Rozsa v. Jenkinson
Opinion
This is a summary judgment case stemming from an automobile collision/negligence suit. Appellant is before us pro se by writ of error filed within six months after final judgment was rendered.
Appellant was involved in a car accident in Bexar county on March 14,1985. Appel-lees filed a negligence suit against appellant on March 31, 1986, and properly served appellant at her correct address which included the apartment number “27B”. Appellant answered pro se on April 26, 1986, by sending a letter directly to the trial judge denying responsibility for the accident. 1
*508 Appellant then received, properly addressed, appellees’ Request for Admissions, dated August 8, 1986. The request demanded that appellant “specifically admit under oath or deny under oath the following facts” within 30 days after service. Appellant did not answer the request for admissions.
Appellees filed a motion to deem the request for admissions admitted on October 1, 1986. The record does not reflect any action being taken on this motion, but presumably the trial court allowed the admissions to stand for summary judgment purposes. On retrial the trial court is empowered to strike the admissions and permit appellant to answer the requests for admissions, if equity so requires. TEX.R. CIV.P. 169. 2 See Gordon v. Williams, 164 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1942, no writ) (Rule 169 should not be construed to give one party advantage by permitting judgment without testimony when case can be opened without injustice).
Appellees then moved for summary judgment based upon the deemed admissions. Notice of the motion for summary judgment was improperly addressed and mailed to apartment 2713, instead of appellant’s apartment, 27B.
Summary judgment was taken against appellant on June 17, 1987. Appellant was not present and did not participate in any way. The judgment ordered appellant to pay $100.00 to appellee Stephen Jenkinson, $8,737.23 to appellee Zurich American Ins. Co., plus costs and 10% interest.
Appellant brings a single point of error: that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment because ap-pellees failed to comply with TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a and TEX.R.CIY.P. 21a providing for proper notice of the summary judgment hearing. 3
*509 Proper notice to the non-movant of the summary judgment hearing is a prerequisite to summary judgment. See Gulf Refining Co. v. A.F.G. Management 34 Ltd., 605 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The right to summary judgment exists only in compliance with TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a, and the movant must comply with all the requirements of the rule before being entitled to summary judgment. Tobin v. Garcia, 159 Tex. 58, 316 S.W.2d 396, 400 (1958).
We find that appellant was never properly served with notice of the summary judgment hearing, as required by Rule 166a. 4 The error and invalidity of the trial court’s judgment affirmatively appears on the face of the record in that the wrong address for appellant is typed on the notice of Motion for Summary Judgment. Additionally, the record shows that appellees had access to appellant’s correct address and served appellant with other documents at her correct address twice prior to the motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the notice was not sent to appellant’s “last known address.”
Appellant’s point of error is sustained. We further find that all requirements for the writ of error have been met. We reverse the summary judgment and remand this cause to the trial court for trial on the merits.
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754 S.W.2d 507 (Rozsa v. Jenkinson) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.