Richards v. City of New York

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided April 11, 2024·No. 1:24-cv-02212·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK --------------------------------------------------------- X : ALROY RICHARDS, : : Plaintiff, : : 24-CV-2212 (VSB) - against - : : OPINION & ORDER : CITY OF NEW YORK, : : Defendant. : : --------------------------------------------------------- X

VERNON S. BRODERICK, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Alroy Richards, of Valley Stream, Nassau County, New York, brings this action pro se. He has paid the fees to bring this action and sues the City of New York. Plaintiff asserts claims of retaliation and employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), as well as claims of federal constitutional violations, and claims under state law, including claims of retaliation and employment discrimination under the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws. His claims arise out of the City of New York’s alleged failure to hire him. I understand Plaintiff’s claims of federal constitutional violations as brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks as relief: (1) his immediate hiring; (2) damages; (3) a “cease and desist” order; and (4) “mediation.” (Doc. 1, “Complaint” or “Compl.” at 6.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this order. Background Plaintiff alleges that the City of New York has retaliated against him for suing it previously, and that it has discriminated against him because of his age (born in 1972), race (Black), color (Black), national origin (Jamaican citizen), immigration status (“green card holder”), and because of other unspecified “protected characteristics,” by not hiring him. (Doc 1 at 3–5.) Plaintiff also alleges the following: Plaintiff applied for a position with the New York City Department of Homeless Services (“DHS”).1 During or after being interviewed, he

“submitted all personal document paid for services, in order to be employed [sic].” (Id. at 5.) He also “[c]ompleted all the required documentations, to include IDs, work permits, green card, Social Security card, etc. Contracts signed [sic].” (Id.) But “[t]wo and a half years later, [he is] not employed.” (Id.) Plaintiff believes that the City of New York “knew of other pending civil lawsuits [he] had filed against [it] prior.” (Id.) Legal Standard The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the

fees to bring a civil action, if the Court determines that the action is frivolous, see Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363–64 (2d Cir. 2000), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court may also dismiss an action for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, “so long as the plaintiff is given notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Wachtler v. Cnty. of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds, Murphy v. Hughson, 82 F.4th 177 (2d Cir. 2023). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,”

1 An attachment to the Complaint seems to indicate that, on or about May 19, 2021, Plaintiff applied for the position of a “community assistant/peer coordinator” with DHS. (Doc. 1 at 13.) Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original).

Discussion A. Claims of employment discrimination under Title VII Title VII prohibits an employer or a potential employer from discriminating against an employee or a potential employee because of that person’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). To state a claim of discrimination under Title VII, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against him, and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at

87. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding race, color, and national origin-based employment discrimination are conclusory and lack detail. Plaintiff alleges nothing that connects the City of New York’s alleged failure to hire him with any of his characteristics that is protected by Title VII (his race, color, sex, national origin, or religion). Because he has not alleged facts sufficient to show that at least one of those characteristics has been a motivating factor with respect to the City of New York’s decision not to hire him, he has failed to state a claim of employment discrimination under Title VII. In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, however, Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint to allege facts sufficient to state a claim of employment discrimination against the City of New York under Title VII.

B. Claims of retaliation under Title VII Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim of retaliation under Title VII. To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that: “(1) [the] defendant[] discriminated—or took an adverse employment action—against him, (2) ‘because’ he has opposed any unlawful employment practice.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 90 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). “[F]or an adverse retaliatory action to be ‘because’ a plaintiff [opposed an unlawful employment practice], the

plaintiff must plausibly allege that the retaliation was a ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse action. It is not enough that retaliation was a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in the employer’s decision.” Id. at 90–91 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff alleges no facts showing that he suffered an adverse employment action because he opposed an unlawful employment practice. Although the filing of a previous lawsuit opposing an unlawful employment practice may be a protected activity for the purpose of such a claim, Plaintiff alleges nothing to suggest that, but for such a lawsuit that he has previously brought, including any lawsuit that he has previously brought against the City of New York, the City would have hired him. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim of retaliation under Title VII.

However, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint to allege facts sufficient to state a claim of retaliation under Title VII. C. Claims of employment discrimination under the ADEA The ADEA “prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of age against persons aged 40 or older.” D’Cunha v.

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