Reuven Lyak v. City of Hackensack

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: April 1, 2026
• Docket: 25-1548
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-1548

REUVEN LYAK, Appellant

V.

CITY OF HACKENSACK; RAYMOND GUIDETTI, Individually and in his official capacity; BENNY MARINO, Individually and in his official capacity; XYZ CORP, INC.; JOHN DOES (1-10); JANE DOES (1-10) _____________________________ Appeal from the U.S. District Court, D.N.J. Senior Judge William J. Martini, No. 2:23-cv-13104

Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and BOVE, Circuit Judges Submitted Jan. 27, 2026; Decided Apr. 1, 2026 _____________________________

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION*

PORTER, Circuit Judge.

Reuven Lyak, a police officer and union representative, claimed municipal defendants

intentionally retaliated against him for his protected speech and association. But mere dis-

agreement with internal department-wide policies is not enough to plausibly allege consti-

tutional violations in federal court. We will affirm the District Court’s dismissal.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. I

Reuven Lyak is a police officer for the City of Hackensack and vice president of the

PBA Local 9 police union. Lyak was a “close associate” of Lt. Anthony DiPersia, president

of the PBA Local 9A supervisory police officer union. Appendix (“App.”) 32. In 2022, an

audit of the police department revealed that some police officers were getting paid twice,

amassing tens of thousands of dollars on top of their regular pay by manipulating their

schedules to complete “extra duty details.”1 The audit results showed that “the number of

arrests dropped by 85% while overtime costs soared by 115%.” App. 33. The story made

local news, drawing condemnation from residents for the “alleged abuse of taxpayer dol-

lars.” App. 33. So the city hired new police leadership, presumably to tighten the belt—

Raymond Guidetti as police director and Benny Marino as his executive assistant.

Guidetti sought to reform the extra-duty policy but was opposed by DiPersia, who ac-

cused him of “unlawful conduct and acting beyond the legal scope of his employment.”

App. 33. Lyak criticized the proposed policy changes. Lyak felt that some of the organiza-

tional and department-wide changes were targeted at him. He complained to the local un-

ion, other officers and their families, and city residents. The union issued a vote of no

confidence against Guidetti, but that did not slow him down.

1 “Extra duty details” included things like providing traffic control at construction sites, and were outside the scope of an officer’s usual shift responsibilities. Officers who ma- nipulated their schedules would clock in for their usual shift, accept and complete extra duty in the middle of their usual shift (without clocking out), then finish their usual shift when the extra duty ended. This enabled those officers “to be paid twice for the same hours worked.” App. 33.

2 Over the next few months, Guidetti began implementing the policy changes. He

amended a policy to require that any extra duty details needed to be completed an hour

before the officer’s regular shift. Around the same time, Lyak put in for a shift change that

would allow him to maximize the amount of extra-duty time he could work, but his re-

quested shift change was not granted in full. Instead, he picked up extra-duty shifts for a

few hours before his regular shift and then arranged for an outside entity to cover the re-

mainder of the extra-duty shift. Later, the policy was updated again so that an officer was

not permitted to accept an extra-duty shift unless he could work at least half of the detail.

A few months after these policy changes, Lyak was reassigned to another position in

the department. Lyak conceded that the transfer appeared to be “prestigious and a promo-

tion,” but argued that it was really a “clear demotion . . . to humiliate” him. App. 40. A

month after that, Lyak was transferred again, as were 15 other officers. This time, Lyak

alleges his transfer was to a “far lower position” than the other officers’ transfers. App. 44.

A few days later at Guidetti’s direction, he was “written up” for allegedly violating the

extra-duty policy. Lyak emailed the entire union membership the next day, communicating

that union leaders were being “singled out,” presumably by the reassignments and discipli-

nary action. App. 48.

On August 30, 2023, Lyak commenced a civil rights action, alleging that the reassign-

ments and disciplinary action were intentional acts of retaliation for his protected speech

and association. The District Court dismissed the case without prejudice after Lyak failed

to respond to defendants’ motion to dismiss. Lyak moved to reopen the case and for leave

3 to file an amended complaint. The District Court denied both motions. Lyak timely ap-

pealed.

II

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367(a). We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review the District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Chang v. Childs.’

Advoc. Ctr. of Del. Weih Steve Chang, 938 F.3d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2019). On review, we

will “accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can

be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Evancho

v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350–51 (3d Cir. 2005). “[T]o survive a motion to dismiss, a plain-

tiff must allege facts sufficient to make it ‘plausible’ the defendant is liable.” Migliore by

Migliore v. Vision Solar LLC, 160 F.4th 79, 87 (3d Cir. 2025).

We review the District Court’s denial of Rule 60 and Rule 15 motions for abuse of

discretion. Penn W. Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 371 F.3d 118, 124 (3d Cir. 2004) (Rule 60); In

re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1323 (3d Cir. 2002) (Rule 15).

III

This appeal presents four primary issues: whether the District Court (1) erred by finding

that Lyak did not engage in protected speech or association under § 1983 and the New

Jersey Civil Rights Act, (2) erred by finding that Lyak failed to plead a procedural due

process claim, (3) erred by finding that Lyak failed to plead a § 1985 claim for conspiracy,

and (4) abused its discretion by denying the motion to reopen and for leave to file an

amended complaint. We will affirm on each issue.

4 A

Lyak did not plausibly allege that he faced retaliation for engaging in protected First

Amendment speech or association under § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.2

To plead a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that:

“(1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) the defendant engaged in retali-

atory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitu-

tional rights, and (3) a causal link [existed] between the constitutionally protected conduct

and the retaliatory action.” Javitz v. Cnty. of Luzerne, 940 F.3d 858, 863 (3d Cir. 2019)

(citation omitted; alteration in original).

To determine whether employee speech is constitutionally protected conduct, we em-

ploy the familiar Pickering-Connick balancing test, which asks: (1) whether the employee

spoke as a citizen, and (2) whether the topic is a matter of public concern. Connick v. My-

ers, 461 U.S. 138, 143, 146 (1983). If those threshold questions are answered in the affirm-

ative, then we “balance [] the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon

matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the

efficiency of the public services it performs.” Id. at 142 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.,

391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)) (second alteration in original).

2 The New Jersey Civil Rights Act is coextensive with § 1983, so we analyze those claims together. Falcone v. Dickstein, 92 F.4th 193, 205 n.8 (3d Cir. 2024). To the extent that Lyak argues the New Jersey Constitution protects a public employee’s right to “make known . . . grievances and proposals through representatives of [his] own choosing,” Lyak cannot transform his status as a union leader into a constitutional violation any time the department implements new policies with which he disagrees. See N.J. Const. art. I, § 19.

5 Lyak did not speak as a citizen, so he does not clear the first threshold factor. His at-

tempt to couch his departmental grievances and internal policy preferences as a public-

safety concern is unavailing. Lyak spoke as a police officer on matters directly related to

his employment—departmental policy and reassignment. His dissatisfaction with those

policies and his reassignments were “matters only of personal interest . . . [so] a federal

court is not the appropriate forum” for reviewing the city’s employment decisions. Amal-

gamated Transit Union Loc. 85 v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 39 F.4th 95, 103 (3d Cir.

2022) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147). “[T]he First Amendment does not require a

public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs.”

Connick, 461 U.S. at 149 (holding that an employee’s concerns regarding office transfer

policy, morale, and supervisors were not of public concern).

And even if Lyak clears the second threshold question, it is clear from the proposed

amended complaint (“PAC”) that his departmental grievances and internal policy prefer-

ences are outweighed by the state’s interest in promoting efficiency, particularly consider-

ing the audit results that revealed significantly fewer arrests and soaring overtime costs.

While the audit results may well have been a matter of public concern, Lyak’s gripes with

the way the police department addressed those results were not outweighed by the city’s

interest in doing so.

On the second retaliation element, though it is hardly clear that Guidetti and Marino’s

actions were sufficiently retaliatory to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising

his constitutional rights, Lyak’s allegations that his first reassignment was designed to cre-

ate resentment against him and humiliate him may clear the low threshold. See Baloga v.

6 Pittson Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 758–59 (3d Cir. 2019). On the second reassignment,

however, Lyak offers nothing more than bald assertions that the reassignment was less than

favorable. And on his alleged discipline, he fails to explain what it means to be “written

up.”

In any event, Lyak shows no causal link between the constitutionally protected conduct

and the alleged retaliatory actions (his reassignments and the disciplinary action). Lyak

was first reassigned months after he spoke out about the extra-duty policy, and he did not

allege any pattern of antagonism that persisted. Moreover, the policy changes and later

reassignments affected more than a dozen officers, not just Lyak, and were implemented

to rectify significant police department problems brought to light by the audit. Even con-

strued favorably to Lyak, the allegations in the PAC are too attenuated to suggest that the

department-wide policy changes and reshuffling of officers were pretextual.3

B

The District Court held that Lyak failed adequately to plead a due-process violation

by alleging he was deprived of a property interest in his job. That was not error.

To state a procedural due process claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that:

“(1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth

Amendment’s protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to

3 Although Lyak invokes “association” as a separate right, he has not asserted a pure as- sociational claim. Rather, the claim is based on his association with DiPersia as a fellow critic of the extra-duty policy. That associational claim is coextensive with the speech claim, so it too will be dismissed. See Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 906 F.3d 76, 81, 84 (3d Cir. 2018).

7 him did not provide ‘due process of law.’ ” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225,

233–34 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Lyak does not plausibly allege the deprivation of a liberty or property interest. Lyak

asserts that he had “a liberty or property interest in his employment with the Defendant

City of Hackensack and his reputation as a police officer and Vice President of PBA Local

9,” and that Guidetti and Marino’s actions led to “damage to his reputation . . . and damage

to future career prospects.” App. 54, 55.

True, Lyak has a protected liberty interest in his reputation. But we usually recognize a

deprivation of that liberty interest only when a public employee satisfies the “stigma-plus”

test, i.e., when the employee is stigmatized by public statements and terminated from em-

ployment. Hill, 455 F.3d at 236 (“[W]hen an employer ‘creates and disseminates a false

and defamatory impression about the employee in connection with his termination,’ it de-

prives the employee of a protected liberty interest.” (quoting Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624,

628 (1977))). “The creation and dissemination of a false and defamatory impression is the

‘stigma,’ and the termination is the ‘plus.’ ” Id. Here, Lyak does not meet either prong of

that test. The only purported stigmatizing statements that Lyak points to were made by an

“ally of . . . Guidetti” at a private union meeting. Appellant’s Br. 22 (citing App. 49). He

makes no allegation that the purported “stigmatizing statements” were public, or that he

was terminated. Not even his pay or formal rank were diminished.

Lyak also has a protected property interest in being a police officer. See Elmore v.

Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[S]tate law determines whether such a property

interest exists.”); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:14-147 (“[N]o permanent member or officer of the

8 police department or force shall be removed from his office, employment or position . . . ,

nor shall such member or officer be suspended, removed, fined or reduced in rank from or

in office, employment, or position therein, except for just cause . . . .”). Here though, Lyak

was one among many police officers who were affected by the department-wide changes

to policy and reassignments. Again, he alleged no decrease in pay or formal reduction in

rank whatsoever. And other than threadbare assertions that he was “reassigned,” “de-

mot[ed],” and “written up” on the early warning system, Lyak failed plausibly to allege

that he was “suspended, removed, fined or reduced in rank” or pay sufficient to establish

deprivation of his property interest. App. 40, 44; see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:14-147.

Even if Lyak plausibly alleged deprivation of his liberty or property interests, he failed

plausibly to allege that “the procedures available to him did not provide ‘due process of

law.’ ” Hill, 455 F.3d at 234. Lyak says Guidetti violated city policies and procedures by

failing to give him a chance to contest the discipline in advance. But he does not mention

whether he was offered a hearing, denied a hearing, or even asked for one. Lyak only al-

leges that he complained to Marino about being written up and later emailed all union

members about his qualms. See Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000) (“In order

to state a claim for failure to provide due process, a plaintiff must have taken advantage of

the processes that are available to him or her, unless those processes are unavailable or

patently inadequate.”).

C

Lyak also does not plead sufficient facts to show discriminatory animus against an iden-

tifiable class. So his conspiracy claim was properly dismissed.

9 A conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege

that (1) the conspiracy “was motivated by discriminatory animus against an identifiable

class,” and (2) “that the discrimination against the identifiable class was invidious.” Farber

v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2006).

Lyak’s claim that Guidetti and Marino conspired against “a class of union leaders who

opposed Defendant Guidetti’s changes to the extra duty policy” fails to allege discrimina-

tory animus against an identifiable class. Appellant’s Br. 25. The “group [must have] an

identifiable existence independent of the fact that its members are victims of the defend-

ants’ tortious conduct.” Farber, 440 F.3d at 136. Not so here, where the alleged class of

union leaders opposed to Guidetti’s policies exists only because of changes to the extra-

duty policy and the ways those changes allegedly impacted the class. And, unlike discrim-

ination on the basis of race or sex, discrimination on the basis of union membership and

policy opposition is not invidious discrimination under § 1985(3). Cf. id. at 135 (“[D]is-

crimination on the basis of political affiliation is not, as a matter of law, discrimination so

invidious such that § 1985(3) would apply.”).

D

The District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lyak’s motion to reopen and

for leave to file an amended complaint.

Rule 60 allows a party to seek relief from final judgments and orders in limited circum-

stances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 15 allows a party to move for leave to amend its plead-

ings, which “[t]he court should freely give [] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a)(2). And “an order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is not a final order as

10 long as the plaintiff may cure the deficiency and refile the complaint.” Ahmed v. Dragovich,

297 F.3d 201, 207 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, even if the dismissal without prejudice was final,

permitting the filing of the PAC would have been futile under Rule 15 because, as we

discuss above, it does not state any plausible claim for relief. See In re NAHC, Inc., 306

F.3d at 1332 (noting that the futility analysis for motion to amend is the same as for a

motion to dismiss). So the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lyak’s

motion to reopen and for leave to file an amended complaint. Ahmed, 297 F.3d at 209

(“When a party requests post-judgment amendment of a pleading, a court will normally

conjoin the Rule 60(b) and Rule 15(a) motions to decide them simultaneously, as it ‘would

be a needless formality for the court to grant the motion to reopen the judgment only to

deny the motion for leave to amend.’ ”).

* * *

For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court.