Reynolds v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided September 7, 2021·No. 7:21-cv-04763·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT USDC SDNY SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED BRIAN EDWARDS REYNOLDS, Plaintiff, -against- No. 21-cv-4763 (NSR) ORDER UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendant.

NELSON S. ROMAN, United States District Judge: The Court is in receipt of several letter motions that Plaintiff submitted on August 30, 2021 seeking, (1) reconsideration of this Court’s Order of Service (ECF No. 12) sua sponte dismissing claims against several defendants in this action (ECF No. 17); (2) an extension of time to file a Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 15); and (3) appointment of pro bono counsel (ECF No. 18). As discussed further below, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is DENIED, Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED, without prejudice to later renewal, and Plaintiffs motion for an extension of time to file a Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff's deadline to file a Second Amended Complaint is extended until October 22, 2021. A. Plaintiff's Request for Reconsideration of the August 9, 2021 Order of Service and Request for Pre-Service Order Compelling Discovery of Unspecified Parties Plaintiff requests reconsideration of this Court’s August 9, 2021 Order of Service because, in large part, he disagrees with the Court’s characterization of his claims as arising under either the FTCA or Bivens. Instead, he believes that he asserted claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and “cannot understand why the Court would place an action under designations (FTCA/Bivens) that would cause dismissal of the action.” (ECF No. 17 at 5.)

Section 1983 does not apply in this case because the only Defendants named in this action are federal government officials – i.e., officers, wardens, and health service providers working at Federal Correctional Institute Otisville. (See Am. Compl. at 3-4.) Section 1983 only confers a right to sue state governmental employees and others acting under color of state law and does not

typically apply to federal officials like those named as defendants in this action. Bivens is essentially the federal version of Section 1983 and permits federal courts to hear suits for money damages against federal government officials accused of constitutional rights. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). So, while the Court appreciates that Plaintiff may have been confused by the Court’s description of his claim as arising under Bivens rather than Section 1983, the Court was not characterizing it as Bivens claim in order blindside him or make his ability to seek relief more difficult. To the contrary, the Court was liberally construing Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and interpreted it as seeking relief under either the FTCA or Bivens because his assertion of constitutional violations against federal officials plainly does not fit within the scope of Section 1983.

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s confusion and exasperation with the Court, he has given no basis for this Court to reconsider its previous Order of Service. As the Court previously observed, in order to state a Bivens claim Plaintiff needs to allege facts showing the personal involvement of the defendants in the action. He has not alleged how Defendants Petrucci, Pliler, LeMaster, Elmore, Walls, or Heuett were personally involved in this case. Plaintiff need not be excessively discouraged by the Court’s holding. The Court has not dismissed claims against those Defendants with prejudice. When a court dismisses a claim without prejudice that means the defendant can attempt to amend his complaint to cure any deficiencies identified by the court. Plaintiff can further amend his complaint to describe what conduct Defendants Petrucci, Pliler, LeMaster, Elmore, Walls, and/or Heuett individually engaged in that he believes constituted a violation of his rights. Likewise, the Court did not dismiss claims against Defendants Grove, Linley, or Stewart at all. Accordingly, Plaintiff can simply proceed with his claims against those three individuals without amending his complaint any further if he so wishes.

Separately, Plaintiff asks that this case “proceed to a discovery and deposition process to assess the accusations of upper level administrators.” (ECF No. 17.) This request is premature and is based on a misunderstanding of the ordinary trajectory for litigation. Defendants have not yet been served or responded to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, accordingly, this Court does not yet have jurisdiction over those Defendants and cannot compel them to disclose anything to Plaintiff at this stage. Separately, the type of discovery requested by Plaintiff—i.e., discovery in order to find out if he has a claim against unidentified upper level administrators—would be inappropriate at any stage because this Court has not been given the identity of the subjects of the requested discovery. Instead, the ordinary next steps in this case would be: (1) Plaintiff can either further amend his complaint or proceed on his Amended Complaint against Defendants Grove,

Linley, and Stewart, then (2) defendants will either answer or file a motion to dismiss the complaint, and then (3) if no motion is filed by defendants, defendants instead choose to answer the complaint, or the Court denies defendants’ motions, then discovery will begin to take place, beginning with initial disclosures pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(1). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request to compel unspecified discovery is denied, without prejudice to renewal at a later point in this litigation. B. Request for an Extension of Deadline to Amend Complaint The Court grants Plaintiff an extension of 45 days to file a Second Amended Complaint. His deadline to submit a Second Amended Complaint is October 22, 2021. As Plaintiff discussed in his motion, he did not intend to bring a FTCA claim and disagrees with the Court’s characterization of his complaint as arising under the FTCA. He does not need to bring a FTCA claim and need not assert one in his Second Amended Complaint. Separately, though Plaintiff believes that he should be able to bring a Section 1983 claim, he has not identified any defendants that are state officials or persons acting under state color, and accordingly does not have a

cognizable Section 1983 claim. If he wishes to assert a Bivens claim against the federal officials he has identified as defendants (which, again, is functionally similar to a Section 1983 claim), then he can amend his complaint to cure deficiencies relating to those claims identified herein and in the Court’s Order of Service. C. Application for Pro Bono Counsel Plaintiff applies for the Court to request pro bono counsel. (ECF No. 18.) The factors to be considered in ruling on an indigent litigant’s request for counsel include the merits of the case, litigant’s efforts to obtain a lawyer, and litigant’s to gather the facts and present the case if unassisted by counsel. See Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1989); Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60-62 (2d Cir. 1986). Of these, the merits are “[t]he factor which command[s] the most attention.” Cooper, 877 F.2d at 172. At this stage of the litigation, the Court

has assessed that Plaintiff has failed to plead certain claims and granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to cure those deficiencies.

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Reynolds v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

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