HEANEY, Circuit Judge.
. Rosa Lee Brown appeals from a district court decision affirming the Secretary of Health and Human Services’s denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
Brown is a sixty-two-year-old woman with two years of college training. Her past relevant work was primarily clerical in nature. On May 21, 1982, she applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 1381a, respectively, complaining of heart and back problems, blackout spells, neck pains, muscle spasms, general body pain, and dizziness. She attributes many of her physical problems to automobile accidents in 1978, 1979, and 1980. Brown’s daily activities consist primarily of watching television while sitting or lying down. She does not cook, do housework, shop, or engage in social activities. Her pain is aggravated by sitting for more than five minutes, and her abilities to stand and walk are severely limited. She takes Motrin, Valium, and Dalmane daily.1 The Social Security Administration denied her application both initially and on reconsideration. On May 18, 1984, a hearing was held before an administrative law [871]*871judge (AU), who affirmed the denial. He found that although there was evidence of “early degenerative arthritis in the cervical spine and lumbar spine, early chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and possible psychophysiological musculoskeletal reaction,” Brown had not met the severity requirement of the second step of the sequential evaluation process,2 and was therefore not disabled. The ALJ’s determination became the Secretary’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied review. On April 5, 1985, the district court affirmed the Secretary’s decision.
On appeal, Brown argues that step two of the sequential evaluation process, as applied by the Secretary, contravenes the Social Security Act (Act). She also states that a remand would be necessary even if step two were valid, since the Secretary’s determination of no disability was not supported by substantial evidence. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand.
DISCUSSION
Brown questions the validity of the second step of the sequential evaluation process. This regulation requires a finding of “not disabled” if the claimant does not have severe impairments, regardless of the claimant’s age, education, or work experience. Brown argues that this regulation contravenes the Social Security Act, which requires a consideration of these vocational factors when determining disability. The Secretary argues that the regulation is consistent with the Act.
The Circuits are divided on this question. Three Circuits3 have accepted Brown’s argument and have invalidated the provision. See Hansen v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 170 (10th Cir.1986); Baeder v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 547, 553 (3d Cir.1985); Yuckert v. Heckler, 774 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir.1985). These Circuits have reasoned that the provision on its face conflicts with the Act. They point out that while the provision explicitly requires the Secretary to disregard the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, the Act expressly requires those factors to be taken into account when determining disability.4 See Hansen, 783 F.2d 170, 174; Baeder, 768 F.2d at 551; Yuckert, 774 F.2d [872]*872at 1368. The five other Circuits that have considered the question have refused to invalidate the second step, but have interpreted it as a de minimis, threshold requirement. See e.g., Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir.1985); Salmi v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 774 F.2d 685, 691 (6th Cir.1985); Evans v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1012, 1014 (4th Cir.1984); Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir.1984); Chico v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 947, 954-55 n. 10 (2d Cir.1983). Under the de minimis approach, “[a]n impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual’s ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or work experience.” Brady, 724 F.2d at 920 (quoting Appeals Council Review of Sequential Evaluation Under Expanded Vocational Regulations (1980)).
Regardless of whether we invalidate the second step or accept it as a de minimis requirement, a remand would be necessary; the record clearly shows that Brown’s impairments, at the very least, would meet a de minimis requirement. Even though we could avoid this question, its importance and recurring nature convince us that its prompt settlement is appropriate.
We believe that those Circuits which have invalidated the provision have the stronger argument. Although the second step might be consistent with the Act if the Secretary applied it “as a preliminary screening device to deny a claimant with impairments so minimal that they could under no circumstances have a serious impact on the ability to work,” Hansen, 783 F.2d 170, 174, the Secretary has not done so. See Baeder, 768 F.2d at 552 (“a full forty percent of disability applicants are denied benefits without any evaluation of their age, education or past relevant work experience”); Hansen, 783 F.2d 170, 175-76. The facts in this case illustrate the manner in which the Secretary actually applies the severity standard. The Secretary found that Brown did not have a severe impairment for the purposes of the second step, despite her finding that Brown suffers from early degenerative arthritis, early chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and psychophysiological impairments. Therefore, the only practical way to ensure that the Secretary follows the requirements of the Act is to invalidate the second step.5
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HEANEY, Circuit Judge.
. Rosa Lee Brown appeals from a district court decision affirming the Secretary of Health and Human Services’s denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
Brown is a sixty-two-year-old woman with two years of college training. Her past relevant work was primarily clerical in nature. On May 21, 1982, she applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 1381a, respectively, complaining of heart and back problems, blackout spells, neck pains, muscle spasms, general body pain, and dizziness. She attributes many of her physical problems to automobile accidents in 1978, 1979, and 1980. Brown’s daily activities consist primarily of watching television while sitting or lying down. She does not cook, do housework, shop, or engage in social activities. Her pain is aggravated by sitting for more than five minutes, and her abilities to stand and walk are severely limited. She takes Motrin, Valium, and Dalmane daily.1 The Social Security Administration denied her application both initially and on reconsideration. On May 18, 1984, a hearing was held before an administrative law [871]*871judge (AU), who affirmed the denial. He found that although there was evidence of “early degenerative arthritis in the cervical spine and lumbar spine, early chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and possible psychophysiological musculoskeletal reaction,” Brown had not met the severity requirement of the second step of the sequential evaluation process,2 and was therefore not disabled. The ALJ’s determination became the Secretary’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied review. On April 5, 1985, the district court affirmed the Secretary’s decision.
On appeal, Brown argues that step two of the sequential evaluation process, as applied by the Secretary, contravenes the Social Security Act (Act). She also states that a remand would be necessary even if step two were valid, since the Secretary’s determination of no disability was not supported by substantial evidence. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand.
DISCUSSION
Brown questions the validity of the second step of the sequential evaluation process. This regulation requires a finding of “not disabled” if the claimant does not have severe impairments, regardless of the claimant’s age, education, or work experience. Brown argues that this regulation contravenes the Social Security Act, which requires a consideration of these vocational factors when determining disability. The Secretary argues that the regulation is consistent with the Act.
The Circuits are divided on this question. Three Circuits3 have accepted Brown’s argument and have invalidated the provision. See Hansen v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 170 (10th Cir.1986); Baeder v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 547, 553 (3d Cir.1985); Yuckert v. Heckler, 774 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir.1985). These Circuits have reasoned that the provision on its face conflicts with the Act. They point out that while the provision explicitly requires the Secretary to disregard the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, the Act expressly requires those factors to be taken into account when determining disability.4 See Hansen, 783 F.2d 170, 174; Baeder, 768 F.2d at 551; Yuckert, 774 F.2d [872]*872at 1368. The five other Circuits that have considered the question have refused to invalidate the second step, but have interpreted it as a de minimis, threshold requirement. See e.g., Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir.1985); Salmi v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 774 F.2d 685, 691 (6th Cir.1985); Evans v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1012, 1014 (4th Cir.1984); Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir.1984); Chico v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 947, 954-55 n. 10 (2d Cir.1983). Under the de minimis approach, “[a]n impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual’s ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or work experience.” Brady, 724 F.2d at 920 (quoting Appeals Council Review of Sequential Evaluation Under Expanded Vocational Regulations (1980)).
Regardless of whether we invalidate the second step or accept it as a de minimis requirement, a remand would be necessary; the record clearly shows that Brown’s impairments, at the very least, would meet a de minimis requirement. Even though we could avoid this question, its importance and recurring nature convince us that its prompt settlement is appropriate.
We believe that those Circuits which have invalidated the provision have the stronger argument. Although the second step might be consistent with the Act if the Secretary applied it “as a preliminary screening device to deny a claimant with impairments so minimal that they could under no circumstances have a serious impact on the ability to work,” Hansen, 783 F.2d 170, 174, the Secretary has not done so. See Baeder, 768 F.2d at 552 (“a full forty percent of disability applicants are denied benefits without any evaluation of their age, education or past relevant work experience”); Hansen, 783 F.2d 170, 175-76. The facts in this case illustrate the manner in which the Secretary actually applies the severity standard. The Secretary found that Brown did not have a severe impairment for the purposes of the second step, despite her finding that Brown suffers from early degenerative arthritis, early chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and psychophysiological impairments. Therefore, the only practical way to ensure that the Secretary follows the requirements of the Act is to invalidate the second step.5
In view of the fact that this case must be remanded for a consideration of Brown’s ability to work in light of her vocational characteristics as well as her impairments, we make the following additional observations. The Secretary has a duty to develop a full and fair record, regardless of whether or not the claimant is represented by counsel. See e.g., Brissette v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 548, 549 (8th Cir.1984). In this case, a complete record would fully discuss Brown’s work history, the relationship between her automobile accidents and her [873]*873impairments, and her physical disabilities, particularly her blackouts. The Secretary should also develop the record in regard to the medical opinion of Dr. Bery Engebretsen, Brown’s treating physician, as required by Brissette, 730 F.2d at 550, and Lewis v. Schweiker, 720 F.2d 487, 489 (8th Cir.1983). The need for this is apparent: although Engebretsen reported that Brown had “severe degenerative arthritis” and “chronic obstructive pulmonary disease',” the Secretary found that Brown had no severe impairments. On remand, the Secretary should also give careful consideration to Brown’s subjective complaints. See e.g., Polaski v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 943, 948 (8th Cir.1984); Layton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 440, 442 (8th Cir.1984); Ragsdale v. Secretary, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 623 F.2d 528, 530 (8th Cir. 1980). Before the Secretary may disregard Brown’s subjective evidence, she must make express credibility findings. See Basinger v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir.1984). Finally, the Secretary should consider the disabling effect of any psycho-physiological impairments that Brown may have.6 See Klug v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 423 (8th Cir.1975).
In summary, we hold that the second step of the sequential evaluation process is invalid and remand to the Secretary to reconsider her disability determination in accord with this opinion and in light of Brown’s age, education, work experience, and physical and mental impairments.