WILNER, Judge.
This case arises from a consolidated settlement of several hundred asbestos-related personal injury and wrongful death actions. The issue before us is whether the dispute that emanated from the settlement agreement and that forms the basis of this lawsuit is subject to arbitration, and that, in turn, [333]*333depends in part on whether we are required to give full faith and credit or common law collateral estoppel effect to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia involving none of the plaintiffs and only three of the thirteen defendants in this case. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City concluded that it would not apply the doctrine of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel based on that judgment, and that, under Maryland and Federal law, the dispute was subject to arbitration. Upon those conclusions, the court granted a motion to compel arbitration. The Court of Special Appeals, addressing as well the issue of full faith and credit, affirmed that ruling, Rourke v. Amchem, 153 Md.App. 91, 835 A.2d 193 (2003), and so shall we.
BACKGROUND
In September, 1988, a number of asbestos manufacturers that had been named as defendants in multiple lawsuits pending in several States entered into a Producer Agreement Concerning Center For Claims Resolution. Among other things, that agreement created a non-profit entity known as the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR), to act as a claims agent with respect to all asbestos-related claims made against the participating members. Each participating member designated CCR as its sole agent to administer, evaluate, settle, pay, and defend such claims. The agreement required CCR to handle each claim on behalf of all members and precluded it from settling a claim on behalf of fewer than all members. We were apprized at oral argument, apparently as a result of that requirement, that, whenever CCR settled a claim, it obtained a release of all participating members, even those who had not been named as defendants in the particular case.
Attachment A to the Producer Agreement apportioned among the members their respective shares of three categories of expenses — liability payments (sums paid in settlement of asbestos-related claims or in satisfaction of judgments on such claims), allocated expenses, and unallocated expenses (overhead, administrative, and operating expenses of CCR). The Attachment anticipated the prospect of new members [334]*334joining CCR and current members terminating their membership, and it made provision for reducing apportioned shares when new members were admitted and increasing shares when members withdrew.1
Article III of the Producer Agreement permitted termination of membership in CCR only by (1) voluntary termination upon 60 days notice and a determination by the CCR Board of Directors that the withdrawing member had paid or made provision for the payment of all amounts due from it under the Agreement; (2) filing for bankruptcy protection or other protection from creditors under Federal or State law; or (3) action of the Board of Directors if a member was involuntarily placed in bankruptcy or was determined to be insolvent or if the Board found that the member had materially breached the Agreement. Article III further provided, however, that, notwithstanding termination of membership, the terminated member “shall continue to have and to honor all of the obligations incurred by it hereunder or on its behalf as a member prior to the effective date of its membership termination....”
In April, 2000, two law firms that represented 882 plaintiffs with asbestos-related personal injury or wrongful death claims pending in Maryland courts entered into a global settlement of those claims with CCR which, at the time, had 16 members.2 [335]*335There were five categories of plaintiffs — those with mesotheli-oma (5), those with lung cancer (29), those with other cancer (20), those with non-malignant I diseases (essentially asbestosis or significant bilateral pleural thickening, 359), and those with less significant non-malignant II conditions (469) — and a settlement amount was agreed upon with respect to each plaintiff in each category. In order to receive the money, each individual plaintiff would have to establish that he/she met the criteria for payment, agree to the settlement amount, and execute a release. Because of those conditions and because of the prospect of new plaintiffs being added as the firms acquired additional clients, the aggregate amount actually to be paid was not entirely certain, but, based on counsel’s representations at the time, it was estimated to be $10,089,400. The agreement called for CCR to make aggregate payments to plaintiffs’ counsel, “subject to change as specified after the qualification review,” in three installments: $4,500,000 on July 1, 2000; $4,000,000 on June 1, 2001; and any balance on September 1, 2002.
The procedure for payment of claims was set forth in Appendix C to the Settlement Agreement. That required, among other things, that the settling plaintiff sign a full release, in the form and subject to the conditions specified in the Appendix, of all CCR members, prior to payment.
Three provisions of the Settlement Agreement have particular relevance to this case. Paragraph 7 made clear that the liability of the CCR member companies for payment of the settlement amounts was several and not joint, and it gave Plaintiffs’ Counsel certain options if one or more of the member companies failed to pay its apportioned share. In that regard, ¶ 7 provided, in relevant part:
“Payments to Plaintiff Counsel by the CCR under Paragraph 5 of this Settlement Agreement shall be funded by the CCR member companies in accordance with the terms of the Producer Agreement Concerning Center For Claims Resolution (as amended, effective February 1, 1994) and each CCR member company shall be liable under this [336]*336Settlement Agreement only for its individual share of such payments as determined under that Producer Agreement.”
(Emphasis added).
In the event that, because of a default by one or more CCR members, CCR failed to make a payment due under the Settlement Agreement, plaintiffs’ counsel was given the option, as to any plaintiffs whose claim had not yet been paid in full, of either continuing the settlement as to the non-defaulting CCR members or, by written election made within 30 days after notice of the default, declaring the entire settlement agreement void. Upon that election, the plaintiffs would have one year to bring a tort action. If counsel elected to continue the settlement as to the non-defaulting member companies, ¶ 7 provided:
“[A]s to the defaulting CCR member only, any and all plaintiffs whose claims have not been paid in full by the CCR under this Agreement shall have the option of (a) electing to enforce the Defaulting CCR member company’s obligations under this Settlement Agreement or (b) electing to pursue such plaintiffs claims for asbestos-related injury against the Defaulting CCR member company in the tort system.... ”
The second provision of note, contained in ¶ 12, was the requirement that the parties make a good faith effort to resolve any disputes that may arise while implementing the settlement agreement and that, “[i]f the parties are unable to resolve a dispute, the issue shall be referred to a mutually agreeable arbitrator for binding resolution.” Finally, ¶ 21 provided that all disputes concerning the interpretation or performance of the agreement were to be resolved in accordance with Maryland law.
It appears that CCR anticipated that each installment would pay, in full, the aggregate claims of about one-third of the plaintiffs — the plaintiffs chosen by counsel whose signed releases were forwarded to CCR. The first installment, under that view, was intended to discharge the claims of 208 plaintiffs represented by Ashcraft & Gerel. When the time for [337]*337that first installment arrived, one CCR member, Asbestos Claims Management Corporation (ACMC), had failed to pay its apportioned share of $679,348. Accordingly, the first installment, sent by CCR on October 5, 2000, did not include that amount. The check, in the amount of $3,822,501, was made payable to “Ashcraft & Gerel, attorneys for 208 claimants.”
Ashcraft & Gerel either had or formed a different intent. Perceiving a legal or ethical problem in drawing distinctions among its clients as to when they would be paid, the firm decided that it would be necessary to pay all of its clients on a pro rata basis from the three installments and not pay any claims in full from the first one. That created a problem, as, under the settlement protocol, all plaintiffs who would be receiving any payment were required to sign and submit releases acknowledging payment in full when, in fact, they might not receive full payment of their claim until the final installment was paid two years later. After the CCR check was deposited, William Mulroney, an attorney with that firm, requested that CCR stop payment on the check and issue a new one to “Ashcraft & Gerel as attorneys for various plaintiffs.” In an October 23, 2000, follow-up letter to Michael Rooney, then the Chief Claims Officer for CCR, Mr. Mulroney advised that he had identified 88 plaintiffs whose claims were unaffected by the ACMC default, and he requested a check for $581,246 as the first payment for those clients. He also asked that CCR acknowledge that (1) all Ashcraft & Gerel Maryland clients subject to the CCR settlement are beneficiaries of the first installment payment, and (2) each of those clients “retains his or her remedies under the settlement agreement until such time as the settlement is paid in full.”
In an effort to resolve the problem, Mr. Rooney agreed to at least part of Mulroney’s request. In a letter to the two law firms dated October 31, 2000, he advised that CCR consented to the firms’ using the installments to make partial payment to all qualified plaintiffs rather than to make full payment to three separate groups of them. In order to implement that approach, CCR agreed that:
[338]*338“Each settling plaintiff will execute a release to the CCR for the full amount of the settlement prior to receiving the first installment; however, it is specifically understood and agreed that these releases are not evidence of full satisfaction of the contractual obligation of the CCR to pay the qualified plaintiffs the settlement values that have been agreed upon, and should the CCR fail to timely make any or all of the payments required by the Master Settlement Agreement, then in that event each settling plaintiff who has not received full payment may pursue a remedy in contract against the CCR members for any deficiency. If such action is required, the CCR members shall be responsible to pay the deficiency with interest at 8% per annum, and the CCR members will reimburse each such settling plaintiff for reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses that may be required to collect this deficiency be lawsuit or otherwise.”
and
“This remedy in contract on the release will be the sole legal remedy of each plaintiff who has executed a release for the full consideration of his settlement but fails to receive timely payment in full, with the exception of those plaintiffs who elect to renuncíate the settlement because of the ACMC non-payment before accepting the first settlement installment payment.”3
Between October 25 and November 9, 2000, CCR sent new checks in the aggregate amount of $8,822,501 to replace the check on which, at Mr. Mulroney’s request, payment had been stopped. That aggregate amount, as before, represented the first installment due under the settlement agreement less the apportioned share of ACMC. We assume that those checks were deposited and the funds disbursed.
[339]*339In December, 2000, another CCR member, Armstrong World Industries, Inc., went into bankruptcy and stopped paying its share of previously negotiated settlements. On June 1, 2001, when the second installment came due, CCR sent a check to Ashcraft & Gerel “As Attorneys For 250 Plaintiffs” in the amount of $879,874, claiming, in a covering letter, that the check “constitutes full and final payment of the amounts due under the settlement for each of the claims on the enclosed list by each of the CCR member companies other than ACMC.” The letter noted that, under ¶ 7 of the settlement agreement, “each CCR member company will be liable under the settlement agreement only for its individual share of the payment as determined under the CCR Producer Agreement,” and that, “[a]ccordingly, none of the other CCR members is liable for the share amounts that ACMC has failed to pay.” Although the letter noted the bankruptcy of Armstrong six months earlier, it does not appear that Armstrong’s share was deducted.
Ashcraft & Gerel returned the check, stating that it was $181,195 less than what the contract called for, even after the ACMC and Armstrong defaults. In an August 13, 2001 letter to Daniel Myer, Director of Claims for CCR, the firm, for the first time, asserted that Mr. Rooney’s October 31, 2000 letter modified the Settlement Agreement by creating a joint and several obligation on the part of all CCR members to pay the settlement amounts and by giving additional remedies to the plaintiffs. The firm demanded an alleged unpaid balance of $677,498 from the first installment (together with interest at 8% per annum) and the entire $4,000,000, plus interest, due in the second installment.
When payment was not forthcoming, the plaintiffs filed this action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against CCR and its 12 then-remaining members, seeking a declaratory judgment that CCR members were jointly and severally liable for all payments due under the settlement agreement and a money judgment based on that principle in the amount of $6,023,336 plus interest, costs, and attorney fees.4 The claim [340]*340of joint and several liability was based not only on Mr. Rooney’s October 31, 2000 letter but also on the final provision in Attachment A to the Producer’s Agreement, stating that, if a participating member withdraws from membership or has its membership terminated, “the corresponding shares of the other Participating Producers shall be increased appropriately to pick up the shares of the withdrawing or terminating Participating Producer.”
The defendants responded to the complaint with a motion to compel arbitration under ¶ 12 of the Settlement Agreement and, because the dispute was arbitrable, to dismiss the complaint. The plaintiffs contended, in opposition to the motion, that the October 31, 2000, letter from Mr. Rooney expressly gave the plaintiffs a judicial remedy for breach of contract against CCR members “for any deficiency.” That, they averred, superseded the arbitration provision in the original settlement agreement. They pointed out that this very issue of arbitrability, hinged on a similar letter from Mr. Rooney, arose in Virginia with respect to CCR and a number of Virginia plaintiffs and that the Virginia Supreme Court held that the dispute was not subject to arbitration. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Newport News Circuit Court Asbestos Cases, 264 Va. 89, 563 S.E.2d 739 (2002). The plaintiffs argued that the Circuit Court should apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel and not permit the defendants to relitigate an issue that they tried and lost in Virginia. After a hearing, the court granted the motion to compel arbitration but entered no order on the motion to dismiss CCR.
Aggrieved, the plaintiffs appealed, arguing in the Court of Special Appeals that the Circuit Court erred (1) in failing to find that the initial Settlement Agreement had been modified by Mr. Rooney’s October 31, 2000, letter and that the modification provided a judicial remedy for any deficiency in payment, and (2) by not giving collateral estoppel effect to the Virginia decision. The branch or form of collateral estoppel posited by the plaintiffs was offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel. Traditional collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, [341]*341requires mutuality of parties, i.e., “in a second suit between the same parties, even if the cause of action is different, any determination of fact that was actually litigated and was essential to a valid and final judgment is conclusive.” (Emphasis added). Welsh v. Gerber Products, 315 Md. 510, 516, 555 A.2d 486, 489 (1989) and cases cited there; also Colandrea v. Wilde Lake, 361 Md. 371, 387, 761 A.2d 899, 908 (2000); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475 (1970). Obviously, there was no mutuality of parties in the Maryland and Virginia litigation; none of the plaintiffs in the Maryland litigation were parties in the Virginia case, and, although CCR was a party in both actions, only three of the CCR members named as defendants in the Maryland case were parties in the Virginia action.5
Some courts have modified the mutuality requirement by precluding, in an action between A and B, relitigation of an issue decided in an earlier case to which either A or B, but not both, was a party. If the plaintiff in the second case seeks to foreclose the defendant from relitigating an issue that the defendant previously litigated unsuccessfully against other plaintiffs, the doctrine invoked is offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel; if the defendant seeks to preclude the plaintiff from relitigating an issue that the plaintiff previously litigated unsuccessfully against other defendants, the doctrine is referred to as defensive non-mutual collateral estoppel. See Welsh, supra, 315 Md. at 517-18, n. 6, 555 A.2d at 489, n. 6. In this case, the plaintiffs invoked offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel, as they sought to preclude the defendants from relitigating the issue of arbitrability that some of them raised and lost in the Virginia case.
[342]*342The Court of Special Appeals rejected that effort, largely on the basis of common law conflict of laws principles, although it injected into its discussion, albeit briefly, references to the Constitutional full faith and credit requirement, which none of the parties had raised in either the Circuit Court or the Court of Special Appeals.6 Citing Jessica G. v. Hector M., 337 Md. 388, 404, 653 A.2d 922, 930 (1995), the court noted that, under the Maryland law of conflict of laws, the res judicata effect to be given to the judgment of another State is that which the judgment would have in the State where it was rendered. Referencing Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 221 Va. 638, 272 S.E.2d 217 (1980), the court further observed that Virginia did not recognize offensive non-mutual collateral es-toppel but continued to require mutuality of parties as part of its collateral estoppel law. Thus, it held, as Virginia would not give preclusive effect to its Amchem decision and prevent the defendants here from litigating arbitrability in a Virginia court, preclusive effect should not be given to the judgment in a Maryland court.
On the substantive issue of arbitrability, the appellate court agreed with the Circuit Court that the Rooney letter did not suffice to modify the arbitration provision in the initial Settlement Agreement. The plaintiffs relied on two provisions in that letter, one stating that a settling plaintiff who did not receive full payment could “pursue a remedy in contract against the CCR members for any deficiency” and the other permitting the recovery of interest and costs if the plaintiffs [343]*343are required to collect a deficiency “by lawsuit or otherwise.” The court did not view either provision as negating the arbitration clause and, to that extent, disagreed substantively with the conclusion of the Virginia court.
The plaintiffs have presented four questions for our review: (1) whether, in light of the agreement to apply Maryland law to any dispute arising from the Settlement Agreement, the Court of Special Appeals erred in applying Virginia collateral estoppel law as a basis for refusing to give the Virginia judgment preclusive effect; (2) whether the Full Faith and Credit clause and the implementing Federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, prohibits Maryland from giving greater effect to the Virginia judgment than Virginia would give to it; (3) whether Maryland recognizes offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel and, if so, whether the lower courts erred in failing to make a “fairness” determination in accordance with Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979); and (4) whether the Court of Special Appeals violated the full faith and credit clause by questioning the legal basis of the Virginia judgment. Because some of these questions overlap and are, in part, not really presented, we shall address the issues in a somewhat different manner.
DISCUSSION
Full Faith and CreditICollateral Estoppel
As noted, although the Constitutional full faith and credit requirement was not raised in or ruled upon by the Circuit Court, it was addressed by the Court of Special Appeals, albeit briefly. We agree with the intermediate appellate court, that, under both a full faith and credit and a common law collateral estoppel analysis, Maryland is not required to give, and, indeed, may not ordinarily give, any greater preclusive effect to the Virginia judgment than Virginia would give to it, and that, in resolving that issue, we must apply Virginia, not Maryland, collateral estoppel law.
Article IV, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, [344]*344records, and judicial proceedings in every other State, and that Congress may, by general laws, “prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” (Emphasis added). Congress enacted such a law in its very first session, in 1790, and, in fact, through that law, has expanded the Clause by requiring the Federal courts to give full faith and credit to State court judgments. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738 prescribes the method by which legislative acts, records, and judicial proceedings are to be authenticated and proved. With respect to “effect,” the statute provides that such acts, records, and judicial proceedings, so authenticated, “shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.” The statute is clear and has been interpreted as meaning precisely what it says: with certain very limited exceptions, such as a showing that the rendering court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction, a Federal court or the court of another State must give the same preclusive effect to the judgment of a State court as would the courts of the State that rendered the judgment, no more and no less.
In contrast to the view of the plaintiffs, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that, in determining the preclusive effect to be given to the judgment of a State court, the claim and issue preclusion rules of the State that rendered the judgment must govern. The point was first made in Board of Public Works v. Columbia College, 17 Wall. 521, 84 U.S. 521, 21 L.Ed. 687 (1873).
The Columbia College case was a bit complex, but essentially it involved an effort in a District of Columbia court to reach property in the estate of a deceased partner of an insolvent firm. In order to recover, the plaintiff had to show that the partner’s obligation was for a sum certain, and, to make that showing, the plaintiff relied on a judgment of a New York court that, in turn, had relied on a decree of a Virginia trial court. The problem was that a Virginia appellate court had [345]*345held the trial court decree to be interlocutory and therefore non-final. Because the Virginia decree would not be given preclusive effect in Virginia, the Supreme Court held that it could not be given preclusive effect in New York or the District of Columbia. Citing an earlier New York case, Suy-dam v. Barber, 18 N.Y. 468, 75 Am.Dec. 254 (1858), the Court held that “[n]o greater effect can be given to any judgment of a court of one State in another State than is given to it in the State where rendered,” as “[a]ny other rule would contravene the policy of the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States on that subject.” Columbia College, 84 U.S. at 529, 21 L.Ed. at 691.7
The subsequent cases in the Supreme Court on this issue have mostly involved the extent to which Federal courts must give preclusive effect to State court judgments, and that has hinged on the statute (§ 1738) rather than the Constitutional provision, but the analysis, to the extent the statute applies, is the same. In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1897, 72 L.Ed.2d 262, 280 (1982), the Court, in holding that a New York judgment affirming, on judicial review, an administrative determination that an employment discrimination claim had no merit was entitled to preclusive effect in a subsequent Federal court action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, noted that “[i]t has long been established that § 1738 does not allow federal courts to employ their own rules of res judicata in [346]*346determining the effect of state judgments. Rather, it goes beyond the common law and commands a federal court to accept the rules chosen by the State from which the judgment is taken.” That view has been confirmed on a number of occasions. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980); Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983); Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984) (the concerns of comity reflected in § 1738 generally allow States to determine the preclusive scope of their own courts’ judgments.); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 1332, 84 L.Ed.2d 274, 281 (1984).
In Migra, a discharged teacher recovered judgment in an Ohio State court against the school board for breach of contract. Although she sued the individual board members for conspiracy and interference with her contract, she did not bring a § 1983 action against them, as she could have done. The State court awarded her a judgment for breach of contract but dismissed the claims against the individual board members. Migra then filed a § 1983 action in Federal court against the board members, and the question arose whether, having failed to make that claim in the Ohio litigation, she was barred by claim preclusion from bringing the action in Federal court. The Federal court dismissed the action on res judicata grounds. The Supreme Court made clear that the plaintiff’s “state-court judgment in this litigation has the same claim preclusive effect in federal court that the judgment would have in the Ohio state courts.” Id. at 85, 104 S.Ct. at 898, 79 L.Ed.2d at 64. Uncertain whether the District Court had applied the Ohio law of preclusion or its own, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the trial court to apply the Ohio law. In Marrese, the Court, in discussing Migra, observed that “[s]uch a remand obviously would have been unnecessary were a federal court free to give greater preclusive effect to a state court judgment than would the judgment-rendering State.” Marrese, supra, 470 U.S. at 384, 105 S.Ct. at 1334, 84 L.Ed.2d at 284. The Marrese Court added that § 1738 “em[347]*347bodies concerns of comity and federalism that allow the States to determine, subject to the requirements of the statute and the Due Process Clause, the preclusive effect of judgments in their own courts.” Id. at 380, 105 S.Ct. at 1332, 84 L.Ed.2d at 281.
The expressions and holdings in these § 1738 cases are entirely consistent with the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Constitutional full faith and credit cases. See, for example, Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 192, 83 S.Ct. 273, 276, 9 L.Ed.2d 240, 244 (1962) (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause, if applicable to a custody decree, would require South Carolina to recognize the Virginia order as binding only if a Virginia court would be bound by it.”); Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349, 62 S.Ct. 608, 612, 86 L.Ed. 885, 891 (1942) (“That clause compels that controversies be stilled so that where a state court has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter, its judgment controls in other states to the same extent as it does in the state where rendered.”); Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S., 545, 551, 67 S.Ct. 451, 456, 91 L.Ed. 488, 496 (1947) (“The full faith and credit to which a judgment is entitled is the credit which it has in the State from which it is taken, not the credit that under other circumstances and conditions it might have had.”). Those expressions and holdings have been echoed by lower Federal courts and by various State courts8, and are consistent with language from our cases.9 Where the full faith and credit issue involves full claim [348]*348preclusion (traditional res judicata), there seems to be little or no disagreement with the proposition that the rendering State’s preclusion rules will apply, and that seems to be the majority rule as well when only issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) is at stake. See Gregory S. Getschow, If At First You Do Not Succeed: Recognition of State Preclusive Laws In Subsequent Multistate Actions, 35 Vill. L. Rev. 253 (1990). Some courts, however, have applied their ovm preclusion rules in the latter context. Id. Getschow views the first approach as effectively merging the preclusion rules into the judgment; the rendering State’s preclusion law is applied because it has become part of the judgment. The second approach, he says, views preclusion as independent of full faith and credit, allowing the second State to apply its own rule.
Whether one uses that analysis or some other, we believe that the view enunciated by the Supreme Court is the better rule, even if it is not a Constitutionally required one. The full faith and credit clause was taken from a similar clause in Article 4 of the Articles of Confederation. See Brengle v. McClellan, 7 G. & J. 434, 439 (Md.1836). Although, as noted in Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 584, 71 S.Ct. 474, 476, 95 L.Ed. 552, 556 (1951), there is little or no legislative history to explain the purpose and meaning of either the Constitutional provision or the statute, from judicial experience “there has emerged the succinct conclusion that the Framers intended it to help weld the independent states into a nation by giving judgments within the jurisdiction of the rendering state the same faith and credit in sister states as they have in the state of the original forum.” See also Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439, 64 S.Ct. 208, 214, 88 L.Ed. 149, 155-56 (1944) (“It altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights [349]*349and obligations created under the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each an integral part of a single nation, in which rights judicially established in any part are given nation-wide application.”).10
Neither that unifying role of the clause nor its complementary function of preserving to the States the power to determine the effect to be given to their own judgments is well served when, absent some truly compelling and Constitutionally permissible circumstance, States treat the judgment of a sister State differently than it would be treated in the State of rendition. That is especially the case with respect to failing to respect the rendering State’s issue preclusion law. Whether and how far to depart from the traditional requirement of collateral estoppel that there be mutuality of parties has been, and ought to remain, a policy decision for each State to make. This Court has gone so far as to recognize defensive non-mutual collateral estoppel, at least where the party sought to be bound by the existing judgment had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in question. See Pat Perusse Realty v. Lingo, 249 Md. 33, 238 A.2d 100 (1968). We have acknowledged, however, that “there are many situations where application of the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel would be manifestly unfair,” Welsh, supra, 315 Md. at 517, 555 A.2d at 489, and we have yet to formally embrace offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel.
The Supreme Court, as an aspect of Federal law, has departed from the mutuality requirement, although in Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552, it expressed some concerns about, and refrained from blessing the broad application of, offensive non-mutuality. The Court articulated two reasons posited for why offensive and defensive non-mutuality should not be treated the [350]*350same. First, “offensive use of collateral estoppel does not promote judicial economy in the same manner as defensive use does.” Id. at 329, 99 S.Ct. at 650, 58 L.Ed.2d at 561. The Court explained that, whereas defensive collateral estoppel gives a plaintiff a strong incentive to join all potential defendants in the first action, if possible, offensive collateral estop-pel creates a contrary incentive: “[sjince a plaintiff will be able to rely on a previous judgment against a defendant but will not be bound by that judgment if the defendant wins, the plaintiff has every incentive to adopt a ‘wait and see’ attitude, in the hope that the first action by another plaintiff will result in a favorable judgment.” Id, at 330, 99 S.Ct. at 651, 58 L.Ed.2d at 561.
A second argument against offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel is that it may be unfair to the defendant, for several reasons. The Court noted (1) that “[i]f a defendant in the first action is sued for small or nominal damages, he may have little incentive to defend vigorously, particularly if future suits are not foreseeable,” (2) offensive use may be unfair as well “if the judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favor of the defendant,” and (3) such use may be unfair “where the second action affords the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a different result.” Id. at 330-31, 99 S.Ct. at 651, 58 L.Ed.2d at 562.
Each State supreme court should resolve these policy questions for itself and not have other courts determine the effect of the judgments rendered by the courts of that State. Professor Charles Alan Wright makes the appropriate point that “[t]he first court should have the power to limit the effect of its own proceedings,” and that that power “would be destroyed if the parties could not rely on the mutuality rule adopted by the first court.” 18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper Federal Practice and Procedure § 4467, at 50 (2d ed. 2002). Wright observes elsewhere:
[351]*351“If the court that rendered judgment would deny nonmutual preclusion, later courts should honor that policy. Assertion of nonmutual preclusion in such circumstances would make it impossible for the first court to give effect to policies that may include broad freedom in selecting parties, freedom to litigate a particular case according to its own needs without concern about the impact on other cases, and acceptance of results that seem just between particular parties even though a new trial or directed verdict — or at least an appeal — would be required if the stakes were greater.”
18A Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4465.5 at 806 (2d ed. 2002).
Virginia has made its choice. In Norfolk and W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 221 Va. 638, 272 S.E.2d 217, 218 (1980), the Virginia Supreme Court explored the reasons favoring and disfavoring the adoption of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel and decided to retain the traditional requirement of mutuality. In that case, the court “reaffirmed Virginia’s adherence to the principle of mutuality which holds that ‘a litigant is generally prevented from invoking the preclusive force of a judgment unless he would have been bound had the prior litigation of the issue reached the opposite result.’ ” Rawlings v. Lopez, 267 Va. 4, 591 S.E.2d 691, 692 (2004), quoting in part from Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 202 S.E.2d 917, 921 (1974). In Rawlings, the Virginia court maintained its adherence to that principle. See also TransDulles Center, Inc. v. Sharma, 252 Va. 20, 472 S.E.2d 274 (1996).
For all of these reasons, we hold that, in applying full faith and credit to the Virginia judgment, a Maryland court must treat the judgment precisely the same as it would be treated in a Virginia court, and that requires that we apply the preclusion rules that would be applied in Virginia.11 That is [352]*352also the approach this Court has taken in applying principles of common law collateral estoppel. See Jessica G. v. Hector M., supra, 387 Md. 388, 404, 653 A.2d 922, 930, where, citing two earlier cases, we confirmed that “[u]nder the Maryland law of conflict of laws, the res judicata effect to be given to the judgment of a court of a foreign state is the res judicata effect that that judgment has in the state where the judgment was rendered.” As the parties agree that Virginia continues to require mutuality as part of its collateral estoppel law and would therefore not give preclusive effect to its Amchem judgment in a second action by different plaintiffs, and clearly would not, and could not, give preclusive effect to it against defendants who were not parties, or in privity with parties, in the Virginia action, the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals were correct in not giving preclusive effect to it in this action.
Whether the Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Arbitrable
Because the Circuit Court was not bound in any way by the Virginia judgment, it had to decide for itself whether the claims asserted by the plaintiffs were subject to arbitration under either (or both) the Federal Arbitration Act (Title [353]*3539, U.S.C.) or the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act (Maryland Code, title 3, subtitle 2 of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article). Both statutes make a provision in a written agreement to submit to arbitration any controversy arising between the parties in the future valid and enforceable and, upon petition by a party seeking to compel arbitration, require a court, upon finding that an agreement to arbitrate the dispute exists, to order arbitration. See title 9, U.S.C. §§ 2 and 4, and Maryland Code, §§ 3-206(a) and 3-207 of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article. The only issue for the court in such a proceeding is whether an enforceable agreement exists to arbitrate the underlying dispute; the court is not concerned with the merits of that dispute. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stinebaugh, 374 Md. 631, 642, 824 A.2d 87, 94 (2003) and cases cited there.
There can be no doubt that the arbitration provision set forth in ¶ 12 of the Settlement Agreement is an all-inclusive one, requiring that “any disputes that may arise while carrying out the terms and conditions of this Agreement” not resolved by the parties amicably be submitted to binding arbitration. That provision is certainly broad enough to include a dispute over whether non-defaulting members of CCR are liable for the unpaid shares of defaulting members. The issue is whether that provision has been abrogated or mitigated by Mr. Rooney’s letter of October 31, 2000.
We dealt with a similar issue in Allstate. Two issues were framed in that case: (1) whether it is for the court or the arbitrator to determine arbitrability when the parties entered into a general arbitration agreement but subsequently bound themselves to a consent order that contemplated a judicial remedy; and (2) the effect of an agreement that contemplates a judicial remedy for the particular dispute upon a prior general arbitration agreement that would have required arbitration of the dispute. We concluded, as to the first issue, that “courts, not arbitrators, should decide whether a prior agreement to arbitrate disputes applies when a subsequent agreement calls for a judicial resolution of the particular controversy.” Allstate, supra, 374 Md. at 635, 824 A.2d at 89. [354]*354As to the second issue, we held that the subsequent consent order did, indeed, provide a judicial remedy for the dispute at hand and therefore superseded the earlier general arbitration provision.
The first issue in Allstate is presented here as well. Although it rests on a matter of contract construction — the effect of the Rooney letter — the issue relates directly to and indeed determines whether there is a currently viable agreement to arbitrate, which is an issue that the court must decide.12
In construing contracts, Maryland follows the objective interpretation principle. If the language of the contract is unambiguous, we give effect to its plain meaning and do not delve into what the parties may have subjectively intended. Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 368 Md. 232, 250-51, 768 A.2d 620, 630 (2001). Where the contract comprises two or more documents, the documents are to be construed together, harmoniously, so that, to the extent possible, all of the provisions can be given effect. See Rocks v. Brosius, 241 Md. 612, 637, 217 A.2d 531, 545 (1966); Rothman v. Silver, 245 Md. 292, 296, 226 A.2d 308, 310 (1967); Bachmann v. Glazer & Glazer, Inc., 316 Md. 405, 415, 559 A.2d 365, 369 (1989). In terms of the issue before us, that requires looking at the Rooney letter to see what, if anything, in it precludes giving effect to ¶ 12 of the Settlement Agreement.
The Rooney letter, as noted, was intended to resolve the problem of requiring all settling plaintiffs to execute a release for the full amount of their respective settlements in advance [355]*355of receiving only a partial payment of the settlement. Some provision needed to be made for reserving their rights if they did not ultimately receive all that they were entitled to receive under the settlement agreement. To that end, the letter stated:
“[Sjhould the CCR fail to timely make any or all of the payments required by the Master Settlement Agreement, then in that event each settling plaintiff who has not received full payment may pursue a remedy in contract against the CCR members for any deficiency. If such action is required, the CCR members shall be responsible to pay the deficiency with interest at 8% per annum, and the CCR members will reimburse each such settling plaintiff for reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses that may be required to collect this deficiency by lawsuit or otherwise.”
The plaintiffs view the italicized language — -“a remedy in contract,” “such action,” and “by lawsuit or otherwise” as providing a judicial remedy in the event of any shortfall in full payment. We do not agree. Permitting “a remedy in contract” does not foreclose arbitration as the remedy. To state that if “such action” is required to collect the deficiency the plaintiffs will be entitled to interest, attorneys’ fees, and expenses does not indicate that the collection action is to be other than a claim submitted to arbitration. Indeed, if the two sentences are to be read together harmoniously, “such action” would necessarily refer to the “remedy in contract.” In the absence of a general arbitration clause in the contract, those provisions certainly would permit a judicial action to collect the deficiency and ancillary expenses, but they are in no way inconsistent with the arbitration provision and can be given full meaning in harmony with that provision.
The language that gave the Circuit Court some pause was the last provision, requiring the CCR members to pay the ancillary fees and expenses that may be required to collect the deficiency “by lawsuit or otherwise.” That language — the reference to “lawsuit” — is not necessarily inconsistent with the [356]*356arbitration provision, however, and can be read in full harmony with it. Under the Settlement Agreement, plaintiffs’ counsel is given certain options in the event an installment is short because one or more CCR members failed to contribute their share of the installment. Counsel could declare the entire settlement agreement void, in which event the plaintiffs could sue the defendants in tort.
If counsel elected to “continue” the settlement agreement as to the non-defaulting CCR members, the plaintiffs had the option, as to the defaulting members, of “(a) electing to enforce the, Defaulting CCR member company’s obligations under this Settlement Agreement or (b) electing to pursue such plaintiffs claims for asbestos-related injury against the Defaulting CCR member company in the tort system.” Implicit in that construct is that, if counsel elected to “continue” the settlement with the non-defaulting CCR members, the agreement, and, with it, the arbitration requirement, would be terminated as to the defaulting members. That would allow, as an alternative to a tort action, a lawsuit for breach of contract against the defaulting members to collect the deficiency and, under the Rooney letter, interest, expenses, and attorneys’ fees as well. Read in that manner, the language is entirely consistent with maintaining the arbitration requirement as to any dispute with the non-defaulting CCR members, which is precisely what this case involves.
That construction of the Rooney letter is favored not only by the requirement that all provisions of a contract be read together harmoniously, so that each can be given effect, but also by the ordinary mandate that, where an arbitration agreement exists, ambiguities as to arbitrability be resolved in favor of arbitration. Notwithstanding the contrary conclusion of the Virginia courts in their Amehem decisions, we find no basis in the record before us for refusing to enforce ¶ 12 of the Settlement Agreement.
BELL, C.J., and CATHELL, J., Dissent.