Ret. Bd. of the Policemen's Annuity ex rel. Policemen's Annuity v. FXCM Inc.

333 F. Supp. 3d 338
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedAugust 10, 2018
Docket15-CV-3599 (KMW)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 333 F. Supp. 3d 338 (Ret. Bd. of the Policemen's Annuity ex rel. Policemen's Annuity v. FXCM Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ret. Bd. of the Policemen's Annuity ex rel. Policemen's Annuity v. FXCM Inc., 333 F. Supp. 3d 338 (S.D. Ill. 2018).

Opinion

KIMBA M. WOOD, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago on Behalf of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago ("Plaintiff") brings this putative securities class action against Defendants FXCM Inc. ("FXCM") and Dror Niv (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made material misstatements and omissions concerning risks in FXCM's business. Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for failing to *344adequately allege (i) that Defendants made a materially false statement, (ii) that Defendants acted with scienter, and (iii) loss causation.

For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED because Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that Defendants made material misrepresentations or omissions and acted with scienter.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. The Parties

Defendant FXCM was one of the first brokerage firms to permit retail customers to trade currency in the retail foreign exchange ("FX") market. (Compl.,1 ¶ 31.) Dror Niv is one of the founders of FXCM and was, at all relevant times, its CEO. (Id. ¶ 29.)

Plaintiff is an institutional investor that purchased FXCM common stock from March 17, 2014, up to and including January 20, 2015 (the "Class Period"). (Id. ¶¶ 1, 27.) Plaintiff brings this putative class action on behalf of all those who purchased or otherwise acquired FXCM stock during the Class Period and were damaged thereby. (Id. ¶ 1.)

2. FXCM's Business and the FX Market

FXCM gives its customers access to the FX market, allowing them to bet on changes in prices for certain currency pairs, such as the Euro against the Swiss Franc ("EUR/CHF"). (Id. ¶ 33.) Whenever an FX trader buys one currency-known as trading "long"-that trader simultaneously sells another currency, such as by simultaneously buying Euros and selling Swiss Francs. (Id. )

Most retail brokerage firms earn revenue through what is known as a "principal model." (Id. ¶ 40.) Under that model, the broker takes the opposite side of its customers' trades, meaning that when the customer takes a loss on a trade, the broker profits (and, conversely, when the customer makes a profit, the broker takes a loss). (Id. ) FXCM, by contrast, primarily relied on an "agency model," under which FXCM served as an intermediary between its customer and banks serving as "liquidity providers." (Id. ) Under this model, FXCM did not profit when its customers lost money, but instead earned commissions on trades. (Id. ¶ 42.) Because FXCM did not take the opposite side of its customers' trades, it was not exposed to the risk that a customer's profit would result in a loss the FXCM, as the customer's counterparty. (See id. ¶¶ 40-42.)

Although FXCM's business model eliminated the "principal risk"-acting as its customers' counterparty-FXCM was still exposed to certain changes in currency prices. (Id. ¶¶ 41, 45.) One type of risk FXCM faced resulted from its practice of permitting customers to use leverage to place trades for amounts much larger than the amount of collateral posted in their account. (Id. ) Customers in the United States, for example, were permitted to trade with leverage up to 50:1, meaning a customer with $100 in collateral could post a trade up to $5,000. (Id. ¶ 34.) The leverage permitted in other countries was higher, such as up to 500:1 in Australia. (Id. ¶ 36.) Under FXCM's agreements with its customers, in the event that a customer suffered a loss, the customer would be responsible only for the amount of collateral *345the customer posted. (Id. ¶ 41.) Thus, if a loss exceeded the customer's collateral, FXCM would responsible for paying that excess loss, known as "negative equity" or a "debit." (Id. ¶ 35.) In this way, although FXCM was not exposed to the "principal risk" that could result in losses when its customers did well, it was exposed to the risk that its customers could experience losses exceeding their collateral. (See id. ¶ 41.) To protect itself against the risk of customers accruing losses over-and-above their collateral, FXCM closed out a customer's position whenever changes in currency prices exhausted that customer's collateral. (See id. ¶ 8.)

3. The EUR/CHF Pair and the SNB Crash

On September 6, 2011, the Swiss National Bank ("SNB") announced that it was pegging the value of the Swiss Franc to the Euro at a rate of 1.20 Swiss Francs to 1 Euro. (Id. ¶ 60.) By doing so, the SNB permitted the Euro's value to increase against the Swiss Franc, but prevented the Swiss Franc's value to ever increase beyond the rate of 1.20 Swiss Francs to 1 Euro. (Id. ¶¶ 60, 110.) The SNB's decision resulted in an immediate change in currency prices, causing a movement of 8% in the Swiss Franc within minutes. (Id. ¶ 60.)

In January 2015, FXCM's customers collectively held a $2.2 billion position in the EUR/CHF pair. (Id. ¶ 52.) On January 15, 2015, the SNB announced that it would de-peg the Swiss Franc from the Euro, meaning that SNB would allow the Swiss Franc to move to its actual market value, even if that value went beyond the rate of 1.20 Swiss Francs to 1 Euro. (Id. ¶ 51) Within minutes, the price of the Swiss Franc soared. (Id. ¶ 110.) As a result, many of FXCM's customers with positions in the EUR/CHF pair suffered losses well above their collateral, meaning that FXCM was responsible for those losses. (Id. ¶ 55) FXCM ultimately suffered losses of $276 million. (Id. ) To avoid a regulatory default, FXCM agreed the next day to a punitive financing agreement with an outside investment company, Leucadia National Corporation. (Id. ¶ 56, 112.) As a result, FXCM's stock plummeted from $14.87 on January 14, 2015, to $1.60 on January 20, 2015. (Id. ¶ 113.)

4. Plaintiff's Allegations of Fraud

In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made a number of materially false or misleading statements during the Class Period, in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. (Compl., ¶¶ 132-40.) Plaintiff alleges that Niv, as a "controlling person" of FXCM, violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. (Id. , ¶¶ 141-44.) Plaintiff alleges, in particular, that Defendants misled investors about the risks associated with FXCM's business, especially with respect to the risks associated with FXCM's "agency model," FXCM's leverage policies, and FXCM's exposure to massive losses if the Euro were de-pegged from the Swiss Franc. (See Opp'n,2 at 14-15.)

B. Relevant Procedural History

On May 8, 2015, Plaintiff filed its Complaint. (ECF No. 1.) On January 12, 2016, Plaintiff filed its Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 50.) On February 25, 2016, Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 53.) On August 18, 2016, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (ECF No.

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333 F. Supp. 3d 338, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ret-bd-of-the-policemens-annuity-ex-rel-policemens-annuity-v-fxcm-ilsd-2018.