Revere v. Reed
This text of 675 So. 2d 292 (Revere v. Reed) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Rodney REVERE
v.
Walter REED.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
*294 Rodney Revere, Angola, in pro. per.
Joseph Tosterud, Covington, for Defendant/Appellee.
Before LeBLANC, WHIPPLE and FOGG, JJ.
LeBLANC, Judge.
This appeal arises from an application for a writ of mandamus pursuant to the Public Records Act, which was granted in part and denied in part by the trial court. We affirm.
Appellant, Rodney Revere, is an inmate incarcerated at Angola. In State v. Revere, 572 So.2d 117 (La.App. 1st Cir.1990), writ denied, 581 So.2d 703 (1991), this Court affirmed his conviction for the second-degree murder of his estranged wife, Jean Revere.
On March 13, 1995, appellant filed a pleading entitled "PETITION FOR COMPLIANCE WITH LSA RS 44:1 WITH SANCTIONS" naming Walter Reed, the District Attorney of St. Tammany Parish, as defendant.[1] In his petition, appellant alleged the District Attorney failed to comply with the Public Records Act, La.R.S. 44:1 et seq., in the following two respects: (1) in refusing to provide appellant with the names of the witnesses who appeared before the grand jury in his criminal case[2]; and (2) in failing to respond to appellant's request that a certain photographer be allowed access to several photographs involved in appellant's case for the purpose of making color enlargements.
The record establishes the following facts. With respect to appellant's request for the names of grand jury witnesses, the District Attorney responded by letter that he did not believe appellant was entitled to the information requested. The letter further stated that the District Attorney was not the custodian of the requested records, which "belong to the Clerk of Court."
In response to appellant's original request for copies of the photographs, the District Attorney provided appellant with xerox copies. Thereafter, appellant wrote a letter to the District Attorney acknowledging receipt of the xerox copies, but stating he wished to have color enlargements made of the photographs. The letter requested that a photographer designated by appellant be allowed access to the photographs for that purpose. The District Attorney did not respond to this request.
At the hearing on this matter, Joseph Tosterud, the assistant district attorney appearing for defendant, indicated he had no objection to the photographer designated by appellant having access to the photographs. He further indicated he was responsible for handling public record requests and that he did not respond to appellant's second request regarding the photographs because he had not received it (he had no knowledge as to whether it had been received by the District Attorney's office). Mr. Tosterud stated that, once he was aware of the request, he called the photographer named by appellant and indicated he had no problem with the photographer coming to the office and selecting the photographs he wanted.
*295 The trial court rendered judgment granting appellant's request with regard to access to the photographs, but denying his request for the names of the grand jury witnesses. The trial court declined to award appellant sanctions and/or costs, because it did not find the District Attorney arbitrarily or capriciously withheld records or failed to respond to appellant's request. Rodney Revere appealed, assigning error as to the denial of his request for the names of the grand jury witnesses and the trial court's failure to award damages and/or costs.
On appeal appellant argues the trial court erred: (1) in shifting the burden of proof to him where defendant presented no evidence or sworn testimony to refute appellant's claim that defendant failed to comply with La.R.S. 44:1 et seq.; and (2) in failing to award plaintiff actual costs and damages when there was clear noncompliance with the law by defendant.
ANALYSIS
Initially, we will consider the issue of whether appellant was entitled under the Public Records Act to the names of the witnesses who appeared before the grand jury in connection with appellant's criminal case.
Because the right of access to public records is fundamental, access to public records may be denied only when the law specifically provides against access. La. Const. Art., 12, § 3; La.R.S. 44:1 et seq.; Title Research Corp. v. Rausch, 450 So.2d 933, 936 (La.1984). La. Const. Art. 5, § 34, is pertinent to the issue of whether the law limits access to the names of witnesses who appear before a grand jury. It provides that "[t]he secrecy of the [grand jury] proceedings, including the identity of witnesses, shall be provided by law." In accordance therewith, La.C.Cr.P. art. 434 provides, in pertinent part:
Members of the grand jury, all other persons present at a grand jury meeting, and all persons having confidential access to information concerning grand jury proceedings, shall keep secret the testimony of witnesses and all other matters in the quoted material occurring at, or directly connected with, a meeting of the grand jury.
In Hewitt v. Webster, 118 So.2d 688 (La. App. 2nd Cir.1960), the Second Circuit considered a request made pursuant to the Public Records Act to inspect subpoena returns for witnesses appearing before a grand jury. The Court concluded the requested documents were not public records within the contemplation of the Public Records Act, stating:
The law of secrecy as regards the proceedings of the grand jury includes, as a matter of public policy, the names of the witnesses who appear before the jury. Hewitt, 118 So.2d at 692.
This Court reached a similar conclusion in Fryar v. Guste, 361 So.2d 1300, 1303 (La. App. 1st Cir.1978), affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds, 371 So.2d 742 (1979). In Fryar this Court held that the identities and testimony of individuals who gave information while a grand jury investigation was in session were not subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act, and must be kept secret pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 434. Fryar, 361 So.2d at 1303. In affirming this conclusion, the Supreme Court stated it was "clearly correct". Fryar v. Guste, 371 So.2d 742, 745 (La.1979).
Nevertheless, despite the well-established policy regarding the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, disclosure may be permitted in some situations if a party's need for grand jury materials outweighs the need for continued secrecy. State v. Trosclair, 443 So.2d 1098, 1102-03 (La.1983), cert. dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205, 104 S.Ct. 3593, 82 L.Ed.2d 889 (1984). However, the party seeking disclosure must establish with particularity a "compelling necessity" for the disclosure. "That is, the party seeking disclosure must prove that without access to the grand jury materials the party's case would be `greatly prejudiced' or that an `injustice would be done.'" State v. Trosclair, 443 So.2d at 1103.
In the present case, appellant has not articulated any reason justifying disclosure of the witnesses' names. In fact, appellant has stated no reason for the request, either in his *296 petition, at the hearing held in this matter, or in brief. Because of the policy of protecting the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings, appellant bore the burden of proving with particularity a compelling necessity for breaching the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings. Appellant clearly failed to meet this burden of proof.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
675 So. 2d 292, 1996 WL 242968, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/revere-v-reed-lactapp-1996.