Reed v. The City of New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 20, 2021
Docket1:20-cv-08352
StatusUnknown

This text of Reed v. The City of New York (Reed v. The City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reed v. The City of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CALVIN REED, Plaintiff, -against- CITY OF NEW YORK; NYC POLICE DEP’T; POLICE OFFICERS JOHN DOE #1-#6; POLICE OFFICER DENNIS; DETECTIVE JANE AND JOHN DOE, #1-#2; NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; CYNTHIA BRANN, Commissioner; ANTHONY ANNUCCI, Acting Commissioner; NEW YORK STATE 1:20-CV-8352 (JPC) DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND ORDER OF SERVICE COMMUNITY SUPERVISION (formerly, New York State Division of Parole); P.O., ANDRE LOGAN; SPO MEDINA; AREA SUPV., NYDIA GARCIA; SPO SHANAVIA DANDRIDE; NYS PAROLE OFFICERS JANE AND JOHN DOE #1-#5; NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION (Riker’s Island Correction Officers); JOHN AND JANE DOE #1-#5 (Special Search Team); JOHN DOE #1-#3; CENTRAL BOOKING NURSE JANE DOE, Defendants. JOHN P. CRONAN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently held in the Vernon C. Bain Center in the Bronx, New York, brings this pro se action alleging that the defendants violated his federal constitutional rights as well as state law.1 He seeks damages, his immediate release, and the lifting of a parole-violation warrant lodged against him. Plaintiff sues: (1) the City of New York; (2) the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”); (3) the New York City Department of Correction (“NYCDOC”); (4) the

1 Plaintiff filed his original complaint while he was held in the North Infirmary Command (“NIC”) on Rikers Island. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”); (5) NYPD officers; (6) NYCDOC officers; (7) an NYCDOC nurse; (8) the NYCDOC Commissioner, Cynthia Brann; (9) the DOCCS Acting Commissioner, Anthony Annucci; and (10) DOCCS parole officers, senior parole officers, and another DOCCS parole supervisor. The Court

construes Plaintiff’s amended complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claims for habeas corpus relief, and claims under state law. By order dated December 7, 2020, the court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”).2 The Court directs service on the City of New York and Police Officer Dennis. The Court also directs the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York to provide Plaintiff and the Court with the identities and badge numbers of those unidentified defendants who are members of the NYPD. The Court severs Plaintiff’s claims against the City of New York and NYCDOC employees that arise out of Plaintiff’s allegedly being locked in a NYCDOC van and directs the

Clerk of Court to open those claims in a new unassigned civil action. The Court also severs Plaintiff’s claims that arise from his allegedly being beaten by DOCCS parole officers and directs the Clerk of Court to open those claims in another new unassigned civil action. For the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against DOCCS, the NYPD, and the NYCDOC. The Court also dismisses Plaintiff’s remaining claims – those not including Plaintiff’s claims against the City of New York, “Police Officers John Doe #1-#6,”

2 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Police Officer Dennis, and “Detective Jane and John Doe #1-#2,” that arise from Plaintiff’s arrests and detainments by members of the NYPD – without prejudice as improperly joined. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a

governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original).

BACKGROUND In an order dated December 15, 2020, Judge Stanton dismissed Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DOCCS as well as his claims against the NYPD. (ECF 6, at 4-5.) In that same order, Judge Stanton granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint: (1) alleging facts sufficient to state a claim under § 1983 against the City of New York, (2) naming individuals as defendants and alleging facts showing those individuals’ personal involvement in the violations of his constitutional rights, and (3) naming as defendants only those against whom he asserts properly joined claims. (Id. at 5-8.) Judge Stanton also noted that if Plaintiff was seeking his release from confinement, he would have to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Id. at 8 n.3.) After Judge Stanton granted Plaintiff two extensions of time, Plaintiff filed his amended complaint, which is the operative pleading for this action. (ECF 12.) The relevant allegations are discussed below. DISCUSSION A. DOCCS, the NYPD, and the NYCDOC In his December 15, 2020 order, Judge Stanton dismissed Plaintiff’s claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against DOCCS, a New York State agency, under the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity. (ECF 6, at 4-5.) Judge Stanton also dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the NYPD because, as an agency of the City of New York, it is not a suable entity. (Id. at 5.) In his amended complaint, Plaintiff again names DOCCS and the NYPD as defendants, and names the NYCDOC, another agency of the City of New York, as a defendant. For the reasons discussed in Judge Stanton’s December 15, 2020 order, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims under § 1983 against DOCCS and dismisses his claims against the NYPD and the NYCDOC. B. Service on the City of New York and Police Officer Dennis Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the

Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP). Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

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Bluebook (online)
Reed v. The City of New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reed-v-the-city-of-new-york-nysd-2021.