1 O 2 JS6 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 RUSSELL MULLIN, ) CV 20-2061-RSWL-PJW ) 13 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER re: Plaintiff’s 14 ) Motion to Remand [7] v. ) 15 ) ) 16 FCA US, LLC; SHAVER ) AUTOMOTIVE GROUP; and DOES ) 17 1 through 10, inclusive, ) ) 18 ) Defendants. ) 19 Plaintiff Russell Mullin (“Plaintiff”) brings this 20 Action against Defendant FCA US, LLC (“Defendant FCA”) 21 for violations of California’s Song-Beverly Consumer 22 Warranty Act (the “Song-Beverly Act”) and fraud by 23 omission and against Defendant Shaver Automotive Group 24 (“Defendant Shaver”) for claims of negligent repair 25 (collectively, “Defendants”). Currently before the 26 Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (“Motion”) [7]. 27 Having reviewed all papers submitted pertaining to the 28 1 Motion, the Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: 2 GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 A. Factual Background 5 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant FCA manufactured 6 and/or distributed a 2017 Chrysler Pacifica, Vehicle 7 Identification No. 2C4RC1BG1HR505819 (the “Vehicle”). 8 Ex. B to Decl. of Leon Roubinian in Supp. of Defs.’ 9 Notice of Removal, Compl. (“Compl.”) ¶ 8, ECF No. 1-3. 10 Plaintiff alleges that he purchased the Vehicle on May 11 16, 2016. Id. 12 Plaintiff alleges that during the Vehicle’s 13 warranty period, the Vehicle developed various defects, 14 including a transmission defect (the “Transmission 15 Defect”). Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff further alleges that 16 Defendant FCA knew about the Transmission Defect since 17 2016, if not before, yet failed to mention it to its 18 sales representatives and its consumers, including 19 Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 17. 20 Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that he took the 21 Vehicle to Defendant Shaver, an automobile sales, 22 service, and repair business in Ventura County, for 23 “substantial repair on at least one occasion.” Id. ¶¶ 24 5, 59. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Shaver 25 failed to “properly store, prepare, and repair the [] 26 Vehicle in accordance with industry standards.” Id. ¶ 27 61. 28 /// 1 B. Procedural Background 2 Plaintiff filed his Complaint [1-3] in Superior 3 Court of the State of California, County of Los 4 Angeles, on January 27, 2020, alleging violations of 5 the Song-Beverly Act and fraud by omission against 6 Defendant FCA and negligent repair against Defendant 7 Shaver. Defendants removed this Action to this Court 8 on March 2, 2020 [1]. Plaintiff filed the instant 9 Motion to Remand [7] on March 17, 2020. Defendants 10 filed their Opposition [8] on March 31, 2020, and 11 Plaintiff replied [11] on April 7, 2020. 12 II. DISCUSSION 13 A. Legal Standard 14 Civil actions may be removed from state court if 15 the federal court has original jurisdiction. See 16 Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33 17 (2002) (“Under the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order 18 properly to remove [an] action pursuant to that 19 provision, . . . original subject-matter jurisdiction 20 [must] lie[] in the federal courts.”). Diversity 21 jurisdiction exists in all civil actions between 22 citizens of different states where the amount in 23 controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and 24 costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. There must be complete 25 diversity of citizenship, meaning “each of the 26 plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than 27 each of the defendants.” Morris v. Princess Cruises, 28 Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 1 Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996)). 2 Federal question jurisdiction exists in “all civil 3 actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 4 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 5 “The burden of establishing jurisdiction falls on 6 the party invoking the removal statute, which is 7 strictly construed against removal.” Sullivan v. First 8 Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 9 1987) (internal citations omitted). Courts resolve all 10 ambiguities “in favor of remand to state court.” 11 Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th 12 Cir. 2009) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 13 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). A removed case must be remanded 14 “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that 15 the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 16 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 17 B. Discussion 18 Plaintiff contends that this Court lacks subject 19 matter jurisdiction over this Action and so it should 20 be remanded to state court. The Court undisputably 21 lacks federal question jurisdiction; therefore, the 22 issue is whether the Court has diversity jurisdiction. 23 Thus, the burden is on Defendants to prove: (1) that 24 the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000; and (2) that 25 there is complete diversity of citizenship between the 26 parties. See Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1371; 28 U.S.C. § 27 1332. 28 /// 1 1. Amount in Controversy 2 When a defendant removes a complaint to federal 3 court, the defendant’s burden with respect to the 4 amount in controversy varies depending on the 5 circumstances. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 6 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). But “where it is 7 unclear or ambiguous from the face of a state-court 8 complaint whether the requisite amount in controversy 9 is pled,” the applicable standard is by a preponderance 10 of the evidence; this requires that the defendant 11 offers evidence establishing that it is more likely 12 than not that the amount in controversy is met, 13 exclusive of costs and interest. Id. (citing Sanchez 14 v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th 15 Cir. 1996)). In considering whether the removing 16 defendant has satisfied its burden, the court “may 17 consider facts in the removal petition,” and 18 “‘summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount 19 in controversy at the time of removal.’” Singer v. 20 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th 21 Cir. 1997) (quoting Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas. Co., 63 22 F.3d 1326, 1335-36 (5th Cir. 1995)). 23 Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he 24 “suffered damages in a sum to be proven at trial in an 25 amount that is not less than $25,001.00.” Compl. ¶ 11. 26 Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not clearly indicate 27 that the $75,000 minimum amount in controversy is met. 28 Therefore, Defendants must establish by a preponderance 1 of the evidence that the jurisdictional minimum has 2 been satisfied. 3 a. Actual Damages 4 Plaintiff seeks to recover for Defendant FCA’s 5 violation of an express warranty under the Song-Beverly 6 Act, Cal Civ. Code § 1793.2. Actual damages under the 7 Song-Beverly Act are the “amount equal to the actual 8 price paid or payable by the buyer,” less the reduction 9 in value “directly attributable to use by the buyer.” 10 Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)-(C).
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1 O 2 JS6 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 RUSSELL MULLIN, ) CV 20-2061-RSWL-PJW ) 13 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER re: Plaintiff’s 14 ) Motion to Remand [7] v. ) 15 ) ) 16 FCA US, LLC; SHAVER ) AUTOMOTIVE GROUP; and DOES ) 17 1 through 10, inclusive, ) ) 18 ) Defendants. ) 19 Plaintiff Russell Mullin (“Plaintiff”) brings this 20 Action against Defendant FCA US, LLC (“Defendant FCA”) 21 for violations of California’s Song-Beverly Consumer 22 Warranty Act (the “Song-Beverly Act”) and fraud by 23 omission and against Defendant Shaver Automotive Group 24 (“Defendant Shaver”) for claims of negligent repair 25 (collectively, “Defendants”). Currently before the 26 Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (“Motion”) [7]. 27 Having reviewed all papers submitted pertaining to the 28 1 Motion, the Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: 2 GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 A. Factual Background 5 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant FCA manufactured 6 and/or distributed a 2017 Chrysler Pacifica, Vehicle 7 Identification No. 2C4RC1BG1HR505819 (the “Vehicle”). 8 Ex. B to Decl. of Leon Roubinian in Supp. of Defs.’ 9 Notice of Removal, Compl. (“Compl.”) ¶ 8, ECF No. 1-3. 10 Plaintiff alleges that he purchased the Vehicle on May 11 16, 2016. Id. 12 Plaintiff alleges that during the Vehicle’s 13 warranty period, the Vehicle developed various defects, 14 including a transmission defect (the “Transmission 15 Defect”). Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff further alleges that 16 Defendant FCA knew about the Transmission Defect since 17 2016, if not before, yet failed to mention it to its 18 sales representatives and its consumers, including 19 Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 17. 20 Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that he took the 21 Vehicle to Defendant Shaver, an automobile sales, 22 service, and repair business in Ventura County, for 23 “substantial repair on at least one occasion.” Id. ¶¶ 24 5, 59. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Shaver 25 failed to “properly store, prepare, and repair the [] 26 Vehicle in accordance with industry standards.” Id. ¶ 27 61. 28 /// 1 B. Procedural Background 2 Plaintiff filed his Complaint [1-3] in Superior 3 Court of the State of California, County of Los 4 Angeles, on January 27, 2020, alleging violations of 5 the Song-Beverly Act and fraud by omission against 6 Defendant FCA and negligent repair against Defendant 7 Shaver. Defendants removed this Action to this Court 8 on March 2, 2020 [1]. Plaintiff filed the instant 9 Motion to Remand [7] on March 17, 2020. Defendants 10 filed their Opposition [8] on March 31, 2020, and 11 Plaintiff replied [11] on April 7, 2020. 12 II. DISCUSSION 13 A. Legal Standard 14 Civil actions may be removed from state court if 15 the federal court has original jurisdiction. See 16 Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33 17 (2002) (“Under the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order 18 properly to remove [an] action pursuant to that 19 provision, . . . original subject-matter jurisdiction 20 [must] lie[] in the federal courts.”). Diversity 21 jurisdiction exists in all civil actions between 22 citizens of different states where the amount in 23 controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and 24 costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. There must be complete 25 diversity of citizenship, meaning “each of the 26 plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than 27 each of the defendants.” Morris v. Princess Cruises, 28 Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 1 Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996)). 2 Federal question jurisdiction exists in “all civil 3 actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 4 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 5 “The burden of establishing jurisdiction falls on 6 the party invoking the removal statute, which is 7 strictly construed against removal.” Sullivan v. First 8 Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 9 1987) (internal citations omitted). Courts resolve all 10 ambiguities “in favor of remand to state court.” 11 Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th 12 Cir. 2009) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 13 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). A removed case must be remanded 14 “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that 15 the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 16 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 17 B. Discussion 18 Plaintiff contends that this Court lacks subject 19 matter jurisdiction over this Action and so it should 20 be remanded to state court. The Court undisputably 21 lacks federal question jurisdiction; therefore, the 22 issue is whether the Court has diversity jurisdiction. 23 Thus, the burden is on Defendants to prove: (1) that 24 the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000; and (2) that 25 there is complete diversity of citizenship between the 26 parties. See Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1371; 28 U.S.C. § 27 1332. 28 /// 1 1. Amount in Controversy 2 When a defendant removes a complaint to federal 3 court, the defendant’s burden with respect to the 4 amount in controversy varies depending on the 5 circumstances. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 6 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). But “where it is 7 unclear or ambiguous from the face of a state-court 8 complaint whether the requisite amount in controversy 9 is pled,” the applicable standard is by a preponderance 10 of the evidence; this requires that the defendant 11 offers evidence establishing that it is more likely 12 than not that the amount in controversy is met, 13 exclusive of costs and interest. Id. (citing Sanchez 14 v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th 15 Cir. 1996)). In considering whether the removing 16 defendant has satisfied its burden, the court “may 17 consider facts in the removal petition,” and 18 “‘summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount 19 in controversy at the time of removal.’” Singer v. 20 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th 21 Cir. 1997) (quoting Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas. Co., 63 22 F.3d 1326, 1335-36 (5th Cir. 1995)). 23 Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he 24 “suffered damages in a sum to be proven at trial in an 25 amount that is not less than $25,001.00.” Compl. ¶ 11. 26 Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not clearly indicate 27 that the $75,000 minimum amount in controversy is met. 28 Therefore, Defendants must establish by a preponderance 1 of the evidence that the jurisdictional minimum has 2 been satisfied. 3 a. Actual Damages 4 Plaintiff seeks to recover for Defendant FCA’s 5 violation of an express warranty under the Song-Beverly 6 Act, Cal Civ. Code § 1793.2. Actual damages under the 7 Song-Beverly Act are the “amount equal to the actual 8 price paid or payable by the buyer,” less the reduction 9 in value “directly attributable to use by the buyer.” 10 Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)-(C). To determine the 11 amount directly attributable to the buyer’s use of the 12 vehicle, the manufacturer multiplies the price of the 13 vehicle the buyer paid or will pay by a fraction—the 14 denominator is 120,000, and the numerator is the number 15 of miles the buyer drove the car before the first 16 relevant repair. Id. This calculation provides the 17 actual damages that Plaintiff suffered. 18 Defendants, relying on Plaintiff’s assertion that 19 he “suffered damages in a sum to be proven at trial in 20 an amount that is not less than $25,001.00,” claim that 21 Plaintiff seeks more than $25,001 in actual damages. 22 See Defs.’ Opp’n to Mot. (“Opp’n”) 7:28-8:4, ECF No. 8; 23 Compl. ¶ 11. Defendants further note that Plaintiff 24 expressly seeks a civil penalty equal to two times 25 Plaintiff’s actual damages. Compl. ¶¶ 30, 37, 40, 44. 26 Accordingly, Defendants argue, “the amount in 27 controversy exceeds $75,000.” Opp’n 8:3. 28 However, the Court finds that the allegations in 1 Plaintiff’s Complaint do not make clear whether he is 2 seeking more than $25,001.00 in actual damages or total 3 damages; the Complaint simply states, “Plaintiff 4 suffered damages in a sum to be proven at trial in an 5 amount that is not less than $25,001.00.” Compl. ¶ 11. 6 Defendants’ “assertion that these damages refer only to 7 actual damages is only an assumption.” Edwards v. Ford 8 Motor Co., No. CV 16-05852-BRO-PLAX, 2016 WL 6583585, 9 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2016). Because removal 10 jurisdiction is strictly construed against removal, the 11 Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ reading of the 12 Complaint. 13 Alternatively, Defendants seek to show that the 14 amount in controversy has been satisfied based on the 15 Vehicle’s purchase price. Defendants argue that 16 “[u]sing the total cash price at $34,500.00 plus 17 $69,000.00 as a 2X civil penalty pursuant to the 18 Song-Beverly Act, totals $103,500.00,” so “it is more 19 likely than not that he amount in controversy exceeds 20 $75,000.” Notice of Removal ¶ 20, ECF No. 1. 21 Plaintiff argues that the “mileage offset” might reduce 22 Plaintiff's actual damages and thus impact the amount 23 in controversy. Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. 24 (“Mem.”) 7:6-10, ECF No. 7-1. 25 Plaintiff is correct that the mileage offset may 26 reduce the amount in controversy. See Cortez Martinez 27 v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:18-CV-01607-LJO-JLT, 2019 WL 28 1988398, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2019) (citing 1 Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 756 Fed. Appx. 699, 701 2 (9th Cir. 2018) (unpublished)) (“The appellate court 3 noted the district court’s consideration of the use 4 offset under the Song-Beverly Act to determine the 5 jurisdictional amount in controversy was valid.”). The 6 set-off amount is determined by multiplying the 7 “‘actual price of the new motor vehicle paid or payable 8 by the buyer . . . by a fraction having its denominator 9 120,000 and having as its numerator the number of miles 10 traveled by the new motor vehicle prior to the time the 11 buyer delivered the vehicle’” for correction of the 12 problem. Maciel v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2017 WL 13 8185859, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2017) (quoting Cal. 14 Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(c)). 15 Here, Defendants failed to take into account the 16 mileage offset in alleging that the amount in 17 controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum. In 18 fact, Defendants admit that they “would have needed to 19 determine when and what was the first repair attempt” 20 to calculate the appropriate mileage offset. Opp’n 21 6:18-24. But, Defendants argue, “that information was 22 not contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint.” Id. at 6:24. 23 However, Defendants could have submitted their own 24 evidence in order to calculate the mileage offset; 25 Plaintiff alleges that he “delivered the [] Vehicle to 26 Defendant Shaver for substantial repair on at least one 27 occasion.” Compl. ¶ 59. As such, Defendant Shaver 28 could have submitted its own repair records indicating 1 the mileage on the Vehicle when it was delivered for 2 repair, and calculated the appropriate mileage 3 therefrom. See Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., No. 4 5:19-CV-05545-EJD, 2020 WL 991531, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 5 Mar. 2, 2020) (“Plaintiff’s Complaint and exhibits do 6 not indicate what the appropriate offset should be in 7 this case. Defendants, however, attached an exhibit 8 that reflects that the most recent repairs to 9 Plaintiff’s vehicle occurred at 75,943 miles on October 10 5, 2017.”); see also Cortez Martinez, 2019 WL 1988398, 11 at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2019) (allowing the defendant’s 12 calculation of the mileage offset for the purposes of 13 establishing the amount in controversy based on an 14 estimate defendant made about a reasonable amount of 15 miles the plaintiff could have driven, absent any 16 knowledge of the actual amount driven). Because 17 Defendants neglected to take the mileage offset into 18 account, they failed to meet their burden of showing 19 Plaintiff’s actual damages based on the purchase price 20 of the vehicle. 21 The Court is unpersuaded by Defendants’ reading of 22 the Complaint and thus finds that Defendants have not 23 met their burden of proving Plaintiff’s actual damages 24 based on the purchase price of the Vehicle. 25 b. Civil Penalties 26 The amount in controversy for diversity 27 jurisdiction may include punitive damages if 28 recoverable under state law. Brady v. Mercedes-Benz 1 USA, Inc. 243 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 2 (citing Davenport v. Mutual Ben. Health & Acc. Ass’n, 3 325 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1963)). The Song-Beverly 4 Act does not provide for punitive damages but “[c]ourts 5 have held that the civil penalty under [Song-Beverly] 6 is akin to punitive damages, because both have the dual 7 effect of punishment and deterrence for defendants.” 8 Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, “courts have held 9 in other contexts that treble damages authorized by 10 state law may be included in determining the amount in 11 controversy” and Song-Beverly “in effect authorizes 12 treble damages.” Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, 13 the Court can include the Song-Beverly Act’s civil 14 penalty damages in the amount in controversy 15 calculation. 16 The amount recoverable under the Song-Beverly Act 17 is up to two times the amount of actual damages 18 Plaintiff suffered. Brady, 243 F. Supp. at 1009. “If 19 the amount of actual damages is speculative, however, 20 an attempt to determine the civil penalty is equally 21 uncertain.” Chavez v. FCA US LLC, No. CV 19-06003-ODW- 22 GJSX, 2020 WL 468909, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2020) 23 (citing Edwards, 2016 WL 6583585, at *4). Accordingly, 24 because the amount of actual damages in uncertain, the 25 Court is unable to determine what civil penalties might 26 be imposed. Put differently, Defendants have failed to 27 satisfy the burden of proof necessary to include civil 28 penalties in the amount in controversy. 1 c. Attorneys’ Fees 2 Future attorneys’ fees are to be included when 3 determining the amount in controversy. Fritsch v. 4 Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC, 899 F.3d 785 5 (9th Cir. 2018). However, a “district court may reject 6 the defendant’s attempts to include future attorneys’ 7 fees in the amount in controversy if the defendant 8 fails to satisfy this burden of proof.” Id. at 795. 9 Here, Defendants offered their calculation of the 10 amount in controversy and merely mentioned that the 11 “amount does not consider Plaintiff’s claims for 12 attorneys’ fees.” Opp’n 8:13-14. Defendants provided 13 no estimate of attorneys’ fees likely to be expended, 14 hourly rates, or evidence of attorneys’ fees in similar 15 cases. This is an insufficient basis upon which the 16 Court could include attorneys’ fees in the amount in 17 controversy calculation. See John Wallace Eberle v. 18 Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, No. 2:18-cv- 19 06650-VAP-PLA, 2018 WL 4674598, *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 20 2018) (finding defendant’s claim that it is unaware of 21 plaintiff’s hourly rate but anticipates the fees to be 22 in excess of the “less than $5,000”amount 23 insufficient); Conrad Assocs. v. Hartford Accident & 24 Indemnity Co., 994 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (N.D. Cal. 1998) 25 (finding that a defendant failed to establish the 26 amount in controversy when including attorneys’ fees 27 without estimating “the amount of time each major task 28 will take,” or varying the hourly billing rate for each 1 task). Because any attorneys’ fees that could be 2 awarded is speculative, the Court cannot include 3 attorneys’ fees in its amount in controversy 4 calculation. 5 Ultimately, the Court finds that Defendants failed 6 meet their burden to prove by a preponderance of the 7 evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds 8 $75,000. Accordingly, Defendants failed to establish 9 that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction 10 pursuant to diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. As such, 11 because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 12 over the Action, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion. 13 2. Complete Diversity 14 Because Defendants have failed to meet their burden 15 of showing that the amount in controversy exceeds the 16 jurisdictional minimum, the Court need not address 17 whether complete diversity between the parties exists. 18 III. CONCLUSION 19 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS 20 Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. The Clerk shall REMAND 21 this Action to the Superior Court of California, County 22 of Los Angeles, Case No. 20STCV03381 and close this 23 matter. 24 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 DATED: May _1_4, 2020 /s/ Ronald S.W. Lew 27 HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW Senior U.S. District Judge 28