Munson, J.
Central Washington University appeals the Superior Court's reversal of a decision by its Board of Trustees terminating Gulammohammed Z. Refai, Ph.D.,1 a [3]*3tenured associate professor of history. We reverse the Superior Court.
In September 1981, the president of Central, pursuant to a delegation from the Board, declared a state of financial exigency. This was precipitated by a series of unanticipated financial setbacks, which culminated when the Legislature reduced Central's general fund budget by $3,584,000 later that fall. As a result, Central, through its Board, laid off 10 nontenured faculty members. In March 1982, the Legislature again reduced the general fund budget. In April, the Governor ordered further operating budget reductions. As a result of these actions, Central was forced to reduce its budget by an additional $853,000. In addition, the Board learned the budget reduction plan, which was adopted to cover the first budget reduction, fell approximately $50,000 short of its goal, and Central had an approximate $225,000 liability over the remainder of the biennium for its share of the utilities surcharge resulting from the demise of Washington Public Power Supply System plants 4 and 5.
On May 7, 1982 the president of Central wrote to all faculty, civil service, and administrative exempt personnel that the state of financial exigency had continued and become more serious. Pursuant to the provisions of the faculty code,2 he asked the Faculty Senate Executive Committee (SEC) to evaluate his declaration of continued financial exigency and, if they agreed that cause for faculty layoffs existed, to prepare a layoff plan.
The SEC met on May 12 to evaluate the president's declaration of continued financial exigency. During the May 12 meeting, the president informed them $450,000 had to be cut from Central's instructional budgets. The SEC informed the president by letter dated May 14 they concurred with his declaration of continued financial exigency.
[4]*4Between May 10 and June 10, the SEC met in closed session several times and developed a proposed layoff plan. The SEC developed the following criteria for determining which departments or programs would be selected for reduction: (1) the role of a department or program vis-a-vis the mission and roles of Central; (2) student needs as reflected by enrollment trends; (3) actual staffing versus positions generated by internal ratio and state formula; (4) academic need, i.e., how many faculty members are needed to offer the necessary variety of courses for a given major or program; (5) potential for efficient reorganization of administrative structure; and (6) programmatic impact.
The SEC reviewed data for all the departments and programs and, based on the above criteria, compiled a list of departments and programs which they felt could sustain faculty layoffs. In the meantime, Central's augmented budget committee determined an additional $167,000 could be cut from various areas of Central's budget, reducing the targeted instruction budget reduction to $283,000. The chairman of the SEC listed 10 faculty positions which the SEC determined would have to be eliminated in order to accomplish the $283,000 reduction. These positions would be eliminated on the basis of seniority, i.e., those with the least tenure would go. To lessen the negative impacts on programs and enrollment, the president reduced the proposed position cuts to seven. The difference was made up by utility savings, increased cuts to the physical plant budget, and almost the entire president's reserve budget used to cover unexpected emergencies.
The president met with the affirmative action director and informed her as to the departments or units that would he cut, but did not tell her the names of the people in those positions. The director reviewed the personnel records to see if the layoffs would adversely affect the affirmative action goals of Central and informed the president she had no objection to the proposed layoff plan. The SEC did not consult with the director during its deliberations.
On May 28, the president released the proposed layoff [5]*5plan to the academic community and invited "written responses" and "comments and suggestions" to be submitted to the Office of the Vice-President for Academic Affairs by noon on June 9. The SEC reviewed all the written responses. At a regular faculty senate meeting on June 2, the faculty discussed the proposed layoff plan. The faculty again discussed the plan in an open faculty forum attended by the president and the members of the SEC on June 8. Dr. Refai attended this meeting.
On June 10, the SEC met for the last time concerning the layoff plan. They invited the deans of the College of Letters, Arts and Sciences and School of Professional Studies and the department chairs of each of the affected departments to meet with them individually to discuss the proposed plan before it was sent to the president. The SEC modified its proposed plan by deleting the proposed elimination of the physics position, reasoning that it would be difficult to maintain a physics program without four faculty at a time when Central was moving to strengthen its efforts in technology. The president concurred in dropping the physics position from the layoff list without knowing how the difference would be made up. He learned that all but $1,500 of the difference could be made up from a payment on a defaulted contract; the rest could be made up by small contributions from the budgets of the Graduate Office, Undergraduate Office, and the Vice-President for Academic Affairs.
The SEC sent the final draft of the proposed layoff to the president on June 10. On June 17 the president sent notices to the affected faculty indicating that on the basis of seniority in their respective departments they would be laid off effective December 31, 19823 for reasons of financial exigency. Dr. Refai received one of the notices.
Dr. Refai requested a formal hearing in a letter dated [6]*6June 21, 1982. The hearings officer conducted hearings from December 28, 1982, through January 19, 1983, and determined that the closed meetings of the SEC violated RCW 42.30, the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971, and rendered the entire process void. The Board issued resolution 83-3 which adopted the hearings officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law and his proposal for decision, except the Board found no violation of RCW 42.30 and affirmed Dr. Refai's layoff. Dr. Refai petitioned for judicial review; the Superior Court reversed the decision of the Board and ordered Central to reinstate Dr. Refai with back pay effective January 1, 1983. Central appeals.
Standard of Review
Our review is governed by the State Higher Education Administrative Procedure Act, RCW 28B.19, the provisions of which are identical to the Administrative Procedure Act, RCW 34.04. Stastny v. Board of Trustees, 32 Wn. App. 239, 245, 647 P.2d 496, review denied, 98 Wn.2d 1001 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1071, 75 L. Ed. 2d 950, 103 S. Ct. 1528 (1983). The scope of our review is on the record of the administrative tribunal itself, not of the Superior Court. Clark v. Horse Racing Comm'n, 106 Wn.2d 84, 88, 720 P.2d 831 (1986); Franklin Cy. Sheriffs Office v. Sellers, 97 Wn.2d 317, 323-25, 646 P.2d 113 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106, 74 L. Ed. 2d 954,103 S. Ct. 730 (1983).
RCW 28B. 19.150(6) provides:
The court may affirm the decision appealed from, or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(d) Affected by other error of law; or
(e) Clearly erroneous in view of the entire record as submitted and the public policy contained in the act of the legislature authorizing the decision or order; or
(f) Arbitrary or capricious.
We will not disturb the Board's findings of fact unless, after [7]*7reviewing the entire record, we have a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been committed. Sherman v. Moloney, 106 Wn.2d 873, 880, 725 P.2d 966 (1986); Franklin Cy., at 324. We will substitute our judgment, however, for that of the Board's conclusions of law, although we will accord substantial weight to the Board's view of the law. Clark, at 88.
Financial Exigency
Central first contends the court erred in finding Central's actions in continuing to hire full-time and part-time faculty and its failure to relocate personnel4 were inconsistent with a financial exigency justifying the termination of a tenured faculty member. In so finding, the court rejected the hearings officer and Board's finding a state of financial exigency did exist. Although the evidence in support of the Board's finding of a bona fide financial exigency is plentiful, we must also determine whether the state of financial exigency caused Dr. Refai's termination. See American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 136 N.J. Super. 442, 346 A.2d 615, 617 (1975). He contends the true reason for his termination was Central's desire to cut programs which were obsolete, nontechnological, and nonlucrative. He cites no evidence to support his claim other than the fact that during the state of financial exigency Central hired people to fill new positions in ballroom dance, leisure studies, and in the food services. However, the hiring of faculty is not necessarily inconsistent with a bona fide financial exigency necessitating the layoff of tenured faculty in other departments. See Keppeler v. Board of Trustees, 38 Wn. App. 729, 733, 688 P.2d 512 (1984). We do not have a firm and definite conviction a mistake has been committed; thus, we must agree with the Board's finding the state of financial exigency did exist and was the true cause of Dr. Refai's termination. We note further that courts should exercise caution when reviewing this type of [8]*8decision.
[W]here lack of funds necessitate[s] releasing a size-able number of the faculty, certainly it [is] peculiarly within the province of the school administration to determine which teachers should be released, and which retained.
Where there is a showing that the administrative body, in exercising its judgment, acts from honest convictions, based upon facts which it believes are for the best interest of the school, and there is no showing that the acts were arbitrary or generated by ill will, fraud, collusion or other such motives, it is not the province of a court to interfere and substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body.
Klein v. Board of Higher Educ., 434 F. Supp. 1113, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (quoting Levitt v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 945, 950 (D. Neb. 1974)). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-78, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
As two commentators have noted:
Allowing courts or faculty members to second guess the response of university administration to a bona fide financial crisis would serve to protect neither the financial stability of the institution nor the academic freedom of the faculty. The summary question must be one of causation and motive; if the institution's decision to terminate a tenured faculty member was caused by financial exigency and the university has no other improper motive for the termination, then the question of whether the termination was the best response under the circumstances is a purely administrative one.
Bolger & Wilmoth, Dismissal of Tenured Faculty Members for Reasons of Financial Exigency, 65 Marq. L. Rev. 347, 355 n.35 (1982).
Compliance With the Faculty Code
We next address whether the layoff plan was formulated and implemented in compliance with the faculty code. Section 3.78A provides in part:
If cause for the declaration is substantiated, this plan will (1) identify particular departments or programs in which a specified number of positions are to be eliminated, (2) [9]*9state the reasons for each decision as to department or program and number of positions, (3) describe the process by which such decisions were arrived at, and (4) establish a strict timetable for each step in the process of review and for final implementation of the plan.
The layoff plan stated the reasons for the layoffs in a very succinct fashion: "The above listed positions are recommended for elimination based on program need, enrollment trends and faculty positions generated, or curtailment of program." The Board adopted the hearings officer's finding the layoff plan was written in minimal compliance with the faculty code and that the reasons for the layoff were adequately set forth. The court determined the reasons were not adequately set forth and reversed the Board's decision. Again, we cannot say with definite and firm conviction the Board erred in making this finding; accordingly, we reverse on this issue. Dr. Refai contends on appeal the layoff plan did not adequately describe the process by which the layoff decisions were made because it did not refer to specific data or information. The layoff plan, however, listed six criteria, noted previously herein, the SEC considered in establishing the plan; thus, we find sufficient compliance with section 3.78A.
Dr. Refai also contends Central had an affirmative duty to find alternative employment within Central. However, section 3.78C requires Central to make an effort to find commensurate employment if the layoff is necessitated by staffing adjustments or program needs and not when it is caused by financial exigency. We decline to impose this requirement, as Dr. Refai urges, on Central. Moreover, the Board adopted the hearings officer's finding that Central did make adequate efforts to find alternative employment for Dr. Refai.
Affirmative Action
We next examine whether Central's layoff plan violated its affirmative action program. Shortly before the layoff was finalized, the president met with Central's affirmative action director to discuss whether the layoffs would [10]*10adversely affect the affirmative action goals of Central. The president told the director what positions would be cut, but did not tell her the specific people to be laid off. The director called the president the next day and told him she had no objection to the plan based strictly on seniority. Dr. Refai contends the failure of the SEC to consider the affirmative action plan during its preparation of the layoff plan is essentially a violation of the affirmative action plan and cites the following language from the first page of the plan: "The University administration acknowledges that an Affirmative Action Program, to be successful, must be built into the structures and procedures affecting all personnel actions and the administration of all programs, activities and services." Part III, section F, relating to layoffs, provides:
Statistical summaries of employees laid off and/or reinstated will be submitted to the Affirmative Action Director on a quarterly basis for the purpose of developing and maintaining procedures for auditing Layoff and Return from Layoff to determine the impact on current policies and procedures on minorities, women, handicapped and Viet Nam era or disabled veterans.
This language suggests the plan does not require Central to consider it before the layoffs are made. There was, as Dr. Refai concedes, no evidence Central had a specific intent to discriminate. Therefore, the layoff plan, using a strict seniority system to determine who was to be terminated, did not violate Central's affirmative action plan nor Dr. Refai's civil rights. See Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 81 L. Ed. 2d 483, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
The Open Public Meetings Act
We must next determine whether the SEC meetings violated RCW 42.30, the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971. RCW 42.30.030 provides: "All meetings of the governing body of a public agency shall be open and public and all persons shall be permitted to attend any meeting of the governing body of a public agency, except as otherwise provided in this chapter." (Italics ours.)
[11]*11The terms "governing body" and "public agency" are defined in former RCW 42.30.020, in effect at the time of the meetings in question, as follows:
(1) "Public agency" means:
(a) Any state board, commission, committee, department, educational institution, or other state agency which is created by or pursuant to statute, other than courts and the legislature;
(c) Any subagency of a public agency which is created by or pursuant to statute, ordinance, or other legislative act, including but not limited to planning commissions, library or park boards, commissions, and agencies;
(2) "Governing body" means the multimember board, commission, committee, council, or other policy or rule-making body of a public agency.
Laws of 1982, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 43, § 10, p. 1307.
While Central does not dispute it is a public agency, it claims the SEC is not itself a public agency because it is not a "subagency of a public agency which is created by or pursuant to statute," nor is it a "governing body" of a public agency, Central. The hearings officer found the SEC to be a "governing body" of Central and thus subject to the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971. The Board, on the other hand, found the SEC was not created pursuant to statute and also was not delegated any policy or rulemaking authority and, therefore, was not subject to the act. The Superior Court found, in turn, the SEC to be a governing body of Central because its layoff plan was a necessary antecedent to Central's action.
Whether the SEC is subject to the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 is a question of law; thus, we make this determination de novo although we afford substantial weight to the Board's decision. Clark, at 88. We begin by determining whether the SEC is a subagency of a public agency, i.e., whether it was "created by or pursuant to statute, ordinance, or other legislative act". In Cathcart v. Andersen, 85 Wn.2d 102, 530 P.2d 313 (1975), the issue was whether the [12]*12Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 applied to the monthly meetings of the University of Washington Law School faculty. The court determined the law school was a subagency of a public agency, the University of Washington, because RCW 28B.20.020 and .060 specifically enabled the university to create a law school. Cathcart, at 105. The court, therefore, focused on whether the law school faculty was a "governing body" of the law school. Cathcart, at 105-06. Because there are no enabling provisions authorizing the creation of the SEC in the present case, the SEC is not a subagency of Central. Therefore, we focus on whether SEC is a "governing body" of Central.
To be a "governing body," the SEC must be a "policy or rule-making body" of Central. In Cathcart the court found the law school faculty to be a "policy or rule-making body" of the law school for several reasons. First, RCW 28B.20-.200 provided that the "faculty shall have charge of the immediate government of the institution". Second, the Board of Regents by resolution formulated certain de facto delegations to the faculty which gave them considerable power in governing the school. The faculty (1) unilaterally approved curriculum additions and deletions; (2) amended scholastic standards; (3) exercised its authority to provide adequate instruction and supervision of its students; and (4) took final action related to the sponsorship of guest speakers and other extracurricular uses of law school facilities. Third, the president of the university issued an executive order authorizing the university faculty to enact regulations for the immediate government of the university and to share responsibility with the president and the academic deans in such matters as:
1. educational policy and general welfare;
2. policy for regulation of student conduct and activities;
3. scholastic policy, including requirements for admission, graduation, and honors;
4. approval of candidates for degrees;
5. criteria for faculty tenure, appointment, and promotion;
[13]*136. recommendations concerning the University budget;
7. formulation of procedures to carry out the policies and regulations thus established.
Cathcart, at 107. The power of the law school faculty in Cathcart to govern the affairs of the law school was significantly broader than the power of the SEC, which had no governing power.
Here, section 3.78A of the faculty code provided that once the president declares a state of financial exigency he will direct the vice-president and the SEC to develop a layoff plan. After the vice-president and SEC evaluate the declaration of financial exigency and the cause or causes of the layoff, they are to develop a layoff plan, make it available for review and comment, and submit it with a recommendation to the president. "The president shall then decide whether to implement the plan as presented or to propose modifications to the vice president and the Senate Executive Committee."
We are aware of the legislative declaration as to the need for open meetings, RCW 42.30.010, and that the act is remedial and should be liberally construed, RCW 42.30.910. However, even under a very liberal construction, the SEC is not a "governing body" of Central. Dr. Refai urges that we adopt the reasoning of the hearings officer and the Superior Court that because the SEC's action in developing a layoff plan, while not binding on the president or Central, was a necessary antecedent to the president's and Central's action and therefore the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 applied. We reject this reasoning because we are not persuaded the SEC's formulation of a layoff plan is a "policy or rulemaking" function; the SEC merely makes recommendations subject to the president's modifications. The final layoff decision is the president's, not the SEC's. Here, the president modified the SEC's recommendation. The SEC's authority is quite different from the broad authority exercised by the law school faculty in Cathcart. Therefore, the SEC is not a "governing body" of Central and, thus, not subject to the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971.
[14]*14This finding is consistent with the purposes of the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 in that it was not designed to cover groups which meet to collect information and make recommendations, but have no authority to make final decisions. Compare McLarty v. Board of Regents, 231 Ga. 22, 200 S.E.2d 117 (1973). Thus, we are not persuaded the public interest is advanced by requiring these types of meetings to be open to the public.5 See Pierce v. Lake Stevens Sch. Dist. 4, 84 Wn.2d 772, 787, 529 P.2d 810 (1974).
Due Process
As a tenured professor, Dr. Refai's interest in continued employment is a property right protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington Educ. Ass'n v. State, 97 Wn.2d 899, 908, 652 P.2d 1347 (1982); see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-602, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570, 92 S. Ct. 2694 (1972). The issue is "what process is due.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972).
Although the protean nature of due process requires that procedures vary according to the particular interests at stake, Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., — U.S. —, 95 L. Ed. 2d 239, 107 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (1987); In re Deming, 108 Wn.2d 82, 97, 736 P.2d 639 (1987), ”[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. [15]*15545, 552, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62, 85 S. Ct. 1187 (1965)). Initially, we observe that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that Dr. Refai have the opportunity to respond prior to the decision to lay off specific individuals. Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227, 239 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1975). It must have been apparent to Dr. Refai, who attended the faculty meeting on June 9, that he was a candidate for the layoff plan. Therefore, we focus on what procedures were required after the layoff letters were sent. To determine the required procedural safeguards, we must weigh the following factors: (1) the private interest in retaining employment; (2) the risk of erroneous termination; and (3) the government interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedures would entail. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
In Loudermill, the Board of Education dismissed Mr. Loudermill, a security guard, for dishonesty in filling out the job application. He was not afforded an opportunity to respond to the charge or challenge his dismissal. The Court first determined that, because he was a classified civil servant who could be terminated only for cause pursuant to an Ohio statute, he possessed a property right in continued employment and, therefore, was entitled to the protections of due process prior to termination. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-41. The Court then utilized the Mathews balancing test:
First, the significance of the private interest in retaining employment cannot be gainsaid. . . .
Second, some opportunity for the employee to present his side of the case is recurringly of obvious value in reaching an accurate decision. Dismissals for cause will often involve factual disputes. . . .
The governmental interest in immediate termination does not outweigh these interests. As we shall explain, affording the employee an opportunity to respond prior to termination would impose neither a significant admin[16]*16istrative burden nor intolerable delays. Furthermore, the employer shares the employee's interest in avoiding disruption and erroneous decisions; and until the matter is settled, the employer would continue to receive the benefit of the employee's labors. It is preferable to keep a qualified employee on than to train a new one.
(Citations omitted.) Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543-44.
The Court noted, at pages 545-46, that
the pretermination hearing need not definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge. It should be an initial check against mistaken decisions—essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action.
The Court concluded that Mr. Loudermill was "entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story." Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.
Loudermill, however, has limited application to a case where an employee is terminated for reasons of financial exigency. Jermain v. Board of Regents, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 503 N.E.2d 50 (1987); Breslin v. School Comm., 20 Mass. App. Ct. 74, 478 N.E.2d 149 (1985). Because Dr. Refai's termination was not due to allegations of misconduct, the reasons for requiring a pretermination hearing are not as compelling. Johnson, 377 F. Supp. at 237; see also Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675, 680 (4th Cir. 1978); Russell v. Harrison, 562 F. Supp. 467, 469 (N.D. Miss. 1983), rev'd in part, 736 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1984). While we recognize the significant private interest Dr. Refai has in retaining his employment at Central, we do not believe the risk of erroneous termination is as serious as it is in cases such as Loudermill where an employee is discharged for some type of misconduct. Although a pretermination hearing serves the important purpose of providing an "initial check against mistaken decisions," it has limited use where the termination was caused by financial exigency. Also, the administrative burdens and delays resulting from a pretermination hearing for every terminated faculty [17]*17member are significant.
The president of Central sent Dr. Refai a layoff letter and a copy of the layoff plan. The letter described the budget reductions which were necessary to resolve the financial exigency and described the process by which the decision was made. The layoff plan included a list of the criteria used to select the positions for layoff. Dr. Refai received a copy of the pertinent faculty code sections and was informed of his right to appeal the decision. Dr. Refai has followed the appeal process set forth in the faculty code. On balance, we are not persuaded Dr. Refai's due process rights were violated.
In conclusion, we are not persuaded the Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or capricious, or affected by other legal error. The decision of the Superior Court is reversed; the decision of the Board is reinstated.
Green, J., concurs.