MITCHELL, Justice.
The question before us for review in this consolidated appeal is whether the plaintiffs complaints state a claim upon which relief can be granted against either or both defendants for either libel or invasion of privacy. We hold that the plaintiffs complaints fail to state a claim against either defendant on either theory.
The plaintiff, Hayden B. Renwick, is Associate Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of North Carolina [314]*314at Chapel Hill. He has been employed by the University since 1969. On April 22, 1981, The Raleigh Times published an editorial entitled “And He Calls It Bias?”. The same editorial was reprinted on April 26, 1981, in The Greensboro Daily News and Record in a commentary section entitled “Around The State” under the title “Discrimination?”. The complete text of the editorial as printed in both instances was as follows:
Some of the continuing deluge of charges from Washington against the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill —many obviously unfounded —are so ridiculous they only widen the gulf between reason and resentment as the state seeks to create better racial relations.
The latest barrage is based on allegations by Hayden Renwick, Associate Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at Chapel Hill, in a 1978 newspaper article. Renwick, formerly in charge of minority admissions, said between 1975 and 1978 about 800 black students had been denied admission.
Yet Collin Rustin, the minority admissions director since 1975, flatly denies the charge. Furthermore, the special admission concessions in effect for blacks also give the lie to charges of unfair discrimination against minorities.
According to Rustin, every black student who meets the minimum standard combined score of 800 on the Scholastic Aptitude Test and has a 1.6 predicated grade point average is AUTOMATICALLY admitted. The exception would be if the applicant had not taken high school subjects required for admission.
That’s discrimination? When the 800 required is only half the maximum possible score of 1,600? When the average SAT score for other, competitive students admitted to last fall’s freshman class at Carolina was between 1,070 and 1,080? When those competitive students admitted were in the top five percent of their high school graduating classes? When only 4,800 of 11,500 applicants clamoring to get in were admitted?
It has taken North Carolinians years to adjust to the necessity to grant some minority applicants, because of their disenfranchised background, special concessions in admis[315]*315sions. This gives them a chance to prove that their academic deficiencies are only temporary, not permanent.
But extremists who belittle and criticize these concessions — which, indeed seem here so excessive they do nothing for the student or the quality of education — should be publicly rebuffed.
The fact that, according to a 1979 faculty committee report, only 36 blacks have been denied access to UNC between 1975 and 1979 —compared to 6,700 competitive students turned away in one season — attests to UNC’s yeoman efforts to make minorities welcome on campus. How long highly qualified whites denied admission will tolerate this reverse discrimination without taking the university to court is undoubtedly affected by irresponsible charges such as this one.
After requesting in writing a retraction of the editorials by the defendants and having received no retraction, the plaintiff filed separate complaints against each defendant alleging libel per se and invasion of privacy. The defendants, The News and Observer Publishing Company, which publishes The Raleigh Times, and Greensboro News Company, which publishes The Greensboro Daily News and Record, each filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court entered judgments on March 3, 1982, granting each defendant’s motion and dismissing the plaintiffs actions for failure to state a claim. The cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had erred and reversed. We reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals.
The function of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the law of a claim and not the facts which support the claim. Snyder v. Freeman, 300 N.C. 204, 266 S.E. 2d 593 (1980). The allegations of the complaint are taken as true for the limited purpose of testing its sufficiency. Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 260 S.E. 2d 611 (1979). A claim for relief should not be dismissed unless it affirmatively appears that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be presented in support of the claim. Id. Bearing these principles in mind, we turn to [316]*316a determination of whether the plaintiff’s complaints in these two cases state claims entitling the plaintiff to relief.
I.
Libel
Three classes of libel are recognized under North Carolina law.
They are: (1) publications obviously defamatory which are called libel per se; (2) publications susceptible of two interpretations one of which is defamatory and the other not; and (3) publications not obviously defamatory but when considered with innuendo, colloquium, and explanatory circumstances become libelous, which are termed libels per quod.
Arnold v. Sharpe, 296 N.C. 533, 537, 251 S.E. 2d 452, 455 (1979). As we have previously stated:
When an unauthorized publication is libelous per se, malice and damage are presumed from the fact of publication and no proof is required as to any resulting injury. The law presumes that general damages actually, proximately and necessarily result from an unauthorized publication which is libelous per se and they are not required to be proved by evidence since they arise by inference of law, and are allowed whenever the immediate tendency of the publication is to impair plaintiffs reputation, although no actual pecuniary loss has in fact resulted.
In an action upon a publication coming within the second class, that is, a publication which is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which is defamatory, it is for the jury to determine under the circumstances whether the publication is defamatory and was so understood by those who saw it.
In publications which are libelous per quod the innuendo and special damages must be alleged and proved.
Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 785, 195 S.E. 55, 59 (1938) (citations omitted).
The plaintiffs complaints in these cases failed to bring the editorial complained of within the second class of libel, since it [317]*317was not alleged that the editorial is susceptible of two meanings, one defamatory, and that the defamatory meaning was intended and was so understood by those to whom the publication was made. Id; Wright v. Commercial Credit Company, Inc., 212 N.C. 87, 89, 192 S.E. 844, 845 (1937). The complaints failed to bring the editorial within the third class —libel per quod — since it was not alleged that the plaintiff suffered special damages. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. at 785, 195 S.E. at 59. In fact, the plaintiffs counsel stated with commendable candor and accuracy during oral arguments before this Court that these were actions for libel per se or not actions for libel at all. Therefore, we are concerned here only with the law relative to libel per se. We must determine whether the editorial is defamatory per se. If it is not, the defendants were entitled to judgments ordering dismissal of the plaintiffs claims for relief for libel. Id.
Under the well established common law1 of North Carolina, a libel per se is a publication by writing, printing, signs or pictures which, when considered alone without innuendo, colloquium or explanatory circumstances: (1) charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; (2) charges a person with having an infectious disease; (3) tends to impeach a person in that person’s trade or profession; or (4) otherwise tends to subject one to ridicule, contempt or disgrace. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. at 787, 195 S.E. at 60. It is not always necessary that the publication involve an imputation of crime, moral turpitude or immoral conduct. Arnold v. Sharpe, 296 N.C. at 537, 251 S.E. 2d at 455. “But defamatory words to be libelous per se must be susceptible of but one meaning and of such nature that the court can presume as a matter of law that they tend to disgrace and degrade the party or hold him up to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or cause him [318]*318to be shunned and avoided.” Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. at 786, 195 S.E. at 60 (emphasis added).
The initial question for the court in reviewing a claim for libel per se is whether the publication is such as to be subject to only one interpretation. Oates v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 205 N.C. 14, 16, 169 S.E. 869, 871 (1933). If the court determines that the publication is subject to only one interpretation, it then “is for the court to say whether that signification is defamatory.” Id. It is only after the court has decided that the answer to both of these questions is affirmative that such cases should be submitted to the jury on a theory of libel per se.
We turn then to the question whether the editorial published and republished by the defendants is susceptible of but one interpretation, which is defamatory when considered alone without innuendo or explanatory circumstances. We find that it is not. The worst that could be said of the editorial is that it is “reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning.” 63 N.C. App. at 213, 304 S.E. 2d at 601. However, we find the editorial, at the very least, equally susceptible of a nondefamatory interpretation. Therefore, it could not be libelous per se. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. at 786, 195 S.E. at 60; Oates v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 205 N.C. at 16-17, 169 S.E. at 871.
In determining whether publications are susceptible of only one meaning, and that a defamatory meaning, so as to be libelous per se:
The principle of common sense requires that courts shall understand them as other people would. The question always is how would ordinary men naturally understand the publication .... The fact that supersensitive persons with morbid imaginations may be able, by reading between the lines of an article, to discover some defamatory meaning therein is not sufficient to make them libelous.
In determining whether the article is libelous per se the article alone must be construed, stripped of all insinuations, innuendo, colloquium and explanatory circumstances. The article must be defamatory on its face “within the four corners thereof.”
[319]*319Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. at 786-87, 195 S.E. at 60 (citations omitted).
In each of his complaints against the defendants, the plaintiff specifically complained that in the editorial in question:
plaintiff is reported as having said in a 1978 newspaper article that between 1975 and 1978 about 800 black students had been denied admission. That said statement is false. That the entire article . . . gives the impression that the plaintiff is an extremist, a liar and is irresponsible in his profession.
We do not think such allegations can find support in the editorial of which the plaintiff complains.
The editorial giving rise to this appeal when viewed “within the four corners thereof’ and as ordinary people would understand it simply_.is not directed toward the plaintiff. Instead, it criticizes “the continuing deluge of charges from Washington against the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.” The thrust of the editorial is to express the opinion that special admissions concessions in effect for blacks at the University contradict and disprove charges from Washington of unfair discrimination against minorities. In fact, the only direct mention of the plaintiff occurs in the second paragraph of the editorial, which states that the “latest barrage” of charges from Washington is based on a 1978 newspaper article written by him. The editorial states direct opinions in a robust manner concerning a controversial public issue and takes to task unnamed persons who have expressed contrary opinions. It does not indicate directly or by implication that the plaintiff is “an extremist, a liar and irresponsible in his profession,” as alleged by the plaintiff.
We do not find the editorial to be “of such nature that the court can presume as a matter of law that [it tends] to disgrace and degrade the party or hold him up to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or cause him to be shunned and avoided.” Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. at 786, 195 S.E. at 60. Although every defamation must be false, not every falsehood is defamatory. Here, neither the statement that the defendant wrote such [320]*320a 1978 newspaper article nor the characterization of that article are defamatory even if they are untrue.2
The majority in the Court of Appeals concluded that the editorial charged that the plaintiff was irresponsible and:
ordinary men would naturally understand the editorial to imply or insinuate that plaintiffs statistics regarding the number of blacks denied admission to UNC between 1975 and 1979 were either knowingly and intentionally false, or the result of gross incompetence in the conduct of plaintiffs profession.
63 N.C. App. at 211-12, 304 S.E. 2d at 600. We have concluded, on the other hand, that the most obvious and natural meaning to be accorded the editorial in question does not tend to defame the plaintiff. Certainly, the editorial at worst is susceptible of two interpretations one of which is defamatory and the other not. When a publication is susceptible of two interpretations, one defamatory and the other not, it will not support an action for a libel of the first class — a libel based upon a publication obviously defamatory which is libel per se. Arnold v. Sharpe, 296 N.C. at 537, 251 S.E. 2d at 455. As previously pointed out, the plaintiffs complaints failed to allege any class of libel other than.libel per se. The trial court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs complaints for failure to state a claim for libel upon which relief could be granted. That part of the opinion of the Court of Appeals to the contrary on this issue must be reversed.
II.
Invasion of Privacy
In each of the cases giving rise to this appeal the plaintiff alleged as a second claim for relief that the editorials published by the defendants “placed the plaintiff in a false light before the public and constituted an invasion of the plaintiffs privacy.” The trial court entered judgments allowing the defendants’ motions to [321]*321dismiss these claims. The Court of Appeals was of the opinion that the complaint stated a valid claim for relief for false light invasion of privacy. 63 N.C. App. at 241, 304 S.E. 2d at 617. We will not expand the tort of invasion of privacy recognized in this jurisdiction to include “false light” invasions of privacy. We reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue.
The existence of a right of privacy recognizable in law appears to have originated in a law review article by Samuel D. Warren and his law partner Louis D. Brandéis, later to become a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, which was published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890. Warren and Brandéis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). Warren and his wife, the daughter of Senator Bayard of Delaware, were among the social elite of Boston. This was during the era of “yellow journalism,” and the newspapers of Boston were specializing in articles embarrassing to “blue bloods.”
The matter came to a head when the newspapers had a field day on the occasion of the wedding of a daughter, and Mr. Warren became annoyed. It was an annoyance for which the press, the advertisers and the entertainment industry of America were to pay dearly over the next seventy years.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960). The article by Warren and Brandéis had a profound and almost immediate impact and “has come to be regarded as the outstanding example of the influence of legal periodicals upon the American law.” Id.
The tort of invasion of privacy is now recognized, in one or more of its forms, in a majority of jurisdictions. See generally, W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, §§ 117, 118 (4th Ed. 1971). It is generally recognized that:
The right of privacy, as an independent and distinctive legal concept has two main aspects: (1) the general law of privacy, which affords a tort action for damages resulting from an unlawful invasion of privacy, and (2) the constitutional right of privacy which protects personal privacy against unlawful governmental invasion.
The general law of the right of privacy, as a matter of tort law, is mainly left to the law of the states ....
[322]*322Annotation, Supreme Court’s Views As To The Federal Legal Aspects Of The Right Of Privacy, 43 L.Ed. 2d 871, 875-76. A review of the current tort law of all American jurisdictions reveals cases identifying at least four types of invasion of four different interests in privacy: (1) appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiffs name or likeness; (2) intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude or into his private affairs; (3) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; and (4) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 117 (4th Ed. 1971) (emphasis added).
This Court was first called upon to consider a claim for invasion of privacy in Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938). In that case we were concerned, as were the courts of all jurisdictions when considering the early cases, primarily “with the question whether the right of privacy existed at all, and gave little or no consideration to what it would amount to if it did.” W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 117 at 804 (4th Ed. 1971).
In Flake we held that a right of privacy existed and for the first time held that an invasion of privacy by the appropriation of a plaintiffs photographic likeness for the defendant’s advantage as a part of an advertisement constitutes a tort giving rise to a claim for relief recognizable at law. Although Flake involved overtones of “false light” publicity, we neither reached nor decided the precise question presented by the plaintiff here — whether publicity by a defendant which places a plaintiff in a false light before the public gives rise to a claim for which relief can be granted upon a theory of invasion of privacy. We now hold that such facts do not give rise to a claim for relief for invasion of privacy. A plaintiff must recover in such situations, if at all, in an action for libel or slander.
In Flake, we specifically noted that questions surrounding the right of privacy involved “a relatively new field in legal jurisprudence. In respect to it the courts are plowing new ground and before the field is fully developed unquestionably perplexing and harassing stumps and runners will be encountered.” Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. at 790, 195 S.E. at 62-63. We also specifically noted that the question of the extent to which a [323]*323newspaper may publish information concerning an individual “necessarily involves a consideration of the constitutional right of free speech and of a free press.” Id. We now have the advantage of almost a half century of cases decided subsequent to Flake in this and other jurisdictions for our consideration in deciding whether to recognize a separate tort of false light invasion of privacy in addition to the torts of libel and slander already well recognized in this jurisdiction. Our continuing “consideration of the constitutional right of free speech and of a free press” guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as a proper interest in judicial efficiency, leads us to reject the concept of a separate tort of false light invasion of privacy.
Two basic concerns argue against the recognition of a separate tort of false light invasion of privacy. First, any right to recover for a false light invasion of privacy will often either duplicate an existing right of recovery for libel or slander or involve a good deal of overlapping with such rights. Second, the recognition of a separate tort of false light invasion of privacy, to the extent it would allow recovery beyond that permitted in actions for libel or slander, would tend to add to the tension already existing between the First Amendment and the law of torts in cases of this nature.
Some commentators have specifically expressed concerns as to whether a tort of false light invasion of privacy would overwhelm existing laws of libel and slander. See Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 1093 (1962). It has often been recognized that claims for false light invasion of privacy and claims for libel or slander are at least very similar and that many of the same considerations apply to each type of claim. See e.g. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652 E, F, G (1977); Hill, Defamation and Privacy under the First Amendment, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1205, 1207 (1976); Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 693 (1972); Warren and Brandéis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
As early as 1960 one respected authority pointed out that:
The false light cases obviously differ from those of intrusion, or disclosure of private facts. The interest protected is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental [324]*324distress as in defamation. There is a resemblance to disclosure; but the two differ in that one involves truth and the other lies, one private or secret facts and the other invention. Both require publicity. There has been a good deal of overlapping of defamation in the false light cases, and apparently either action, or both, will very often lie. The privacy cases do go considerably beyond the narrow limits of defamation, and no doubt have succeeded in affording a needed remedy in a good many instances not covered by the other tort.
It is here, however, that one disposed to alarm might express the greatest concern over where privacy may be going. The question may well be raised, and apparently still is unanswered, whether this branch of the tort is not capable of swallowing up and engulfing the whole law of public defamation; and whether there is any false libel printed, for example, in a newspaper, which cannot be redressed upon the alternative ground. If that turns out to be the case, it may well be asked, what of the numerous restrictions and limitations which have hedged defamation about for many years, in the interest of freedom of the press and the discouragement of trivial and extortionate claims? Are they of so little consequence that they may be circumvented in so casual and cavalier a fashion?
Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 400-401 (1960).
An answer was not long in coming to at least some of the questions raised by Dean Prosser. In cases decided prior to 1964, occasional concern had been expressed about the potential of claims for invasion of privacy to conflict with First Amendment rights of free speech and press. See e.g. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. at 790, 195 S.E. at 63. In 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States decided New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) which held that the First Amendment itself imposes limitations upon state claims for libel or slander. In 1967, the Supreme Court decided Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) which extended First Amendment protections at least as stringent as those required by Sullivan to defendants in cases for false light invasion of privacy. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E comment d (1977). “By this decision, and others which followed it, the two branches of invasion of privacy which turn on [325]*325publicity were taken over under the Constitutional Privilege. The other two, however, are pretty clearly not.” W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 118 at 827 (4th Ed. 1971).
In those jurisdictions recognizing the tort of false light invasion of privacy, the false light need not necessarily be a defamatory light. See Zolich, Laudatory Invasion of Privacy, 16 Clev. Marsh. L. Rev. 532, 540 (1967). In many if not most cases, however, the false light is defamatory and an action for libel or slander will also lie. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 117 at 813 (4th Ed. 1971).
We believe that we will:
create a grave risk of serious impairment of the indispensable service of a free press in a free society if we saddle the press with the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty the facts associated in news articles with a person’s name, picture or portrait, particularly as related to nondefamatory matter.
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) (emphasis added). This is especially true since plaintiffs in actions for invasions of privacy are entitled to nominal damages and in some cases to injunctive relief — a prior restraint — without allegation or proof of special damages. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. at 792, 195 S.E. at 64.
The conditions which led Warren and Brandéis to argue almost a century ago for a separate tort of invasion of privacy have at least to some extent subsided. Most modern journalists employed in print, television or radio journalism now receive formal training in ethics and journalism entirely unheard of during the era of “yellow journalism.” As a general rule journalists simply are more responsible and professional today than history tells us they were in that era. Our recognition of these facts is entitled to some weight in deciding the question before us, even though we are completely aware that nothing in the First Amendment mandates that members of the news media be responsible or professional. As regards this, however, we cannot improve upon the statement of James Madison that:
[326]*326Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing, and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press.
It has accordingly been decided . . . that it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than by pruning them away, to injure the vigor of those yielding the proper fruits.
4 Elliot’s Debates on the Federal Constitution 571 (1876 Ed.).
Given the First Amendment limitations placed upon defamation actions by Sullivan and upon false light invasion of privacy actions by Hill, we think that such additional remedies as we might be required to make available to plaintiffs should we recognize false light invasion of privacy claims are not sufficient to justify the recognition in this jurisdiction of such inherently constitutionally suspect claims for relief. Additionally, the recognition of claims for relief for false light invasions of privacy would reduce judicial efficiency by requiring our courts to consider two claims for the same relief which, if not identical, would not differ significantly.
We reject the notion of a claim for relief for false light invasion of privacy in this jurisdiction. The trial court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs claims based upon this theory for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, holding that the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs claims for relief for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted within the meaning of Rule 12(b)(6), is reversed. The cases comprising this consolidated appeal are remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the Superior Court, Orange County, for reinstatement of the judgments entered by the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs claims against these defendants.
Reversed and remanded.