Reed v. Trinity Services Group Incorporated

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided January 3, 2023·No. 2:21-cv-00016·Unknown

Opinion

SH WO Kenneth W. Reed, No. CV 21-00016-PHX-JAT (CDB) Plaintiff, v. ORDER Trinity Services Group Incorporated, et al., Defendants.

Plaintiff Kenneth W. Reed, who is currently confined in Arizona State Prison Complex-Tucson, Winchester Unit, brought this civil rights case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 25.) Defendants Merriman and Montaño move for summary judgment (Doc. 155), and Plaintiff did not respond, despite being granted additional time to do so (see Doc. 168 (giving Plaintiff until September 2, 2022 to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment)).1 Defendant Muko joins in the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 212.) I. Background On screening Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 25) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Montaño, Merriman, Gaye, Muko, and Tuozzo based on their alleged failure in August 2018 to ensure that Plaintiff received all of his meals as required under the food service contract between the Arizona Department of

1 The Court provided notice to Plaintiff pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), regarding the requirements of a response. (Doc. 157.) Corrections (ADC) and Trinity Services Group. (Doc. 27 at 12.) The Court directed them to answer and dismissed the remaining claims and Defendants. (Id. at 12, 18.) Thereafter, the Court dismissed Defendants Gaye and Tuozzo without prejudice for failure to timely serve. (Docs. 125, 162.) Defendants Montaño and Merriman now move for summary judgment and argue that Plaintiff did not exhaust the available administrative remedies, they were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s health and safety, and they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 155.) Defendant Muko joins in the motion. (Doc. 212.) Because Plaintiff did not file a response or controverting statement of facts, the Court will consider Defendants’ facts undisputed unless they are clearly controverted by Plaintiff’s first-hand allegations in the verified First Amended Complaint or other evidence on the record. Where the nonmovant is a pro se litigant, the Court must consider as evidence in opposition to summary judgment all the nonmovant’s contentions set forth in a verified complaint or motion. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004). II. Summary Judgment Standard A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). III. Exhaustion A. Legal Standard Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner must exhaust “available” administrative remedies before filing an action in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). The prisoner must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006). Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). The defendant bears the initial burden to show that there was an available administrative remedy and that the prisoner did not exhaust it. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014); see Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37 (a defendant must demonstrate that applicable relief remained available in the grievance process). Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the prisoner, who must either demonstrate that he, in fact, exhausted administrative remedies or “come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. The ultimate burden, however, rests with the defendant. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner, shows a failure to exhaust. Id. at 1166, 1168; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If sum

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Reed v. Trinity Services Group Incorporated, (D. Ariz. 2023).

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