[Cite as Robinson v. Robinson, 2026-Ohio-2107.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
JOSEPH S. ROBINSON : : C.A. No. 30698 Appellant : : Trial Court Case No. 2020 DR 00138 v. : : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- AMY M. ROBINSON : Domestic Relations) : Appellee : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on June 5, 2026, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE
LEWIS, P.J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30698
TYRONE P. BORGER, Attorney for Appellant DEAN E. HINES, Attorney for Appellee
HANSEMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant Joseph S. Robinson (“Father”) appeals from the decision of
the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, that dismissed
his September 4, 2024 motion to modify parenting time and child support and converted his
support arrearages to a judgment. For the reasons discussed below, the trial court’s
judgment is affirmed.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} Father and defendant-appellee, Amy M. Robinson (“Mother”), were married on
December 5, 2009, and two children were born of the marriage: a son in November 2012
and a daughter in February 2015. Father filed a complaint for divorce on February 20, 2020,
and on September 28, 2022, the court issued a final judgment and decree of divorce. Father
appealed and we affirmed on April 14, 2023, in Robinson v. Robinson, 2023-Ohio-1233
(2d Dist.).
{¶ 3} Of relevance to this appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s order designating
Mother as the residential parent of the children and granting Father “midweek parenting
time” from Thursday after school until Friday morning plus every other weekend, with his
weekend parenting time being from Thursday after school until Monday morning. Id. at ¶ 39.
We also affirmed the trial court’s orders for Father to pay Mother $ 3,500.00 per month in
spousal support for a period of 51 months and to pay a total of $2,235.17 per month in child
support. Id. at ¶ 60.
2 {¶ 4} The parties engaged in extensive post-decree litigation during and after our
decision in Robinson. Father filed three separate motions to modify support. The first motion
was filed in April 2023 but was withdrawn due to an agreement filed in August 2023.
Pursuant to that agreement, Father admitted to being in contempt of court for failing to pay
support and agreed to pay a lump sum to avoid a jail sentence. Father purged his contempt
by paying $12,000 before his jail sentence commenced on December 1, 2024.
{¶ 5} Father’s second motion to modify support was filed in October 2023, and it also
resulted in an agreement. The agreement was filed in May 2024 and reduced Father’s
spousal support to $0 per month and increased Father’s child support to $2,824.18 per
month, with each new support order to commence on April 1, 2024.
{¶ 6} On September 4, 2024, Father filed his third motion to modify support and
parenting time. In his motion, Father generally stated that he had changed circumstances,
being “numerous health issues” that reduced his income. When he filed his motion, he did
not complete and file an accompanying financial disclosure affidavit that was required by the
Montgomery County Domestic Relations Division’s local rules.
{¶ 7} After Father filed his third motion to modify, Mother sent Father discovery
requests that went unanswered. On November 22, 2024, Mother filed a motion to dismiss
Father’s motion to modify or, alternatively, a motion to compel discovery. On November 25
and 27, 2024, the trial court filed entries granting Mother’s motion to compel discovery. Later,
Mother filed a motion requesting Father to file a financial disclosure affidavit. On February
25, 2025, the trial court issued an order instructing Father to file his financial disclosure
affidavit no later than 10 days after the order. Father did not file the affidavit.
{¶ 8} Mother continued to request discovery from Father. However, Father failed to
comply, and after each time, Mother filed for orders compelling Fathers’ compliance, which
3 the trial court ordered on October 28, 2024, November 27, 2024, February 24, 2025, and
April 19, 2025.
{¶ 9} On February 25, 2025, Mother filed a motion for an order reducing the spousal
and child support arrearage amount to a judgment. At the time of her filing, Father had an
outstanding arrearage of $62,016.79 from his support obligation, spanning from April 2023
to February 2025.
{¶ 10} On August 1, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Father’s September 4,
2024 motion to modify support and parenting time, among numerous other motions. At the
commencement of the hearing, Mother withdrew all her motions except the motion to convert
the support arrearages into a judgment. Mother also made an oral motion to dismiss Father’s
motion based on Father’s noncompliance with discovery, the court’s orders to compel ,and
the failure to provide a financial disclosure affidavit. Father opposed the dismissal and orally
requested a continuance. However, the magistrate denied Father’s request for a
continuance and dismissed Father’s motion to modify parenting time and child support.
In the magistrate’s written decision, the magistrate articulated:
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO MODIFY SUPPORT; PARENTING TIME FILED
9/4/24
The case records show that the Plaintiff was served with discovery
requests, and when he failed to provide discovery, an Order Compelling
Plaintiff was filed. Still Plaintiff failed to reply to the discovery. Plaintiff believed
his medical records were not discoverable. In actions concerning the allocation
of parental rights and responsibilities, the parents’ medical records are
discoverable.
4 On February 25, 2025, an Order Requiring Plaintiff/Father to File
Affidavit of Financial Disclosure was filed giving Plaintiff 10 days to file his
Affidavit. Plaintiff never complied with this Court Order.
Due to Plaintiff’s failure to provide discovery, Defendant requested his
Motion to Modify Support and Parenting Time be dismissed. Defendant’s
motion is granted.
Magistrate Decision (Aug. 6, 2025), p. 4-5.
{¶ 11} The magistrate further granted Mother’s motion to convert the support
arrearages into a judgment, reasoning:
Defendant requests this Court reduce the Plaintiff’s outstanding child
and spousal support obligation to a judgment. Defendant presented a Payment
History Report from the Support Enforcement Agency which shows that
Plaintiff’s unpaid balance is $74,399.77 as of July 20, 2025 [Exhibit S]. This
unpaid balance includes the Administrative Fee owed to Ohio. Court Exhibit II,
an Audit from the SEA has the breakdown of what is owed to Defendant
($71,627.09) and what is owed to Ohio ($2,772.67) as of July 20, 2025.
As of July 20, 2025, the spousal support arrearage was $40,359.10, the
child support arrearage was $29,029.74, and the medical support arrearage
was $1,338.25. The spousal support obligation was reduced to $0 per month
commencing April 1, 2024.
Defendant’s request for the unpaid child and spousal support to be
reduced to a judgment is granted. Defendant will be given a Judgment against
Plaintiff in the amount of $71,627.09. Said Judgment of $71,627.09 shall
5 accrue interest from the date of the filing of this Order at the maximum legal
rate permitted by ORC Section 5703.47.
Id. at p. 5-6.
{¶ 12} Father filed objections to the magistrate’s decision on August 18, 2025, which
the trial court overruled in a decision filed on November 4, 2025. The court reasoned:
OBJECTIONS:
BRANCH I-Dismissal of 9/4/24 Motion to Modify Support and
Parenting Time Due to Non-Filing of Financial Affidavit
The Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Decision dismissing Plaintiff’s
Motion to Modify Support and Parenting time filed on September 4, 2024.
Plaintiff asserts that the dismissal based on the Plaintiff’s failure to file a
financial affidavit “deprives him of his substantive right to a hearing on the
merits.” Mont. Co. Domestic Relations Court Local Rule 1.9 addresses the
financial disclosure affidavit, specifically requiring the following:
“…Required Filing. The Court’s approved Affidavit of Financial
Disclosure [Appendix, Form 1] must be submitted to the Court
as required by this rule. All Affidavits of Financial Disclosure
must be complete and provide detailed disclosure under oath.
Incomplete affidavits may not be considered by the Court. Each
party is under an affirmative duty to supplement any Affidavit of
Financial Disclosure immediately upon any material change in
employment, income, expenses or other information included in
the affidavit. 18 The Supreme Court of Ohio has authorized the
use of their Affidavit of Income and Expenses. If a party elects to
6 use this form, and the party is requesting a temporary custody or
support order, the party must also file a separate motion for a
temporary order…
…4. Post-Decree Motions: In all post-decree motions
involving support, the moving party must file an Affidavit of
Financial Disclosure and serve it on the nonmoving party
with the motion. (emphasis added) ...”
Here, Plaintiff argues that the Plaintiff’s poverty affidavit, filed at the time
of his Motion to proceed in Pauperis, should satisfy the requirement in Rule
1.9. Further, Counsel for Plaintiff asserts that his failure to file a financial
affidavit is “excusable neglect” and that the financial documentation supplied
in discovery should satisfy the financial affidavit requirement. This argument
falls flat. First, the affidavit filed at the time of the Pauperis Motion is not the
same as the financial affidavit required for post decree motions. Moreover, on
February 25, 2025, the Plaintiff was ordered to file a financial affidavit within
ten (10) days. No affidavit was filed thereafter. Therefore, the Objection is
denied and dismissed.
(Emphasis in original.) Final Judgment, p. 4-5.
{¶ 13} Regarding the conversion of Father’s arrearages into a judgment, the trial
court reasoned:
BRANCH IV-Arrearage Judgment Entered While April 2023 and
September 2024 Modification Motions Remained Pending Without
Hearing
7 Plaintiff contends that the April 2023 Motion to Modify remained
pending until this hearing. This is a clear oversight, as the August 7, 2023
Agreed Order, which was signed by both Parties contained the following
language: “…5. All Motions listed above, not addressed herein, are
withdrawn…” Plaintiff’s Motion to Modify Spousal Support and Child Support
filed on April 6, 2023 was one of listed motions address by the August 7, 2023
Agreed Order. Plaintiff voluntarily, and by agreement, withdrew the pending
April 2023 Motion to Modify at that time.
With respect to Plaintiff’s claim that the September 2024 Motion
remained pending, the court thoroughly addressed this Motion in Plaintiff’s
Branch I Objection above. For these reasons, this Objection is hereby
(Emphasis in original.) Id. at 7.
{¶ 14} This appeal followed on December 2, 2025. Father asserts the following three
assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 1:
The trial court abused its discretion by dismissing Plaintiff’s September
4, 2024 Motion to Modify Support and Parenting Time as a discovery sanction
without adjudicating the merits and without articulated proportionality findings.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 2:
The trial court erred in reducing alleged arrearages to judgment while
Plaintiff’s September 4, 2024 motion to Modify Support and Parenting Time
remained unresolved on the merits.
8 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 3:
The trial court failed to articulate findings sufficient to permit meaningful
appellate review of its dismissal of Plaintiff’s September 4, 2024 Motion to
Modify Support and Parenting Time.
Because Father’s first and third assignments of error are related, for ease of
discussion, we address them together.
II. The Dismissal of Father’s Motion to Modify Parenting Time and Support
{¶ 15} A domestic relations court retains continuing jurisdiction over parenting time,
custody, and child support issues after the issuance of the final decree. Civ.R. 75(J).
Civ.R. 75(J) specifically provides that “[w]hen the continuing jurisdiction of the court is
invoked pursuant to this division, the discovery procedures set forth in Civ. R. 26 to 37 shall
apply.” Civ.R. 75(J).
{¶ 16} Civ.R. 37(B)(1) outlines the sanctions a court may consider when a party fails
to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Civ.R. 35
or 37(A). Such sanctions include, in relevant part:
(b) Prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing
designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in
evidence;
(c) Striking pleadings in whole or in part;
(d) Staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed dismissing;
(e) Dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part;
(f) Rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or
(g) Treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except
an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.
9 Civ.R. 37(B)(1).
{¶ 17} “A trial court has broad discretion when imposing discovery sanctions.” Nakoff
v. Fairview Gen. Hosp., 75 Ohio St.3d 254 (1996), syllabus. “A reviewing court shall review
these rulings only for an abuse of discretion.” Id. “‘The term discretion itself involves the idea
of choice, of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between competing
considerations.’” Id. at 256, quoting State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 222 (1984).
“In order to have an abuse of that choice, the result must be so palpably and grossly violative
of fact or logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but the perversity of will, not the
exercise of judgment but the defiance of judgment, not the exercise of reason but instead
passion or bias.” Id. In other words, we may reverse a trial court’s discovery sanction only if
the record shows that the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio
St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶ 18} While we apply an abuse of discretion standard, we have also stated: “When
considering what sanction to impose for a party’s failure to comply with discovery, ‘“the trial
court must consider the posture of the case and what efforts, if any, preceded the
noncompliance and then balance the severity of the violation against the degree of possible
sanctions, selecting that sanction which is most appropriate.”’” Stratacache, Inc. v. Wenzel,
2019-Ohio-3523, ¶ 35 (2d Dist.), quoting Dayton Modulars, Inc. v. Dayton View Community
Dev. Corp., 2005-Ohio-6257, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.), quoting Russo v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
36 Ohio App.3d 175, 178 (9th Dist. 1987). “In reversing a trial court’s dismissal of an action
with prejudice as a sanction for a party’s failure to comply with discovery, we have
considered whether ‘[a] more proportionate sanction, in line with the appellees’ prejudice,’
10 would have been appropriate.” Id., quoting Levorchick v. DeHart, 119 Ohio App.3d 339, 345
(2d Dist. 1997).
{¶ 19} Additionally, we have said: “Dismissal is a harsh sanction, and ‘should be
reserved for cases when a party’s conduct falls substantially below what is reasonable under
the circumstances, evidences a complete disregard for the judicial system or the rights of
the opposing party, or when the failure to comply with discovery orders is due to willfulness
or bad faith.’” (Citations omitted.) Farmer v. PNC Bank, N.A., 2017-Ohio-4203, ¶ 29
(2d Dist.), quoting Foley v. Nussbaum, 2011-Ohio-6701, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 20} Father claims the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his
September 4, 2024 motion to modify support and parenting time as a discovery sanction
and suggests a continuance should have been granted instead. However, upon a review of
the record before us, we cannot conclude that a continuance was more appropriate. There
was ample time for Father to comply with the court’s orders to compel, and he failed to do
so before the hearing. Father was subject to five orders compelling him to comply with
Mother’s discovery requests, and by the August 1, 2025 hearing (approximately one year
after he filed his motion), Father had not complied. At the hearing, Mother’s counsel
articulated that Father had not provided any documents related to his alleged medical
conditions or documents regarding Father’s financial circumstances, and that Father had
failed to file a financial disclosure affidavit as ordered by the court. Without the discovery
having been produced, Mother could not adequately cross-examine Father at the hearing
regarding his alleged change in circumstances or claims that his financial circumstances
had changed as a result of medical issues.
{¶ 21} On February 25, 2025, the court ordered Father to file a financial disclosure
affidavit and by the August 1, 2025 hearing (five months later), Father had not complied.
11 Father admits in his appellant’s brief that he did not comply. The financial disclosure affidavit
was required by the court’s local rules. Mont. D.R. Rule 1.9(4) (effective June 1, 2025) (“In all
post-decree motions involving support, the moving party must file an Affidavit of Financial
Disclosure and serve it on the nonmoving party with the motion.”); see former Mont. D.R.
Rule 4.41(B)(1) (effective Jan. 1, 2020) (“Any motion requesting a modification of an existing
child or spousal support order shall set forth the reason for the modification with specificity.
. . . All motions requesting modification shall be accompanied by an updated Affidavit of
Financial Disclosure.”). The use of the word “shall” in a court’s local rules means the affidavit
is a requirement and is not optional. Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio St.2d 102
(1971), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 22} While Father admits in his brief that the affidavit was not filed, he also claims
that he sufficiently complied with the court’s local rules by filing an affidavit of indigency. We
do not agree. Father’s affidavit of indigency was filed pro se when he was represented by
counsel. It stated that he wanted to proceed in forma pauperis and further requested a
waiver of filing fees and court costs. The affidavit of indigency to waive filing fees and costs
under R.C. 2323.311 is not sufficient to comply with the requirement to file a financial
disclosure affidavit as mandated by Mont. D.R. Rule 1.9(4). Additionally, Father’s affidavit
stated only generally that his financial obligations exceeded his income; however,
“‘[s]tatements contained in affidavits . . . cannot be legal conclusions.’” Eikenberry v.
Municipality of New Lebanon, 2021-Ohio-453, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.), quoting Brannon v. Rinzler,
77 Ohio App.3d 749, 756 (2d Dist. 1991).
{¶ 23} Not only was Father’s noncompliance with discovery and the financial
disclosure affidavit unfair to the opposing side, but by taking away Mother’s ability to cross-
examine Father at the hearing, the trial court itself was also hindered in its ability to perform
12 its function to determine Father’s income and any changes in circumstances. Trial courts
are statutorily required to utilize a basic child support schedule and worksheet. R.C. 3119.02.
R.C. 3119.02 provides:
In any action in which a court child support order is . . . modified [or] in any
other proceeding in which the court determines the amount of child support
that will be ordered to be paid pursuant to a child support order, . . . the court
or agency shall calculate the amount of the parents’ child support and cash
medical support in accordance with the basic child support schedule, the
applicable worksheet, and the other provisions of Chapter 3119. of the
Revised Code. The court or agency shall specify the support obligation as a
monthly amount due and shall order the support obligation to be paid in
periodic increments as it determines to be in the best interest of the children.
In performing its duties under this section, the court or agency is not required
to accept any calculations in a worksheet prepared by any party to the action
or proceeding.
See R.C. 3119.021 and 3119.022; see also R.C. 3119.79(A) (“If an obligor . . . under a child
support order requests that the court modify the amount of child support required to be paid
pursuant to the child support order, the court shall recalculate the amount of support that
would be required to be paid under the child support order in accordance with the schedule
and the applicable worksheet. If that amount as recalculated is more than ten per cent
greater than or more than ten per cent less than the amount of child support required to be
paid pursuant to the existing child support order, the deviation from the recalculated amount
that would be required to be paid under the schedule and the applicable worksheet shall be
considered by the court as a change of circumstance substantial enough to require a
13 modification of the child support amount.”). To determine a change of circumstance, a trial
court must have the basic information contained in the financial disclosure affidavit and facts
elicited during a hearing held before it to determine income. Without such essential
information, a trial court cannot be expected to perform its function on a motion to modify
support alleging a change in circumstance.
{¶ 24} As stated by the Fourth District Court of Appeals, “a court that is calculating
the amount of child support must ensure that the ‘parents’ current and past income and
personal earnings [are] verified by electronic means or with suitable documents, including,
but not limited to, paystubs, employer statements, receipts and expense vouchers related to
self-generated income, tax returns, and all supporting documentation and schedules for the
tax returns.’” (Bracketed text in original.) Martindale v. Martindale, 2019-Ohio-3028, ¶ 72
(4th Dist.), quoting R.C. 3119.05(A). “Testimonial evidence concerning a parent’s income is
generally insufficient to satisfy R.C. 3119.05(A).” Id. (citing cases).
{¶ 25} Additionally, the court in Martindale observed:
Ohio courts have held that a trial court abuses its discretion by calculating
income for child support purposes without requiring some form of documentary
evidence listed in R.C. 3119.05(A). In re M.C.M., 2018-Ohio-1307, 110 N.E.3d
694 (8th Dist.), ¶ 32 (concluding that trial court abused its discretion by failing
to rely upon sufficient documentary evidence when calculating parent’s
income); In re K.R.B., 2017-Ohio-7071, 95 N.E.3d 799 (8th Dist.), ¶ 26 (finding
an abuse of discretion when record failed to contain documentary evidence to
support income-calculation); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 3rd Dist. Union No.
14-14-22, 2015-Ohio-2976, 2015 WL 4510904, ¶ 50 (determining that trial
court abused its discretion when fixing income based solely upon parent’s
14 testimony); Rymers v. Rymers, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2011-L-064, 2012-Ohio-
1675, 2012 WL 1288726, ¶ 29 (concluding that trial court abused its discretion
when court failed to verify the parents’ incomes with proper documentation);
Basham v. Basham, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-02-37, 2002-Ohio-4694, 2002 WL
31007154, at ¶ 8 (finding that trial court abused its discretion when record did
not contain sufficient documentation to verify parent’s income). As the
Montgomery court explained: “‘Allowing a party in a divorce proceeding to
reduce his gross income level, and therefore his child support obligation, by
testimony alone, without proper verification as required under
R.C. 3119.05(A), is an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.’” Montgomery v.
Montgomery, 3rd Dist. Union No. 14-14-22, 2015-Ohio-2976, 2015 WL
4510904, ¶ 51, quoting Ornelas v. Ornelas, 12th Dist. Warren No CA2011–
08–094, 2012–Ohio–4106, ¶ 25.
Id. at ¶ 73.
{¶ 26} We agree with Martindale. Under Martindale, if the trial court had allowed
Father to testify without adequate documentation to verify his financial circumstances at the
August 1, 2025 hearing, the trial court would have abused its discretion. We therefore do
not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed Father’s motion to
modify as a discovery sanction.
{¶ 27} Father also claims that he did not receive adequate notice of the dismissal by
the August 1, 2025 hearing. But the record before us demonstrates otherwise. After Mother’s
first request for discovery went unanswered by Father, Mother filed a motion on November
22, 2024 that specifically requested a dismissal of Father’s motion to modify support and
parenting time. Instead of granting the dismissal at that time, the trial court granted Mother’s
15 alternative motion and ordered Father to produce discovery. “[A party] has notice of an
impending dismissal with prejudice for failure to comply with a discovery order when [that
party’s] counsel has been informed that dismissal is a possibility and has had a reasonable
opportunity to defend against dismissal.” Quonset Hut, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 80 Ohio St.3d
46 (1997), syllabus. In Quonset Hut, the Supreme Court noted that counsel for the non-
compliant plaintiff “was aware that [the defendant] had filed a motion requesting the court to
dismiss [the plaintiff’s] claim with prejudice.” Id. at 48. On that basis, the Supreme Court
deemed it “apparent” that the plaintiff’s attorney “was on notice of the possibility of dismissal
with prejudice.” Id.; see also Sazima v. Chalko, 86 Ohio St.3d 151, 155 (1999) (in Quonset
Hut, “the fact that the defendant had filed a motion requesting the court to dismiss plaintiff’s
claim with prejudice constituted sufficient implied notice for purposes of Civ.R. 41(B)(1),”
and “represents a rejection of the proposition that Civ.R. 41(B)(1) requires the trial court to
expressly and unambiguously give actual notice of its intention to dismiss with prejudice”).
Here, Father’s counsel knew of Mother’s initial motion to dismiss, and he had subsequent
orders compelling him to provide discovery and file a financial disclosure affidavit. Father
chose not to comply. In addition, Civ.R. 37 expressly states that a dismissal is a possible
sanction for the failure to comply with a discovery order. The trial court afforded Father an
opportunity to argue against the dismissal at the August 1, 2025 hearing. Previously, the trial
court had provided Father multiple opportunities to comply with its orders to compel
discovery and to file a financial disclosure affidavit. Father simply refused to comply.
{¶ 28} We further do not conclude that the dismissal of a motion to modify child
support is as drastic of a discovery sanction as the dismissal with prejudice of a claim for
relief in other civil cases. Given the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court, Father may refile
his motion to modify support with the trial court anytime pursuant to Civ.R. 75(J). The
16 dismissal of Father’s motion does not foreclose his ability to refile if he has a change of
circumstances.
{¶ 29} After a review of the entire record and applicable law, we conclude that the
trial court had sufficient justification to dismiss Father’s September 4, 2024 motion to modify
support and parenting time as a discovery sanction at the August 1, 2025 hearing due to
Father’s repeated failures for almost one year to obey multiple court orders compelling him
to provide relevant discovery to Mother and his apparent defiance against the court’s local
rules requiring an affidavit of financial disclosure. We conclude that Father’s conduct fell
“substantially below what is reasonable under the circumstances [and] evidences a
complete disregard for the judicial system [and] the rights of the opposing party.” Farmer v.
PNC Bank, N.A., 2017-Ohio-4203, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion and Father’s first and third assignments of error are overruled.
III. The Conversion of the Support Arrearages into a Judgment
{¶ 30} Father also claims that the trial court erred when it ordered Father’s support
arrearages to be converted to a judgment. In his argument, he does not allege
miscalculation. Instead, he contends that it was error to convert the arrearages to a judgment
when his motion to modify the support order was pending. However, given our determination
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or err in dismissing Father’s motion to modify
as a discovery sanction, we find Father’s second assignment to be without merit.
{¶ 31} Father’s motion to modify was not pending because it was dismissed, and the
trial court had authority to enter a judgment in favor of Mother for Father’s unpaid child
support arrearages. R.C. 3123.171 provides that
[w]hen a court renders a money judgment for child support, pursuant to a
motion for a lump sum judgment filed by an obligee, interest shall accrue on
17 that arrearage unless the court finds that it would be inequitable to assess
interest. The interest shall accrue from the date the judgment is rendered to a
date certain set for payment of the judgment at a rate specified in section
1343.03 of the Revised Code at the time the judgment is rendered. A court
may assess interest on a child support arrearage prior to judgment pursuant
to section 3123.17 of the Revised Code. The court shall enter the amount due,
including interest, in the journal.
The trial court properly converted the support arrearages of $71,627.09 into a
judgment. Father’s second assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 32} Having overruled Father’s three assignments of error, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
.............
LEWIS, P.J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.