appeal.
D. State Habeas Petition
In March 2008, Mr. Salgado, still represented by counsel, filed a petition for
habeas relief in the state trial court. The petition argued various theories of
ineffective assistance of counsel, including:
• Mr. Kochersberger’s investigation was inadequate because he could
have tried to find the person with tattoos matching those described by
R.S. (Mr. Salgado had since discovered Mr. Baca had at least one
matching tattoo).
6 In this order, we do not discuss theories Mr. Salgado asserted in prior proceedings that he does not continue to assert in his COA application.
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• Mr. Kochersberger’s trial presentation was inadequate because he could
have introduced employment records and other evidence and testimony
to bolster Mr. Salgado’s testimony that he was a bus driver during the
charging period, not a bail bondsman.
• Ms. Trebizo’s testimony was crucial to the defense, so
Mr. Kochersberger should have sought a continuance when she failed to
appear.
Multiple substitutions of counsel delayed adjudication of Mr. Salgado’s
petition. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of
counsel in October and November 2019. The hearing featured six witnesses,
including Mr. Kochersberger and experts retained specifically to give an opinion on
his performance.
The trial court issued a written decision on Mr. Salgado’s petition in April
2020. The trial court found that Mr. Kochersberger’s decisions had been reasonable,
given the circumstances. It therefore denied relief.
Mr. Salgado petitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court for review. That court
denied the petition in July 2020.
E. Federal Habeas Petition
Mr. Salgado, now pro se, filed his § 2254 petition in August 2020 asserting the
arguments described above (insufficient evidence, A.H.’s presence on the jury, and
various ineffective-assistance theories). He further asserted two new theories:
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• T.R. testified she saw Mr. Salgado touch R.S.’s vagina (the accusation
underlying count 2), but R.S. herself did not testify Mr. Salgado touched
her vagina. Allowing the jury to convict on count 2 was therefore a
Confrontation Clause violation.
• Mr. Kochersberger was constitutionally ineffective for an additional
reason, namely, he did not move to strike juror A.H. from the panel.
In response, the State pointed out that Mr. Salgado had not exhausted these new
theories, but the State also explicitly waived exhaustion and asked the district court
to reject the new theories on their merits.
The district court referred Mr. Salgado’s § 2254 petition to a magistrate judge
for a recommendation. The magistrate judge recommended accepting the State’s
waiver and addressing all asserted grounds for relief on their merits. As to the
merits, the magistrate judge recommended denying the petition. Mr. Salgado timely
objected but the district court overruled that objection, adopted the recommendation
in full, and entered final judgment.
This appeal timely followed.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
As to the issues Mr. Salgado exhausted in state court, the district court’s task
was to determine whether the state court’s legal rulings were “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” and whether the state court’s
factual rulings were “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 11 Appellate Case: 23-2032 Document: 010110966292 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Page: 12
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As to
the issues the district court ruled on in the first instance, its task was simply to “hear
the merits of the unexhausted claims.” Harris v. Champion, 48 F.3d 1127, 1131 n.3
(10th Cir. 1995). 7
Our task now is to decide if any issue ruled upon in the district court merits a
COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). We may not issue a COA unless Mr. Salgado
“has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id.
§ 2253(c)(2). This means he “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find
the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). And specifically as to the claims he
exhausted in state court, our COA analysis must also account for the deference given
to state-court decisions under § 2254(d). Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336
(2003) (“We look to the District Court’s application of AEDPA to petitioner’s
constitutional claims and ask whether that resolution was debatable amongst jurists
of reason.”).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
1. Legal Standard and Prior Resolution
When a defendant claims the evidence at trial could not support a conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt, the question for the reviewing court is “whether, after
7 Mr. Salgado has not argued that the district court should have allowed him to pursue his unexhausted claims in state court first. 12 Appellate Case: 23-2032 Document: 010110966292 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Page: 13
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The New Mexico Court of
Appeals identified this as the proper standard of review. See R. at 153. 8 It then
summarized the trial evidence, recognized the weaknesses and potential
contradictions, reasoned the jury could accept the prosecution’s theory over
Mr. Salgado’s theory, and held the evidence in favor of the prosecution’s case
supported the verdicts. The district court employed the same reasoning when it
denied habeas relief.
2. Mr. Salgado’s Overall Argument
In his COA application, Mr. Salgado reprises his claim that the jury could not
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed any crimes against R.S. or
T.R. during the charging period because, in his view, the evidence showed he did not
meet Ms. Trebizo or either daughter until months later. He claims the issue deserves
a COA because “no reviewing court has ever identified what evidence the jury may
have, could have[,] or[] did rely on that established beyond a reasonable doubt that
[he] was in a relationship with Christine Trebizo during the charging period.” COA
Appl. at 6.
8 The court cited New Mexico case law, not federal case law, but it nonetheless applied the proper standard. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (holding that a state court need not cite federal case law so long as it does not contradict that case law).
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“The [sufficiency-of-the-evidence] inquiry is based upon the entire record and
the reasoning process actually used by the trier of fact, known or not, is not
considered.” Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1151 (10th Cir. 2003). Moreover, we
need not decide if the New Mexico Court of Appeals adequately described the
available evidence because the question is whether that court’s “result[]” contradicted
clearly established Federal law or was factually unreasonable, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1), (2), not whether it discussed the issue in any particular manner, see
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). On our review of the record, the
evidence provided a path for a rational trier of fact to find Mr. Salgado guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
T.R. testified Mr. Salgado (the same person she identified as the defendant in
the courtroom) molested her and R.S. during a timeframe when they were living with
her mother. T.R. could not remember precisely when that was, but the prosecution
introduced evidence, such as school and daycare records, that T.R. and R.S. were
living with their mother in August and September 2000 (the last two months of the
charging period). Mr. Salgado has never challenged that documentary evidence. In
other words, T.R.’s testimony, if believed, established (1) Mr. Salgado molested her
and R.S., and (2) he did so in Ms. Trebizo’s home when T.R. and R.S. were living
there. The documentary evidence then filled in the missing timeframe.
Mr. Baca’s testimony also supported the timeframe. He testified he saw
Mr. Salgado (whom he identified as the defendant in the courtroom) helping
Ms. Trebizo move out of her house when he (Mr. Baca) came to take custody of
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T.R. again. The prosecution introduced evidence that this likely happened in
mid-September 2000. Thus, if the jury believed Mr. Baca, it further confirmed the
prosecution’s theory.
3. Challenges to Mr. Baca’s and T.R.’s Testimony
Mr. Salgado offers several reasons why Mr. Baca’s and T.R.’s testimony was
not enough to support a rational finding of guilt. We address these arguments in turn.
a. Mr. Baca
Mr. Salgado says, “Even if Joe Baca believes he may have seen some one,
possibly named Randy, at Christina Trebizo’s residence during the month of October
2000, that does not establish that that individual had any interactions with R.S. and
T.R. between March 01, and September 30, 2000.” COA Appl. at 9. Two parts of
this assertion require clarification.
First, the phrase “possibly named Randy” is an allusion to another part of
Mr. Baca’s testimony, where he stated he had heard of Mr. Salgado before the day he
came to pick up T.R., but had never met him. When he arrived at Ms. Trebizo’s
house, however, Ms. Trebizo’s mother was there and she told Mr. Baca that the
person helping Ms. Trebizo to move her things was Mr. Salgado. 9
9 Many pages later in his COA application, when elaborating on an argument for ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Salgado claims Ms. Trebizo’s mother testified at trial and denied having met Mr. Salgado. See COA Appl. at 28. We cannot find the transcript of Ms. Trebizo’s mother’s testimony in the record, nor can we find any argument to the district court or the New Mexico courts about the significance of the mother’s testimony. We therefore do not consider this assertion. See United States v. Viera, 674 F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2012) (in the § 2255 context, refusing to consider an argument raised for the first time in a request for a COA). 15 Appellate Case: 23-2032 Document: 010110966292 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Page: 16
Second, the phrase “during the month of October 2000” does not accurately
reflect Mr. Baca’s testimony. Rather, he testified he came to pick up T.R. in
“September, October, somewhere around there.” R. at 280.
So clarified, Mr. Salgado’s attack on the significance of Mr. Baca’s testimony
misses the mark. Whatever Mr. Baca may have known about Mr. Salgado before
picking up T.R., and whatever may have been said to him on that day, he identified
the defendant in the courtroom as the man he saw at Ms. Trebizo’s house, and he
identified the timeframe. Mr. Salgado is correct this “does not establish that [he] had
any interactions with R.S. and T.R. between March 01, and September 30, 2000.”
COA Appl. at 9 (emphasis added). But, if believed, it does establish that
Mr. Salgado was with Ms. Trebizo during September or October 2000, contrary to
Mr. Salgado’s testimony that they never met until months later. And recall, the
prosecution’s other evidence suggested Mr. Baca picked up T.R. in September 2000,
within the charging period.
b. T.R.
Mr. Salgado says T.R. “testified that she was nine years old when she was
abused. T.R. didn’t turn nine until December 2000; after the charging period.” COA
Appl. at 10. He also says she “testified that when she met Mr. Salgado, he worked at
the bailbonds company,” and his employment records show he was working as a bus
driver then—he did not work for the bail bond company “until November or
December 2000; again, outside of the charging period.” Id.
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As to T.R.’s age (eight vs. nine), we agree there was a discrepancy. On direct
examination, she did not remember her age; on cross-examination, she agreed with
Mr. Kochersberger that she had been nine.
As to having “met” Mr. Salgado when he worked for a bail bond agency, we
disagree with Mr. Salgado’s characterization of the testimony if he means to say this
is when T.R. first met him. On direct examination, the prosecutor elicited from T.R.
the details of the alleged abuse and then had this exchange with her:
Q. . . . When this happened to you this day, was this the only time you met Randy, or were there other times?
A. I met Randy because he worked at a bond place.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. And we slept overnight there, my mom, my sister, and me and Randy. We slept overnight there, and then he had an RV, and we went driving in it.
R. at 224. In context, it is clear the prosecutor used “met” in the sense of “met with,”
not “first met.” T.R. then echoed the prosecutor’s choice of the word “met.” It is
unclear if she also meant to convey anything about the order of the instances in
which she “met” Mr. Salgado.
Also, the significance of T.R.’s memory about Mr. Salgado “work[ing] at a
bond place” heavily depends on whether the jury believed Mr. Salgado when he
testified he began working for the bail bond agency “around December [2000],”
R. at 244. This overlaps somewhat with his claim that Mr. Kochersberger was
ineffective for failing to bolster his testimony with employment records. However,
as we will explain when we address that claim directly, see infra Part III.D.3, those 17 Appellate Case: 23-2032 Document: 010110966292 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Page: 18
records neither support nor undermine Mr. Salgado’s testimony about when he
started at the bail bond agency. There was no documentary evidence Mr. Salgado
was not working at the bail bond agency during the charging period.
Still, we see the force of the argument. T.R. said she was nine years old at the
time of the crimes (but she did not turn nine until December 2000, after the charging
period), and she remembered Mr. Salgado’s employment with the bond agency,
which arguably reinforces his testimony that he did not work there until around
December 2000. Other evidence supported this theory, including Ms. Borunda’s
claim she remembered the day in March 2001 when Mr. Salgado and Ms. Trebizo
first met, and Ms. Trebizo’s claim (in her prior statement read to the jury) that
Mr. Salgado had never been in her home at a time when her girls were living there.
Ultimately, however, it was the jury’s responsibility “fairly to resolve conflicts
in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic
facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. And “a jury may believe a part of
a witness’ testimony, and disbelieve other parts.” Meek v. Martin, 74 F.4th 1223,
1260 (10th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the jury had to parse T.R.’s testimony. She testified Mr. Salgado abused
her and R.S. when they were living with their mother. R.S. similarly testified,
although with less detail, that Mr. Salgado abused her and T.R. in their mother’s
home. But T.R. also testified she was nine years old at the time of the abuse, and she
did not turn nine until a few months after she stopped living with her mother.
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The jury could have rationally resolved this conflict by deciding the abuse
never happened, regardless of location or timeframe—the girls were making it up.
But Mr. Salgado has never explained why the jury could not likewise rationally
conclude T.R. and R.S. were telling the truth about the fact of the abuse and the
location. And if the jury believed that much, it necessarily disregarded T.R.’s
statement that she was nine years old at the time. That is a rational resolution of the
conflict, given T.R.’s age at the time of the abuse and at the time of trial (over four
years later).
If the jury could rationally accept the fact and location of the abuse, then other
(uncontradicted) evidence established the timeframe when the girls lived at the
relevant location, and the final piece was the identity of the abuser. T.R. provided
that piece by identifying Mr. Salgado in the courtroom as the man who abused her
and her sister.
4. Summary
When a defendant raises a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge on direct
appeal, the question is not whether the reviewing court is convinced of the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether any rational trier of fact
could have been convinced, looking at all evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19. And when a state court’s resolution of a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge comes before a federal court in the § 2254
context, the question is not whether the federal court would have reached the same
resolution, but whether that resolution was an unreasonable application of Jackson or
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an unreasonable determination of the facts. See Smith v. Sharp, 935 F.3d 1064, 1074
& n.3 (10th Cir. 2019) (observing that a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is a
mixed question of law or fact, so it implicates both § 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)). These
“two layers of judicial deference” create a “high bar.” Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S.
650, 651 (2012).
Mr. Salgado’s arguments do not persuade us that he might overcome this high
bar. Therefore, the district court’s refusal to overturn the decision of the New
Mexico Court of Appeals is not reasonably debatable, and we deny a COA on this
issue.
B. Confrontation Clause
According to Mr. Salgado, R.S.’s inability to identify him in the courtroom as
her abuser, and her failure to testify that Mr. Salgado touched her vagina, means the
jury could only have convicted him of count 2 based on T.R.’s testimony. In these
circumstances, Mr. Salgado claims his Sixth Amendment right to confront the
witnesses against him was violated. We cannot agree.
The Confrontation Clause governs “admission of out-of-court statements
[against the accused]” and “restrictions imposed by law or by the trial court on the
scope of cross-examination.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18 (1985).
Neither situation was present here. In this case, R.S. and T.R. testified in person and
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were subject to cross-examination without restriction. Thus, their testimony raised
no Confrontation Clause question. We deny a COA on this issue. 10
C. Jury Composition
Defendants have a due-process right to “a fair trial by a panel of impartial,
indifferent jurors.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Mr. Salgado claims A.H.’s presence on the jury violated that right
because A.H. had an implied bias. See Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978, 987
(10th Cir. 1996) (holding that implied bias may exist if “the juror has a personal
connection to the parties or circumstances of the trial,” or if there are “similarities
between the juror’s experiences and the facts giving rise to the trial”). According to
Mr. Salgado, A.H.’s physiological reaction when she remembered the abuse from
many years ago (heart pounding, sweaty palms) shows she likely had PTSD, so she
“would not have been cons[c]iously aware of her inability to regulate the transference
of her own unresolved psychological damage into the case before the court.” COA
Appl. at 17. 11
10 Mr. Salgado also appear to argue that T.R.’s testimony is insufficient under the Jackson standard to sustain his conviction on count 2. We reject that argument for the reasons explained in Part III.A. 11 Mr. Salgado’s arguments assume A.H. was the victim of sexual abuse, and he claims A.H. described the abuse as “similar” to the abuse experienced by T.R. and R.S. COA Appl. at 17. A.H. never made either claim. However, she did say: (i) she was “abused” (when the pending question was actually whether she was bullied); (ii) “[i]t wasn’t innocent”; and (iii) at age five, she “didn’t know what the heck [the abuser] was up to.” R. at 379. We will therefore presume for argument’s sake that A.H. was sexually abused. 21 Appellate Case: 23-2032 Document: 010110966292 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Page: 22
The New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Salgado’s argument because it
was not “willing to presume that the victim of a sex crime should be barred from
participating as a juror in a trial involving wholly unrelated charges.” R. at 160. To
merit a COA on this issue, this result must be debatably “contrary to, or involve an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Miller-El,
537 U.S. at 336.
The New Mexico court did not cite case law, but its resolution reflects the only
form of implied (or presumed) bias the Supreme Court has clearly acknowledged to
be a possible disqualification, namely, “bias conclusively presumed as [a] matter of
law” because of some objective circumstance. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123,
133 (1936); see also id. at 134 (examining whether the Constitution prohibits
government employees from sitting as jurors in criminal cases). Mr. Salgado points
us to no Supreme Court case law clearly establishing that sexual abuse victims cannot
sit as jurors on criminal trials involving sexual abuse.
Mr. Salgado instead asks the court to evaluate his claim under an implied bias
theory based on the alleged similarity between the juror’s particular experience
compared to the allegations at issue in the case. This argument is unavailing. There
appears to be no clearly established Supreme Court holdings against which to
evaluate whether the state court reasonably handled a claim of implied juror bias
based on similarities between the juror’s life experiences and the accusations at issue
in the case. Cf. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009) (“[I]t is not an
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unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to
decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this
Court.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
To be sure, this court’s Gonzales decision—applying the pre-AEDPA version
of § 2254—recognized the sort of claim asserted here. See 99 F.3d at 987; see also
id. (“Though a juror might honestly believe she can be impartial, she nevertheless
may have such a close connection to the circumstances at hand that bias must be
presumed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 989–90 (rejecting a categorical
rule that rape victims cannot sit on rape trials and calling for “an approach that
focuses more closely on the particular juror’s experience”). But there, we relied on
Supreme Court concurring opinions and circuit-level decisions, not Supreme Court
holdings. See id. at 985–90.
Even if we assume the standards established in our case law reflect the law as
clearly established by the Supreme Court, we see no basis for a COA. “The implied
bias doctrine should not be invoked lightly. It must be reserved for those ‘extreme’
and ‘exceptional’ circumstances that ‘leave serious question whether the trial court
subjected the defendant to manifestly unjust procedures resulting in a miscarriage of
justice.’” Gonzales, 99 F.3d at 987 (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 &
n.* (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (brackets and ellipses omitted). Applying that
principle here, we cannot say the state court’s result was unreasonable in the
circumstances. A.H. had a strong physiological reaction to the memory of her own
abuse and she stated there was a ten-year timeframe when she would have killed her
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abuser had she possessed a gun. But a long time had obviously passed. Her exact
age is not disclosed in the record, but she was five at the time of the abuse and she
was now old enough to have served on three or four juries. See id. at 991 (noting that
“the passage of a quarter-century [between the time a juror was raped and the time
she sat on a rape trial] argues against presuming [the juror] was biased”). And, in
light of her prior jury service, she assured the court she could be impartial. She also
opined that her experience might help her to decide whether T.R. and R.S. were
telling the truth, thus showing her open-mindedness to the possibility the girls’
testimony might not be trustworthy. The deference we must accord to the state court
would not allow us to overturn its decision on this record, so we deny a COA.
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Mr. Salgado’s COA application asserts four theories of ineffective assistance
of counsel. This claim requires: (1) constitutionally deficient performance by the
attorney that (2) prejudices the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). Prejudice means “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id. at 694.
1. Failure to Strike A.H.
Mr. Salgado first argues Mr. Kochersberger was constitutionally ineffective
because he “fail[ed] to move the trial court to strike A.H. for cause or to use a
peremptory strike to prohibit A.H. from being seated as a juror.” COA Appl. at 21.
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The district court denied relief on this claim because the “decision to strike or not
strike a potential juror rests within the strategic decisions that are vested in trial
counsel” and “reasonable explanations might exist for counsel’s desire to have A.H.
on the jury.” R. at 2942, 2943.
We are not comfortable with this reasoning. As Mr. Salgado points out, there
is a fair basis to suspect Mr. Kochersberger kept A.H. on the jury mistakenly, not
strategically. He requested striking a different juror to whom he attributed statements
about increased blood pressure and sweaty palms. But that juror never made those
statements or anything like them. A.H., however, spoke of a racing heart and sweaty
palms. Thus, Mr. Kochersberger may have intended to exclude A.H., instead of or in
addition to the other juror.
Even so, we may deny a COA on any basis evident in the record, just as we
may affirm on any basis evident in the record. See Davis v. Roberts, 425 F.3d 830,
834 (10th Cir. 2005). Here, although the district court resolved this on Strickland’s
deficient-performance prong, we instead see no debatable issue on the prejudice
prong, i.e., whether A.H.’s presence on the jury caused prejudice to Mr. Salgado.
The record before the court shows A.H. forthrightly disclosed a traumatic experience
that (we will assume) had some similarity to the accusations at issue. But the record
confirms she also understood her duty as a juror to be impartial. Mr. Salgado’s
theory that she “would not have been cons[c]iously aware of her inability to regulate
the transference of her own unresolved psychological damage into the case before the
court,” COA Appl. at 17, is speculative. We therefore deny a COA on this issue.
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2. Failure to Investigate Mr. Baca’s Tattoos
Before trial, R.S. stated in her safehouse interview that her abuser had a rose
tattoo on his elbow. On the stand at trial, she denied having reported a rose tattoo.
The attorneys representing Mr. Salgado in his state habeas proceeding
submitted a subpoena to the New Mexico Corrections Department for any records it
had about Mr. Baca. The Corrections Department responded with a record showing
Mr. Baca had been in prison in 1980 for forgery. The document described
Mr. Baca’s numerous tattoos, including a rose tattoo on the “[r]ight inter [sic] arm.”
R. at 433. Mr. Kochersberger, in his testimony at the habeas hearing, testified that
“this would have been important information,” had he known it at the time of trial.
R. at 28.
Mr. Salgado argues Mr. Kochersberger was constitutionally ineffective
because he did not adequately search for persons with tattoos matching those
described by R.S. If he had, Mr. Salgado says it would have led him to Mr. Baca,
who would have become the primary suspect.
In the district court, the State argued Mr. Salgado failed to exhaust certain
theories in state court, but the State did not identify this as one of the unexhausted
theories. Yet we cannot find where the state court ruled on this claim (although the
parties obviously explored it in the evidentiary hearing). The district court,
moreover, never identified the state court’s ruling. It instead ruled that the state
court’s resolution of the various ineffective-assistance issues was entitled to
deference.
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“When a state court rejects a federal claim without expressly addressing that
claim, a federal habeas court must presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on
the merits,” and is therefore subject to § 2254(d) deference. Johnson v. Williams,
568 U.S. 289, 301–02 (2013). “[T]hat presumption can in some limited
circumstances be rebutted,” id. at 301, but the burden of rebuttal falls on the
habeas petitioner if he is seeking non-deferential (de novo) review, id. at 301–02. In
the district court, Mr. Salgado never attempted to rebut the presumption, and he does
not attempt to rebut the presumption in his COA application. Thus, the presumption
of adjudication on the merits remains intact, and the question for the federal habeas
court is whether “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief,”
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98.
Under this standard, we see no basis for a COA. It is undisputed
Mr. Kochersberger did not know Mr. Baca had a rose tattoo, or any other tattoos that
might correspond to those R.S. described in her safehouse interview. Instead, he
knew that R.S. had described a tall, skinny person with certain tattoos, and that
Mr. Salgado was neither tall nor skinny, nor did he have the tattoos described by R.S.
He put this information before the jury during R.S.’s cross-examination.
We do not doubt Mr. Kochersberger could have strengthened the case had he
also found a person better matching R.S.’s description, but we cannot say the state
court had no reasonable basis under Strickland to reject this claim. 12 The fact that
12 Notably, there is no way to know if such an investigation would have led to Mr. Baca. Mr. Salgado says “the record suggests that as R.S.’s biological grandfather, 27 Appellate Case: 23-2032 Document: 010110966292 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Page: 28
Mr. Salgado’s habeas attorneys thought to investigate Mr. Baca—who had been
T.R.’s guardian, not R.S.’s—does not show Mr. Kochersberger was objectively
unreasonable in his own investigation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“A fair
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate
the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the
time.”). We therefore see no debatable issue, and we deny a COA.
3. Failure to Introduce Employment Records
Mr. Salgado next contends Mr. Kochersberger was ineffective because he did
not bolster Mr. Salgado’s testimony with employment records confirming he was a
bus driver during the charging period. Mr. Salgado claims the employment records
would have led the jury to believe he never worked at a bail bond agency during that
timeframe, so T.R.’s memory of having met with Mr. Salgado at a bail bond place
could not have been formed during the charging period. And this, in turn, suggests
Mr. Salgado never knew Ms. Trebizo or her daughters during the charging period.
At the state habeas hearing, Mr. Kochersberger testified about the choice not
to introduce employment records. He “felt that bringing in employment records
could possibly bolster the testimony of the children and that there were gaps in
[Mr. Baca] had access to R.S. throughout the charging period.” COA Appl. at 24. He cites nothing in support of either assertion. Mr. Baca testified that R.S. was his stepson’s biological daughter, not his own biological relation. We can find nothing in the record suggesting Mr. Baca had access to R.S. (or T.R.) during the charging period, other than coming to pick up T.R. toward the end of that period. 28 Appellate Case: 23-2032 Document: 010110966292 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Page: 29
employment that could have hurt Petitioner’s defense.” R. at 27. The state court
held this was a reasonable strategic decision. The district court held this was not an
unreasonable application of Strickland. We agree.
For a claim like this, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Salgado tells us why he thinks the
employment records could have helped, but he does not attempt to demonstrate why
Mr. Kochersberger had unsound reasons for choosing not to introduce them.
We have also examined the only employment records we can find in the
appellate record. One is a letter from the City of Albuquerque stating it employed
Mr. Salgado as a bus driver between March and October 2000. The other is a letter
from a New Mexico state agency stating Mr. Salgado became a licensed bail bond
solicitor in April 2001. Neither document shows Mr. Salgado was not working for a
bail bond agency during the charging period. The latter document shows only when
he became licensed, not when he began his employment. Mr. Salgado himself
testified he began working for a bail bond agency in roughly December 2000, i.e.,
before he became licensed.
The employment records have gaps, just as Mr. Kochersberger said. The
district court’s deference to the state court’s resolution of this issue is not debatable,
so we deny a COA.
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4. Failure to Secure Ms. Trebizo’s Testimony
Finally, Mr. Salgado claims Mr. Kochersberger was ineffective for failing to
have Ms. Trebizo (the girls’ mother) testify. In state habeas proceedings,
Mr. Salgado framed this claim as a failure to seek a continuance until Ms. Trebizo
could be found—because, as it happened, she turned herself in on the material
witness warrant nine days after trial.
The state court refused to deem this ineffective assistance because the trial
judge held a hearing on the day of Ms. Trebizo’s expected testimony and the
transcript of that hearing shows the parties “reasonably believed Ms. Tre[b]izo had
no intention of testifying and that there was no way to determine when she would be
found.” R. at 35 (citing R. at 436–39 (transcript of trial court’s hearing on this
issue)). Thus, in the state court’s view, it would be impermissible hindsight bias to
factor her reappearance into the analysis. The state court also observed
Mr. Kochersberger had convinced the trial judge to allow the jury to consider
Ms. Trebizo’s prior statement at the bond hearing for its truth. Mr. Kochersberger
deemed this to be even better than Ms. Trebizo’s actual testimony, given she could
not change or misremember anything on the stand and the prosecution could not
cross-examine her. The district court upheld this is a reasonable application of
Strickland.
Mr. Salgado does not convince us there is a debatable issue here. His COA
application focuses on why, in his view, Ms. Trebizo’s live testimony could have
provided important details beyond the statement the jury heard, but he does not
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explain why that raises a debatable issue about Mr. Kochersberger’s performance.
He ensured she was served with a subpoena and he obtained a material witness
warrant. When she did not comply, he successfully sought introduction of a
favorable statement that the prosecution could not cross-examine. Under these
circumstances, we cannot say the state court unreasonably held this strategy was
within the range of constitutionally permissible performance.
Mr. Salgado also argues that Mr. Kochersberger was ineffective for having
“promised the jury that Ms. Trebizo would take the witness stand for the defense,”
and then failing to “deliver on that promise.” COA Appl. at 26. The record does
not contain a transcript of the opening statements. The record contains a transcript of
closing arguments, however, and that transcript shows both sides alluded to
Mr. Kochersberger having said something about Ms. Trebizo in his opening
statement. However, those allusions, without more, do not confirm what actually was
said. Regardless, Mr. Salgado did not raise this claim below, so we will not examine
it for the first time in this proceeding. See Viera, 674 F.3d at 1220.
IV. CONCLUSION
We deny a COA and dismiss this proceeding. We grant Mr. Salgado’s motion
to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees.
Entered for the Court
Veronica S. Rossman Circuit Judge