Reed v. Trinity Services Group Incorporated

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedJanuary 3, 2023
Docket2:21-cv-00016
StatusUnknown

This text of Reed v. Trinity Services Group Incorporated (Reed v. Trinity Services Group Incorporated) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reed v. Trinity Services Group Incorporated, (D. Ariz. 2023).

Opinion

1 SH 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Kenneth W. Reed, No. CV 21-00016-PHX-JAT (CDB) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Trinity Services Group Incorporated, et 13 al., 14 Defendants.

15 Plaintiff Kenneth W. Reed, who is currently confined in Arizona State Prison 16 Complex-Tucson, Winchester Unit, brought this civil rights case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 17 1983. (Doc. 25.) Defendants Merriman and Montaño move for summary judgment (Doc. 18 155), and Plaintiff did not respond, despite being granted additional time to do so (see Doc. 19 168 (giving Plaintiff until September 2, 2022 to respond to the Motion for Summary 20 Judgment)).1 Defendant Muko joins in the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 212.) 21 I. Background 22 On screening Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 25) under 28 U.S.C. § 23 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated Eighth Amendment deliberate 24 indifference claims against Defendants Montaño, Merriman, Gaye, Muko, and Tuozzo 25 based on their alleged failure in August 2018 to ensure that Plaintiff received all of his 26 meals as required under the food service contract between the Arizona Department of 27

28 1 The Court provided notice to Plaintiff pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), regarding the requirements of a response. (Doc. 157.) 1 Corrections (ADC) and Trinity Services Group. (Doc. 27 at 12.) The Court directed them 2 to answer and dismissed the remaining claims and Defendants. (Id. at 12, 18.) Thereafter, 3 the Court dismissed Defendants Gaye and Tuozzo without prejudice for failure to timely 4 serve. (Docs. 125, 162.) 5 Defendants Montaño and Merriman now move for summary judgment and argue 6 that Plaintiff did not exhaust the available administrative remedies, they were not 7 deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s health and safety, and they are entitled to qualified 8 immunity. (Doc. 155.) Defendant Muko joins in the motion. (Doc. 212.) Because Plaintiff 9 did not file a response or controverting statement of facts, the Court will consider 10 Defendants’ facts undisputed unless they are clearly controverted by Plaintiff’s first-hand 11 allegations in the verified First Amended Complaint or other evidence on the record. 12 Where the nonmovant is a pro se litigant, the Court must consider as evidence in opposition 13 to summary judgment all the nonmovant’s contentions set forth in a verified complaint or 14 motion. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004). 15 II. Summary Judgment Standard 16 A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 17 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The 19 movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying 20 those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 21 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 22 If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not 23 produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 24 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts 25 to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in 26 contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 27 governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable 28 jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 1 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th 2 Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its 3 favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, 4 it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 5 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal 6 citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 7 At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 8 determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 9 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw 10 all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited 11 materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 12 III. Exhaustion 13 A. Legal Standard 14 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner must exhaust “available” 15 administrative remedies before filing an action in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); 16 Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 17 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). The prisoner must complete the administrative review process in 18 accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006). 19 Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 20 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through the administrative process, Booth v. 21 Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 22 The defendant bears the initial burden to show that there was an available 23 administrative remedy and that the prisoner did not exhaust it. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 24 1162, 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014); see Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37 (a defendant must 25 demonstrate that applicable relief remained available in the grievance process).

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Related

First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Co.
391 U.S. 253 (Supreme Court, 1968)
Booth v. Churner
532 U.S. 731 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Porter v. Nussle
534 U.S. 516 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Woodford v. Ngo
548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Oscar W. Jones v. Lou Blanas County of Sacramento
393 F.3d 918 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
Garayalde-Rijos v. Municipality of Carolina
747 F.3d 15 (First Circuit, 2014)
Brown v. Valoff
422 F.3d 926 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co.
68 F.3d 1216 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
Reed v. Trinity Services Group Incorporated, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reed-v-trinity-services-group-incorporated-azd-2023.