Richardson Co. v. United States

8 Ct. Cust. 179, 1917 WL 20108, 1917 CCPA LEXIS 77
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMay 28, 1917
DocketNo. 1794
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 8 Ct. Cust. 179 (Richardson Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richardson Co. v. United States, 8 Ct. Cust. 179, 1917 WL 20108, 1917 CCPA LEXIS 77 (ccpa 1917).

Opinions

De Vries, Judge,

delivered the opinion, of the court;

The issue presented by this appeal is the proper dutiable classification of carbureters for certain tractors. The controversy presents for decision the inclusive scope of paragraph 391 of the present tariff act, reading:

391. Agricultural implements: Plows, tooth and disk harrows, headers, harvesters, reapers, agricultural drills and planters, mowers, horserakes, cultivators, thrashing machines, cotton gins, machinery for use in the manufacture of sugar, wagons, and carts, and all other agricultural implements of any kind and description, whether specifically mentioned herein or not, whether in whole or in parts, including repair parts.

The imported articles were classified for dutiable purposes by the collector of customs at the port of Detroit as manufactures of metal [180]*180under pargaraph 167 of that act. On due protest that decision was-affirmed by the Board of General Appraisers and importers make this appeal. The importers, appellant's, claim their property dutiable as parts of agricultural implements under paragraph 391.

Question is early made in the case whether or not a farm tractor is an “ agricultural implement.” If not so appellants,* of course, must fail. The court is of the opinion, however, that a farm tractor is an agricultural implement. We are not without highly respectable-authority in support of this view. The argument to the contrary by the Government in effect is “ that an engine whose sole function is the furnishing of power for the operation of agricultural implements is not itself an agricultural implement,” and that a traction engine is not an “implement.”

The precise principle was before the Supreme Court of Kansas in Jackman v. Lambertson (71 Kans., 138; 80 Pac, Rep., 55). The “syllabus by the court” concisely and authoritatively states the court’s view, as follows:

The thrashing separator, traction engine, belts, and all parts necessary to constitute a thrashing machine, kept by such person for the purpose of carrying on his business of thrashing, constitutes an implement under said subdivision 8, and, together with all tools necessary to operate the same, is exempt to such resident head of a family while used for the purpose of carrying on such business.

The same court, in Reeves v. Bascue (76 Kans., 333; 91 Pac. Rep., 77), reaffirmed the last-cited case and applied the same principle to a portable traction engine and lumber-sawing outfit. The court observed:

The plaintiff complains and contends that the engine and other appliances for sawing lumber constitute a manufacturing plant and can not be classed as the neces-sary tools and implements of the defendant’s business. His principal business, it appears, is sawing timber into lumber of various dimensions and forms. He did use the traction engine in thrashing for a brief time during the thrashing season, but. the sawjng of lumber appears to have been his principal occupation. Aside from the traction engine, which is portable, the saws, carrier, belts, etc., are said to be such as can be moved in a farmer’s wagon. Were they exempt? The statute provides-that there shall be exempt to a resident of the State who is the head of a family “the necessary tools and implements of any mechanic, miner, or other person, used and kept in stock for the purpose of carrying on his trade or business, and in addition thereto stock in trade not exceeding 8400 in value.” (Gen. Stats., 1901, sec. 3018, subd. 8.)
It will be observed that the fact that the tools and implements are large and heavy does not take them out of the operation of the statute. Nor is there any limit placed on the number, character, or value of the tools and implements protected by the exemption. It is enough that they belong to the mechanic, miner, or other person, that they are necessary, and are personally used for the purpose of carrying on his. trade or business. If hé uses the tools and implements in person and performs a considerable portion of the work himself, it would seem to be immaterial whether he is called a manufacturer or a mechanic. A liberal interpretation is given to statutes of exemption, and following the one already placed upon this provision in Jackman v. Lambertson (71 Kans., 138; 80 Pac., 55), the appliances in controversy must beheld to be exempt. ■ ■

[181]*181The Supreme Court of Colorado in a late case held the same •opinion in Eckman v. Poor (38 Col., 200; 87 Pac. Rep., 1088). That court said:

“Implements” are defined in Anderson’s Law Dictionary to be “things necessary to any trade, without which the work can not be performed.” Stemmer v. Insurance Co. (33 Oreg., 65, 49 Pac., 588, 53 Pac., 498). The portable engine and boiler and the attachments are implements of trade, without which the business can not be •carried on, and, as the value is not in excess of $300, we must hold that they are exempt from execution.

The philosophy of this precept, with other here pertinent observations, was well expressed by the Supreme Court of California in Estate of Klemp (119 Cal., 41), as follows:

It is clear from the evidence that the combined harvester in question is a farming utensil and an implement of husbandry, if, indeed, that fact is not a matter of common knowledge. It was used directly and prominently in the business of farming, and for no other purpose; and it is not contended that appellant had other implements by which he could cut, thrash, or winnow his wheat. Horserakes, gang plows, headers, thrashing machines, and combined harvesters are as clearly implements of husbandry as are hand rakes, single plows, sickles, cradles, flails, or an old-fashioned machine for winnowing. There‘is no ground for excluding an.implement from the •opmtion of the statute because it is an improvement and supplants a former implement used with less effectiveness for the same purpose. Present methods of farming, as well as conducting other kinds of business, require the use of improved machinery.

See also United States v. American Express Co. (6 Ct. Cust. Appls., 494; T. D. 36124).

Advancement in methods of agricultural pursuits is of the most •conspicuous examples of what may well become matters of common knowledge, and as such, of judicial notice. Whoever, in this day of advanced and efficient methods of travel, journeys far .from the hearthstone must observe these very pronounced improvements, which are not only necessary to keep the farmer in touch with competition but for the adequate and necessary supply of the world’s urgent needs. Everyday observation also confirms, what this •record tends strongly to establish at least prima facie, that slow traveling, heavy duty tractors are everywhere to a great degree supplanting the horse as motive power on the farm; that these machines by construction travel too slowly and are too heavy for hauling on the modern roadway, their construction intending them for slow travel and field work on a more yielding surface.

Of course, there are exceptional uses of these as of all implements, but exceptional or incidental use has never been held to control ■classification. Herein chief use is held the controlling factor—cases, infra.

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Bluebook (online)
8 Ct. Cust. 179, 1917 WL 20108, 1917 CCPA LEXIS 77, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richardson-co-v-united-states-ccpa-1917.