NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: August 12, 2025
S25A0959. ROUSE v. THE STATE.
LAGRUA, Justice.
Appellant Terrence Rouse was found guilty on three counts of
felony murder and related crimes in connection with the shooting
death of Jamaal Smith. 1 On appeal, Rouse raises three
1 The crimes occurred on November 16, 2020. A Houston County grand
jury indicted Rouse and co-defendants Jakobe Brown and Jamaurie Moss in connection with Smith’s death on December 12, 2021. The indictment charged each of the three with felony murder predicated on armed robbery (Count 1); felony murder predicated on home invasion (Count 2); felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 3); criminal attempt to commit armed robbery (Count 4); home invasion (Count 5); and aggravated assault (Count 6). Rouse was also charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 7). Rouse was tried individually on April 11-15, 2022 and found guilty on Counts 1-6. Count 7 was nolle prossed after the verdict. On April 27, 2022, Rouse was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for Count 1 (felony murder predicated on armed robbery) with Counts 2-6 merging into Count 1. We note that the trial court erred at sentencing by merging Counts 2 and 3 into Count 1, rather than vacating Counts 2 and 3 by operation of law. See Noel v. State, 297 Ga. 698, 700 (2015) (“[A] defendant found guilty of the felony murder of the same victim through the commission of more than one felony may only be sentenced on one felony murder charge, and the remaining felony murder charges stand vacated by operation of law.”) (citation omitted). enumerations of error. First, he argues that the evidence presented
at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction as a matter of
constitutional due process under Jackson2 and its progeny and on
various statutory grounds. Second, he argues that his trial counsel
was ineffective for offering into evidence, but not publishing, two jail
letters addressed to co-defendant Jemaurie Moss that were
authored by co-defendant Jakobe Brown while in custody. Third, he
argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
testimonial evidence from Tavares Booker regarding his first-hand
account of a drug deal that devolved into an argument between
Rouse and Booker’s roommate, Deshannon Gibson, in the weeks
before the shooting. Each enumeration of error lacks merit, and we
However, this error does not affect Rouse’s sentence and is otherwise harmless. Hood v. State, 303 Ga. 400, 424 (2018). We express no opinion as to whether Counts 5 and 6 were properly merged. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 696–97 (2017) (citations omitted) (explaining that this Court retains discretion to correct harmless sentencing errors). Rouse filed a motion for new trial on May 26, 2022 and an amended motion for new trial through new counsel on December 17, 2024. After a hearing, Rouse’s amended motion for new trial was denied on February 5, 2025. Rouse timely filed a notice of appeal, which was docketed to the April 2025 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
2 affirm.
The evidence presented at trial showed that Smith was fatally
shot during an attempted robbery on the night of November 16,
2020. That night, Booker was inside his apartment at the Cedar
Pointe apartment complex (“Cedar Pointe”) when he heard a knock
on his door. Booker did not recognize the person on his doorstep, but
he opened the door anyway and learned that this person was
“looking for some weed.” A marijuana purchaser on Booker’s
doorstep was not unusual, because Booker lived in his apartment
with Gibson, who was also known as “Champ,” and Gibson sold
marijuana out of Booker’s apartment. 3 Booker invited the purchaser
inside, told him to shut the door behind him, and began walking
toward the kitchen to retrieve Gibson’s paraphernalia. Booker
testified that, seconds later, “a second dude came around from the
side of the building,” “kicked in” the half-closed door “with a gun in
3 Booker testified that Rouse had come to Booker’s apartment in the
weeks prior to November 16, 2020 to purchase marijuana from Gibson. Booker was present for that drug deal, which devolved into a “heated” argument between Gibson and Rouse. 3 his hand,” and fired in Booker’s direction. Booker then pulled out his
own gun and fired several times in the direction of the front door.
The purchaser and the “second guy with the pistol” fled Booker’s
apartment in different directions. Booker followed them out the door
and fired twice more from his doorstep. He then went back inside,
and called Gibson, but not the police. Gibson picked up Booker after
this “drug deal gone bad” and took him to a friend’s house, where
Booker gave Gibson his gun to put “in a safe spot.” Booker went back
to his apartment (now a crime scene) later that night, gave a
statement to officers with the Warner Robins Police Department,
and assisted officers in recovering his gun. Booker told the police
that he was unable to identify either of the perpetrators.4
Earlier that day, three teenage friends from school – co-
defendants Moss and Brown, and the victim, Smith – met up before
a concert they planned to attend in Macon later that night. The three
friends traveled together in Moss’s car to an acquaintance’s home,
4 Booker testified that the purchaser had on a hoodie “with the string
pulled tight” around his face and that the “second dude with the pistol” was wearing a face-covering mask. 4 where they were approached by Rouse. Rouse asked them if he could
get a ride to Cedar Pointe in exchange for $20 so that Rouse could
“go get some weed.” They agreed to this exchange, and Moss drove
the four of them to Cedar Pointe. At Cedar Pointe, Rouse told Moss
where to park and then got out of the car. Moss and Brown testified
that they first saw Rouse with a gun when he exited the car. Rouse
then opened the rear passenger door (next to where Smith was
seated) and asked the three friends to “come over here right quick
so that I can get the rest of this weed and give y’all $20” and told
them that he “got this lick.”5 Each of the three friends initially
declined, but Rouse persisted, called them names for not wanting to
come, and explained that someone named “Champ” had “shorted
[Rouse] on his weed last time” and “owe[d] [Rouse] some money.”
Smith agreed to go with Rouse while Brown and Moss remained in
the car. Rouse and Smith walked away from the car, into a field, and
out of sight.
A couple minutes later, Brown followed in that same direction
5 Moss and Brown both testified that they knew a “lick” meant a robbery.
5 because he and Moss were worried about Smith, and the situation
did not “feel right.” Brown testified that he turned a corner to see an
open apartment door and Rouse crouched on the side of that
apartment with a gun. Brown did not see Smith. Brown testified
that Rouse then ran into the apartment, and Brown heard several
gunshots. Brown “took off running back to the car” when the
gunshots rang out. Moss also heard gunshots from the car and was
“fixin’ to pull off” just as Brown made it back to the car. Moss and
Brown saw Smith in the field, so Brown doubled back to help Smith
– who had sustained a gunshot wound to the chest – get into the
backseat of Moss’s car. Brown testified that, when he asked Smith
what happened, Smith responded: “I was trying to get -- run out the
house and he shot me.” Neither Moss nor Brown saw Rouse after the
shooting, and they never called the police.
Moss drove Brown and the wounded Smith to the hospital.
After Smith was taken inside, Moss and Brown left. Attempts to
save Smith’s life at the hospital were unsuccessful, and the medical
examiner who conducted an autopsy on Smith testified at trial that
6 the cause of death was a single gunshot wound to the chest and that
the manner of death was homicide. The State’s expert in firearms
and ballistics testified at trial that four shell casings recovered at
Booker’s apartment were fired from Booker’s gun. This expert also
compared a test-fired bullet to the fatal bullet recovered during
Smith’s autopsy. The expert testified that “class characteristics were
consistent” between the two bullets, but there was also “a lot of
damage” to them, such that he could not conclusively “identify [the
fatal bullet] or eliminate [the fatal bullet] as having been fired from”
Booker’s gun.
After leaving the hospital, Moss dropped off Brown and went
home, where he “tried to clean out” Smith’s blood from his car with
water, bleach, a knife, and some rags. Police, responding to a BOLO 6
on a car that “had dropped off a shot victim at the hospital,” located
Moss while he was cleaning his car. 7 Moss was detained, his car was
6 BOLO stands for “[b]e on the lookout [for].” See BOLO, Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“Police sometimes use this expression for people or vehicles that they are trying to locate.”). 7 Officer Daron Gray’s bodycam footage was admitted into evidence and
7 secured (and subsequently searched),8 and Moss was taken by
officers to the police department, where he gave a statement to
Detective Trent VanLannen. In his statement, Moss identified
Rouse as the perpetrator of the attempted robbery at Cedar Pointe.
Moss also identified Rouse as the perpetrator of the attempted
robbery at trial.
After Brown had been dropped off by Moss, Brown informed
members of Smith’s family what had happened and went to the
home of Smith’s mother. Smith’s mother called the police, who
picked up Brown from her home and took him to the police
department, where Brown gave a statement to Detective
VanLannen. Brown identified Rouse as the perpetrator of the
attempted robbery at Cedar Pointe in his statement to Detective
depicts his interactions with Moss. Several photos taken of Moss’s car after the shooting were also admitted into evidence. 8 In addition to searching Moss’s car and collecting evidence, officers
conducted print comparison testing on impressions lifted from that car. Officer Juan Herrara (the State’s finger and handprint expert) testified there was “no doubt” that a handprint on the exterior of the car belonged to Rouse, but he was unable to associate any prints inside the car with Rouse. 8 VanLannen and testified to this fact at trial.9
On November 18, 2020, a warrant issued for Rouse’s arrest in
connection with the attempted robbery and shooting at Cedar
Pointe, though he was not apprehended until January 5, 2021, in
Florida. Moss and Brown were also arrested and charged as Rouse’s
co-defendants in Counts 1-6. See n.1 supra. At the time of Rouse’s
trial, charges against Moss and Brown were still pending, both were
housed at the Peach County jail, both had met with prosecutors and
agreed to testify against Rouse, and both testified that they had not
been promised anything in exchange for their testimony.
At Rouse’s trial, Moss testified before Brown. While Moss was
on the stand, Rouse’s counsel asked whether Moss and Brown had
communicated in jail about the testimony they planned to give. Moss
said they had not. Rouse’s counsel then showed Moss two letters and
inquired whether Moss had seen them before. Importantly, the
9 Moss and Brown both conceded at trial that the version of events articulated to officers in the hours after the shooting did not align perfectly with the version of events that they testified to at trial. Moss said that he told police “most,” but not all, of the facts that he testified to at trial. Brown also admitted he did not tell the full truth in his initial interview. 9 letters had not been admitted into evidence at this point, and their
contents were unknown to the jury. Moss testified that he had seen
the letters for the first time over the previous weekend when he was
shown them by his attorney. No additional testimony was elicited
from Moss regarding the letters or their contents.
During Brown’s testimony, Rouse’s counsel presented the
letters to Brown and asked whether Brown recognized them. Brown
said he did not. Rouse’s counsel then asked Brown whether he wrote
one of the letters to Moss to which Brown responded: “It’s my
handwriting, but I don’t remember writing it. The only letter I wrote
Mr. Moss was about telling him to keep his head up. That’s it.”
However, Brown went on to concede that he wrote this letter to Moss
“at some point,” and the letter was admitted into evidence. Brown
similarly testified that the second letter was in his handwriting and
had been written by him to Moss but maintained that he did not
recall writing either letter. The second letter was also admitted into
evidence. In questioning Brown about these letters, Rouse’s counsel
got Brown to admit that many of the facts which he had testified to
10 were set out in these letters intended for Moss; however, the specific
contents of the letters were not read or published for the jury.
These two letters, admitted into evidence through Brown, were
the only evidence put up by the defense, and Rouse did not testify.
During closing arguments, Rouse’s counsel argued that Rouse was
never at Cedar Pointe, told the jury that Moss, Brown, and Booker
were all unreliable witnesses and highlighted inconsistencies in
their testimony, noted that Moss and Brown in particular had
motivations to lie and had conspired regarding their testimony (as
shown by the jail letters), pointed out the State’s minimal physical
evidence connecting Rouse to the crime, and attempted to discredit
the State’s theory of motive. However, the jury returned guilty
verdicts on Counts 1-6, and Rouse was sentenced accordingly.
Following the denial of his amended motion for new trial, see n.1
supra., Rouse appealed.
1. Rouse argues that the evidence supporting his conviction
was insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process under
Jackson and its progeny, as well as on various statutory grounds,
11 and that his conviction should be reversed. See 443 U.S. at 319. We
disagree.
(a) In a sufficiency review, “we view the evidence presented at
trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts and consider whether
it was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which
he was convicted.” Wilkerson v. State, 317 Ga. 242, 245 (2023). In so
doing, we “leave[ ] to the jury the resolution of conflicts in the
evidence, the weight of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and
reasonable inferences to be made from basic facts to ultimate facts.”
Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
Rouse’s enumeration of error on sufficiency of the evidence is
not a model of clarity, but he generally argues that “[t]he evidence
was vague and ambiguous and conflicting at best.” In furtherance of
that position, he points to the State’s minimal offering of physical
evidence, along with the “questionable” testimony of the accomplice
co-defendants, suggests that his conviction was supported only by
circumstantial evidence, and appears to argue that the State failed
12 to prove that Rouse was a party to the crime. However, as set out
below, each point made by Rouse lacks merit.
To the extent Rouse challenges his conviction because “[t]he
only physical evidence in the case was a handprint on the roof of the
getaway car that could have occurred at any time[,]” we observe
that, while “the State is required to prove its case with competent
evidence, there is no requirement that it prove its case with any
particular sort of evidence.” Plez v. State, 300 Ga. 505, 506 (2017).
Thus, insofar as Rouse implies that more physical evidence was
required to support his conviction, his argument fails.
Next, we reject Rouse’s challenge to his conviction on the basis
that it is supported by “questionable” accomplice testimony because
the determination of whether witness testimony is “questionable” or
credible is one left for the jury and not considered by this Court on
review. See Wilkerson, 317 Ga. at 245 (explaining that matters
relating to “the credibility of witnesses” fall within the province of a
jury and will not be disturbed by the reviewing court in a sufficiency
13 review).10
(b) To the extent that Rouse argues his conviction was
supported only by circumstantial evidence, he is incorrect. This
argument appears to implicate OCGA § 24-14-6,11 but that statute
also does not apply here because first-hand eyewitness testimony –
like that of Brown, Moss, and Booker – is direct evidence, and “if
there is any direct evidence presented by the State, the
circumstantial evidence statute does not apply in a sufficiency
analysis.” Bradley v. State, 318 Ga. 142, 144 (2024) (citing Maynor
10 To the extent that Rouse separately argues here that the evidence
supporting his conviction was insufficient as a matter of Georgia statutory law under OCGA § 24-14-8, his argument also fails. OCGA § 24-14-8 applies, among other circumstances, to “felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice[,]” and in such cases, requires “the testimony of a second witness” or other “corroborating circumstances” to sustain a conviction. OCGA § 24-14- 8. Even assuming that Brown was an accomplice, Brown’s testimony was consistent with the testimony of Booker and Moss, and that corroboration is sufficient for us to reject Rouse’s contention. See Nabors v. State, 320 Ga. 43, 53 (2024) (explaining that “it is well settled that the testimony of one accomplice can corroborate the testimony of another”) (citation omitted); Head v. State, 316, Ga. 406, 411 (2023) (explaining that corroboration for purposes of OCGA § 24-14-8 “may be circumstantial, slight, and need not be of itself sufficient to warrant a conviction of the crime charged”) (citation omitted). 11 OCGA § 24-14-6 provides: “To warrant a conviction on circumstantial
evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” 14 v. State, 317 Ga. 492, 498 (2023)).
(c) Insofar as Rouse raises an argument that he was not a party
to the crimes under OCGA § 16-2-20 12 because “Booker does not put
Rouse a[t] the crime scene,” that argument also fails. The testimony
of Moss and Brown put Rouse at the scene of the crime with a gun
and established that the attempted robbery was Rouse’s idea.
Brown’s testimony directly implicated Rouse as the shooter. And
Brown’s account of the shooting was corroborated by Booker’s
account of the shooting. Collectively, these facts support the jury’s
conclusion that Rouse was a party to the crimes.
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the evidence
was sufficient to support Rouse’s conviction.
2. Rouse next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for
12 Pursuant to OCGA § 16-2-20 (a), “[e]very person concerned in the commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged with and convicted of commission of the crime.” OCGA § 16-2-20 (b), in turn, provides that persons are “concerned in the commission of a crime” if he or she: “(1) Directly commits the crime; (2) Intentionally causes some other person to commit the crime under such circumstances that the other person is not guilty of any crime either in fact or because of legal incapacity; (3) Intentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime; or (4) Intentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to commit the crime.” 15 not publishing the jail letters after they were offered into evidence
and admitted by the trial court. We disagree.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
defendant must establish (1) that performance of his or her counsel
was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance resulted in
prejudice to the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). “Deficient performance means that no reasonable lawyer
would have done what trial counsel did, while prejudice means there
is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have
been different but for the deficient performance.” Parker v. State,
320 Ga. 572, 579 (2024) (citation omitted). Failure to satisfy either
prong is fatal to a claim. See Lawrence v. State, 286 Ga. 533, 533–
34 (2010) (“If an appellant fails to meet his or her burden of proving
either prong of the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have
to examine the other prong.”).
The record shows that Rouse’s trial counsel offered the jail
letters into evidence and that they were admitted by the trial court.
On appeal, Rouse complains that his trial counsel “did not use that
16 opportunity to read them into evidence and publish them to the
jury[,]” maintaining that this failure resulted in a handful of “missed
benefit[s]” to the defense.13 However, like the trial court, we see “no
evidence that the decision not to publish the letters was anything
but strategic.”
As a general matter, decisions regarding trial strategy and
tactics will not support an ineffectiveness claim “unless they were so
patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have
followed such a course.” Warren v. State, 314 Ga. 598, 602 (2022)
(citation omitted). In large part, this is because “hindsight has no
place in an assessment of the performance of trial counsel.” Bryant
v. State, 306 Ga. 687, 697 (2019).
Rouse fails to demonstrate how the decision not to publish the
jail letters was an unreasonable trial strategy. At most, Rouse
13 To the extent that Rouse’s brief suggests that non-publication of the
jail letters meant that the jury was unable to see the contents of those letters for themselves, his contention is misplaced. The trial transcript noted three exhibits which did not go out with the jury, but the jail letters are not so noted, and there is no indication in the record that these otherwise properly admitted jail letters did not go out with the jury. 17 argues that publication of the jail letters would have provided a
greater opportunity for trial counsel to call into question the
credibility and motivations of Moss and Brown than was afforded by
way of cross-examination or closing arguments.14 But the Strickland
standard does not require trial counsel to take advantage of every
possible opportunity to call witness testimony into question, as
decisions surrounding when and how to impeach fit squarely within
the realm of trial strategy. See Dinkins v. State, 300 Ga. 713, 716
(2017) (“The decision whether to impeach a witness is a matter of
trial strategy that typically will not support a claim of ineffective
assistance.”) (citation omitted). Additionally, many of the
statements included within the jail letters were inculpatory as to
Rouse and consistent with the testimony given by Moss and Brown,
which could have had the effect of strengthening, rather than
14 We note that both co-defendants were impeached on cross-examination
when Rouse’s trial counsel got them to admit that their trial testimony was not fully consistent with the version of events articulated to the police after the shooting. Rouse’s trial counsel also highlighted those inconsistencies during closing while making the point that Moss and Brown had reason to lie for their own benefit. 18 weakening, the reliability of Moss’s and Brown’s testimony. See
Sauder v. State, 318 Ga. 791, 811 (2024) (concluding that trial
counsel did not perform deficiently for failing to introduce
“potentially inculpatory evidence”) (citation omitted).
Because Rouse has not shown his trial counsel was deficient,
we need not address prejudice, and his ineffectiveness claim fails.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Lawrence, 286 Ga. at 533–34
3. Rouse’s final enumeration of error is that the trial court
abused its discretion under Rules 403 and 404 in allowing the State
to elicit testimony from Booker concerning a prior drug deal between
Gibson and Rouse. See OCGA §§ 24-4-403 and 24-4-404. For the
reasons stated below, we see no error.
Just before Booker took the stand at trial (and outside the
presence of the jury), the State raised with the trial court its intent
to elicit testimony from Booker that Rouse was “in [Booker’s]
apartment a few weeks prior [to the shooting at issue here]” to
purchase marijuana from Gibson, that this prior drug deal devolved
into an “argument” between Gibson and Rouse “about quantity and
19 price” of the marijuana that Rouse wanted to purchase, and that this
testimony was intrinsic evidence that should be admitted to show
motive, such that it could be admitted without prior notice to the
defense under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”). Rouse’s counsel
objected, but did not seek a continuance, and argued that this
testimony was not intrinsic evidence, such that Rule 404 (b)’s notice
requirement needed to be satisfied – and, because notice was
provided only 15 minutes prior, the evidence should be excluded
under Rule 404 (b). The trial court disagreed, ruling that the
evidence was intrinsic and, therefore, not subject to Rule 404 (b)’s
notice requirement. Further, in its colloquy with Rouse’s counsel
and the State, the trial court found that while the evidence was “a
little prejudicial” to Rouse, it was also “extremely probative,” and
admitted the intrinsic evidence on balance under OCGA § 24-4-403
(“Rule 403”). Booker went on to testify that Rouse was in his
apartment a few weeks prior to the Cedar Pointe shooting to buy
marijuana from Gibson and that an argument ensued between
20 Rouse and Gibson. 15
To the extent that Rouse argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting Booker’s testimony under Rule 404 (b), his
arguments fail because “[t]he limitations and prohibition on ‘other
acts’ evidence set out in OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) do not apply to intrinsic
evidence.” Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 485 (2017) (footnote
omitted). We review the admission of intrinsic evidence for abuse of
discretion, Abbott v. State, 311 Ga. 478, 482–83 (2021), and have
explained that “evidence pertaining to the chain of events explaining
the context, motive, and set-up of the crime is properly admitted [as
intrinsic] if it is linked in time and circumstances with the charged
crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the
crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.”
Heade v. State, 312 Ga. 19, 25 (2021) (cleaned up). And “this sort of
intrinsic evidence remains admissible even if it incidentally places
the defendant’s character at issue.” Id. (citation omitted).
15 The State went on to argue during closing that Rouse wanted to “hit
that lick” as “payback” because Gibson had “embarrassed” and “disrespected” Rouse during this prior incident, and because Gibson “owed [Rouse] money.” 21 Applying those standards here, we agree with the trial court
that Booker’s testimony was intrinsic to the Cedar Pointe shooting,
as it was both “linked in time and circumstances with the charged
crime” and “necessary to complete the story of the crime for the
jury.” Callaway v. State, 321 Ga. 186, 191 (2025); Heade 312 Ga. at
25. Specifically, this intrinsic evidence demonstrated that the
attempted robbery was not a random act of violence, but a targeted
“lick” intended for Gibson and Booker because – as Rouse told Moss
and Brown upon their arrival at Cedar Pointe – Gibson had “shorted
[Rouse] on his weed last time” and “owe[d] [Rouse] some money.”
Because the evidence was properly admitted as intrinsic evidence,
the State was not obligated “to provide reasonable notice to the
defense in advance of trial” under Rule 404 (b), and the mere fact
that this evidence may have “incidentally placed” Rouse’s character
at issue does not otherwise render its admission improper. Heade,
312 Ga. at 25. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in this ruling.
We similarly reject Rouse’s argument to the extent that he
22 argues the admission of this intrinsic evidence was an abuse of
discretion under Rule 403. See Coleman v. State, 321 Ga. 476, 480
(2025) (observing that “intrinsic evidence must still satisfy Rule
403’s balancing test”). Rule 403 provides in part that “[r]elevant
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” OCGA § 24-4-403.
While “inculpatory evidence in inherently prejudicial,” we have
explained that “it is only when unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs probative value that the rule permits exclusion.” Anglin
v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 337 (2017) (citation omitted) (emphasis in
original).
Here, the trial court expressly conducted Rule 403’s balancing
test before admitting Booker’s testimony. In so doing, the trial court
concluded that the probative value of Booker’s testimony was high
because the evidence explained why Rouse targeted Booker’s
apartment, despite the fact that the evidence was “a little
prejudicial” to Rouse. On balance, the trial court ruled that the
probative value of this evidence was not outweighed by an unfair
23 prejudicial effect, and we see no abuse of discretion in that
conclusion. See OCGA § 24-4-403. Accordingly, Rouse’s final
enumeration fails.
4. To the extent that Rouse makes an argument predicated on
cumulative error, that argument fails because he has not “carried
his burden of showing that at least two errors were committed
during trial.” Henderson v. State, 318 Ga. 752, 759–60 (2024)
(citation omitted).
supporting Rouse’s conviction was sufficient, that Rouse’s counsel
was not ineffective, and that the trial court did not err in its
evidentiary rulings. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Land. J., not
participating.