Reed v. Trinity Services Group Incorporated

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided January 29, 2021·No. 2:21-cv-00016·Unknown

Opinion

1 WO MDR 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Kenneth W. Reed, No. CV 21-00016-PHX-JAT (CDB) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Trinity Services Group, Inc., et al., 13 Defendants.

14 15 I. Procedural History 16 On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff Kenneth W. Reed, who is confined in the Arizona 17 State Prison Complex-Tucson in Tucson, Arizona, filed a Complaint (Doc. 1-3 at 2-28)1 in 18 the Superior Court of Pima County, Arizona, against Trinity Services Group (“Trinity”), 19 Charles L. Ryan, Ruben Montaño, David Merriman, Jones, Gaye, K. Muko, L. Valisto, 20 P. Tuozzo, Barr, Urrea, and a variety of fictitiously named individuals. On November 25, 21 2020, Defendant Merriman filed a Notice of Removal in the Tucson Division of this Court 22 and removed the case to this Court. In the Notice of Removal, Defendant Merriman stated 23 that Defendant Trinity, who filed a waiver of service in March 2020, “consents to this 24 removal” and that none of the other Defendants had been served. 25 On December 9, 2020, Defendants Merriman and Trinity each filed Applications 26 for Substitution of Counsel. On December 29, 2020, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Remand 27

28 1 The citation refers to the document and page number generated by the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Filing system. 1 of Cause” (Doc. 5). He also filed a Motion to Correct Clerical Error-Wrong Venue, in 2 which he alleged that this action should have been transferred to the Phoenix Division of 3 this Court because the transactions and events discussed in the Complaint occurred at the 4 Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence in Florence, Arizona. On January 4, 2021, 5 Defendant Trinity Services Group filed a “Joinder in or Consent to Removal.” 6 In a January 6, 2021 Order, Senior United States District Court Raner C. Collins 7 granted the Applications for Substitution of Counsel. In a second January 6, 2021 Order, 8 Judge Collins granted the Motion to Correct Clerical Error-Wrong Venue and directed the 9 Clerk of Court to transfer this action to the Phoenix Division. The Clerk of Court did so 10 and assigned the case to the undersigned. 11 II. Removal 12 A state court defendant may remove to federal court any civil action brought in the 13 state court over which the federal district courts would have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 14 § 1441(a). In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks redress pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 15 Defendants’ alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. This Court’s jurisdiction 16 extends to such claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a federal court has original jurisdiction “of 17 all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”). 18 In his Motion for Remand of Cause, Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant 19 Merriman’s Notice of Removal was timely filed within thirty days of Defendant Merriman 20 being served. He claims, however, that “[t]here is absolutely nothing contained within 21 Defendant Merriman’s Notice of Removal of Jurisdiction or even filed contemporaneously 22 therewith which might constitute Defendant Trinity’s joinder to the contemplated 23 removal.” 24 Plaintiff states that Defendant Merriman’s counsel “made a passing remark [in the 25 Notice of Removal] that Defendant Trinity ‘consents to this removal.’” Plaintiff contends, 26 however, that because Defendant Merriman’s counsel was not representing Defendant 27 Trinity, “that remark can[]not conceivably be construed to have any force or effect.” 28 Plaintiff also contends that there was nothing else “contained within or annexed to 1 Defendant Merriman’s Notice of Removal of Jurisdiction, or file contemporaneously 2 therewith[,] to evince Defendant Trinity’s putative consent to the contemplated removal.” 3 He argues that the Court should remand this action to the state court because of this 4 “procedural deficiency.” 5 If an action is removed solely because the court has original jurisdiction over the 6 action, “all defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in or consent 7 to removal of the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). However, as the Ninth Circuit Court 8 of Appeals explained in Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1225 (9th 9 Cir. 2009), “the filing of a notice of removal can be effective without individual consent 10 documents on behalf of each defendant. One defendant’s timely removal notice containing 11 an averment of the other defendants’ consent and signed by an attorney of record is 12 sufficient.” Here, as in Proctor, the removing Defendant’s attorney “submitted such an 13 averment under threat of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 [of the Federal Rules of Civil 14 Procedure]; the other co-defendants were notified of the removal notice and had an 15 opportunity to object to it.”2 Id. “These two considerations—the availability of sanctions 16 and of objection—mitigate concerns that one defendant might falsely state the other 17 defendants’ consent, or that one defendant might game the system by silently allowing 18 another to remove and, if the federal forum proves disadvantageous, belatedly object that 19 he had not consented.” Id. Thus, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand of 20 Cause. 21 III. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 22 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 23 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 24 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). After screening is complete, the Court will notify the parties if an 25 answer to the Complaint or any subsequently filed amended complaint is required. 26 . . . .

27 2 The Court notes that Defendant Trinity did not object, but, instead, stated in its 28 Joinder in or Consent to Removal that “Defendant Merriman accurately states that Trinity consented to the removal.” 1 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims 2 that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 3 granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 4 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the 5 allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint 6 before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) 7 (en banc). 8 Local Rule of Civil Procedure 3.4 requires in part that “[a]ll complaints . . . by 9 incarcerated persons must be signed and legibly written or typewritten on forms approved 10 by the Court and in accordance with the instructions provided with the forms.” Plaintiff’s 11 Complaint is not on the court-approved form. The Court may, in its discretion, forgo the 12 requirement that a plaintiff use a court-approved form. See LRCiv 3.4. The Court will 13 require use of the court-approved form because Plaintiff’s Complaint substantially differs 14 from the court-approved form. Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed without 15 prejudice and with leave to amend, in order for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint on a 16 court-approved form. 17 IV.

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Reed v. Trinity Services Group Incorporated, (D. Ariz. 2021).

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