Rubert v. King

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 30, 2019
Docket7:19-cv-02781
StatusUnknown

This text of Rubert v. King (Rubert v. King) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rubert v. King, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JOSE LUIS RUBERT, Plaintiff, 19-CV-2781 (CM) -against- ORDERTO AMEND DANIEL KING, et al., Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action alleging that Defendants created a hostile work environment and then fired him.By order dated April 9, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is,in forma pauperis.For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro sepleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474(2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). BACKGROUND Plaintiff, who is detained at the Westchester County Jail, uses this Court’s “Prisoner Complaint”form to raise claims arising out ofhis employment at a Walmart store in Monticello, New York (“Walmart”). He names as defendants Walmart; Daniel King, a security guard who worked at Walmart; Sam, Walmart store manager; and Carry, Walmart assistant manager.

Plaintiff seeks money damages. The following facts are taken from the complaint: from September 2016 to September 2017,King harassed Plaintiff. During the four-month period before the harassment commenced, from May 2016 to September 2016, King falsely alleged to Plaintiff’s wife that Plaintiff was having an affair. In September 2016, Plaintiff learned about these false allegations and confronted King, who thencalledPlaintiff “a junkie [and a] spic.” (Compl. at 4.) Once King’s yearlong harassment campaign commenced, King sent Plaintiffand Plaintiff’s wife inappropriate text messages. Plaintiff informed Walmart management about the harassment and provided managers with the text messages. But Walmart management failed to act, and Kingcontinued to harass Plaintiff, “creat[ing] a hostile an[d] unbearable situation,

eventually breaking up [his] marriage.” (Id.) Management still failed to act. Plaintiff and King eventually had “a confrontation” that resulted in Walmart management firing Plaintiff but not King. Plaintiff claims that King violated company policy, and that management was aware of this violation, but did not enforce the policy. DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff fails to state a claim of employment discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 The Court construes Plaintiff’s claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because he asserts that (1) King called him a “spic”; (2)Walmart management ignored the hostile work environment created by King, which included the use of the word “spic”; and (3) Walmart fired Plaintiff and not King after the two had a “confrontation.” To state a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must allegethat he “is a member of a racial minority,” that the defendant discriminated against him because of his race, and the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute,such as making

and enforcing a contract. Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993). Hispanic ancestry qualifies as a racial minority under § 1981.SeeVill. of Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 2016).And at-will employment is a “contractual relationship within the meaning of § 1981.” Lauture v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 216 F.3d 258, 261 (2d Cir. 2000). A§ 1981 claim must be filed within four years of the discrimination.See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382(2004). Plaintiff’s assertions, while suggesting that his race was a motivating factor for the alleged hostile workplace environment, areinsufficient to state a claim under § 1981. Rather, the

assertions –several of which involve personal matters unrelated to race –fail to suggest that Defendants’ employment decisions were motivated by Plaintiff’s race. For example, Plaintiff complains that Walmart failed to intervene in his dispute with King, but he does not allege that he informed Walmart that King called him a “spic” or otherwise harassedhim because of his race. Nor does he allege that Walmart fired him because of his race; he asserts only that Walmart fired him, not King. But because Plaintiff does raise the possibility that Defendants were motivated by his race, the Court grants him leave to amend his complaint to assert any facts that support his claim under § 1981. B. Plaintiff fails to state a claim of employment discrimination under Title VII The Court also construes Plaintiff’s claims as arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer. . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a). Title VII prohibits employers from either mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions).Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d

Cir. 2001)).

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Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
455 U.S. 385 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co.
541 U.S. 369 (Supreme Court, 2004)
Laurance A. Tewksbury v. Ottaway Newspapers
192 F.3d 322 (Second Circuit, 1999)
Chukwuka v. City of New York
513 F. App'x 34 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Vance v. Ball State Univ.
133 S. Ct. 2434 (Supreme Court, 2013)
Patane v. Clark
508 F.3d 106 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Village of Freeport v. Barrella
814 F.3d 594 (Second Circuit, 2016)
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District
801 F.3d 72 (Second Circuit, 2015)

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Rubert v. King, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rubert-v-king-nysd-2019.