Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.

56 F.3d 1538, 1995 WL 358097

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
• Decided: June 15, 1995
• Docket: Nos. 92-1206, 92-1260
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion of the court filed by Circuit Judge LOURIE, in which Circuit Judges RICH, MICHEL, PLAGER, CLEVENGER, and SCHALL join; Chief Judge ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge EDWARD S. SMITH, and Circuit Judges NIES and MAYER join as to part AIII; and Circuit Judges PAULINE NEWMAN and RADER join as to parts AI and B. Circuit Judge NIES filed an opinion, joined by Chief Judge ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge EDWARD S. SMITH, and Circuit Judge MAYER, dissenting as to parts AI and AIV and concurring in result as to part All. Circuit Judge PAULINE NEWMAN filed an opinion, joined by Circuit Judge RADER, concurring in part as to part AIV and dissenting as to parts All and AIII.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge.

Kelley Company appeals from a decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, awarding damages for the infringement of U.S. Patent 4,373,847, owned by Rite-Hite Corporation. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 774 F.Supp. 1514, 21 USPQ2d 1801 (E.D.Wis.1991). The district court determined, inter alia, that Rite-Hite was entitled to lost profits for lost sales of its devices that were in direct competition with the infringing devices, but which themselves were not covered by the patent in suit. The appeal has been taken in banc to determine whether such damages are legally compensable under 35 U.S.C. § 284. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

BACKGROUND

On March 22, 1983, Rite-Hite sued Kelley, alleging that Kelley’s “Truk Stop” vehicle restraint infringed Rite-Hite’s U.S. Patent 4,373,847 (“the ’847 patent”).² The ’847 patent, issued February 15,1983, is directed to a device for securing a vehicle to a loading dock to prevent the vehicle from separating from the dock during loading or unloading. Any such separation would create a gap between the vehicle and dock and create a danger for a forklift operator.

Rite-Hite distributed all its products through its wholly-owned and operated sales organizations and through independent sales organizations (ISOs). During the period of infringement, the Rite-Hite sales organizations accounted for approximately 30 percent of the retail dollar sales of Rite-Hite products, and the ISOs accounted for the remaining 70 percent. Rite-Hite sued for its lost profits at the wholesale level and for the lost retail profits of its own sales organizations. Shortly after this action was filed, several ISOs moved to intervene, contending that they were “exclusive licensees” of the ’847 patent by virtue of “Sales Representative Agreements” and “Dok-Lok Supplement” agreements between themselves and Rite-Hite. The court determined that the ISOs were exclusive licensees and accordingly, on August 31, 1984, permitted them to intervene.³ The ISOs sued for their lost retail profits.

The district court bifurcated the liability and damage phases of the trial and, on March 5, 1986, held the ’847 patent to be not invalid and to be infringed by the manufacture, use, and sale of Kelley’s Truk Stop device. The court enjoined further infringement. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 629 F.Supp. 1042, 231 USPQ 161 (ED.Wis.1986). The judgment of liability was affirmed by this court. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 2 USPQ2d 1915 (Fed.Cir.1987).

On remand, the damage issues were tried to the court. Rite-Hite, 774 F.Supp. at 1514, 21 USPQ2d at 1801. Rite-Hite sought damages calculated as lost profits for two types of vehicle restraints that it made and sold: the “Manual Dok-Lok” model 55 (MDL-55), which incorporated the invention covered by the ’847 patent, and the “Automatic Dok-Lok” model 100 (ADL-100), which was not covered by the patent in suit. The ADL-100 was the first vehicle restraint Rite-Hite put on the market and it was covered by one or more patents other than the patent in suit. The Kelley Truk Stop restraint was designed to compete primarily with Rite-Hite’s ADL-100. Both employed an electric motor and functioned automatically, and each sold for $1,000-$1,500 at the wholesale level, in contrast to the MDL-55, which sold for one-third to one-half the price of the motorized devices. Rite-Hite does not assert that Kelley’s Truk Stop restraint infringed the patents covering the ADL-100.

Of the 3,825 infringing Truk Stop devices sold by Kelley, the district court found that, “but for” Kelley’s infringement, Rite-Hite would have made 80 more sales of its MDL-55; 3,243 more sales of its ADL-100; and 1,692 more sales of dock levelers, a bridging platform sold with the restraints and used to bridge the edges of a vehicle and dock. The court awarded Rite-Hite as a manufacturer the wholesale profits that it lost on lost sales of the ADL-100 restraints, MDL-55 restraints, and restraint-leveler packages. It also awarded to Rite-Hite as a retailer and to the ISOs reasonable royalty damages on lost ADL-100, MDL-55, and restraint-leveler sales caused by Kelley’s infringing sales. Finally, prejudgment interest, calculated without compounding, was awarded. Kelley’s infringement was found to be not willful.

On appeal, Kelley contends that the district court erred as a matter of law in its determination of damages. Kelley does not contest the award of damages for lost sales of the MDL-55 restraints; however, Kelley argues that (1) the patent statute does not provide for damages based on Rite-Hite’s lost profits on ADL-100 restraints because the ADL-lOOs are not covered by the patent in suit; (2) lost profits on unpatented dock levelers are not attributable to demand for the ’847 invention and, therefore, are not recoverable losses; (3) the ISOs have no standing to sue for patent infringement damages; and (4) the court erred in calculating a reasonable royalty based as a percentage of ADL-100 and dock leveler profits. Rite-Hite and the ISOs challenge the district court’s refusal to award lost retail profits and its award of prejudgment interest at a simple, rather than a compound, rate.

We affirm the damage award with respect to Rite-Hite’s lost profits as a manufacturer on its ADL-100 restraint sales, affirm the court’s computation of a reasonable royalty rate, vacate the damage award based on the dock levelers, and vacate the damage award with respect to the ISOs because they lack standing. We remand for dismissal of the ISOs’ claims and for a redetermination of damages consistent with this opinion. The issues raised by Rite-Hite are unpersuasive.

DISCUSSION

Because the technology, the ’847 patent, and the history of the parties and their litigation are fully described in the opinions of the district court and that of the earlier panel of our court that affirmed the liability judgment, we will discuss the facts only to the extent necessary to discuss the issues raised in this appeal.

In order to prevail on appeal on an issue of damages, an appellant must convince us that the determination was based on an erroneous conclusion of law, clearly erroneous factual findings, or a clear error of judgment amounting to an abuse of discretion. Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d , 3 USPQ2d 1412, 1415 (Fed.Cir.1987); see also SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1163-65 & n. 2, 17 USPQ2d 1922, 1924-25 & n. 2 (Fed.Cir.1991).

A.

Kelley’s Appeal

I. Lost Profits on the ADL-100 Restraints

The district court’s decision to award lost profits damages pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284 turned primarily upon the quality of Rite-Hite’s proof of actual lost profits. The court found that, “but for” Kelley’s infringing Truk Stop competition, Rite-Hite would have sold 3,243 additional ADL-100 restraints and 80 additional MDL-55 restraints. The court reasoned that awarding lost profits fulfilled the patent statute’s goal of affording complete compensation for infringement and compensated Rite-Hite for the ADL-100 sales that Kelley “anticipated taking from Rite-Hite when it marketed the Truk Stop against the ADL-100.” Rite-Hite, 774 F.Supp. at 1540, 21 USPQ2d at 1821. The court stated, “[t]he rule applied here therefore does not extend Rite-Hite’s patent rights excessively, because Kelley could reasonably have foreseen that its infringement of the ’847 patent would make it hable for lost ADL-100 sales in addition to lost MDL-55 sales.” Id. The court further reasoned that its decision would avoid what it referred to as the “whip-saw” problem, whereby an infringer could avoid paying lost profits damages altogether by developing a device using a first patented technology to compete with a device that uses a second patented technology and developing a device using the second patented technology to compete with a device that uses the first patented technology.

Kelley maintains that Rite-Hite’s lost sales of the ADL-100 restraints do not constitute an injury that is legally compensable by means of lost profits. It has uniformly been the law, Kelley argues, that to recover damages in the form of lost profits a patentee must prove that, “but for” the infringement, it would have sold a product covered by the patent in suit to the customers who bought from the infringer. Under the circumstances of this case, in Kelley’s view, the patent statute provides only for damages calculated as a reasonable royalty. Rite-Hite, on the other hand, argues that the only restriction on an award of actual lost profits damages for patent infringement is proof of causation-in-fact. A patentee, in its view, is entitled to all the profits it would have made on any of its products “but for” the infringement. Each party argues that a judgment in favor of the other would frustrate the purposes of the patent statute. Whether the lost profits at issue are legally compensable is a question of law, which we review de novo.

Our analysis of this question necessarily begins with the patent statute. See General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 653-54, 103 S.Ct. 2058, 2061-62, 76 L.Ed.2d 211 (1983). Implementing the constitutional power under Article I, section 8, to secure to inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries, Congress has provided in 35 U.S.C. § 284 as follows:

Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.

35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988). The statute thus mandates that a claimant receive damages “adequate” to compensate for infringement. Section 284 further instructs that a damage award shall be “in no event less than a reasonable royalty”; the purpose of this alternative is not to direct the form of compensation, but to set a floor below which damage awards may not fall. Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1326, 5 USPQ2d 1255, 1260 (Fed.Cir.1987). Thus, the language of the statute is expansive rather than limiting. It affirmatively states that damages must be adequate, while providing only a lower limit and no other limitation.

The Supreme Court spoke to the question of patent damages in General Motors, stating that, in enacting § 284, Congress sought to “ensure that the patent owner would in fact receive full compensation for ‘any damages’ [the patentee] suffered as a result of the infringement.” General Motors, 461 U.S. at 654, 103 S.Ct. at 2062; see also H.R.Rep. No. 1587, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1946) (the Bill was intended to allow recovery of “any damages the complainant can prove”); S.Rep. No. 1503, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1946), (same). Thus, while the statutory text states tersely that the patentee receive “adequate” damages, the Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that “adequate” damages should approximate those damages that will fully compensate the patentee for infringement. Further, the Court has cautioned against imposing limitations on patent infringement damages, stating: “When Congress wished to limit an element of recovery in a patent infringement action, it said so explicitly.” General Motors, 461 U.S. at 653, 103 S.Ct. at 2061 (refusing to impose limitation on court’s authority to award interest).

In Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 84 S.Ct. 1526, 12 L.Ed.2d 457, 141 USPQ 681 (1964), the Court discussed the statutory standard for measuring patent infringement damages, explaining:

The question to be asked in determining damages is “how much had the Patent Holder and Licensee suffered by the infringement. And that question [is] primarily: had the Infringer not infringed, what would the Patentee Holder-Licensee have made?”

377 U.S. at 507, 84 S.Ct. at 1542, 141 USPQ at 694 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). This surely states a “but for” test. In accordance with the Court’s guidance, we have held that the general rule for determining actual damages to a patentee that is itself producing the patented item is to determine the sales and profits lost to the patentee because of the infringement. Del Mar, 836 F.2d at 1326, 5 USPQ2d at 1260; see State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577, 12 USPQ2d 1026, 1028 (Fed.Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 725, 107 L.Ed.2d 744 (1990) (award of damages may be split between lost profits as actual damages to the extent they are proven and a reasonable royalty for the remainder). To recover lost profits damages, the patentee must show a reasonable probability that, “but for” the infringement, it would have made the sales that were made by the infringer. Id.; King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 863, 226 USPQ 402, 409 (Fed.Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1197, 89 L.Ed.2d 312 (1986).

Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 197 USPQ 726 (6th Cir.1978), articulated a four-factor test that has since been accepted as a useful, but non-exclusive, way for a patentee to prove entitlement to lost profits damages. State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1577, 12 USPQ2d at 1028. The Panduit test requires that a patentee establish: (1) demand for the patented product; (2) absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes; (3) manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand; and (4) the amount of the profit it would have made. Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156, 197 USPQ at 730. A showing under Panduit permits a court to reasonably infer that the lost profits claimed were in fact caused by the infringing sales, thus establishing a patentee’s prima facie case with respect to “but for” causation. Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1141, 17 USPQ2d 1828, 1831 (Fed.Cir.1991). A patentee need not negate every possibility that the purchaser might not have purchased a product other than its own, absent the infringement. Id. The patentee need only show that there was a reasonable probability that the sales would have been made “but for” the infringement. Id. "When the patentee establishes the reasonableness of this inference, e.g., by satisfying the Panduit test, it has sustained the burden of proving entitlement to lost profits due to the infringing sales. Id. at 1141, 17 USPQ2d at 1832. The burden then shifts to the infringer to show that the inference is unreasonable for some or all of the lost sales. Id.

Applying Panduit, the district court found that Rite-Hite had established “but for” causation. In the court’s view, this was sufficient to prove entitlement to lost profits damages on the ADL-100. Kelley does not challenge that Rite-Hite meets the Panduit test and therefore has proven “but for” causation; rather, Kelley argues that damages for the ADL-100, even if in fact caused by the infringement, are not legally compensable because the ADL-100 is not covered by the patent in suit.

Preliminarily, we wish to affirm that the “test” for compensability of damages under § 284 is not solely a “but for” test in the sense that an infringer must compensate a patentee for any and all damages that proceed from the act of patent infringement. Notwithstanding the broad language of § 284, judicial relief cannot redress every conceivable harm that can be traced to an alleged wrongdoing. See Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536, 103 S.Ct. 897, 907-08, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983).⁴ For example, remote consequences, such as a heart attack of the inventor or loss in value of shares of common stock of a patentee corporation caused indirectly by infringement are not compensable. Thus, along with establishing that a particular injury suffered by a patentee is a “but for” consequence of infringement, there may also be a background question whether the asserted injury is of the type for which the patentee may be compensated.

Judicial limitations on damages, either for certain classes of plaintiffs or for certain types of injuries have been imposed in terms of “proximate cause” or “foreseeability.” See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, — U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 2406, 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994). Such labels have been judicial tools used to limit legal responsibility for the consequences of one’s conduct that are too remote to justify compensation. See Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992). The general principles expressed in the common law tell us that the question of legal compensability is one “to be determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent.” See 1 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability 110 (1906) (quoted in W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 42, at 279 (5th ed. 1984)).⁵

We believe that under § 284 of the patent statute, the balance between full compensation, which is the meaning that the Supreme Court has attributed to the statute, and the reasonable limits of liability encompassed by general principles of law can best be viewed in terms of reasonable, objective foreseeability. If a particular injury was or should have been reasonably foreseeable by an infringing competitor in the relevant market, broadly defined, that injury is generally compensable absent a persuasive reason to the contrary. Here, the court determined that Rite-Hite’s lost sales of the ADL-100, a product that directly competed with the infringing product, were reasonably foreseeable. We agree with that conclusion. Being responsible for lost sales of a competitive product is surely foreseeable; such losses constitute the full compensation set forth by Congress, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, while staying well within the traditional meaning of proximate cause. Such lost sales should therefore clearly be compensable.

Recovery for lost sales of a device not covered by the patent in suit is not of course expressly provided for by the patent statute. Express language is not required, however. Statutes speak in general terms rather than specifically expressing every detail. Under the patent statute, damages should be awarded “where necessary to afford the plaintiff full compensation for the infringement.” General Motors, 461 U.S. at 654, 103 S.Ct. at 2062. Thus, to refuse to award reasonably foreseeable damages necessary to make Rite-Hite whole would be inconsistent with the meaning of § 284.

Kelley asserts that to allow recovery for the ADL-100 would contravene the policy reason for which patents are granted: “[T]o promote the progress of ... the useful arts.” U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Because an inventor is only entitled to exclusivity to the extent he or she has invented and disclosed a novel, nonobvious, and useful device, Kelley argues, a patent may never be used to restrict competition in the sale of products not covered by the patent in suit. In support, Kelley cites antitrust case law condemning the use of a patent as a means to obtain a “monopoly” on unpatented material. See, e.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 459, 60 S.Ct. 618, 626, 84 L.Ed. 852 (1940) (“The patent monopoly of one invention may no more be enlarged for the exploitation of a monopoly of another than for the exploitation of an unpatented article, or for the exploitation or promotion of a business not embraced within the patent.”); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 463, 58 S.Ct. 288, 291, 82 L.Ed. 371 (1938) (“[E]very use of a patent as a means of obtaining a limited monopoly on unpatented material is prohibited ... whatever the nature of the device by which the owner of the patent seeks to effect unauthorized extension of the monopoly.”).

These cases are inapposite to the issue raised here. The present case does not involve expanding the limits of the patent grant in violation of the antitrust laws; it simply asks, once infringement of a valid patent is found, what compensable injuries result from that infringement, i.e., how may the patentee be made whole. Rite-Hite is not attempting to exclude its competitors from making, using, or selling a product not within the scope of its patent. The Truk Stop restraint was found to infringe the ’847 patent, and Rite-Hite is simply seeking adequate compensation for that infringement; this is not an antitrust issue. Allowing compensation for such damage will “promote the Progress of ... the useful Arts” by providing a stimulus to the development of new products and industries. See 1 Ernest B. Lipscomb III, Walker on Patents 65 (3d ed. 1984) (quoting Simonds, Summary of the Law of Patents 9 (1883)) (“The patent laws promote the progress in different ways, prominent among which are by protecting the investment of capital in the development and working of a new invention from ruinous competition till the investment becomes remunerative.”).⁶

Kelley further asserts that, as a policy matter, inventors should be encouraged by the law to practice their inventions. This is not a meaningful or persuasive argument, at least in this context. A patent is granted in exchange for a patentee’s disclosure of an invention, not for the patentee’s use of the invention. There is no requirement in this country that a patentee make, use, or sell its patented invention. See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424-30, 28 S.Ct. 748, 753-54, 52 L.Ed. 1122 (1908) (irrespective of a patentee’s own use of its patented invention, it may enforce its rights under the patent). If a patentee’s failure to practice a patented invention frustrates an important public need for the invention, a court need not enjoin infringement of the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1988) (courts may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity). Accordingly, courts have in rare instances exercised their discretion to deny injunctive relief in order to protect the public interest. See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 4 USPQ2d 1001, 1987 WL 123997 (C.D.Cal.1987) (public interest required that injunction not stop supply of medical test kits that the patentee itself was not marketing), aff'd, 849 F.2d 1446, 7 USPQ2d 1191 (Fed.Cir.1988); Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 64 USPQ 285 (9th Cir.1945) (public interest warranted refusal of injunction on irradiation of oleomargarine); City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 21 USPQ 69 (7th Cir.1934) (injunction refused against city operation of sewage disposal plant because of public health danger). Whether a patentee sells its patented invention is not crucial in determining lost profits damages. Normally, if the patentee is not selling a product, by definition there can be no lost profits. However, in this case, Rite-Hite did sell its own patented products, the MDL-55 and the ADL-100 restraints.

Kelley next argues that to award lost profits damages on Rite-Hite’s ADL-100s would be contrary to precedent. Citing Panduit, Kelley argues that case law regarding lost profits uniformly requires that “the intrinsic value of the patent in suit is the only proper basis for a lost profits award.” Kelley argues that each prong of the Panduit test focuses on the patented invention; thus, Kelley asserts, Rite-Hite cannot obtain damages consisting of lost profits on a product that is not the patented invention.⁷

Generally, the Panduit test has been applied when a patentee is seeking lost profits for a device covered by the patent in suit. However, Panduit is not the sine qua non for proving “but for” causation. If there are other ways to show that the infringement in fact caused the patentee’s lost profits, there is no reason why another test should not be acceptable. Moreover, other fact situations may require different means of evaluation, and failure to meet the Panduit test does not ipso facto disqualify a loss from being compensable.

In any event, the only Panduit factor that arguably was not met in the present fact situation is the second one, absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes. Establishment of this factor tends to prove that the patentee would not have lost the sales to a non-infringing third party rather than to the infringer. That, however, goes only to the question of proof. Here, the only substitute for the patented device was the ADL-100, another of the patentee’s devices. Such a substitute was not an “acceptable, non-infringing substitute” within the meaning of Panduit because, being patented by RiteHite, it was not available to customers except from Rite-Hite. Cf. State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1578, 12 USPQ2d at 1030-31. Rite-Hite therefore would not have lost the sales to a third party. The second Panduit factor thus has been met. If, on the other hand, the ADL-100 had not been patented and was found to be an acceptable substitute, that would have been a different story, and RiteHite would have had to prove that its customers would not have obtained the ADL-100 from a third party in order to prove the second factor of Panduit.

Kelley’s conclusion that the lost sales must be of the patented invention thus is not supported. Kelley’s concern that lost profits must relate to the “intrinsic value of the patent” is subsumed in the “but for” analysis; if the patent infringement had nothing to do with the lost sales, “but for” causation would not have been proven. However, “but for” causation is conceded here. The motive, or motivation, for the infringement is irrelevant if it is proved that the infringement in fact caused the loss. We see no basis for Kelley’s conclusion that the lost sales must be of products covered by the infringed patent.

Kelley has thus not provided, nor do we find, any justification in the statute, precedent, policy, or logic to limit the compensability of lost sales of a patentee’s device that directly competes with the infringing device if it is proven that those lost sales were caused in fact by the infringement. Such lost sales are reasonably foreseeable and the award of damages is necessary to provide adequate compensation for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 284. Thus, Rite-Hite’s ADL-100 lost sales are legally compensable and we affirm the award of lost profits on the 3,283 sales lost to Rite-Hite’s wholesale business in ADL-100 restraints.⁸

II. Damages on the Dock Levelers

Based on the “entire market value rule,” the district court awarded lost profits on 1,692 dock levelers that it found Rite-Hite would have sold with the ADL-100 and MDL-55 restraints. Kelley argues that this award must be set aside because Rite-Hite failed to establish that the dock levelers were eligible to be included in the damage computation under the entire market value rule. We agree.

When a patentee seeks damages on unpatented components sold with a patented apparatus, courts have applied a formulation known as the “entire market value rule” to determine whether such components should be included in the damage computation, whether for reasonable royalty purposes,⁹ see Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 974, 220 Ct.Cl. 234, 202 USPQ 424, 439, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991, 100 S.Ct. 522, 62 L.Ed.2d 420 (1979), or for lost profits purposes, see Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 23, 223 USPQ 591, 599 (Fed.Cir.1984). Early cases invoking the entire market value rule required that for a patentee owning an “improvement patent” to recover damages calculated on sales of a larger machine incorporating that improvement, the patentee was required to show that the entire value of the whole machine, as a marketable article, was “properly and legally attributable” to the patented feature. See Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121, 4 S.Ct. 291, 291-92, 28 L.Ed. 371 (1884); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 615, 32 S.Ct. 691, 694-95, 56 L.Ed. 1222 (1912) (same). Subsequently, our predecessor court held that damages for component parts used with a patented apparatus were recoverable under the entire market value rule if the patented apparatus “was of such paramount importance that it substantially created the value of the component parts.” Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, 53 USPQ 246, 250 (Ct.Cl.1942), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 320 U.S. 1, 63 S.Ct. 1393, 87 L.Ed. 1731 (1943). We have held that the entire market value rule permits recovery of damages based on the value of a patentee’s entire apparatus containing several features when the patent-related feature is the “basis for customer demand.” State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1580, 12 USPQ2d at 1031; TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 900-01, 229 USPQ 525, 528 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852, 107 S.Ct. 183, 93 L.Ed.2d 117 (1986).

The entire market value rule has typically been applied to include in the compensation base unpatented components of a device when the unpatented and patented components are physically part of the same machine. See, e.g., Western Elec. Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 631 F.2d 333, 208 USPQ 183 (4th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 971, 101 S.Ct. 1492, 67 L.Ed.2d 622 (1981). The rule has been extended to allow inclusion of physically separate unpatented components normally sold with the patented components. See, e.g., Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 23, 223 USPQ at 599. However, in such cases, the unpatented and patented components together were considered to be components of a single assembly or parts of a complete machine, or they together constituted a functional unit. See, e.g., Velo-Bind, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 647 F.2d 965, 211 USPQ 926 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1093, 102 S.Ct. 658, 70 L.Ed.2d 631 (1981).

In Paper Converting, this court articulated the entire market value rule in terms of the objectively reasonable probability that a pat-entee would have made the relevant sales. See 745 F.2d at 23, 223 USPQ at 599-600. Furthermore, we may have appeared to expand the rule when we emphasized the financial and marketing dependence of the unpat-ented component on the patented component. See id. In Paper Converting, however, the rule was applied to allow recovery of profits on the unpatented components only because all the components together were considered to be parts of a single assembly. The references to “financial and marketing dependence” and “reasonable probability” were made in the context of the facts of the case and did not separate the rule from its traditional moorings.

Specifically, recovery was sought for the lost profits on sales of an entire machine for the high speed manufacture of paper rolls comprising several physically separate components, only one of which incorporated the invention. The machine was comprised of the patented “rewinder” component and several auxiliary components, including an “unwind stand” that supported a large roll of supply paper to the rewinder, a “core loader” that supplied paperboard cores to the rewin-der, an “embosser” that embossed the paper and provided a special textured surface, and a “tail sealer” that sealed the paper’s trailing end to the finished roll. Although we noted that the auxiliary components had “separate usage” in that they each separately performed a part of an entire rewinding operation, the components together constituted one functional unit, including the patented component, to produce rolls of paper. The auxiliary components derived their market value from the patented rewinder because they had no useful purpose independent of the patented rewinder.

Similarly, our subsequent eases have applied the entire market value rule only in situations in which the patented and unpat-ented components were analogous to a single functioning unit. See, e.g., Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 1485, 16 USPQ2d 1093, 1102 (Fed.Cir.1990) (affirming award of damages for filter screens used with a patented filtering device); TWM, 789 F.2d at 901, 229 USPQ at 528 (affirming award of damages for unpatented wheels and axles sold with patented vehicle suspension system); Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 656, 225 USPQ 985, 989 (Fed.Cir.) (affirming an award of damages for unpatented uppers of an improved amphibious vehicle having a patented pontoon structure), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902, 106 S.Ct. 230, 88 L.Ed.2d 229 (1985).

Thus, the facts of past cases clearly imply a limitation on damages, when recovery is sought on sales of unpatented components sold with patented components, to the effect that the unpatented components must function together with the patented component in some manner so as to produce a desired end product or result. All the components together must be analogous to components of a single assembly or be parts of a complete machine, or they must constitute a functional unit. Our precedent has not extended liability to include items that have essentially no functional relationship to the patented invention and that may have been sold with an infringing device only as a matter of convenience or business advantage. We are not persuaded that we should extend that liability. Damages on such items would constitute more than what is “adequate to compensate for the infringement.”

The facts of this case do not meet this requirement. The dock levelers operated to bridge the gap between a loading dock and a truck. The patented vehicle restraint operated to secure the rear of the truck to the loading dock. Although the two devices may have been used together, they did not function together to achieve one result and each could effectively have been used independently of each other. The parties had established positions in marketing dock levelers long prior to developing the vehicle restraints. Rite-Hite and Kelley were pioneers in that industry and for many years were primary competitors. Although following Rite-Hite’s introduction of its restraints onto the market, customers frequently solicited package bids for the simultaneous installation of restraints and dock levelers, they did so because such bids facilitated contracting and construction scheduling, and because both Rite-Hite and Kelley encouraged this linkage by offering combination discounts. The dock levelers were thus sold by Kelley with the restraints only for marketing reasons, not because they essentially functioned together. We distinguish our conclusion to permit damages based on lost sales of the unpatented (not covered by the patent in suit) ADL-100 devices, but not on lost sales of the unpatented dock levelers, by emphasizing that the Kelley Truk Stops were devices competitive with the ADL-100s, whereas the dock levelers were merely items sold together with the restraints for convenience and business advantage. It is a clear purpose of the patent law to redress competitive damages resulting from infringement of the patent, but there is no basis for extending that recovery to include damages for items that are neither competitive with nor function with the patented invention. Promotion of the useful arts, see U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8, requires one, but not the other. These facts do not establish the functional relationship necessary to justify recovery under the entire market value rule. Therefore, the district court erred as a matter of law in including them within the compensation base. Accordingly, we vacate the court’s award of damages based on the dock leveler sales.

III. Standing of the ISOs

The ISOs asserted claims for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 281 as co-plaintiffs with Rite-Hite and were awarded damages calculated on the basis of a reasonable royalty at the retail level on both restraints and dock levelers, based on the number of sales each asserted it lost to Kelley. Kelley challenges any award of damages to the ISOs on the ground that the ISOs had no standing to seek recovery for patent infringement. The ISOs argue that the exclusivity of their sales territories gave them standing as “exclusive licensees.” The question of standing to sue is a jurisdictional one, Imperial Tobacco, Ltd. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575, 1580 n. 7, 14 USPQ2d 1390, 1393 n. 7 (Fed.Cir.1990), which we review de novo, Transamerica Ins. Corp. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572 (Fed.Cir.1992). We agree with Kelley that the ISOs must be dismissed for lack of standing.

The right of a patentee to a remedy for patent infringement is created by the statute, Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1578, 19 USPQ2d 1513, 1516-17 (Fed.Cir.1991), which provides that a “patentee” shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his or her patent, 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1988). The term “patentee” includes “not only the patentee to whom the patent was issued but also the successors in title to the patentee.” 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) (1988).

Generally, one seeking money damages for patent infringement must have held legal title to the patent at the time of the infringement. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 40-41, 43 S.Ct. 254, 258, 67 L.Ed. 516 (1923). A conveyance of legal title by the patentee can be made only of the entire patent, an undivided part or share of the entire patent, or all rights under the patent in a specified geographical region of the United States. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255, 11 S.Ct. 334, 335, 34 L.Ed. 923 (1891). A transfer of any of these is an assignment and vests the assignee with title in the patent, and a right to sue infringers.¹⁰ Id. A transfer of less than one of these three interests is a license, not an assignment of legal title, and it gives the licensee no right to sue for infringement at law in the licensee’s own name. Id.

Under certain circumstances, a licensee may possess sufficient interest in the patent to have standing to sue as a co-plaintiff with the patentee. See id. (if necessary to protect the rights of all parties, the licensee may be joined as co-plaintiff); Independent Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 269 U.S. 459, 468, 46 S.Ct. 166, 169, 70 L.Ed. 357 (1926) (if the patentee refuses or is unable to join an exclusive licensee as co-plaintiff, the licensee may make him a party defendant). Such a licensee is usually an “exclusive licensee.” To be an exclusive licensee for standing purposes, a party must have received, not only the right to practice the invention within a given territory, but also the patentee’s express or implied promise that others shall be excluded from practicing the invention within that territory as well. See Independent Wireless, 269 U.S. at 468-69, 46 S.Ct. at 169. If the party has not received an express or implied promise of exclusivity under the patent, i.e., the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented invention, the party has a “bare license,” and has received only the patentee’s promise that that party will not be sued for infringement. See Western Elec. Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118, 5 USPQ 105, 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 873, 51 S.Ct. 78, 75 L.Ed. 771 (1930).

The ISOs maintain that they are allowed to join as co-plaintiffs because each claims it has a virtually exclusive license to sell products made by Rite-Hite to particular customers in an exclusive sales territory. To determine whether the ISOs have standing to be co-plaintiffs, we look to their contracts with Rite-Hite.

The typical original ISO contract provided in pertinent part:

Representative’s right to solicit sales of the Company’s products in the Territory shall be exclusive in that the Company will not appoint any other sales representative in the territory so long as, in Company’s good faith judgment, Representative is doing an adequate job in the entire Territory for all listed products. [If not,] Company shall have the right to reduce the Territory, if it gives Representative notice of the change. Company shall in no event be hable for any violation or infringement of Representative’s territorial rights hereunder except such as are committed directly by Company. Company also reserves the non-exclusive right to make sales of its products within the Territory directly to the motor freight industry, governmental agencies, government contractors, and any other purchasers which, in Company’s judgement, can be served best by direct sales.

The subject products are “All Rite-Hite Mechanical and Hydraulic Dock Levelers and Related Equipment.” The word “patent” appears nowhere in this document, although, just prior to their intervention as plaintiffs, many of the ISOs executed supplements to their contracts which specified that the “products” of the Sales Representative Agreement include “products manufactured and sold by [Rite-Hite] ” that embody “any of the claims set forth in Rite-Hite patents relating to ‘Dok-Lok’ devices, including (but not by any way of limitation) U.S. Patent No. 4,373,847.” Rite-Hite, 774 F.Supp. at 1523, 21 USPQ2d at 1807 (alteration in original) (first emphasis supplied). The agreement also provided that each ISO had, in addition to the right to solicit sales for Rite-Hite, the right to sell products made by Rite-Hite. Rite-Hite reserved the right to sell its products to the motor freight industry.¹¹

In the original agreement, Rite-Hite itself expressly retained substantial rights to sell within the assigned territories to specific classes of purchases and to “any other purchasers which, in Company’s judgement, can be served best by direct sales.” The last minute modifications on the eve of litigation included for the first time products covered by the patent in the definition of the range of products covered by the agreement, and reduced the retained rights of Rite-Hite to sell within the assigned territories. Neither the original agreements nor the modifications granted the ISOs any right to exclude others under the patent.

We agree with Kelley that the district court’s conclusion that these contracts conveyed a “sufficient, legally recognized interest in the rights secured by the [’847] patent” to confer standing on the ISOs was erroneous as a matter of law. Id., 774 F.Supp. at 1525, 21 USPQ2d at 1808 (alteration in original). The contracts in this case were not exclusive patent licenses. As noted, they did not mention the word “patent” until the eve of this lawsuit. The ISO contracts permitted the ISOs only to solicit and make sales of products made by Rite-Hite in a particular “exclusive” sales territory. While the agreements conveyed the right to sell restraints covered by the patent, any “exclusivity” related only to sales territories, not to patent rights. Even this sales exclusivity was conditional on Rite-Hite’s judgment that the ISOs were doing an “adequate job.”

Most particularly, the ISOs had no right under the agreements to exclude anyone from making, using, or selling the claimed invention. The ISOs could not exclude from their respective territories other ISOs, third parties, or even Rite-Hite itself. Any remedy an ISO might have had for violation of its rights would lie in a breach of contract action against Rite-Hite, if the agreement was breached, not in a patent infringement action against infringers. Rite-Hite had no obligation to file infringement suits at the request of an ISO and the ISOs had no right to share in any recovery from litigation. Moreover, appellees have not contended that such obligations and rights are to be implied. Nor do appellees even argue that the ISOs had the right under their contracts to bring suit for infringement against another ISO or a third party, making Rite-Hite an involuntary plaintiff. To the contrary, under their agreement, if an ISO sold in another’s territory, the profits were shared according to Rite-Hite’s “split commission” rules. While the patentee and the ISOs have cooperated in this litigation, that fact alone does not establish their right to sue.

Weinar v. Rollform, 744 F.2d 797, 223 USPQ 369 (Fed.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S.Ct. 1844, 85 L.Ed.2d 143 (1985), which is cited by Rite-Hite in support of the ISOs’ position, is not to the contrary. In that case, a damage award was upheld to a licensee with the exclusive right to sell in the entire United States. Id. at 807, 223 USPQ at 374. However, the exclusive licensee in Weinar was found to have received more than a “bare” license from the paten-tee. Id. The exclusive licensee and the patentee “shar[ed] the property rights represented by a patent.” Id. That is not the case here. The ISOs were not licensees under the patent, except perhaps as nonexclusive licensees by implication. They were not granted any right to exclude others under the patent. They do not accordingly “share” with the patentee the property rights represented by the patent so as to have standing to sue as a co-plaintiff with the patentee.

These agreements were simply sales contracts between Rite-Hite and its independent distributors. They did not transfer any proprietary interest in the ’847 patent and they did not give the ISOs the right to sue. If the ISOs lack a remedy in this case, it is because their agreements with Rite-Hite failed to make provisions for-the contingency that the granted sales exclusivity would not be maintained. The ISOs could have required Rite-Hite to sue infringers and arrangements could have been agreed upon concerning splitting any damage award. Apparently, this was not done.

The grant of a bare license to sell an invention in a specified territory, even if it is the only license granted by the patentee, does not provide standing without the grant of a right to exclude others. The ISOs are legally no different from the individual salespersons whom the district court earlier refused to allow to join the suit. Rite-Hite, 774 F.Supp. at 1536, 21 USPQ2d at 1818 (holding that sales persons employed by the sales organizations are not entitled to recover damages as agents of the exclusive licensee-sales organizations). They are not proper parties to this suit, and their claims must be dismissed.¹²

IV. Computation of Reasonable Royalty

The district court found that Rite-Hite as a manufacturer was entitled to an award of a reasonable royalty on 502 infringing restraint or restraint-leveler sales for which it had not proved that it contacted the Kelley customer prior to the infringing Kelley sale. Rite-Hite, 774 F.Supp. at 1534, 21 USPQ2d at 1816. The court awarded a royalty equal to approximately fifty percent of Rite-Hite’s estimated lost profits per unit sold to retailers. Id. at 1535, 21 USPQ2d at 1817. Further, the court found that Rite-Hite as a retailer was entitled to a reasonable royalty amounting to approximately one-third its estimated lost distribution income per infringing sale. Kelley challenges the amount of the royalty as grossly excessive and legally in error.

A patentee is entitled to no less than a reasonable royalty on an infringer’s sales for which the patentee has not established entitlement to lost profits. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988); Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078, 219 USPQ 679, 681-82 (Fed.Cir.1983) (“If actual damages cannot be ascertained, then a reasonable royalty must be determined.”). The royalty may be based upon an established royalty, if there is one, or if not, upon the supposed result of hypothetical negotiations between the plaintiff and defendant. Id. at 1078, 219 USPQ at 682.¹³ The hypothetical negotiation requires the court to envision the terms of a licensing agreement reached as the result of a supposed meeting between the patentee and the infringer at the time infringement began. Id. “One challenging only the court’s finding as to amount of damages awarded under the ‘reasonable royalty’ provision of § 284, therefore, must show that the award is, in view of all the evidence, either so outrageously high or so outrageously low as to be unsupportable as an estimation of a reasonably royalty.” Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 895 F.2d 1403, 1406, 13 USPQ2d 1871, 1874 (Fed.Cir.1990).

The district court here conducted the hypothetical negotiation analysis. It determined that Rite-Hite would have been willing to grant a competitor a license to use the ’847 invention only if it received a royalty of no less than one-half of the per unit profits that it was foregoing. In so determining, the court considered that the ’847 patent was a “pioneer” patent with manifest commercial success; that Rite-Hite had consistently followed a policy of exploiting its own patents, rather than licensing to competitors; and that Rite-Hite would have had to forego a large profit by granting a license to Kelley because Kelley was a strong competitor and Rite-Hite anticipated being able to sell a large number of restraints and related products. See Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1559, 218 USPQ 481, 487 (Fed.Cir.1988) (court may consider impact of anticipated collateral sales); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp. 1116, 166 USPQ 235, (S.D.N.Y.1970) (wide range of factors relevant to hypothetical negotiation), modified and aff'd, 446 F.2d 295, 170 USPQ 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870, 92 S.Ct. 105, 30 L.Ed.2d 114 (1971). It was thus not unreasonable for the district court to find that an unwilling patentee would only license for one-half its expected lost profits and that such an amount was a reasonable royalty. The fact that the award was not based on the infringer’s profits did not make it an unreasonable award. See State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1580, 12 USPQ2d at 1031 (“The determination of a reasonable royalty ... is based not on the infringer’s profit margin[; t]here is no rule that a royalty be no higher than the infringer’s net profit margin.”); Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1563, 219 USPQ 377, 387 (Fed.Cir.1983) (royalty need not be less than price of infringing unit). Furthermore, the fact that the award was based on and was a significant portion of the patentee’s profits also does not make the award unreasonable. The language of the statute requires “damages adequate to compensate,” which does not include a royalty that a patentee who does not wish to license its patent would find unreasonable. See Del Mar, 836 F.2d at 1328, 5 USPQ2d at 1261 (“[The] imposition on a patent owner who would not have licensed his invention for [a certain] royalty is a form of compulsory license, against the will and interest of the person wronged, in favor of the wrongdoer.”). Moreover, what an infringer would prefer to pay is not the test for damages. See TWM, 789 F.2d at 900, 229 USPQ at 528 (that the parties might have agreed to a lesser royalty is of little relevance, for to look only at that question would be to pretend that the infringement never happened; it would also make an election to infringe a handy means for competitors to impose a compulsory license policy upon every patent owner).

We conclude that the district court made no legal error and was not clearly erroneous in determining the reasonable royalty rate. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s calculation of a reasonable royalty rate. However, because we vacate the court’s decision to include dock levelers in the royalty base, we remand for a redetermination of damages based only on the sale of the infringing restraints and not on the restraint-leveler packages.

B.

Rite-Hite’s Cross Appeal

Rite-Hite and the ISOs sought damages based on lost profits at the retail level for ADL-100 and MDL-55 restraints and dock levelers. The district court denied the award on the basis that both Rite-Hite and the ISOs failed to meet their evidentiary burden of proving lost profits. Rite-Hite has not persuaded us that the court’s decision was erroneous. As for the ISOs, this issue is mooted by the above rulings.

Rite-Hite also argues that the district court erred in awarding interest at a simple rather than a compound rate because, as a matter of law, prejudgment interest must be compounded. We disagree. It has been recognized that “an award of compound rather than simple interest assures that the patent owner is fully compensated.” Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 13 USPQ2d 1856, 1862, 1989 WL 149268 (E.D.Mo.1989), aff'd mem., 909 F.2d 1495 (Fed.Cir.1990). However, the determination whether to award simple or compound interest is a matter largely within the discretion of the district court. Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 557, 222 USPQ 4, 10 (Fed.Cir.1984) (declining to rule that prejudgment interest must be compounded as a matter of law). Rite-Hite has not persuaded us that the court abused its discretion in awarding interest at a simple rate.

CONCLUSION

On Kelley’s appeal, we affirm the district court’s decision that Rite-Hite is entitled to an award of lost profit damages based on its lost business in ADL-100 restraints. We affirm the court’s determination of the reasonable royalty rate. We vacate the awards to the ISOs and vacate the damage award based on the dock levelers. We remand for the court to dismiss the ISOs as plaintiffs and recalculate damages to Rite-Hite. On Rite-Hite’s cross-appeal, we affirm.

COSTS

Each party will bear its own costs of this appeal.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, and REMANDED.

2 . Claim 1 of the patent reads:

A releasable locking device for securing a parked vehicle to an adjacent relatively stationary upright structure, said device comprising a first means mountable on an exposed surface of the structure, a second means mounted on said first means for substantially vertical movement relative thereto between operative and inoperative modes, the location of said second means when in an inoperative mode being a predetermined distance beneath the location of said second means when in an operative mode and in non-contacting relation with the vehicle, and third means for releasably retaining said second means in an operative mode; said second means including a first section projecting outwardly a predetermined distance from said first means and the exposed surface of the structure, one end of said first section being mounted on said first means for selective independent movement relative thereto along a predetermined substantially vertical path, and a second section extending angularly upwardly from said first section and being spaced outwardly a substantially fixed distance from said first means and the exposed surface of the structure, said second means, when in an operative mode, being adapted to interlockingly engage a portion of the parked vehicle disposed intermediate the second section and said first means; said second means, when in an inoperative mode, being adapted to be in a lowered nonlocking relation with the parked vehicle.

3 . On February 15, 1989, seven ISOs that had not yet intervened brought a separate action, Block-Dickson, Inc. v. Kelley Co., Case No. 89-C-0190 (E.D.Wis. Feb. 15, 1989), which was consolidated with Rite-Hite's action by stipulation of the parties.

4 . As succinctly summarized by Keeton et at.: In a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond. But any attempt to impose responsibility upon such a basis would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and would "set society on edge and fill the courts with endless litigation.” As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability. Some boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.

W. Page Keeton et at., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984) (citation and footnote omitted).

5 . After an explication of established patent law principles, the partial dissent of Judge Nies ultimately agrees that there are judicial limitations on damages; the dissent simply disagrees that the damages sought here fall within those limitations, concluding instead that the damages are too "remote.” The dissent's disagreement thus centers not on whether lines are drawn regarding the compensability of damages, but only on where those lines are to be drawn.

6 . The partial dissent of Judge Nies appears to confuse exclusion under a patent of a product that comes within the scope of the claims with the determination of damages to redress injury-caused by patent infringement once infringement has been found.

7 . The partial dissent of Judge Nies agrees with Kelley, citing several Supreme Court decisions. However, the Supreme Court has provided no definitive ruling on the proper scope of damages to redress lost sales of diverted products such as those in this case. The dissent also relies on dicta in older district court cases; however, the issue directly before us is one of first impression in this court. Moreover, the more recent (post-1946) cases cited by the dissent do not hold that a patentee may receive damages in the form of lost profits only for diverted sales of devices covered by the patent in suit. Rather, the cases relied upon either relate to recovery for lost sales of items sold with devices covered by the patent in suit under the entire market value rule, or they stand for the unremarkable proposition that the patentee must be in the business of selling a device in order to recover damages for alleged lost sales of such a device.

8 . The partial dissent of Judge Nies makes much of the fact that Rite-Hite could not mark its ADL-100 restraints with notice of the '847 patent, cautioning, "[t]o hold that a patentee may recover damages respecting injury to its business in products that do not embody the invention which are unmarked or marked with a different patent number would treat a patentee that does not practice its invention more favorably than a patentee that does. The marking statute generates absurd results when applied to damages tied to products not made under the patent in suit." We disagree. The marking statute provides that if a product is not marked, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee except on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1988). That a patentee cannot recover damages in the absence of actual notice when it has not marked remains the law, but that law does not preclude assessing damages for lost sales of diverted products after actual notice of infringement has been given.

9 . This issue of royalty base is not to be confused with the relevance of anticipated collateral sales to the determination of a reasonable royalty rate. See Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1559, 218 USPQ 481, 487 (Fed.Cir.1983); Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1568, 224 USPQ 259, 269-70 (Fed.Cir.1984).

10 . In the first and third cases, the assignee may sue in its name alone; in the second case, it may sue jointly with the assignor. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255, 11 S.Ct. 334, 335, 34 L.Ed. 923 (1891).

11 . The court found that this industry was an insignificant market for Rite-Hite’s products, in-eluding its vehicle restraints.

12 . Appellees contend that the issue of the ISOs' standing to recover damages is law of the case because of Kelley's failure to appeal during the liability phase of the trial the district court’s order permitting intervention, for which reconsideration was denied in August 1984. We disagree. At the time of intervention, other unfair competition claims were asserted, now abandoned. Further, in the damage phase of the case, now appealed, the district court heard evidence and made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the background of the ISOs, the exclusivity of their licenses, and their entitlement to damages. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 774 F.Supp. 1514, 1522-25, 1536, 21 USPQ2d 1801, 1806-08, 1818 (E.D.Wis.1991). In so doing, the court addressed arguments and evidence that were not before it in its summary August 1984 ruling. Id. at 1524, 21 USPQ2d at 1808. The issue presented here, the ISOs' right to recover damages, was not finally resolved by the district court until the damage phase of trial. Indeed, the court expressly stated in the Rite-Hite damage opinion that the ISOs' right to patent damages was at issue.

13 . The hypothetical negotiation is often referred to as a "willing licensor/willing licensee" negotiation. However, this is an inaccurate, and even absurd, characterization when, as here, the pat-entee does not wish to grant a license. See Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1081, 219 USPQ 679, 684 (Fed.Cir.1983) (The willing licensee/licensor concept is "employed by the court as a means of arriving at reasonable compensation and its validity does not depend on the actual willingness of the parties to the lawsuit to engage in such negotiations!) t]here is, of course, no actual willingness on either side."); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 900, 229 USPQ 525, 528 (Fed.Cir.) (“The willing licensee/licensor approach must be flexibly applied as a 'device in the aid of justice.' ") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852, 107 S.Ct. 183, 93 L.Ed.2d 117 (1986).