Roche v. Lincoln Property Co.

278 F. Supp. 2d 744, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23361, 2003 WL 22025062
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedJuly 25, 2003
DocketCIV.A.02-1390-A
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 278 F. Supp. 2d 744 (Roche v. Lincoln Property Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roche v. Lincoln Property Co., 278 F. Supp. 2d 744, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23361, 2003 WL 22025062 (E.D. Va. 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LEE, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants, Lincoln Property Company’s (“Lincoln”) and the State of Wisconsin Investment Board’s (“SWIB”), motions to bar the testimony by Richard Bernstein, M.D., and for summary judgment on all claims for personal injury. This case concerns Plaintiffs Christophe and Juanita Roche’s claim for personal injuries stemming from exposure to alleged toxic levels *746 of mold in their apartment. The Roches contend that Defendants negligently failed to properly maintain their apartment and allowed toxic levels of mold to develop, causing the Roches and their family to suffer respiratory and other medical problems. The issue before the Court is whether Dr. Bernstein’s testimony regarding the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs’ personal injuries, allegedly resulting from exposure to toxic levels of mold, satisfies the standards of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and its progeny. For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that Dr. Bernstein’s testimony lacks, as to the proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ personal injuries, a methodology satisfying Daubert because: (1) Dr. Bernstein failed to adhere to the established methodology of differential diagnosis by not ruling in the suspected causes and by not ruling out other possible causes; (2) he failed to establish why various reports and studies showing some correlation between exposure to mold and allergic reactions support his conclusions that the mold in the apartment was the proximate cause of Plaintiffs ailments, and (3) he relied solely on temporal relation to arrive at his conclusions.

I. BACKGROUND

Christophe and Juanita Roche and their children lived in an apartment at Westfield Village from April 2001 to March 2002. The Roches claim that their apartment was poorly maintained, that there were water leaks, holes in the wall, and mold growing within the apartment. The Roch-es contend that, as a result of being exposed to toxic levels of mold, they currently suffer respiratory and other ailments.

Plaintiffs leased their apartment from SWIB. Lincoln managed the Westfield Village Apartments in Centreville, Virginia. Plaintiffs complained to Lincoln on several occasions about the poor condition of their apartment. Plaintiffs complained of water leaks needing repair, of holes that had been cut in the wall, of the carpet being torn up, and of “the fact that mold was all over [the] apartment.” (Comply 17.) Plaintiffs allege that toxic levels of mold developed within the apartment due to moisture damage from the leaky fixtures and plumbing. In February 2002, Plaintiffs engaged a consultant, Ronald G. Ginste of Potomac Environmental Testing Services, to conduct testing for the presence of mold in the apartment, and the consultant discovered that there was “extensive” mold contamination in the apartment. {Id. ¶ 28.) Specifically, Mr. Ginste found several types of molds present in the apartment: Stachybotrys, Cladosporium, Penieillium, Aspergillus, Smuts, Hyphal elements, and epicoccum.

Subsequent to leaving the apartment in March 2002 and after having filed this action, Plaintiffs sought treatment from Dr. Bernstein, an allergist. Mr. Roche complained of memory loss, chronic headaches, sinus problems, mild hypersensitivity to smells, and chronic nasal stuffiness. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp., Ex. D. at 2.) Mrs. Roche complained of memory loss, chronic upper respiratory sinus symptoms, some chest congestion, and shortness of breath. {Id. at 4.) Dr. Bernstein first examined the Plaintiffs on December 24, 2002. After his initial examination, Dr. Bernstein wrote to the Plaintiffs stating that he believed they were dealing with two health issues: first, the allergenic effects of the molds to which the Plaintiffs were exposed, primarily Cla-dosporium and Aspergillus; second, sick-building symptoms “which were probably secondary to the mycotoxie effects of the Stachybotrys, which can also be seen with Aspergillus.” {Id. at 1.) Dr. Bernstein recommended that Mr. Roche stop smoking, that the Roches find a new home for their *747 cat, and that they start a low-sugar diet. (Id.) In his inter-office report, Dr. Bernstein noted that Mrs. Roche had a history of asthma. (Id. at 4.) Dr. Bernstein scheduled the Plaintiffs for allergy testing. (Id. at 3, 5.)

On February 12, 2003, the Plaintiffs presented themselves for allergy testing through skin endpoint titration. Dr. Bernstein found that Mr. Roche was allergic to several common allergens found in Northern Virginia; however, Mr. Roche was not allergic to the molds found in the apartment — namely Aspergillus, Cladosporium, or Penicillium. (Bernstein Dep. at 14:9-20:9.) Mr. Roche was allergic to mites, cockroaches, eats, dust, most weeds and grasses he was tested for, and all trees in the test. In addition, Mr. Roche smoked about 8 cigarettes per day, and the family owned a cat. Dr. Bernstein repeated his prior recommendation that Mr. Roche stop smoking because smoking is a “nonspecific irritant” which makes allergic symptoms worse. (Id. at 20:10-21:11.) He restated his recommendation that Mr. Roche find a new home for the cat. (Id. at 20:10-12.) As to Mrs. Roche, Dr. Bernstein found that she was allergic to most allergens, including the molds Aspergillus, Cladoso-porium, and Penicillium. (Id. at 21:12-23:7.) Mrs. Roche was also allergic to cats. Dr. Bernstein also recommended that Mrs. Roche get rid of the cat. (Id. at 23:11-21.) Dr. Bernstein, however, performed no testing addressing the Plaintiffs’ reaction to Stachybotrys because Dr. Bernstein does not consider Stachybotrys to be an allergen. (Id. at 26:20-27:9.)

The Scheduling Order in the case required that the Plaintiffs designate expert witnesses pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and to comply with the other mandates of the statute by December 15, 2002. See Fed.R.CivJP. 26(a)(2). On December 27, 2002, the Plaintiffs designated Dr. Bernstein as one of three experts; Plaintiffs failed to provide any of the required disclosures under Rule 26(a)(2), i.e., the expert report. Defendants moved to bar Dr. Bernstein’s testimony based on Plaintiffs failure to submit a Rule 26 report. Magistrate Judge Se-well denied the motion because he found that Dr. Bernstein was a treating physician under Hall v. Sykes, 164 F.R.D. 46 (E.D.Va.1995), and, therefore, exempt from the expert report requirement. Thus, Plaintiffs did not need to submit a report to the extent that Dr. Bernstein was going to testify about his treatment of the Plaintiffs.

Defendants now bring two motions. First, Defendants seek to exclude Dr. Bernstein’s testimony as to specific causation for both Plaintiffs for failure to adhere to the principles enunciated in Daubert because Dr. Bernstein “has no appropriate methodology to opine that molds in the apartment contributed to any health problems.” (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. at 1.) Defendants contend that Dr.

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Bluebook (online)
278 F. Supp. 2d 744, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23361, 2003 WL 22025062, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roche-v-lincoln-property-co-vaed-2003.