R.D.T.M. v. Minga Wofford, Mesa Verde ICE Processing Center Facility Administrator; Polly Kaiser, Acting Field Office Director of the San Francisco Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kristi Noem, Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security; Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the United States

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: September 9, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-01141
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 R.D.T.M., No. 1:25-cv-01141-KES-SKO (HC) 8 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE MOTION 9 v. FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 10 MINGA WOFFORD, Mesa Verde ICE Doc. 3 Processing Center Facility Administrator; 11 POLLY KAISER, Acting Field Office Director of the San Francisco Immigration 12 and Customs Enforcement Office; TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director of United 13 States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of 14 the United States Department of Homeland Security; PAMELA BONDI, Attorney 15 General of the United States, 16 Respondents. 17 18 19 Petitioner R.D.T.M. is a noncitizen who entered the United States in 2023 as an 20 unaccompanied minor. After entry, she was briefly detained by immigration officials but then 21 released to the care of a sponsor after immigration officials determined that she was neither a 22 danger nor a flight risk. Since then, she has lived with her family in Howard Lake, Minnesota, 23 graduated high school, gained lawful work authorization, worked in childcare services, and 24 volunteered at a church in her community. However, notwithstanding the immigration officials’ 25 prior determination that she posed neither a flight risk or danger and the apparent lack of changed 26 circumstances, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents re-detained her on 27 September 1, 2025. 28 1 On September 7, 2025, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, Doc. 1, and a 2 motion for a temporary restraining order, Doc. 3.1 Petitioner seeks an order that immediately 3 releases her from immigration detention and enjoins the government from re-detaining her unless 4 it first provides her with a hearing before a neutral adjudicator where the government must prove 5 by clear and convincing evidence that she is a flight risk or danger to the community. For the 6 reasons set forth below, the Court grants petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order. 7 I. Background2 8 In 2023, when she was a minor, petitioner fled Honduras because she had been left there 9 on her own, making her a vulnerable target for physical and sexual violence. Doc. 1 at ¶ 43; see 10 Doc. 3-2 at ¶ 5. She had previously lived in the United States, from when she was around seven 11 years old until she was ten years old. See Doc. 3-2 at ¶ 5. On January 14, 2023, she crossed the 12 southern border and encountered U.S. immigration officials. Id. ¶ 6; Doc. 1 at ¶ 43. The 13 immigration officials detained her for approximately eleven days at a facility for unaccompanied 14 minors. Doc. 3-2 at ¶ 6. On January 26, 2023, immigration officials released her into the custody 15 of her mother. Id. The statute that governs the detention of unaccompanied minors encountered 16 at the border, the Trafficking Victims Protection and Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), provides 17 that, in making custody determinations, immigration officials should consider “danger to self, 18 danger to the community, and risk of flight.” 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A). In releasing petitioner, 19 immigration officials determined that she was not a flight risk or danger to the community. See 20 Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176, 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“[Immigration officials] 21 may release the minor to a “sponsor” . . . so long as the minor is not dangerous . . . . Release 22 [therefore] reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the 23

24 1 Petitioner also filed a motion to proceed under pseudonym, which was granted by separate order. 25

2 This section is based on petitioner’s verified petition, declarations, and exhibits. A court “may 26 treat the allegations of a verified . . . petition [for writ of habeas corpus] as an affidavit.” L. v. 27 Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197–98 (9th Cir. 1987)). 28 1 community or a flight risk.” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A)), aff’d 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2 2018). On February 11, 2023, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) sent petitioner a 3 notice to appear in immigration court for removal proceedings. Id.; Doc. 3-3 at 1–3. The notice 4 to appear charged her as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as “an alien present in the 5 United States without being admitted or paroled.” Doc. 3-3 at 1–3. 6 Following her release from detention, petitioner went to live with her parents and siblings 7 in Howard Lake, Minnesota, and she established a life there. Doc. 3-2 at ¶ 7. On June 2, 2024, 8 she graduated from Lake-Waverly-Winsted High School. Id. After she graduated, she was 9 granted lawful work authorization and worked as a child-care professional at the Howard Lake- 10 Waverly-Winsted Laker Care Program. Id.; Doc. 1 at ¶ 10. She also worked as a waitress at a 11 restaurant in Howard Lake. Doc. 3-2 at ¶ 7. She joined St. John’s Lutheran Church in Howard 12 Lake and regularly volunteers with church activities. Doc. 1 at ¶ 47. Her positive school, 13 employment, and volunteer work record are described in letters of support from Howard Lake 14 community members. See Doc. 1-4 at 2–7. 15 Petitioner indicates that she has maintained a clean criminal record, pursued relief in her 16 removal proceedings, and complied with the requirements of her release. See Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 10, 36, 17 47–48, 94. On October 10, 2023, she retained counsel and filed an application for asylum and 18 withholding of removal with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). 19 Doc. 1 at ¶ 48. An immigration judge administratively closed her removal proceedings due to the 20 pending application for asylum with USCIS. Id. Her asylum application remains pending. Doc. 21 3-2 at ¶ 9. 22 On September 1, 2025, over two and a half years after her release, Immigration and 23 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents arrested petitioner as she was preparing to board a domestic 24 flight at San Francisco International Airport to return home. Doc. 3-2 at ¶¶ 11. The agents were 25 dressed in plainclothes and did not present her with a warrant. Id. They asked for petitioner’s 26 identification documents, and she showed them her passport and work authorization permit. Id. 27 Agents handcuffed her and took her property. Id. ¶ 12. They did not tell her why she was being 28 arrested. Id. Agents then held petitioner in an immigration office in San Francisco for 1 approximately thirty hours. Id. ¶ 13. They stated that she had a prior deportation order in place 2 from when she was a child, but they did not show her the warrant.3 Id. ¶¶ 13–14. Petitioner is 3 unaware of any prior deportation order as she left voluntarily when she was ten years old. Doc. 3- 4 2 at ¶ 5.4 Petitioner explained to the agents that she had immigration proceedings and had filed 5 an asylum application with USCIS. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14. ICE agents then took petitioner in custody to 6 Mesa Verde ICE Processing Center, an immigration detention center in Bakersfield, California, 7 where she remains detained. Id. ¶ 14. 8 On September 2, 2025, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, Doc. 1, and a 9 motion for temporary restraining order, Doc. 3. 10 II. Legal Standard 11 The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are 12 “substantially identical.” See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Bush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 13 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of 14 right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 15 U.S. 674, 689–90 (2008)). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is 16 likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 17 preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [her] favor, and that an injunction is in the 18 public interest.” Id. at 20 (citing Munaf, 553 U.S. at 689–90; Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of 19 Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12 20 (1982)). “Likelihood of success on the merits is a threshold inquiry and is the most important 21 3 Even if there were a prior order of removal in place, it appears that petitioner would still be 22 entitled to seek asylum. As someone previously determined to be an unaccompanied minor, 23 petitioner is covered by the class action settlement agreement entered in J.O.P. v. US Department of Homeland Security, No. 8:19-cv-01944-SAG (D. Md.). Doc. 1 at ¶ 4. That settlement 24 agreement provides that anyone initially determined to be an unaccompanied minor must be permitted to pursue an asylum application with USCIS, even if there is already a final order of 25 removal in place. See Doc. 199-2 at ¶ I, J.O.P. v. US Department of Homeland Security, No. 8:19-cv-01944-SAG (D. Md. July 30, 2024). 26

27 4 Petitioner’s counsel asserts that she requested petitioner’s full immigration file through a Freedom of Information Act request, and that request did not turn up any such deportation order. 28 Id. 1 factor.” Simon v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 135 F.4th 784, 797 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting 2 Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Carlson, 968 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2020)). “[I]f a plaintiff can only 3 show that there are serious questions going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of 4 success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships 5 tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor, and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Friends of the 6 Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations 7 omitted). 8 III. Discussion 9 The Court finds that the requirements for issuing a temporary restraining order without 10 notice are met. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Petitioner notified respondents’ counsel on September 11 7, 2025 that she would be filing the motion, by email to the U.S. Attorney’s Office email address 12 for habeas petition filings. See Doc. 3-1. While respondents have not appeared or filed a 13 response, petitioner has set out specific facts demonstrating that immediate and irreparable injury, 14 loss, or damage may result before respondents can be heard in opposition. See Pinchi v. Noem, 15 No. 25-cv-05632-RML, 2025 WL 1853763, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 4, 2025) (granting ex parte 16 temporary restraining order in similar circumstances). 17 a. Petitioner is Likely to Succeed on the Merits. 18 Petitioner argues that the Due Process Clause bars the government from re-detaining her 19 without first providing a bond hearing. Doc. 4 at 5–11. “Courts analyze [] due process claims in 20 two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process 21 Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that 22 protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-cv-01884- 23 TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing Kentucky Dep’t of 24 Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). These two steps are examined in turn. 25 1. Petitioner Possesses a Protected Liberty Interest. 26 A protected liberty interest may arise from a conditional release from physical restraint. 27 Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147–49 (1997). Even when a statute allows the government to 28 arrest and detain an individual, a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause may 1 entitle the individual to procedural protections not found in the statute. See id. (Due Process 2 requires pre-deprivation hearing before revocation of preparole); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 3 778, 782 (1973) (same, in probation context); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) 4 (same, in parole context). To determine whether a specific conditional release rises to the level of 5 a protected liberty interest, “[c]ourts have resolved the issue by comparing the specific 6 conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by 7 Morrissey.” Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 8 marks and citation omitted). 9 In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that parole “enables [the parolee] to do a wide 10 range of things open to persons” who have never been in custody or convicted of any crime, 11 including to live at home, work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other enduring 12 attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. “Though the [government] properly 13 subjects [the parolee] to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens,” such as monitoring 14 and seeking authorization to work and travel, her “condition is very different from that of 15 confinement in a prison.” Id. “The parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole 16 will be revoked only if [she] fails to live up to the parole conditions.” Id. The revocation of 17 parole undoubtedly “inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee.” Id. (quotations omitted). Therefore, 18 a parolee possesses a protected liberty interest in her “continued liberty.” Id. at 481–84. 19 Petitioner’s release is similar. For over two-and-a-half years, it allowed her to live with 20 her family in Howard Lake and establish a life there. She graduated high school in Howard Lake, 21 became lawfully employed in childcare services and at a restaurant, and volunteered at her 22 church. Immigration officials’ release of petitioner in 2023 reflected a determination that she did 23 not pose a flight risk or danger to the community. See Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1176. 24 Petitioner indicates that she has no criminal record, and that, following her release in January 25 2023, she complied with her release terms and appeared at all immigration proceedings as 26 required. The government then rearrested petitioner without showing any changed circumstances 27 in this regard, contradicting the “implicit promise that [petitioner’s freedom] will be revoked only 28 if [she] fails to live up to the [release] conditions.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. 1 The Court finds that petitioner has a protected liberty interest in her release. See 2 Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-05436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 3 2025) (recognizing that “the liberty interest that arises upon release [from immigration detention] 4 is inherent in the Due Process Clause”); Ortega v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05259-JST, 2025 WL 5 1771438, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025) (collecting cases finding that noncitizens who have 6 been released have a strong liberty interest). The Court must therefore determine what process is 7 due before the government may terminate her liberty. 8 2. A Pre-Deprivation Bond Hearing Is Required. 9 Due process “is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation.” Zinermon v. 10 Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). The procedural protections required in a given situation are 11 evaluated using the Mathews v. Eldridge factors:

12 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 13 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government’s 14 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 15 requirement would entail. 16 Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); see Hernandez, 872 F.3d 976, 993 17 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Mathews factors in immigration detention context). 18 Turning to the first factor, petitioner has a significant private interest in remaining free 19 from detention. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other 20 forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” 21 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Petitioner had been out of custody for over two- 22 and-a-half years, and during that time, began a life in Howard Lake, living with her parents and 23 siblings, finishing school, gaining lawful employment, and volunteering at her church. Her 24 detention denies her that freedom. 25 Second, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high” where, as here, “[the 26 petitioner] has not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing.” A.E. v. Andrews, No. 27 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025). Civil 28 1 immigration detention, which is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]” is justified when a 2 noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; 3 Padilla, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 1172. Petitioner has no criminal history and indicates she has 4 attended every court hearing and check-in since she arrived in the United States. See Doc. 1 at 5 ¶¶ 10, 36, 47–48, 94. Given the absence of any procedural safeguards to determine if her 6 detention was justified, “the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, i.e., a bond 7 hearing, is high.” A.E., 2025 WL 1424382, at *5. 8 Third, the government’s interest in detaining petitioner without a hearing is “low.” 9 Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Doe, 2025 WL 691664, at *6. In 10 immigration court, custody hearings are routine and impose a “minimal” cost. Doe, 2025 WL 11 691664, at *6. The government’s interest is further diminished where a person “has consistently 12 appeared for her immigration hearings . . . and [] does not have a criminal record.” Pinchi, 2025 13 WL 1853763, at *2. 14 On balance, the Mathews factors show that petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, which 15 should have been provided before petitioner was detained. “‘[T]he root requirement’ of the Due 16 Process Clause” is “‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived 17 of any significant protected interest.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 18 (1985) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)); see Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127 19 (“Applying [the Mathews] test, the Court usually has held that the Constitution requires some 20 kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty . . . .”). The Supreme Court has 21 held that Due Process requires a pre-deprivation hearing before those released on parole from a 22 criminal conviction can have their bond finally revoked. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480–86. The 23 same is true for those subject to revocation of probation. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 782. 24 Given the absence of “evidence of urgent concerns,” the Court concludes that “a pre- 25 deprivation hearing [was] required to satisfy due process.” Guillermo M. R., 2025 WL 1983677, 26 at *9. Numerous district courts have reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., id.; Garcia, 2025 27 WL 1927596, at *5; Pinchi, 2025 WL 1853763, at *3–4; Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970; Doe v. 28 Becerra, No. 2:25-CV-00647-DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 691664, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025); Diaz 1 v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-cv-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025); Romero v. 2 Kaiser, No. 22-cv-02508-TSH, 2022 WL 1443250, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022); Vargas v. 3 Jennings, No. 20-cv-5785-PJH, 2020 WL 5074312, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2020). 4 With these considerations in mind, petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits. 5 b. Petitioner Will Face Irreparable Harm Without Injunctive Relief. 6 Turning to the second Winters factor, petitioner’s evidence shows that her detention has 7 caused and will continue to cause irreparable harm. As the Supreme Court has recognized, 8 incarceration “has a detrimental impact on the individual” because “it often means loss of a job” 9 and “disrupts family life.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532–33 (1972). Petitioner’s detention 10 has taken her from her family, her community, and the job she had pursuant to her employment 11 authorization. 12 Moreover, “[i]t is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 13 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994 (quoting Melendres 14 v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)). “When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional 15 right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” 16 Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Wright, Miller, & 17 Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2948.1 (2d ed. 2004)). Thus, petitioner faces irreparable 18 harm absent a temporary restraining order. 19 c. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 20 When the government is the nonmoving party, “the last two Winter factors merge.” Baird 21 v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal citations omitted). Faced with a choice 22 “between [minimally costly procedures] and preventable human suffering,” as discussed above, 23 the Court concludes “that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in [petitioner’s] favor.” 24 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 996 (quoting Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983)). 25 The public interest also weighs in petitioner’s favor. “The public has a strong interest in 26 upholding procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has 27 recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Diaz, 2025 WL 28 1676854, at *3 (citing Jorge M.F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-CV-01434-JST, 2021 WL 783561, at *3) 1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021); see also Index Newspapers LLC v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 2 838 (9th Cir. 2020) (“It is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s 3 constitutional rights.”) (citing Padilla, 953 F.3d at 1147–48). 4 In conclusion, the Court finds that the requirements for issuing a temporary restraining 5 order are met. Petitioner’s immediate release is required to return her to the status quo ante—“the 6 last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 1853763, at 7 *3; Kuzmenko v. Phillips, No. 2:25-cv-00663-DJC-AC, 2025 WL 779743, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8 10, 2025); see also Valdez v. Joyce, 25 Civ. 4627, 2025 WL 1707737, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 9 2025) (ordering immediate release of unlawfully detained noncitizen); Ercelik v. Hyde, No. 1:25- 10 CV-11007-AK, 2025 WL 1361543, at *15–16 (D. Mass. May 8, 2025) (same); Günaydın v. 11 Trump, No. 25-CV-01151, 2025 WL 1459154, at *10–11 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025) (same). 12 Respondents are ordered to release petitioner immediately without requiring bond or electronic 13 monitoring. Respondents may not re-detain petitioner unless the government proves by clear and 14 convincing evidence at a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker that petitioner is a flight 15 risk or danger to the community. 16 The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. Courts 17 regularly waive security in cases like this one. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 18 2011); Garcia, 2025 WL 1676855, at *3; Pinchi, 2025 WL 1853763, at *4; Singh, 2025 WL 19 1918679, at *9. 20 IV. Conclusion and Order 21 Accordingly, petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order, Doc. 3, is GRANTED. 22 Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release petitioner without requiring bond or 23 electronic monitoring. 24 Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining petitioner unless 25 they demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a 26 neutral decisionmaker, that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that her 27 physical custody is legally justified.

28 1 Respondents may move for modification or dissolution of this Order on two (2) days’ 2 | notice. See Fed. Rule Civ. P. 65(b); Local Rule 231(c)(8). 3 Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE before this Court why a preliminary 4 | injunction should not issue pending a final disposition of this matter. The hearing on the order to 5 | show cause will be held on September 18, 2025, at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 6 before District 6 | Judge Kirk E. Sherriff. Respondents shall file any response to petitioner’s motion by 7 | September 15, 2025. Petitioner may file a reply by September 17, 2025. The parties may 8 | stipulate to extend the briefing schedule and hearing date, provided that this temporary restraining 9 || order remain in effect pending any such continuance.* 10 11 | TPIS SO ORDERED. _ 12 Dated: _ September 9, 2025 4h 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ———R_ > Counsel requesting to appear at the hearing by video appearance shall contact the courtroom 28 | deputy at least 24 hours prior to the hearing. 11