24-2833-cv Sacaza v. City of New York UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term 2025
(Argued: September 18, 2025 Decided: March 11, 2026)
Docket No. 24-2833-cv
DENNIS SACAZA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
- against -
CITY OF NEW YORK, DETECTIVE MICHAEL FRIEDMAN, Defendants-Appellants.
JOHN DOES 1-3, OF THE 71ST PRECINCT, Defendants. ∗
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Before: CHIN and PÉREZ, Circuit Judges. **
∗ The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption accordingly.
** Circuit Judge Alison J. Nathan, originally a member of the panel, was unavailable at
the time of argument. Accordingly, the appeal is being decided by the remaining members of the panel, who are in agreement. See 2d Cir. IOP E(b). Interlocutory appeal from a decision of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York (Bulsara, J.), denying summary
judgment to a New York City detective on claims against him of false arrest and
malicious prosecution. The district court held that because questions of fact
existed as to whether there was arguable probable cause to arrest and charge the
plaintiff, the defendant had not established his entitlement to qualified immunity
and therefore summary judgment was precluded. We disagree and accordingly
reverse the decision of the district court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
CHIDI A. EZE, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
AMY MCCAMPHILL, Assistant Corporation Counsel (Richard Dearing & Jeremy W. Shweder, Assistant Corporation Counsel, on the brief), for Muriel Goode-Trufant, Acting Corporation Counsel for the City of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants- Appellants.
CHIN, Circuit Judge:
This case arises from the arrest and prosecution of plaintiff-appellee
Dennis Sacaza after a minor accused him of sexually assaulting her while on a
-2- Metropolitan Transit Authority ("MTA") bus. Following an investigation, the
New York City Police Department (the "NYPD") arrested Sacaza and
defendant-appellant Michael Friedman, an NYPD detective, charged Sacaza with
several violations of the New York Penal Code. After the charges were
dismissed on speedy trial grounds, Sacaza commenced this action against
Friedman and the City of New York (the "City").
On appeal, Friedman argues that he is entitled to qualified
immunity because he had at least arguable probable cause to arrest and charge
Sacaza. Sacaza counters that video footage of the incident is plainly exculpatory
and casts such doubt on the minor's statement that no reasonable officer could
have believed that probable cause existed. For the reasons set forth in more
detail below, we conclude that arguable probable cause existed and therefore we
REVERSE the district court's denial of summary judgment as to qualified
immunity on the federal claims against Friedman and REMAND for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
-3- BACKGROUND
I. The Facts
A. The MTA Footage
On the morning of October 18, 2019, video footage from an MTA bus
traveling through Brooklyn (the "MTA Footage") captured the following: 1 At
approximately 7:53 AM, a teenage girl (the "Complainant") boarded a crowded
MTA bus on her way to school. Upon boarding, the Complainant was standing
to the right of and slightly behind an individual later identified as Sacaza. At this
point in the video, the Complainant and Sacaza were located at the very front of
the bus, on the passenger side between the driver and the doors. Sacaza's left
hand was holding onto a railing and his right hand was out of view, but he was
carrying a bag. While the Complainant and Sacaza were at the front of the bus,
the MTA Footage does not definitively show any contact between them. But
again, Sacaza's right hand was not visible to the camera. Around 7:59 AM,
Sacaza stepped off the bus to allow others to board, and the Complainant moved
1 On an interlocutory appeal of a decision denying summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, we accept stipulated facts, the plaintiff's alleged facts, or facts favorable to the plaintiff that the district court concluded the jury might find, see Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004), and construe the evidence in favor of the non- moving party. See Marcavage v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 98, 110 (2d Cir. 2012). -4- further toward the middle of the bus. Sacaza then re-boarded the bus and stood
a few steps away from the Complainant. After about fifteen seconds, Sacaza
moved further toward the middle of the bus and stood directly behind the
Complainant. Still, Sacaza's left hand was holding onto a railing, and his right
hand was out of view.
Sacaza stood directly behind the Complainant for just over a minute.
During this minute, the Complainant looked back several times and appeared
uncomfortable, though the MTA Footage still does not definitively show any
contact between Sacaza and the Complainant. After seeming to notice the
Complainant's apparent discomfort, a nearby passenger offered the Complainant
a seat. Once seated, the Complainant appeared to take several videos of Sacaza.
About a minute and a half later, as Sacaza began to exit the bus with the
Complainant following behind, the Complainant showed the nearby passenger
something on her phone and appeared to begin crying. The female passenger
consoled the Complainant by rubbing her side as the Complainant exited the
bus. After exiting at the front of the bus, Sacaza immediately boarded again
through a different door near the middle of the bus and continued riding the bus.
-5- B. The Investigation
After arriving at school on October 18, the Complainant notified
someone at the school about the alleged assault. The school then notified the
Complainant's father and called 911. The Complainant's father also called 911
and spoke to Officer Hernandez from the 71st precinct. The 71st precinct then
contacted Friedman at the Brooklyn Special Victims Bureau.
The Complainant went to Friedman's office the same day. Friedman
interviewed her and filled out a general investigation report concerning the
alleged assault. During the interview, the Complainant texted Friedman videos
of Sacaza that she took while she and Sacaza were still on the bus. Friedman
then used still images from those videos to create wanted posters with Sacaza's
face on them, and Friedman later circulated the wanted posters to the media.
Friedman also requested the MTA Footage, which he received on or about
October 22, 2019.
On October 25, 2019, Friedman conferred with Sergeant Freyre.
After reviewing Friedman's media request concerning Sacaza, who was still
unidentified at the time, Sergeant Freyre informed Friedman that the man he was
looking for was likely Sacaza, who had been the subject of a 2017 city wide
-6- "public lewdness pattern" case and a person of interest in a different Transit
Special Victims case for public lewdness. J. App'x at 184; see also id. at 187.
On October 26, 2019, Detective Chery presented the Complainant
with a double-blind photo array of six individuals. 2 The Complainant identified
Sacaza in the photo array. Sacaza was arrested on November 14, 2019. The same
day, Friedman presented the Complainant with an in-person lineup where the
Complainant again identified Sacaza. The Complainant noted she was
"[a]bsolutely [p]ositive" about her identification of Sacaza. Id. at 197.
The next day, November 15, 2019, Friedman signed the initial
criminal complaint charging Sacaza with forcible touching, sexual abuse,
harassment, and endangering the welfare of a child. Friedman listed only the
Complainant as a source of information for the initial criminal complaint. The
initial criminal complaint details that the Complainant boarded an MTA bus, and
that while located at the front of the MTA bus, Sacaza "rubbed [the
2 A double-blind photo array is a procedure administered by an officer who is not involved in the investigation, does not know the identities of the people in the photos, does not know the suspect, and does not know where in the array the suspect is located. See Serrano v. Royce, No. 20-CV-06660, 2023 WL 9418661, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 20-CV-06660, 2024 WL 295374 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2024); United States v. Loyd, No. 19-CR-6186, 2020 WL 2027003, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 19-CR-6186, 2020 WL 4754472 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020). -7- Complainant's] vagina and inner thigh with [his] hand" without her consent. Id.
at 218. It further states that after the Complainant moved further back on the
MTA bus, Sacaza followed her and "brushed [his] penis against [her] buttocks in
a side to side motion." Id.
A second criminal complaint listing the same charges contained in
the initial criminal complaint was signed by a Kings County assistant district
attorney on November 19, 2019. The second criminal complaint also only listed
the Complainant as the source of information. The second criminal complaint
includes the same two allegations as the first criminal complaint, in addition to
an allegation that Sacaza pulled down the Complainant's pants.
While not included in either criminal complaint, the Complainant
also alleged on the day of her initial report that after they both exited the MTA
bus, Sacaza followed her for three blocks.
Sacaza was released from custody on December 12, 2019. In April of
2021, the case against Sacaza was dismissed on speedy trial grounds.
II. Procedural History
On May 19, 2022, Sacaza commenced this action against the City,
Friedman, and several John Does. Sacaza's complaint asserts claims against
-8- Friedman for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and denial of his right to a fair
trial pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York state law. Sacaza's complaint
also asserted similar claims against the City for false arrest under the theory of
respondeat superior, and for Monell liability. The parties consented to jurisdiction
before a Magistrate Judge, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 3 In November 2023, after the
conclusion of discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing,
inter alia, that Friedman was entitled to qualified immunity, and Sacaza filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment. The district court granted Defendants'
motion for summary judgment on Sacaza's fair trial, Monell, and state law false
arrest claims. See Sacaza v. City of N.Y., No. 22-cv-02954, 2024 WL 4333688, at *12
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2024).
The district court also denied both parties' motions for summary
judgment on the federal false arrest claim, and the state and federal malicious
prosecution claims. The district court concluded that "a reasonable jury could
conclude that the [MTA Footage] shows there was no physical contact between
Sacaza and the [Complainant] at any time." Id. at *6. It further concluded that
the MTA Footage, combined with inconsistencies about the Complainant being
3 The case was heard by then-Magistrate Judge Sanket J. Bulsara beginning in April 2023. Judge Bulsara was sworn in as a District Judge on December 20, 2024. -9- followed by Sacaza, "at a minimum, raises doubts about the complainant's
recitation of events." Id. At the same time, however, the district court also
concluded that a reasonable jury could find "that the contradictions between the
[MTA Footage] and the [Complainant's] statements do not raise doubts as to her
veracity, and therefore determine that there was probable cause to arrest." Id. at
*7. Based on those conclusions, the district court held that Sacaza raised "a
genuine issue of fact as to whether the video raised doubt about the veracity and
reliability of the [Complainant's] statement," id., and denied Friedman summary
judgment on Sacaza's federal false arrest claim and the state and federal
malicious prosecution claims. This appeal followed. 4
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
This Court possesses jurisdiction to review an interlocutory appeal
of a district court's denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity where "the underlying issues raise only questions of law." Bryant v.
4The district court's rulings dismissing Sacaza's fair trial and state law false arrest claims against Friedman and the claims against the City are not before this Court on this appeal. - 10 - Egan, 890 F.3d 382, 386 (2d Cir. 2018). Appellate jurisdiction generally does not
exist "if resolution of the immunity defense depends upon disputed factual
issues." Washington v. Napolitano, 29 F.4th 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2022) (citation
modified). A district court's conclusion that a genuine dispute of material fact
exists, however, is not enough to preclude this Court's review in some
circumstances. See Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004). This Court
may review the denial of qualified immunity where "it can be resolved on
stipulated facts, or on the facts that the plaintiff alleges are true, or on the facts
favorable to the plaintiff that the trial judge concluded the jury might find." Id.
(citation modified). Ultimately, Friedman bears the burden of establishing our
appellate jurisdiction. See Jok v. City of Burlington, 96 F.4th 291, 293-94 (2d Cir.
2024).
Here, Friedman has carried his burden to establish our jurisdiction
over this appeal. Because we are able to resolve the question of qualified
immunity based on undisputed facts and facts the district court concluded a jury
could reasonably find in Sacaza's favor, we have appellate jurisdiction.
- 11 - B. Standard of Review
Review of the district court’s denial of summary judgment involving
qualified immunity is de novo, and summary judgment is appropriate only where
the moving party meets its burden of establishing that no genuine issue of
material fact exists and that the undisputed facts entitle them to judgment as a
matter of law. Coollick v. Hughes, 699 F.3d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 2012).
C. Qualified Immunity
In certain circumstances, qualified immunity shields government
actors, such as police officers, from liability for actions taken in their official
capacity -- providing "ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law." Dufort v. City of New York, 874 F.3d 338,
354 (2d Cir. 2017) (citation modified). To determine whether a police officer is
entitled to qualified immunity, courts consider: (1) whether the facts evince that
the police officer violated a statutory or constitutional right; and (2) whether "the
right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct." Washington,
29 F.4th at 105 (citation modified). Courts may use their discretion in deciding
the order in which to approach a qualified immunity analysis, see Coollick, 699
F.3d at 219-20, and here, we begin with the second prong.
- 12 - Under the second prong of a qualified immunity analysis, "[a] right
is clearly established when the contours of the right are sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what they are doing violates that
right." Soukaneh v. Andrzejewski, 112 F.4th 107, 116 (2d Cir. 2024) (citation
modified). In the context of an arresting officer, qualified immunity applies
where it was objectively reasonable to believe there was probable cause to make
the arrest, or there was arguable probable cause -- that is, where reasonable
police officers could disagree as to the existence of probable cause. See Figueroa v.
Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 2016). 5 The party asserting a qualified immunity
defense bears the burden of showing actual probable cause or arguable probable
cause. See Coollick, 699 F.3d at 219. We discuss both.
5 Under New York state law, the test for qualified immunity or its equivalent may vary from that of federal law. See Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that, similar to the federal doctrine, New York law instructs a court to dismiss a false arrest claim at the summary judgment stage if the officer's probable cause determination was objectively reasonable, without any consideration of an officer's subjective intent); but see Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 166 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that, unlike the federal standard, "the New York standard for entitlement to qualified immunity has both objective and subjective components"). Here, the district court did not conduct an analysis under New York law. Instead, it concluded that "[b]ecause the state law claim relie[d] on the same facts as the federal claim, summary judgment [was] inappropriate . . . ." Sacaza, 2024 WL 4333688, at *12. On remand, the district court should evaluate Friedman’s qualified immunity defense to Sacaza’s state malicious prosecution claim in light of our holding that, as a matter of federal law, Friedman had arguable probable cause. - 13 - 1. Probable Cause
Actual probable cause is a "complete defense" to federal false arrest
claims. Triolo v. Nassau Cnty., 24 F.4th 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2022). The same is true for
malicious prosecution claims, see Boyd v. City of New York, 336 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir.
2003), unless intervening facts discovered between the arrest and the initiation of
prosecution dissipate probable cause. Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563,
571 (2d Cir. 1996).
"To determine whether probable cause existed, we consider the
totality of the circumstances, reviewing plainly exculpatory evidence alongside
inculpatory evidence to ensure the court has a full sense of the evidence that led
the officer to believe that there was probable cause to make an arrest." Triolo, 24
F.4th at 106 (citation modified). We focus our analysis on the "facts available to
the officer at the time of arrest and immediately before it." Id. (citation modified).
"Law enforcement officers have probable cause to arrest when they have
knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances
that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the
person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime." Id. (citation
modified).
- 14 - Unless exculpatory evidence or circumstances that "raise doubts as
to the alleged victim's veracity" arise, probable cause is present where a police
officer relies on such victim's identification of the suspect and statement of the
alleged crime. Id. (citation modified); see Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 82 (2d
Cir. 2014); Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Alberty v.
Hunter, 144 F.4th 408, 416 (2d Cir. 2025) (finding that a victim's in-person
identification "alone would be enough to provide Defendants with probable
cause to arrest"); Mara v. Rilling, 921 F.3d 48, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that
even "undoubtedly suggestive" photo identifications can inform a finding of
probable cause).
Even considering all the above-described parameters, probable
cause "is a fluid standard" and law enforcement is not required to rely on "hard
certainties" or a belief that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed.
Figueroa, 825 F.3d at 99 (citation modified). "Rather, it requires only facts
establishing the kind of fair probability on which a reasonable and prudent
person, as opposed to a legal technician, would rely." Id. (citation modified).
- 15 - 2. Arguable Probable Cause
Even absent actual probable cause, police officers are entitled to
qualified immunity on federal claims if arguable probable cause existed. Betts,
751 F.3d at 82-83. Again, arguable probable cause existed here if it was
objectively reasonable for Friedman to arrest Sacaza or if police officers of
reasonable competence could have disagreed as to whether probable cause
existed. See Figueroa, 825 F.3d at 100.
II. Application
The district court ruled that summary judgment was inappropriate
because a reasonable jury could conclude "there was no physical contact"
between Sacaza and the Complainant and that inconsistencies about her being
followed raise "doubts" about the Complainant's recitation of events. Sacaza,
2024 WL 4333688, at *6-7. The district court also ruled, however, that a
reasonable jury could conclude that the contradictions in the Complainant's
statements "do not raise doubts as to her veracity, and therefore determine that
there was probable cause to arrest." Id. at 16. Hence, the district court
determined that a reasonable jury could find either probable cause or the lack
thereof. If a reasonable jury could find probable cause, then so could a reasonable
- 16 - officer. And if a reasonable officer could find probable cause, then Friedman is
entitled to qualified immunity.
Based on the undisputed facts in the record, a reasonable police
officer in Friedman’s position could have found probable cause that Sacaza had
touched the Complainant inappropriately. While the Complainant's statements
and identifications of Sacaza served as Friedman's principal basis for finding
probable cause, the MTA Footage and other information provided objective
evidence for a reasonable police officer to arrest and charge Sacaza.
The record contains the following undisputed evidence to support the conclusion
that Sacaza sexually assaulted the Complainant: (1) the Complainant reported
the alleged assault to her school and the police almost immediately; (2) the
Complainant identified Sacaza as her assailant on two separate occasions,
including once in-person; (3) Friedman learned that Sacaza was a person of
interest in other public lewdness incidents; (4) the MTA Footage shows the
Complainant being uncomfortable and looking back several times while Sacaza
is positioned directly behind her for more than a minute; (5) the MTA Footage
shows that the Complainant felt the need to and did take videos of Sacaza, which
she later shared with Friedman; and (6) the MTA Footage shows that the
- 17 - Complainant was so visibly disturbed by Sacaza that a nearby passenger felt the
need to console her. Based on this evidence, a reasonable police officer could
have believed that Sacaza committed a crime justifying arrest.
Sacaza argues that no probable cause existed because the MTA
Footage raises doubts as to the Complainant's veracity. While the record does
show that there were inconsistencies in the Complainant's statements, this
argument fails, for a reasonable police officer could have found that the
inconsistencies did not undermine the veracity of a fifteen-year-old girl in
distress.
The MTA Footage of the alleged assault both corroborates and
contradicts parts of the Complainant's statements to the NYPD. For example, the
MTA Footage contradicts the Complainant's allegation that Sacaza followed her
for three blocks because it shows Sacaza continued riding on the bus after the
Complainant's stop. And the MTA Footage does not definitively show that an
assault took place. But the MTA Footage does show that Sacaza repositioned
himself to stand right behind the Complainant, and it also shows her great
discomfort and emotional reaction. The MTA Footage also reveals that the
passenger felt it necessary to offer a seat to the Complainant and to console her.
- 18 - Arguable probable cause exists where reasonable police officers
could disagree on whether there was probable cause. Figueroa, 825 F.3d at 100.
Therefore, it follows that to dissipate arguable probable cause, the circumstances
or facts casting doubt on a victim's veracity need to be such that no reasonable
police officer could find that probable cause existed. See Triolo, 24 F.4th at 108.
Even assuming there were inconsistencies in the Complainant's statements, at
most, Sacaza's arguments show only that reasonable police officers could
disagree. Thus, at the very least, arguable probable cause existed.
Sacaza also argues that the MTA Footage is plainly exculpatory
because it does not show that there was an inappropriate interaction, or that he
followed the Complainant after she exited the bus. For similar reasons, this
argument is also unavailing.
Evidence is plainly exculpatory where it shows that a person cannot
be guilty of the relevant crime as a matter of law. Alberty, 144 F.4th at 417. Here,
the MTA Footage neither definitively proves nor disproves Sacaza's alleged
assault of the Complainant. While Sacaza is correct that the MTA Footage does
not show him following the Complainant after exiting the bus or show an
outright sexual assault, it also supports many aspects of the Complainant's
- 19 - statements. While the MTA Footage is arguably exculpatory in some respects, it
is also inculpatory in others. Even assuming Friedman erred and the
Complainant made up the accusations or simply got it wrong, a reasonable
officer could have believed that there was a basis for arresting and charging
Sacaza. See Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 421 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[I]n qualified
immunity cases, we are not concerned with the correctness of the [officer's]
conduct, but rather the objective reasonableness of their chosen course of action
given the circumstances . . . ." (citation modified)).
Lastly, Sacaza argues that it should be left to a jury to determine
whether Friedman had probable cause. This argument fails, however, because
where, as the district court concluded here, a reasonable jury could find
Friedman had probable cause to arrest and charge Sacaza or the lack thereof, the
appropriate remedy is not to leave that determination to the jury, but to grant
summary judgment on qualified immunity to the officer. See Cerrone v. Brown,
246 F.3d 194, 203 (2d Cir. 2001).
* * *
"We recognize the apparent anomaly of holding that summary
judgment is appropriate when a trier of fact would find that reasonable officers
- 20 - could disagree." Lennon, 66 F.3d at 421. But in the context of arguable probable
cause, law enforcement officers must be granted qualified immunity if a
reasonable jury could find that there was probable cause. See id. at 424-25.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the district court's decision is
REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for entry in favor of Friedman on the
federal claims and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including
resolution of the state claims.
- 21 -