Rodriguez v. Blanding

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 19, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-07288
StatusUnknown

This text of Rodriguez v. Blanding (Rodriguez v. Blanding) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rodriguez v. Blanding, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DENNIS RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, -against- 22-CV-7288 (LTS) S. BLANDING; DEPARTMENT OF ORDER TO AMEND CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Upstate Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that, when he was incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility (Sing Sing), another prisoner assaulted him, causing him serious injuries. By order dated August 29, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Dennis Rodriguez alleges the following facts in his complaint. On June 23, 2022, Plaintiff was in the “A-block yard” at Sing Sing. (ECF 2 at 4.) He was taking out a cigarette to roll, when another prisoner, S. Blanding, struck him from behind. The blow caused Plaintiff to fall and hit his head on the toilet and the floor. Blanding then cut Plaintiff’s face with a “white cutting object.” (Id.) As a result of the assault, Plaintiff now cannot hear well in his right ear, and he suffers from headaches. The following day, Plaintiff reported the incident to Sing Sing officials. (Id.) Pictures were taken of his face. Plaintiff contends that DOCCS has failed to provide “proper treatment.”

(Id.) He sues DOCCS and S. Blanding, for alleged violations of his constitutional rights, seeking damages. DISCUSSION A. Section 1983 Claims Against Prisoner Blanding A claim for relief under Section 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties therefore generally are not liable under the statute. Sykes v. Bank of America, 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”). Plaintiff alleges that the individual who assaulted him was another prisoner, Defendant S.

Blanding. Because Defendant Blanding is a private party, who was not acting as a state or other government employee, Plaintiff cannot bring a claim against him under Section 1983. Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendant Blanding under Section 1983 are therefore dismissed without leave to replead.2

2 Nothing in this order prevents Plaintiff from including a supplemental state law claim against a private party, such as Blanding, that arises from the same incident as his federal claim. B. New York State DOCCS Plaintiff contends that he received inadequate medical care for injuries that he suffered in DOCCS custody. (ECF 2 at 4.) In addition, the allegations might be construed as a claim for failure to protect him from assault. Plaintiff brings these Section 1983 claims against DOCCS, which is a New York State agency. “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in

federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . .” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity in enacting Section 1983. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977).

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Bluebook (online)
Rodriguez v. Blanding, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rodriguez-v-blanding-nysd-2022.