Rex Michael Bailey v. Larry Spears, Warden & the Attorney General of the State of Alabama

847 F.2d 695, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 8144, 1988 WL 53315

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: June 16, 1988
• Docket: 86-7319
• Status: Published

Opinions

DUMBAULD, Senior District Judge:

Appellant (Bailey) attacks by means of application for habeas corpus his detention under a life sentence imposed under the Alabama Habitual Offenders Act (Alabama Code 1975, Section 13A-5-9) for escape in the first degree (Alabama Code 1975, Section 13A-10-31). The sentence was upheld by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. Bailey v. State, 421 So.2d 1364 (Ala.Cr.App.1982). Habeas corpus was denied by final judgement of the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama on April 23, 1986, when Senior District Judge Clarence W. Allgood accepted the recommendations of Magistrate Elizabeth Todd Campbell’s report of April 10, 1986.

It is argued on appeal before us that by reason of psychiatric difficulties Bailey was not competent to stand trial, and that he was entitled to the benefit of an insanity defense. Because we are not satisfied that these contentions are without merit, and in view of the youth of the offender,¹ the nature of the offense,² and the severity of the penalty,³ we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing with respect to these matters.⁴

The inconclusive evidence heretofore offered regarding this subject, upon which the State court and the District Court based their determinations, is summarized in the opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court at 421 So.2d 1364 et seq. Succinctly stated, the testimony of a psychologist with an undergraduate degree (not a qualified psychiatrist) indicated that defendant exhibited “psychotic like behavior” and that “it would be advisable that he receives further, more indepth psychiatric evaluation”. This witness stated that defendant’s ability to participate in his defense and to assist counsel “would be limited”.

Defendant’s mother testified regarding his mental difficulties and suicide attempts. She had been advised that he had been diagnosed in previous examinations by psychiatrists as suffering from brain damage. Fellow inmates in the county jail, and the jailer, testified regarding Bailey’s bizarre behavior and a suicide attempt in the jail.

These circumstances raise sufficient doubts regarding Bailey’s mental capacity as to justify further inquiry by a competent medical expert. Accordingly, we believe that an evidentiary hearing should be held, and the case is REMANDED for that purpose to the District Court.

1 . Apparently Bailey was 26 at the date of the instant offense, but has been exhibiting psychiatric symptoms since 1981 at age 14.

2 . Bailees current conviction (which triggered the recidivist statute) was for escape from the county jail. We are not unmindful of the admonition of Thomas Jefferson that effective prison administration, rather than multiplication of criminal offenses, is the best method of protecting society against escapes. In the 1784 Report of the committee of Revisors of the laws of Virginia after the Revolution, commenting upon his celebrated Bill Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capital (in which prison breach was not enumerated as an offense), Jefferson declared:

“It is not only vain, but wicked, in a legislator to frame laws in opposition to the laws of nature ... The law of nature impels every one to escape from confinement; it should not therefore be subjected to punishment. Let the legislator restrain his criminal by walls, not by parchment." 2 Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson (1950) 502 [quoted in Neg-rich v. Hohn, 246 F.Supp. 173, 179 (W.D.Pa.1965), aff'd 379 F.2d 213 (C.A.3,1967) ].

3 . The penalty is life imprisonment, which many respectable authorities (including some members of the Supreme Court) regard as the maximum permissible punishment for heinous crimes such as brutal and premeditated murder.

4 . We do not address two other issues urged by appellant (ineffective assistance of counsel, and selective application of the Habitual Offenders Act).