Reynolds v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 7, 2021
Docket7:21-cv-04763
StatusUnknown

This text of Reynolds v. Federal Bureau of Prisons (Reynolds v. Federal Bureau of Prisons) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reynolds v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK BRIAN EDWARDS REYNOLDS, Plaintiff, -against- FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; MICHAEL CARVAJAL, Director of Bureau of Prisons; JOHN PETRUCCI, Former 21-CV-4763 (LTS) Warden of Otisville; PLILER, Warden F.C.I. ORDER TO AMEND Otisville; DAVID LEMASTER, Former Associate Warden; MS. ELMORE, Associate Warden; MR. SCHAEFLER, Camp Administrator, MS. GROVE, Associate Health Services Administrator; LINLEY, Medical Doctor, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Otisville Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. By order dated June 1, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d

636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Named as Defendants in this complaint are the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), BOP Director Michael Carvajal, Former Warden of Otisville John Petrucci, Warden of Otisville Pliler,

Former Otisville Associate Warden David Lemaster, Associate Warden Ms. Elmore, Associate Warden Heuett; Camp Administrator Mr. Schaefler, Associate Health Services Administrator Ms. Grove, Health Services Administrator Brian Walls, and Dr. Linley. Plaintiff’s allegations are as follows: Injuries are sores on all areas of the body from scalp to toes with resulting itchiness even in sleep with resulting bleeding on bedding in morning. Constant discomfort resulting in increased stress. Unreliable psychology staff. (ECF 2 at 5.) Plaintiff seeks money damages. DISCUSSION A. Sovereign immunity Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the BOP is immune from suit. The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars federal courts from hearing all suits against the federal government, including suits against federal agencies, unless sovereign immunity has been waived. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); see Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Because an action against a federal agency . . . is essentially a suit against the United States, such suits are . . . barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless such immunity is waived.”). Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the BOP under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). B. Federal Tort Claims Act The Court construes the complaint as asserting a claim for money damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80. The FTCA provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity for injuries arising from the tortious conduct of federal officers or

agents acting within the scope of their office or employment. See § 1346(b)(1). The only proper defendant for an FTCA claim is the United States of America. See § 1346(e); see, e.g., Holliday v. Augustine, No. 14-CV-0855, 2015 WL 136545, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 9, 2015). An FTCA claimant must exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court by: (1) filing a claim for money damages with the appropriate federal government entity and (2) receiving a final written determination from that agency. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); Phillips v. Generations Family Health Ctr., 723 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2013). FTCA claims must be “presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues” and an FTCA action must be commenced within six months of when the agency issues its final denial of administrative remedy. Roberson v. Greater Hudson Valley Family Health Ctr.,

Inc., ECF 1:17-CV-7325, 17, 2018 WL 2976024, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2018); see 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).

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Reynolds v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reynolds-v-federal-bureau-of-prisons-nysd-2021.