Peck, J.
This is an appeal by plaintiff from an order of the Chittenden Superior Court dismissing his untitled complaint in which he sought to enjoin the defendants from suspending or expelling him as a student at the Essex Junction High School. Plaintiff also claimed damages in an unspecified amount, but presented no evidence as to what the damages amounted to.
The grounds for the proposed disciplinary action was an alleged sale of a small quantity of marijuana by plaintiff to a fellow student on October 16, 1981. The court below granted a temporary restraining order pending a hearing on the merits which was held on November 12, 1981. The findings of fact, conclusions of law and the order issued on February 3, 1982. Plaintiff’s expulsion has been stayed pending this appeal. We affirm.
The underlying fact of the sale of the drug by plaintiff has never been in dispute. It was admitted by him to school authorities on the date it occurred. The issues raised below and on this appeal relate exclusively to the procedures followed in deciding to remove him from the school, originally for the remainder of the fall 1981 semester. They are four in number and all highly technical in nature. The first relates to the authority of the Prudential Committee to act. The second issue challenges the adequacy of the notice of the committee hearing; and, more generally, charges the committee with failing to follow its own established expulsion procedures; thirdly, plaintiff contends the court erred in finding that he had been removed from school by the assistant principal as the duly [404]*404authorized agent of the principal. Finally, he contends the committee failed to make a finding that his continued presence at the school would be harmful to the welfare of the school as, he argues, is required by 16 Y.S.A. § 1162.
We consider the issues in the order presented.
I.
Plaintiff challenges the authority of the defendant committee to suspend or expel a student. He relies on 16 V.S.A. § 1162, which reads in part:
A superintendent or principal may, pursuant to regulations adopted by the governing board, suspend, or with the approval of a majority of the... board ..., dismiss or expel a pupil for misconduct when the misconduct makes the continued presence of the pupil harmful to the welfare of the school.
From this language, plaintiff would have us hold that only the superintendent or principal, subject to regulations adopted by the defendant committee as the “governing board,” had the power to act in this case. We reject this interpretation of § 1162, however, as an improbable limitation on the authority of the governing boards of our state schools.
The purpose of § 1162 is not to limit the authority of school boards in disciplinary matters, nor does it mandate that boards must adopt regulations in favor of superintendents or principals. We hold that the purpose of § 1162 is to prescribe the conditions under which school boards may authorize certain officials, to suspend, dismiss, or expel students, that is, by the adoption of appropriate regulations. In the absence of regulations adopted for that purpose, the enumerated disciplinary powers remain with the boards. In this respect we agree with defendants, and hold further that these powers are inherent in school boards, deriving by necessary implication from their statutory powers of governance in all matters pertaining to the schools under their jurisdiction.
One fault with plaintiff’s argument is a familiar and frequently recurring one. His interpretation of 16 V.S.A. § 1162, even standing alone, is neither necessary nor com[405]*405pelled by the literal or plain meaning rule. See State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 509-10, 438 A.2d 1135, 1139 (1981). It is a construction which isolates this statute from others standing with it in pari materia. We have held frequently, and reiterate here, that statutes in pari materia, that is, dealing with the same general subject matter, must be read together and construed as parts of a statutory system. In re Preseault, 130 Vt. 343, 346, 292 A.2d 832, 834 (1972).
Applying this rule, we approve as a sound starting point the defendants’ argument that 16 V.S.A. § 563 grants to school boards, including the defendant prudential committee, the power to establish educational policies, and to prescribe rules and regulations for the conduct and management of their respective schools. See 16 V.S.A. § 563(1). Student discipline is an important and necessary element of school management. The defendant committee was well within the scope of its statutory powers in adopting rules and procedures, reserving to itself the power to expel students. Therefore, we repudiate the validity of plaintiff’s contention that in reserving the power of expulsion, the committee “has arrogated to itself the authority to expel, contrary to established Vermont law.”
It is true of course that § 1162 is specific and § 563 is general. When two such statutes are in conflict to the extent they cannot be reconciled, the specific will usually prevail. Aube v. O’Brien, 140 Vt. 1, 4, 433 A.2d 298, 299 (1981). The rule does not aid the plaintiff; the two statutes are not in conflict. Section 1162 authorizes but does not require school boards to delegate the power to expel. In the instant case the defendant committee elected to retain the power to itself, as it had the right to do. The first sentence of the committee’s “Procedures for Expulsion” reads: “Only the Prudential Committee shall have the authority to expel a student, and its decision shall be final.”
We conclude that the defendant committee has the authority under Vermont law to expel students.
II.
Plaintiff claims next that he did not receive a written notice [406]*406of the committee hearing containing a statement of the charges against him as contemplated by the committee’s own regulations. The trial court agreed with this claim. Paragraph 12 of the findings reads in part: “Contrary to its own rules and regulations, neither the Committee nor its agents gave plaintiff a written statement of the charges . . . .” In the same paragraph, however, the court found the plaintiff was well aware of the charges and of the procedures to be followed at the committee hearing. Moreover, in another paragraph, the court found he had admitted the charges when first confronted by the school authorities, and the record discloses that at his hearing he again admitted he had sold marijuana to a fellow student.
Plaintiff argues that, as a minor, he has no capacity to waive his legal rights. We need not resolve that issue for purposes of this case; we are not concerned here with waiver, but, ultimately, with prejudice.
Essentially, the plaintiff’s claim raises the issue of procedural due process rights. It is his position that the failure of the committee to provide him with a written notice containing a statement of the charges against him, as contemplated by its own regulations, constituted a deprivation of his due process rights, per se, that is, regardless of actual knowledge and notice, the absence of any resulting prejudice, or considerations of overall fairness. This position compels us to review applicable decisions of the federal courts, as well as the laws of this state.
In a leading decision of the United States Supreme Court involving a student suspension, the Court said:
“[Deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication [must] be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” (Citation omitted.) ... At the very minimum, therefore, students . . . must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (emphasis in the original of the two words “some”; other emphasis added). Thereafter, in the same case, the Supreme Court said, “the student [must] be given oral or written notice of the charges against him.” Id. at 581. It is true that Goss involved a sus[407]*407pension for ten days or less, and the Court noted further that “[l]onger suspensions or expulsions . . . may require more formal procedures.” Id. at 584 (emphasis added). But the Court said also that “ ‘[t]he very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.’ ” Id. at 578 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
We construe Goss to mean that, at least beyond the constitutional minimum requirements of notice and hearing, each case, as far as the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution is concerned, must ultimately be determined on its own peculiar facts, and that “ ‘the rudimentary elements of fair play’ meet general requirements of due process.” Nzuve v. Castleton State College, 133 Vt. 225, 229, 335 A.2d 321, 324 (1975).
Turning to the lower federal courts, decisions have examined both administrative noncompliance with established procedures on the one hand, and substantial compliance by school authorities with their own disciplinary rules on the other. In the first, one court said:
[T]he legal conclusion that administrative noncompliance with established procedures and guidelines in itself amounts to deprivation of due process, even though said rules establish requirements in excess of the due process minimum... is incorrect.
Morrow v. Bassman, 515 F. Supp. 587, 592 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (emphasis added).
In a case dealing with substantial compliance, as distinguished from the strict and literal compliance requirement urged here by the plaintiff, the court’s opinion contains the following:
[T]he court finds that plaintiff was afforded due process as required by Goss, and defendants, by substantially complying with their disciplinary rules of suspension which go well beyond the constitutional minimum, satisfied the due process clause.
Hillman v. Elliott, 436 F. Supp. 812, 817 (W.D. Va. 1977) (emphasis added).
[408]*408The claim in Hillman, as in the case before us, involved the failure of written notice in the presence of clear actual notice, coupled, also as here, with an admission to the charges by the student.
We decline to follow those courts which appear to hold that written notice is an inflexible sine qua non of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, or that, if written disciplinary regulations are adopted, they must be strictly and literally complied with necessarily, under pain of reversal and damages. Therefore, it is appropriate that we delineate at least some of the reasons which have persuaded the majority to join with those courts which have espoused the contrary view.
At the outset we think these requirements are too rigid; unnecessarily so. There are, undoubtedly, as Goss points out, certain fundamental requirements such as some kind of adequate notice and opportunity for a proper hearing. Nevertheless, courts should be wary of attempting to prescribe, by judicial fiat, rules for the conduct of institutions and activities of which they have, as a rule, little first-hand familiarity, and at best only evidentiary knowledge, with all the potential shortcomings inherent in that source. Moreover, in adopting these inflexible requirements as a matter of law, courts deny even themselves the opportunity of making a wise choice based on the totality of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In effect, these courts limit their own capacity to accomplish true justice in the unexpected type of case, the deserving, the new, ahd the novel. “Judge-made law” at least, should remain sufficiently flexible, whenever possible, to allow courts room to do justice in the particular case, without the embarrassment of attempting distinctions or outright overruling.
We believe these courts have expanded the proposition announced in Goss, that the very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures applicable to every conceivable situation, far beyond any language to be found in that case. Contrary to the wisdom of the Goss premise, they add instead, one more frozen layer to the concept of due process. They appear to exalt form over substance, and substitute a convenient rule in place of thinking and judicial inquiry. They limit severely the desirable opportunities for case-[409]*409by-case review and a true balancing of interests. They would deny consideration of actual notice and knowledge, substantial compliance, and prejudice or the lack of it. In short, they reject the proposition accepted by many other courts, that “[t] he concept of due process is premised upon fairness and reasonableness in light of the totality of circumstances.” Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 917 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (emphasis added), quoted with approval in Hillman, supra, at 816.1
Some of these courts purport to have established their rigid requirements through a balancing of the interests involved. However, in setting these standards as a matter of law, they must necessarily have balanced the interests on broad hypothetical grounds, effectively shutting themselves off from any true balancing in the individual cases as they arise. They recite, for example, the possible adverse effect on a student as a result of an expulsion or suspension. However, an adverse experience may affect any person, young or adult. Overlooked, apparently, is the fact that these hypothetical traumas, the likelihood and seriousness of which we believe are exaggerated at best, will occur in any event by virtue of the disciplinary action itself, not because of the procedure followed. But this only brings us full circle to the question of fairness and reasonableness of the procedures followed in fact, in the light of the totality of the circumstances. Id.
We believe the underlying question should be whether the student’s interests have been properly protected, so that he was not prejudiced by the failure to give written notice, per se, or by any failure of strict and literal compliance by school authorities with their own regulations. If that question can be answered in the affirmative, we would hold, generally, that there has been no necessary violation of the due process clause; the answer should provide one of the primary standards for the resolution of school disciplinary cases. With that criterion before us, we turn to the facts of the case at bar.
At the outset, the students were warned earlier in the year that drug violations would be looked upon as a serious matter [410]*410and would be dealt with severely. The committee hearing date itself was agreed upon between the assistant principal and plaintiff’s father. No continuance was requested for purposes of further preparation or otherwise, either prior to or at the hearing, although the assistant principal had indicated to the father that additional time would be allowed if requested. Actual notice of the charges to both plaintiff and his parents is clear and has not been questioned, nor is there any suggestion that the charges as presented to the committee were any different from those with which plaintiff had been confronted (and admitted) from the outset, and which he admitted again before the committee. Plaintiff and his parents participated in the committee hearing without objection based on any lack of written notice to either. He did not elect to be represented by counsel, although the family was advised he might have counsel if desired. The committee’s attorney was present but did not take part in the examination of witnesses for either side; he was in fact little more than a spectator. Witnesses were called on behalf of the plaintiff, including both his father and mother, and written statements on his behalf by others, including members of the faculty, were received and considered. If the hearing was more formal than his father had anticipated, formality is a relative term at best, and the father was furnished a written outline of the procedures to be followed on the day prior to the hearing; he made no objection then or at any time thereafter.
For reasons which are not clear, plaintiff himself did not take the stand in the lower court, but his father admitted knowledge that the school administration would recommend his son’s expulsion, and that such a result was a possibility. Several frank and candid discussions between the parents and the assistant principal of the school were held by phone and in the latter’s office in the days prior to the committee hearing. Moreover, the father testified he had not been surprised by anything that took place at the hearing, that he heard nothing he did not already know, and that there was nothing he would have done differently had he been given more time to prepare for the hearing. In short, notice and knowledge is clear from the outset, and continued through the hearing which, in itself, was fair in all respects.
[411]*411In light of these facts we are satisfied that in this particular case the plaintiff was dealt with fairly at all levels of the disciplinary procedures followed. In fact, excepting only the uncertain claim that plaintiff himself may not have been given a notice in writing of the charges, the required content of which he already knew, both the school authorities and the committee itself appear to have leaned over backwards in their efforts to accord him all of his rights relating to adequate notice and a fair hearing, and to satisfy their own obligations in those areas.
We conclude, and so hold, that minimum requirements of due process, as outlined in Goss, were satisfied as to the plaintiff in the instant case. It remains only to examine the effect under Vermont law of the school’s failure to follow, strictly and literally, its own regulations. We must assume, as noted above, that the trial court’s finding of noncompliance is fact.
On the question of notice in administrative proceedings, this Court has held:
In the field of administrative regulation the essentials of due process must be met if a fair and open hearing is to be provided by the Board. (Citations omitted.) The question on review is not the adequacy of the original notice or pleading but is the fairness of the whole procedure. Critical to a determination of whether the procedure was fair is whether or not the parties were given an adequate opportunity to prepare and respond to the issues raised in the proceeding. (Citation omitted.)
In re Green Mountain Power Corp., 131 Vt. 284, 293, 305 A.2d 571, 577 (1973). This ruling is consistent with our holding in Nzuve v. Castleton State College, supra, quoted above, to the effect that the measure of due process is fairness.
In Nzomo v. Vermont State Colleges, 136 Vt. 97, 385 A.2d 1099 (1978), a labor case involving the termination of a member of the faculty, we said that the Colleges’ termination procedures were binding and must be “scrupulously observed.” Id. at 100,385 A.2d at 1101.
We have no quarrel with this language. However, it is perhaps desirable to clarify its meaning. We are reluctant to in[412]*412dulge in semantics, recognizing, nevertheless, that semantics may play a legitimate part in the interpretation of the written word. Here, the word “scrupulous” does not necessarily mean “literal” or “exact.” Dictionary definitions range from the “exact” concept, to attention to what is “right and proper,” “conscientiously honest” and “moral integrity.” See Webster’s New World Dictionary, Second College Edition (1977); Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1975). Moreover, the scrupulous observance language in the context of Nzomo addresses a virtually total disregard for the substance, as well as the form, of the regulations to the point that the plaintiff might well have been prejudiced by the noncompliance; not so in the instant case. Here, the only discrepancy complained of was the alleged failure to provide plaintiff with written notice containing a statement of the charges against him; charges of which, the record makes abundantly clear, and the court properly found, he was well aware. He was advised of, and confronted with, the charges by school authorities, and they were admitted by him. At no time, as far as the record shows, did he equivocate, recant, or qualify his admission, or attempt to deny the truth of any part of the charges.
We hold that on the facts of this case the only regulation complained of on the appeal was scrupulously, if not literally, observed, through substantial compliance: the actual notice provided. We do not need to go even as far as the court did in Hillman, supra, at 815, 817, saying there that since the plaintiff admitted the charges it was sufficient; he must have had notice. There was here, in the view of the majority, at least substantial compliance by the school authorities with their own regulations, and a clear absence of any prejudice resulting from noncompliance by the school authorities with their own regulations.
If there were other regulations in doubt, questions relating thereto were not raised, briefed, or argued. We will not search the record for possible errors, if any, under those circumstances. On the contrary, we will assume they were followed, or substantially complied with to the plaintiff’s satisfaction.
We think it appropriate to conclude discussion of the second issue with the caveat that this opinion is not to be construed [413]*413as carte blanche for any and all failures to comply with administrative regulations. Governmental agencies are expected to comply with their own rules. Where there has been a noncompliance, the potential for a due process violation is ever present, threatening reversal as well as the possible assessment of damages in many cases. We do not approve any failure by the defendants here. Repeated willful or careless disregard for regulations by the very authorities who make them would be a procedural mockery with which we will not be in sympathy. If schools do not intend to follow their own regulations which go beyond minimum due process requirements, they should not adopt them unless otherwise required by law.
On the other hand, where, as here, a close scrutiny of the facts discloses substantial compliance with administrative regulations, and a clear absence of prejudice, the adoption of an inflexible insistence on exact and literal compliance may also have undesirable consequences. These consequences might include, among others, a reluctance to adopt any regulations, or the revocation of those now existing, the breeding of disrespect for law and legitimate authority, and the difficulty in dealing effectively with the disciplinary problems rampant in many of the public schools today.
We hold that on the facts of this case there has been substantial compliance with the regulation complained of, and plaintiff has not been prejudiced by any failure of strict compliance. There has been no failure of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment or under Vermont case law. Accordingly, we reject plaintiff’s due process claim and find no error on the second issue.
III.
Plaintiff next takes issue with the court’s conclusion that “ [p] laintiff was in effect suspended, not expelled or dismissed, by Henry [the assistant principal], the duly authorized agent of principal Emery; and, therefore, the subsequent action by the Committee simply was a ratification of an accomplished fact.”
It is not necessary to address the plaintiff’s objections to this conclusion of law; indeed we agree with him that it is clearly wrong. We hasten to add, however, that this error does not require reversal of the ultimate decision of the trial [414]*414court to dismiss the complaint. The court has, in effect, reached a supportable result, albeit for the wrong reason. Gilwee v. Town of Barre, 138 Vt. 109, 111, 412 A.2d 300, 301 (1980).
It is apparent that in reaching the conclusion it did, the court below misunderstood the application of § 1162 to this case (see discussion of the first issue, supra), and it was, in fact, the committee which expelled the plaintiff.
The correctness of this conclusion is unmistakable. The first paragraph of the letter from a member of the committee, addressed to plaintiff’s parents subsequent to the hearing, reads:
At its meeting on Thursday, October 22, 1981, the Prudential Committee of the Essex Junction School District voted to expel Eric from the Essex Junction Educational Center for the remainder of the fall semester. This action was taken following the disciplinary hearing during which Eric admitted the possession and sale of marijuana on school property. Expulsion, defined as exclusion of the student from the school premises and all school functions for period of time, was deemed effective October 23, 1981.
There is nothing else in this letter which modifies the clear meaning of the quoted paragraph. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff was expelled by the committee and that in doing so the committee acted within the scope of its statutory powers. The trial court’s conclusion, while it was wrong as a matter of law, does not result in prejudice to the plaintiff. The final result reached by the court is proper, although it may have been reached, in part at least, for the wrong reason. Id.
IV.
In the fourth specific issue raised by the plaintiff, he complains of the committee’s finding that “Sale of marijuana on school property gravely affects the well-being of other students enrolled within the Essex Junction School District.” He argues that this finding does not satisfy the provisions of 16 V.S.A. § 1162 which provides that a principal or superintendent is empowered to expel a student “when the misconduct makes the continued presence of the pupil harmful to the welfare of the school.”
[415]*415He contends the statute is penal in nature and consequently must be strictly construed. State v. Sidway, 139 Vt. 480, 484, 431 A.2d 1237, 1239 (1981).
There are several problems with plaintiff’s argument. At the outset, we held above that § 1162 is not applicable to this case. Nevertheless, assuming, without deciding, that the criterion set forth in § 1162 should be the guiding principle, plaintiff’s argument is no more than semantics. A strict construction does not necessarily mean a literal construction, nor one leading to absurd consequences. Id. We agree with defendants that “[i]t is difficult to imagine how anything can gravely affect students and not be harmful to the welfare of the school.” Accordingly, we hold that, even if the criterion of § 1162 controls here, the committee’s finding satisfies the spirit of the prescribed standard.
Finally, again assuming the § 1162 standard is applicable, and assuming further that the committee’s finding did not satisfy it, these conclusions would not, standing alone, provide a basis for a permanent injunction against defendants. The proper course would have been a remand to the committee for further findings in accordance with the statutory mandate.
Plaintiff does not mount any other challenge to the finding beyond his strict construction argument; we reject this claim.
Affirmed. Remanded to Essex Junction Prudential Committee for redetermination of suspension or expulsion period.