Ballinger v. Atkins

947 F. Supp. 925, 1996 WL 727149
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedDecember 16, 1996
DocketCivil Action 96-563-A
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 947 F. Supp. 925 (Ballinger v. Atkins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ballinger v. Atkins, 947 F. Supp. 925, 1996 WL 727149 (E.D. Va. 1996).

Opinion

ORDER

CACHERIS, Chief Judge.

For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED that:

(1) NutraSweet’s Motion in Limine to exclude all expert testimony from Dr. Barry Sears is GRANTED; and

(2) NutraSweet’s Motion in Limine to exclude expert testimony from Dr. James *926 Brodsky concerning Plaintiff Ballinger’s injuries or causation is hereby GRANTED.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to furnish a copy of this Order and attached Memorandum Opinion to counsel for each party.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on Motions in Limine filed by Defendant The NutraSweet Company, Inc. (“NutraSweet”) requesting that the expert testimony of both Barry D. Sears, Ph.D. (“Sears”), and Dr. James H. Brodsky, M.D. (“Brodsky”) be excluded. For reasons set forth below, both motions are GRANTED.

I.

On April 30,1996, Plaintiff Gerry Ballinger (“Ballinger”) filed this products liability complaint against Defendants Robert Atkins, M.D. (“Atkins”), the Atkins Center for Complementary Medicine (“Center”), the Cosmetic Research Development Corporation 1 , and NutraSweet. Ballinger avers that he suffered a series of chronic hypoglycemic-type symptoms as a result of ingesting NutraSweet in connection with the “Atkins Diet Program” (“Diet”), a ketogenic diet developed and marketed by Dr. Atkins, which focuses on high-protein, low-carbohydrate intake.

Ballinger alleges that after beginning the Diet in April of 1994, he ingested artificial sweeteners (notably aspartame), mostly in packet form, with puddings, desserts and in liquids such as Crystal Light. Ballinger contends that commencing in May of 1994, he suffered neurological and physical ailments, including tachycardia, dizziness, anxiety, panic attacks, blurred vision, inability to concentrate, loss of memory, and shooting pains in his left arm. On June 2, 1994, Ballinger visited a physician who advised him to cease ingesting NutraSweet. After communicating with The NutraSweet Company, Ballinger continued his use of the product, but stopped doing so after speaking with Dr. Atkins. Ballinger contends that his acute symptoms waned after discontinuing both the Diet and his use of NutraSweet, but that he has continued to suffer long-term effects, notably the inability to concentrate.

In order to establish his case, Ballinger seeks to rely on expert testimony from Sears and Brodsky. NutraSweet asserts that Dr. Sears should be precluded from testifying as an expert on any issue at all, and that Dr. Brodsky should not be permitted to testify as to any neurological injuries suffered by Bal-linger, and should not be able to provide an opinion as to the causation of such alleged injuries. 2

II.

This Motion is brought pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“Rule 702”), which governs the admissibility of expert witness testimony. The Court serves a “gatekeeper” role with such testimony, as dictated by the principles announced in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Daubert, by its own terms, represented a liberalization of the rules governing the admission of expert testimony. Cavallo v. Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1158-59 (4th Cir.1996). According to Daubert, the Court must assess both “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the [proposed] testimony is scientifically valid and ... whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts at issue.” Id. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. The Court’s analysis should be a flexible one, with a focus “solely on principles and methodology” upon which the proposed expert testimony rests. Id. at 595, 113 S.Ct. at 2797.

Though the Supreme Court expressly refrained from establishing a specific test, it provided a number of considerations for courts to examine: (1) whether, and to what degree, the proposed testimony has been *927 tested; (2) whether the methodology or reasoning has been published or otherwise exposed to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether it.is generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. Id. at 591-595, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97. The fourth factor, general acceptance, is a carryover from an earlier standard for admissibility. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.1923). In recently applying Daubert, the Fourth Circuit apparently added a fifth factor for analysis: whether standards or controls exist over the implementation of the methodology or reasoning. Cavallo, 100 F.3d at 1158-59.

With these principles in mind, the Court will now evaluate the proposed testimony of Drs. Sears and Brodsky.

III.

Barry Sears is a biochemist specializing in cardiovascular issues, and his research interests are dietary modulation, hormonal responses, and eicosanoid synthesis. He has a Ph.D. and received postdoctoral training in biochemistry.

As an initial matter, the Court finds it difficult to hold that Dr. Sears’s background and knowledge qualify him to testify as an expert as to any issue in this case. He is not a medical doctor, is not licensed to practice medicine in any jurisdiction, and is not a member of any scientific or medical associations or societies. Sears Dep. at 13, 60. In addition, Dr. Sears has never conducted research in neurology or brain disorders, has never written specifically about either, and has never spoken to a professional body about brain disorders. Sears Dep. at 13-15. Importantly, when asked whether he has “any special background or expertise in the field of artificial sweeteners,” Dr. Sears admitted, “No, I do not.” Sears Dep. at 83 (emphasis added).

Putting that aside, the Court will examine Sears’ proposed testimony according to the Daubert standards. Ballinger offered Dr. Sears as an expert who would testify how aspartame could cause neurological injury. Sears’ specific opinion is that

the combination of a ketogenie diet with consumption of large amounts of NutraSweet contributed to significant and permanent neurological damage [suffered by Ballinger] caused by an inability of the brain to remove excessive levels of aspartic acid.

Sears Dep. at 60-61.

Dr. Sears describes his opinion as a “working hypothesis.” Sears Dep. at 96, 119, 121, 130-33. In doing so, Sears falls woefully short of expressing an opinion to any degree, of reasonable certainty. His opinion is merely that the combination of NutraSweet,and a ketogenie diet “can possibly

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Bluebook (online)
947 F. Supp. 925, 1996 WL 727149, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ballinger-v-atkins-vaed-1996.