IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION RAY GOORAH, Plaintiff, v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:24-cv-00322-TES TROY MEINK, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In his Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 25], Defendant Troy Meink, Secretary, Department of the Air Force (“Defendant” or “the Government”) contends that Plaintiff Ray Goorah is unable to create a “genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was the subject of discrimination” in his employment discrimination action for failure to promote under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. [Doc. 25-1 at p. 1]. As discussed in more detail below, the Court agrees and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff began his Air Force civilian employee career in approximately 2002. [Doc. 34-1, ¶ 1]. For the next two decades, he worked as an aerospace engineer in the
Special Operations Forces Personnel Recovery & Rotary Division, alternating between work on helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. [Id. at ¶ 2–6]. During the time period relevant to this lawsuit, Plaintiff’s chain of command fell under the umbrella of Rotary
Wing Engineering. [Id. at ¶ 8]. At the time, Plaintiff’s first-level supervisor was Steven Lamb. [Id. at ¶ 9]. Plaintiff’s second-level supervisor was Byron Givens. [Id. at ¶ 10]. On August 26, 2021, John Soltis, a Rotary Wing Technical Advisor, emailed a
listserv, including an Air Force engineering group, and notified them that there was a Jobs Board posting for an open position as Rotary Wing Systems & Integrity Branch Chief (NH-0801-04). [Id. at ¶ 12]; [Doc. 25-1, p. 3]. Plaintiff first learned of the job
posting through this email. [Doc. 34-1, ¶ 13]. Plaintiff applied for the position by submitting a written application. [Id. at ¶ 14]. He was one of 17 applicants who provided a resume for review. [Id. at ¶ 15]. Two separate officials scored each resume according to certain evaluation criteria. [Id. at ¶ 16]. Plaintiff received the highest score
by the two selecting officials on the resume review. [Id. at ¶ 17]. On one scoring matrix, Plaintiff scored 95. [Id. at ¶ 18]. The next highest scores belonged to Jonathan Belknap and Steve Oliver, both of whom scored 90. [Id.]; [Doc. 27, p. 43]. On the other scoring
matrix, Plaintiff scored another 95. [Doc. 34-1, ¶ 19]. The next highest scores belonged to Ricky Solomon, who scored 91, and Mr. Oliver, who scored 90. [Id. at ¶ 19]; [Doc. 27, p. 44]. According to Air Force Manual 36-203, which addresses staffing civilian
positions, conducting interviews is discretionary and is not required in every selection process. [Doc. 34-1, ¶ 20]. In fact, candidates do not have to be interviewed, but for those who are, the same interview questions must be used for each candidate. [Id. at ¶
21]. When interviews are conducted, the Air Force Manual recommends that three to five questions be developed to use in the interview process. [Id. at ¶ 22]. The Air Force Manual also requires that the questions used in the interview process be job-related and
tied to the knowledge, skills, and abilities for the position. [Id. at ¶ 23]. On September 24, 2021, Mr. Soltis notified Plaintiff that he was selected to interview for the open position. [Id. at ¶ 24]. Plaintiff accepted the opportunity to
interview and informed Mr. Soltis that he was available to interview on October 1, 2021. [Id. at ¶ 25]. Mr. Soltis scheduled his interview for that very day. [Id.]. On September 29, 2021, Mr. Soltis sent a confirmation email to Plaintiff. [Id. at ¶ 26]. In that email, Mr. Soltis informed Plaintiff that he would be given 15 minutes to review the interview
questions and make notes, that the 30-minute interview would follow, and that Plaintiff would be permitted to bring one page of notes with him to use during the question review period. [Id.].
A panel including Byron Givens, John Soltis, and Jill Burgess interviewed Plaintiff. [Id. at ¶ 27]. The official Air Force job announcement indicates that Mr. Soltis acted as the selecting official for this job posting. [Doc. 25-3, p. 2]. Both Mr. Soltis and Ms. Burgess have indicated that no one directed or persuaded them in their hiring
recommendation. [Doc. 25-4, p. 5]; [Doc. 25-6, p. 4]. According to Mr. Givens, the panel members received the following verbal instructions prior to the interviews: “Panel members were provided copies of the
questions with the max points allowed. The general format of the interview was discussed (30 minutes total time with 5 questions and 1 observation.)” [Doc. 34-1, ¶ 31]. The interview panel posed the exact same questions to each interviewee. [Id. at ¶ 32].
The questions sought information about prior experience and accomplishments, defining differences between rotary wing and fixed wing aircrafts, and testing each applicant’s technical understanding and capabilities. [Id. at ¶ 34]. Interview panelists
were not allowed to ask any questions outside of those standardized questions that were agreed to in advance. [Id. at ¶ 35]. Each question had an “anchor,” which was a key part of the answer that the interview panel was listening for in response to the question. [Id. at ¶ 36]. Each interviewee was allowed up to thirty minutes to answer the
questions. [Id. at ¶ 37]. Each of the interview panelists took handwritten notes about the response provided by the interviewees. [Id. at ¶ 38]. Each interviewee was given a uniform amount of time to prepare and respond to the questions. [Id. at ¶ 53]. During
the interviews, panelists were not given leeway to ask questions or provide feedback during the interview process. [Id. at ¶ 54]. Each of the three panelists gave Plaintiff similar scores. For example, Plaintiff received a lower score from all three interview panelists, with Mr. Soltis even noting
that Plaintiff’s interview answers were “lacking in depth and discussion of the subject.” [Doc. 25-4, p. 4]. Mr. Soltis also noted that while Plaintiff was given the full thirty minutes for his interview, he took less than half of the allotted time. [Id.]. Ms. Burgess
indicated that Plaintiff “did not meet the anchors or all of the specific criteria or he did not provide enough information” in response to the panel’s questions. [Doc. 25-6, p. 3]. For his part, Mr. Givens expressed that Plaintiff “tanked the interview” and that he
“believed he didn’t have to talk about information already in his resume.” [Doc. 25-5, p. 4]. In contrast, Mr. Belknap earned the highest interview score. See generally [Doc.
25-8, pp. 1–18]. In his interview notes, Mr. Soltis remarked that Mr. Belknap “spoke for the whole time allotted, addressed the areas being graded in greater detail, and expressed a greater depth of knowledge of the questions being asked.” [Doc. 25-4, p. 4]. Ms. Burgess echoed that sentiment, adding that Mr. Belknap “provided more
information and gave multiple examples of everything” and that he “did a good job of providing clear and concise response and made good eye contact” when answering questions. [Doc. 25-6, pp. 3–4]. Mr. Givens agreed, noting that Mr. Belknap “answered
all of the questions and did really well, which is documented in [the panelists’] notes.” [Doc. 25-5, p. 4]. By way of example, Mr. Soltis allotted 27 out of a possible 50 points to Plaintiff on the first interview question and Ms. Burgess assigned Plaintiff 25 points for his
answer to the same question. [Doc. 25-9, p. 1, 13 respectively]. In comparison, Ms. Burgess awarded Mr. Belknap 42 points for his response to the first question while Mr. Soltis awarded him 43 points for the same question. [Doc. 25-8, p. 1, 13 respectively].
When asked about Plaintiff’s qualifications as compared to Mr. Belknap, Ms. Burgess explained that “[t]he number of years of experience doesn’t mean he has the right kind of experience. Longevity doesn’t get a person the job. They must meet the qualifications
and have the right experience for the position. Most importantly, they have to explain that in the interview.” [Doc. 25-6, p. 4]. Mr. Soltis shared this view and added that experience would be reflected as part of the resume review, but that “just because
someone has been doing the job longer, doesn’t mean they are the best qualified.” [Doc. 25-4, p. 4]. On October 26, 2021, Mr. Soltis sent an email to the same engineering email listserv that he used in August 2021, congratulating Mr. Belknap for being selected for
the Rotary Wing Systems & Integrity Engineering Branch Chief position. [Doc. 25-10]. In his email, Mr. Soltis noted that Mr. Belknap “brought over twelve years of Rotary Wing Structural, Systems, and Integrity Programs engineering experience” and that his
“previous helicopter experience and proven performance made him the perfect candidate.” [Id.]. Plaintiff was not aware that Mr. Belknap had been selected until he received that email. [Doc. 34-1 at ¶ 42]. On November 4, 2021, Plaintiff contacted the Equal Opportunity Office (“EEO”)
at Robins Air Force Base to file an informal complaint of discrimination based on race, color, and national origin. [Id. at ¶ 47]. The EEO complaint was not resolved, and Plaintiff filed a formal complaint of discrimination on April 6, 2022. [Id. at ¶ 48]. “On
March 7, 202[3], Administrative Judge Shayla N.M. Sipp entered a notice of proposed summary judgment in the administrative proceeding.” [Id. at ¶ 50]; see also [Doc. 1-3, p. 1 (noting concern with incorrect dates on documents)]. “Then, on March 23, 202[3], after
reviewing submissions by both Plaintiff and the Agency, Judge Sipp determined summary judgment was appropriate in favor of the Agency because Plaintiff was unable to point to evidence of discrimination as to the Agency’s decisions for selecting
Mr. Belknap for the promotion.” [Doc. 25-12]; see also [Doc. 1-3, p. 1 (noting concern with incorrect dates on documents)].1 On September 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Complaint alleging employment discrimination action for failure to promote under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. See [Doc. 1]. On September 26, 2025, the Government filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.
1 Both the Government’s Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement of Undisputed Material Facts reflect that Judge Sipp entered a notice of proposed summary judgment in the administrative proceeding on March 7, 2022, and that Judge Sipp determined summary judgment to be appropriate on March 23, 2022. See [Doc. 25-1, p. 7]; [Doc. 25-16, ¶¶ 50, 51]. Plaintiff does not object to these assertions in his Response to the Government’s Statement of Undisputed Facts. See [Doc. 34-1 at ¶¶ 50, 51]. However, in Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of his Appeal of Judge Sipp’s Order, Plaintiff notes that he believes the year listed on the Notice of Proposed Summary Judgment (dated March 7, 2022) and the Decision and Order Entering Judgment (dated March 23, 2022) are in error and should be 2023. As such, for clarity, the Court assumes that the documents should have been dated with the year 2023. LEGAL STANDARD A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is not genuine unless, based on the evidence presented, “‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.’” Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “The moving party bears
the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion.” Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1437. The movant may cite to particular parts of materials in the record, including, “‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).2 “When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to ‘support its motion with affidavits or other
similar material negating the opponent’s claim[]’ in order to discharge this ‘initial responsibility.’” Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1437–38 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Rather, “the moving party simply may show—that is, point out to the district court—
2 Courts may consider all materials in the record, not just those cited by the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324) (cleaned up). Alternatively, the movant may provide
“affirmative evidence demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at trial.” Id. If this initial burden is satisfied, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party,
who must rebut the movant’s showing “by producing . . . relevant and admissible evidence beyond the pleadings.” Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). The nonmoving party does
not satisfy its burden “if the rebuttal evidence ‘is merely colorable or[] is not significantly probative’ of a disputed fact.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50). “A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the [nonmoving] party’s position will not suffice.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997).
Further, where a party fails to address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the Court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also n.2, supra.
However, “credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Succinctly put, [s]ummary judgment is not a time for fact-finding; that task is reserved for trial. Rather, on summary judgment, the district court must accept as fact all allegations the [nonmoving] party makes, provided they are sufficiently supported by evidence of record. So[,] when competing narratives emerge on key events, courts are not at liberty to pick which side they think is more credible. Indeed, if “the only issue is one of credibility,” the issue is factual, and a court cannot grant summary judgment.
Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1263 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). “[T]he judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The nonmovant’s evidence is to be believed, and “all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. “[I]f a reasonable jury could make more than one inference from the facts, and one of those permissible
inferences creates a genuine issue of material fact, a court cannot grant summary judgment.” Sconiers, 946 F.3d at 1263. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s primary argument is that the Government discriminated against him because of his race, color, and national origin when Defendant selected a white male for the Chief of Rotary Wing Systems and Integrity Engineering Branch over Plaintiff. [Doc.
1 at pp. 3–4]. Under the federal-sector provision of Title VII, “personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment . . . in executive agencies . . . shall be free from any discrimination based on race . . . or national origin.”3 42. U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). This
3 “[T]he McDonnell-Douglas framework and the ‘convincing mosaic’ test . . . ‘no longer apply’ to cases brought under the federal-sector provision of Title VII” because those “are methods used to show that a protected characteristic was the but-for cause of the ultimate decision.” Durr v. Sec’y of Dept. of Veterans Affs., No. 21-12867, 2022 WL 2315086 (11th Cir. June 28, 2022) (citing Durr v. Sec’y of Dept. of Veterans Affs., 843 F. App’x 246, 247 (11th Cir. 2021)). Plaintiff must only “show that discrimination played any part in means that “personnel actions must be made in ‘a way that is not tainted by differential treatment based on’ a protected characteristic.” Terrell v. Sec’y, Dept. of Veterans Affs., 98
F.4th 1343, 1352 (quoting Babb v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 992 F.3d 1193, 1199 (11th Cir. 2021)). Thus, to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must make a sufficient factual
showing to permit a reasonable jury to find that his race, color or national origin “play[ed] any role” in, or “tainted,” the hiring process. Id.; see Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Faced with a defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, a plaintiff asserting an intentional-discrimination claim under Title VII . . . must make a sufficient factual showing to permit a reasonable jury to rule in [his] favor.”). However, “even if [Plaintiff] proves that [unlawful] discrimination tainted the decision-making process, he is not necessarily entitled to all remedies.” Terrell, 98 F.4th
at 1352 (quoting Buckley v. Sec’y of Army, 97 F.4th 784, 793 (11th Cir. 2014)). A showing that discriminatory animus merely tainted the hiring process only entitles a plaintiff to “injunctive or other forward-looking relief.” Id. To obtain retrospective relief, such as
compensatory damages and backpay, a federal employee must still prove that discrimination was the “but-for cause of [his] non-selection.” Id.
the way the decision was made.” Terrell, 98 F.4th 1343, 1352 (quoting Babb, 992 F.3d at 1199). See also Buckley v. Sec’y of Army, 97 F.4th 784, 794-95 (“So using the McDonnell Douglas framework for § 2000e- 16(a) claims is like requiring the plaintiff to move a boulder when she need only push a pebble—in other words, the burden under McDonnell Douglas is heavier than Title VII imposes on a plaintiff in a federal- sector case.”). First, the Court considers whether Plaintiff can demonstrate that unlawful discrimination tainted the hiring process, which would entitle him to prospective relief.
Terrell, 98 F.4th at 1352. Because Plaintiff doesn’t satisfy this lower burden, the Court need not consider whether he could clear the higher bar required for retrospective relief by showing discrimination was the “but-for cause of [his] non-selection.” Id.
Plaintiff points to the interview process as being problematic in his case. As an initial note, the decision to conduct an interview as part of a hiring process does not mean that discrimination is ultimately at play. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that
an interview is a valuable hiring tool, even when subjective analysis is used during that process. See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1033 (11th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, “[a] subjective reason is a legally sufficient, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason if the defendant articulates a clear and reasonably specific factual basis upon which it based
its subjective opinion.” Id. at 1034. In this case, the record indisputably indicates that the panel conducted the interviews in a highly structured manner that was not purely subjective. The panelists
asked each interviewee the same five standardized questions, and each interviewee received the same amount of time to prepare for the interview. [Doc. 34-1, ¶¶ 52, 53]. Interview panelists were not permitted to deviate from the five standardized questions, nor were they permitted to give any feedback at the time of the interviews. [Id. at ¶ 54].
Further, Plaintiff complains that the five standardized questions did not comply with Air Force Manual § 3.16.2.1, which requires that “[e]ach question should be structured with three to four descriptive anchors with points allocated to each anchor.” [Doc. 34, p.
7]. However, the panel identified clear anchors for each question asked of the interviewees as demonstrated by the note sheets used by each interview panelist. See [Doc. 25-8, pp. 1–18]; [Doc. 25-9, pp. 1–18]. The panelists allocated point values to each
question. [Id.]. Although each anchor did not have an assigned point value, that certainly does not evidence any race, color or national origin discrimination tainted the hiring process, and Plaintiff hasn’t pointed to any evidence to the contrary.
Further, interview panelists gave Plaintiff fairly uniform scores much lower than Mr. Belknap and provided ample reasoning for doing so. See [Id.]. Plaintiff’s argument that this result was rooted in discrimination is not supported by any evidence in the record. On the contrary, each panelist gave a reasonable nondiscriminatory justification
for their scoring analysis. Mr. Soltis remarked that Plaintiff’s answers were “lacking in depth and discussion of the subject.” [Doc. 25-4, p. 4]. Mr. Soltis also noted that Plaintiff was given a full thirty minutes for his interview but only used about half the time. [Id.].
Similarly, Ms. Burgess stated that Plaintiff “did not meet the anchors on all of the specific criteria or he did not provide enough information.” [Doc. 25-6, p. 3]. Mr. Givens added that Plaintiff did not think he had to answer questions because the information was already on his resume. [Doc. 25-5, p. 4]. In contrast, Mr. Belknap scored the highest on his interview. See generally [Doc. 25-8, pp. 1–18]. Mr. Soltis stated that Mr. Belknap “spoke for the whole time allotted,
addressed the areas being graded in greater detail, and expressed a greater depth of knowledge of the questions being asked.” [Doc. 25-4, p. 4]. Ms. Burgess also noted that Mr. Belknap “provided more information and gave multiple examples of everything”
and he did a “good job of providing clear and concise response and made good eye contract” when answering questions. [Doc. 25-6, pp. 3–4]. Mr. Givens noted that Mr. Belknap “answered all of the questions and did really well, which is documented in
[their] notes.” [Doc. 25-5, p. 4]. Plaintiff also argues the interview panelists underscored his interview, pointing to an example where Mr. Soltis gave Mr. Belknap a higher score on a question while recording fewer notes about his response. In another example, Plaintiff argues that Mr.
Belknap did not hit any of the anchors per the interview notes, but still got a perfect score from all interview panel members. [Doc. 34, pp. 7–8]. Plaintiff characterizes these perceived inconsistencies as a “sham or pretext to try and mask discrimination . . .” [Id.
at p. 8]. However, the record clearly belies this contention. No reasonable person should expect any panelist would take notes on every single answer or record every internal thought they had in relation to every question asked. The record completely lacks any
evidence of discriminatory intent that Plaintiff has identified in the notes that were taken or in the assessments given by the panelists. The panelists followed a uniform process for each candidate with each candidate given an equal opportunity to succeed.
Plaintiff has offered no clear evidence of discrimination in the process. His claims cannot be supported by mere conjecture or discontent with the process. Nor does he offer any evidence that the panelists’ comments were pretext designed to cover up
discrimination. Without more, the Court can’t conclude that the interview panelists engaged in unlawful discrimination. Plaintiff’s second major complaint stems from his perception and contention that
he is more qualified for the position than Mr. Belknap and thus should have been awarded the position. Plaintiff believes he “had the most experience, most education, most training, most skill sets” and that any reasonable person would believe that he should have been selected for the position. [Doc. 27, p. 71]. When comparing the two
resumes and interview performances of Mr. Belknap and Plaintiff, it cannot be said, however, that no reasonable person would select Mr. Belknap for the position over Plaintiff.
Plaintiff shows that he has twenty years of experience with the government and has earned outstanding performance ratings for the last three of those years. [Doc. 34, p. 2]. In comparison, Plaintiff points to the fact that Mr. Belknap was hired on June 8, 2020, and was still technically within a two-year probationary period. [Id. at pp. 10–11].
Plaintiff also argues that his resume was unanimously scored higher than Mr. Belknap’s and that in the past, the candidate with the highest resume score got the job without an interview. [Id. at p. 11]. Plaintiff, however, ignores Mr. Belknap’s “over twelve years of
Rotary Wing Structural, Systems, and Integrity Programs engineering experience.” [Doc. 25-10, p. 1]. But nothing in our law mandates that the longest-serving employee receive the next promotion. Employers, including the federal government, retain the
flexibility to hire the best person for the job without federal courts sitting as super- personnel departments. Lewis v. Fouts Bros., Inc., No. 5:24-CV-00407-TES, 2026 WL 228021 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2026) (citing Akridge v. Alfa Ins. Co., 93 F.4th 1181, 1195 (11th
Cir. 2024)). In terms of supervisory experience, Plaintiff himself points to the fact that Mr. Belknap had been serving in the selected role as interim supervisor. See [Doc. 34, p. 8]; [Id. at p. 17]; [Doc. 34-3, p. 2]. Additionally, per the Air Force Manual, interviews were
discretionary. [Doc. 34-1, ¶ 20]. There is nothing discriminatory about requiring an interview for all candidates, a scenario clearly allowed by the applicable Air Force regulations. Just because earlier selections excluded an interview does not indicate that
this panel included an interview portion to carry out some discriminatory purpose aimed at Plaintiff. Selection officers may require an interview when they feel it is needed—hence the word discretionary. When specifically asked about Plaintiff’s qualifications as compared to Mr.
Belknap, Ms. Burgess explained that “[t]he number of years of experience doesn’t mean he has the right kind of experience. Longevity doesn’t get a person the job. They must meet the qualifications and have the right experience for the position. Most importantly,
they have to explain that in the interview.” [Doc. 25-6, p. 4]. Mr. Soltis added that while experience would be reflected as part of a resume review, “just because someone has been doing the job longer, doesn’t mean they are the best qualified” person for the job.
[Doc. 25-4, p. 4]. Mr. Givens admits that he did not initially approach Plaintiff for the role because “he can be confrontational, which is not a good character trait to have as a supervisor.” [Doc. 25-5, p. 5]. Nonetheless, Mr. Givens still expected Plaintiff to be
selected for the position, and “if he had done better in the interview, he would have been selected.” [Id.]. To the extent that Plaintiff accuses Mr. Givens specifically of harboring racial animus against him, this is easily contradicted by the record, which shows that Mr. Givens told Plaintiff that “[he is] a great engineer [ ] and [Mr. Givens
was] glad to have [Plaintiff] on [his] team. In terms of this position [Plaintiff’s] interview is what held [him] back . . .” [Doc. 27-9, p. 1]. Mr. Givens then offered to sit down with Plaintiff and give him feedback on that process and areas of improvement. [Id.] Beyond
Plaintiff’s pure speculation, nothing indicates that Mr. Givens had any racial animus toward Plaintiff whatsoever. At the end of the day, Plaintiff just doesn’t have any evidence of discriminatory animus that would lead a reasonable person to believe that he was denied the job based
on his race, color, or national origin. Plaintiff fervently believes he is the most qualified person for the job. But, the fact remains that, based primarily on Plaintiff’s subpar interview performance, the three panelists did not agree. And, unfortunately for
Plaintiff, his “personal belief that he was more qualified is not sufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent.” Rowell v. BellSouth Corp., 433 F.3d 794, 799 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Lee v. GTE Florida, Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1253–54 (11th Cir. 2000)).
The record remains crystal clear that although Plaintiff may have had the best resume, all three panelists found his interview performance to be well below the other candidates. Plaintiff’s interview — not his race, color or national origin — cost him the
job. The Court easily agrees. Bottom line, Plaintiff simply failed to offer any evidence that his race, color or national origin tainted the hiring process. And, without such evidence, Plaintiff cannot prevail. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 25]. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to ENTER Judgment in favor of Defendant and CLOSE this case.
SO ORDERED, this 4th day of March, 2026. S/ Tilman E. Self, III TILMAN E. SELF, III UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE