Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc.
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Opinions
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
This is a Fair Labor Standards Act case. Luis Carlos Josendis sued his former employer, Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc.,1 for unpaid overtime and back wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the “FLSA”),2 its implementing regulations, and Florida law. Wall to Wall moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for relief. Because Wall to Wall attached an affidavit [1297]*1297and a statement of undisputed facts to its motion, the district court converted the motion to a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(d) and gave the parties “a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that [was] pertinent to the motion.”3 Josendis did not avail himself of that opportunity until after the date the district court set for the completion of discovery, when he served Wall to Wall with a battery of discovery requests. Wall to Wall objected to this discovery and moved the court for a protective order under Rule 26(c).4 The court granted Josendis leave to engage in discovery limited to the issues presented in Wall to Wall’s motion, and sanctioned Josendis’s attorney pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(B) for abusing the discovery process.5
At the close of this limited discovery, the court granted Wall to Wall summary judgment on Josendis’s FLSA claim and dismissed his state law claim without prejudice. Josendis now appeals that ruling. He contends that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment and, alternatively, that, had the district court not limited his discovery as it did, he would have uncovered evidence that would have created material issues of fact. Josendis also appeals the district court’s sanctions order against his attorney.
This opinion is organized as follows. Part I describes the FLSA, the facts ger[1298]*1298mane to Josendis’s FLSA claim, and the proceedings in the district court. Part II addresses the limited discovery the district court afforded Josendis after the time for discovery had closed, reviews the court’s sanctions order, and concludes that neither decision constituted an abuse of discretion. Part III deals with and rejects Josendis’s challenges to the summary judgment. Part IV concludes.
I.
A.
The FLSA mandates that an “employee[]” who is “engaged in interstate commerce” must be paid an overtime wage of one and one-half times his regular rate for all hours he works in excess of forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).6 If a covered employee is not paid the statutory wage, the FLSA creates for that employee a private cause of action against his employer for the recovery of unpaid overtime wages and back pay. Id. § 216(b).7
As defined by the statute, and subject to certain exceptions not at issue here, an employee is “any individual employed by an employer.” Id. § 203(e)(1). The statutory definition of “employer” is similarly broad; it encompasses both the employer for whom the employee directly works as well as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interests of an employer in relation to an employee.” Id. § 203(d). We have accordingly held that the FLSA contemplates that a covered employee may file suit directly against an employer that fails to pay him the statutory wage, or may make a derivative claim against any person who (1) acts on behalf of that employer and (2) asserts control over conditions of the employee’s employment. See Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 637-38 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1511 (1st Cir.1983) (explaining that a person is derivatively liable if he is intimately involved in the day-to-day operations of an employer that would be directly liable under the FLSA)).
In order to be eligible for FLSA overtime, however, an employee must first demonstrate that he is “covered” by the FLSA. There are two possible types of FLSA coverage. See, e.g., Ares v. Manuel Diaz Farms, Inc., 318 F.3d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir.2003) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)). First, an employee may claim “individual coverage” if he regularly and “directly partieipat[es] in the actual movement of persons or things in interstate commerce.” Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir.2006) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 776.23(d)(2) (2005); 29 C.F.R. § 776.24 (2005)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (mandating time-and-a-half for “employees ... engaged in [interstate] commerce or in the production of goods for [interstate] commerce”). Second, an employee is subject to enterprise coverage if he is “employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or [1299]*1299in the production of goods for commerce,” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), where commerce means “trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or between any State and any place outside thereof,” id. § 203(b), and an “enterprise” is the activities performed by a person or persons who are (1) engaged in “related activities,” (2) under “unified operation or common control,” and (3) have a “common business purpose,” id. § 203(r)(l).
In relevant part, an enterprise is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce if it
(i) has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or that has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person; and
(ii) is an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $500,000.
Id. § 203(s)(l)(A)(i) — (ii) (emphasis added). Alternatively, enterprise coverage is available to any employee of an enterprise “engaged in the operation of a hospital [or] an institution primarily engaged in the care of ... the aged ... who [also] reside on the premises of such institution.” Id. § 203(s)(l)(B). An employee may be subject to either type, or both types, of FLSA coverage. See Ares, 318 F.3d at 1056 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)).
In aid of that statutory language, the U.S. Department of Labor (the “DOL”) has issued interpretive regulations pertaining to both individual and enterprise coverage.8 We defer to those regulations when the statutory language is
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TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
This is a Fair Labor Standards Act case. Luis Carlos Josendis sued his former employer, Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc.,1 for unpaid overtime and back wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the “FLSA”),2 its implementing regulations, and Florida law. Wall to Wall moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for relief. Because Wall to Wall attached an affidavit [1297]*1297and a statement of undisputed facts to its motion, the district court converted the motion to a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(d) and gave the parties “a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that [was] pertinent to the motion.”3 Josendis did not avail himself of that opportunity until after the date the district court set for the completion of discovery, when he served Wall to Wall with a battery of discovery requests. Wall to Wall objected to this discovery and moved the court for a protective order under Rule 26(c).4 The court granted Josendis leave to engage in discovery limited to the issues presented in Wall to Wall’s motion, and sanctioned Josendis’s attorney pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(B) for abusing the discovery process.5
At the close of this limited discovery, the court granted Wall to Wall summary judgment on Josendis’s FLSA claim and dismissed his state law claim without prejudice. Josendis now appeals that ruling. He contends that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment and, alternatively, that, had the district court not limited his discovery as it did, he would have uncovered evidence that would have created material issues of fact. Josendis also appeals the district court’s sanctions order against his attorney.
This opinion is organized as follows. Part I describes the FLSA, the facts ger[1298]*1298mane to Josendis’s FLSA claim, and the proceedings in the district court. Part II addresses the limited discovery the district court afforded Josendis after the time for discovery had closed, reviews the court’s sanctions order, and concludes that neither decision constituted an abuse of discretion. Part III deals with and rejects Josendis’s challenges to the summary judgment. Part IV concludes.
I.
A.
The FLSA mandates that an “employee[]” who is “engaged in interstate commerce” must be paid an overtime wage of one and one-half times his regular rate for all hours he works in excess of forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).6 If a covered employee is not paid the statutory wage, the FLSA creates for that employee a private cause of action against his employer for the recovery of unpaid overtime wages and back pay. Id. § 216(b).7
As defined by the statute, and subject to certain exceptions not at issue here, an employee is “any individual employed by an employer.” Id. § 203(e)(1). The statutory definition of “employer” is similarly broad; it encompasses both the employer for whom the employee directly works as well as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interests of an employer in relation to an employee.” Id. § 203(d). We have accordingly held that the FLSA contemplates that a covered employee may file suit directly against an employer that fails to pay him the statutory wage, or may make a derivative claim against any person who (1) acts on behalf of that employer and (2) asserts control over conditions of the employee’s employment. See Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 637-38 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1511 (1st Cir.1983) (explaining that a person is derivatively liable if he is intimately involved in the day-to-day operations of an employer that would be directly liable under the FLSA)).
In order to be eligible for FLSA overtime, however, an employee must first demonstrate that he is “covered” by the FLSA. There are two possible types of FLSA coverage. See, e.g., Ares v. Manuel Diaz Farms, Inc., 318 F.3d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir.2003) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)). First, an employee may claim “individual coverage” if he regularly and “directly partieipat[es] in the actual movement of persons or things in interstate commerce.” Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir.2006) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 776.23(d)(2) (2005); 29 C.F.R. § 776.24 (2005)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (mandating time-and-a-half for “employees ... engaged in [interstate] commerce or in the production of goods for [interstate] commerce”). Second, an employee is subject to enterprise coverage if he is “employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or [1299]*1299in the production of goods for commerce,” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), where commerce means “trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or between any State and any place outside thereof,” id. § 203(b), and an “enterprise” is the activities performed by a person or persons who are (1) engaged in “related activities,” (2) under “unified operation or common control,” and (3) have a “common business purpose,” id. § 203(r)(l).
In relevant part, an enterprise is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce if it
(i) has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or that has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person; and
(ii) is an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $500,000.
Id. § 203(s)(l)(A)(i) — (ii) (emphasis added). Alternatively, enterprise coverage is available to any employee of an enterprise “engaged in the operation of a hospital [or] an institution primarily engaged in the care of ... the aged ... who [also] reside on the premises of such institution.” Id. § 203(s)(l)(B). An employee may be subject to either type, or both types, of FLSA coverage. See Ares, 318 F.3d at 1056 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)).
In aid of that statutory language, the U.S. Department of Labor (the “DOL”) has issued interpretive regulations pertaining to both individual and enterprise coverage.8 We defer to those regulations when the statutory language is
ambiguous or the statutory terms are undefined. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-83, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (requiring deference where the statutory language is ambiguous and the rule-making agency’s regulation is a reasonable interpretation of Congress’s intent); see also Falken v. Glynn Cnty., Ga., 197 F.3d 1341, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 1999) (deferring to the DOL’s implementing regulation defining “fire protection activities,” a term left undefined by the FLSA). But we apply the statutory language as written when it is unambiguous. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781; see also Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 1947, 147 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000) (“[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd — is to enforce it according to its terms.”) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (internal quotations marks omitted)). Regulations entitled to Chevron deference bind us in regard to the ambiguous text only. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843—45, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-83; cf. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 164, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944) (applying limited deference to agency interpretations that, “while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance”); Pugliese v. Pukka Dev., Inc., 550 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir.2008) (applying Skidmore deference).
[1300]*1300One DOL regulation is at issue here: 29 C.F.R. § 776.23, which seeks to extend enterprise coverage to all employees engaged in construction work that is “closely or intimately related to the functioning of existing instrumentalities and channels of interstate commerce or facilities for the production of goods for such commerce.” Id. § 776.23(c). The relevant regulatory text reads:
All employees who are employed in connection with construction work which is closely or intimately related to the functioning of existing instrumentalities and channels of interstate commerce or facilities for the production of goods for such commerce are within the scope of the [FLSA]. Closely or intimately related construction work includes the maintenance, repair, reconstruction, redesigning, improvement, replacement, enlargement, or extension of a covered facility. If the construction project is subject to the [FLSA], all employees who participate in the integrated effort are covered, including not only those who are engaged in work at the site of construction such as mechanics, laborers, handymen, truckdrivers, watchmen, guards, timekeepers, inspectors, checkers, surveyors, payroll workers, and repair men, but also office, clerical, bookkeeping, auditing, promotional, drafting, engineering, custodial and stock room employees.
Id. (footnote omitted).9 Under § 776.23(c), then, any employee who takes part in qualifying construction work, or is employed by an employer engaged in such work, would ostensibly be entitled to enforce the FLSA’s wage provisions and collect FLSA mandated overtime — so long as § 776.23 is given the force of law.
The present appeal requires us to interpret the FLSA’s individual and enterprise coverage provisions in light of the following operative facts and also to decide whether § 776.23(c) is deserving of Chevron deference. Now, having laid the statutory and regulatory groundwork for this appeal, we turn to those facts.
B.
Wall to Wall, formerly a Florida corporation engaged in the home restoration and repair business,10 employed Josendis from November 8, 2006, until February 11, 2008 — excepting two months in 2007 when Josendis worked for a separate construction enterprise. Jorge Acosta and Eloísa Lim, both codefendants, managed Wall to Wall and its employees and were directly involved in all of Wall to Wall’s business activities during that period.
While working for Wall to Wall, Josendis was assigned to various construction projects in and around southern Florida. His duties included plumbing and tiling; window, door, floor, and kitchen installation; and stucco and granite work. He worked more than forty hours a week and earned approximately $120 per day. Wall to Wall did not, however, pay Josendis the overtime rate mandated by 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) for covered employees.
C.
Josendis ceased working for Wall to Wall on February 11, 2008, after he got into a dispute over back wages he claimed that Wall to Wall still owed to him. On [1301]*1301July 25, 2008, he brought this lawsuit against Wall to Wall, Acosta, and Lim (collectively “Wall to Wall”),11 seeking back wages, unpaid overtime, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses under the FLSA in Count I, and Fla. Stat. § 448.08, in Count II.12
Wall to Wall responded on September 3, 2008, with a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a statement of undisputed facts, an affidavit provided by Acosta, and a verified copy of Wall to Wall’s 2006 federal tax return.13 Wall to Wall argued that the complaint should be dismissed because its allegations — coupled with the statement of undisputed facts, the affidavit, and the federal tax return— showed that Josendis was ineligible for overtime compensation under the FLSA via individual coverage and enterprise coverage. As Acosta stated in his affidavit, (1) Josendis had not engaged in interstate commerce as a Wall to Wall employee, and (2) the $249,719 of income reported in the federal tax return evidenced that Wall to Wall had not satisfied the gross receipts threshold of $500,000 in any of the years in which Wall to Wall had employed Josendis.14 In its motion to dismiss, Wall to Wall asked the district court to treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d), to the extent the court looked beyond the four corners of the complaint to reach the merits of its motion.
On September 19, 2008, Josendis filed a Verified Amended Complaint (the “VAC”).15 The VAC presented the district [1302]*1302court with additional factual allegations not found in his original complaint. In particular, the VAC stated that (1) Josendis performed at least fifteen kitchen replacements for Wall to Wall, at a minimum average value of $8,000 apiece, in 2007; (2) he, like all of Wall to Wall’s other employees, worked on multiple jobs and at multiple job sites while employed by Wall to Wall; (3) in 2007, in addition to its regular remodeling work, Wall to Wall had also been hired to renovate twenty to thirty apartments at the Miami Jewish Home and Hospital for the Aged (the “Miami Home”); (4) Wall to Wall earned approximately $56,000 for one of the many jobs it completed in 2007; and (5) management provided Wall to Wall employees with the use of approximately ten company-owned vehicles as transportation to and from job sites.
The VAC also alleged that Acosta had regularly asked Wall to Wall’s clients to make out checks payable directly to him or Lim instead of to Wall to Wall in exchange for not charging those clients sales tax, inferring that Wall to Wall’s 2006 federal tax return had underreported the gross sales for that year and that Wall to Wall’s 2007 and 2008 returns would likewise underreport the gross receipts. Extrapolating from the number of employees working for Wall to Wall, the number of jobs completed by Wall to Wall, the expenses sustained by Wall to Wall in completing those jobs, and Josendis’s knowledge of Wall to Wall’s average prices for specific jobs, the VAC alleged that Josendis’s “belie[f|” was that Wall to Wall had gross sales in excess of $500,000 in both 2007 and 2008.
On October 3, 2008, Wall to Wall moved the district court to dismiss the VAC for failure to state a claim for relief or, alternatively, for summary judgment on the same grounds asserted in its September 3 motion: Josendis was ineligible for overtime compensation under the FLSA via individual and enterprise coverage. Josendis filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion on October 24, 2008. In the memorandum, he stated that he could not adequately defend against the motion, if treated as a motion for summary judgment, without additional time to complete the discovery he thought would be necessary to establish FLSA coverage.
Despite the memorandum’s statement that additional time was needed for discovery, Josendis did nothing to obtain this necessary information while Wall to Wall’s motion was pending. In fact, nothing happened in the case until January 16, 2009, when the district court entered an order stating that it was treating Wall to Wall’s motion as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) and granting Josendis “additional time for discovery.” The order required him to “propound [all] discovery requests seeking information necessary to defend against the instant Motion for Summary Judgment” by noon on February 3, 2009. The court gave Wall to Wall fifteen days to respond to such discovery requests and Josendis ten additional days to, if necessary, supplement his memorandum in opposition to the motion.
When the clock struck noon on February 3, Josendis had not noticed the taking of any depositions or served Wall to Wall with any interrogatories or requests for admissions or production of documents. Nonetheless, approximately two hours after the court-imposed deadline had passed, Josendis faxed to defense counsel three [1303]*1303sets of extensive discovery requests and a “notice” that he intended to serve a subpoena on the Miami Home to obtain all of the financial records relating to its dealings with Wall to Wall.
The first set of discovery requests, sent at approximately 2:09 p.m., requested the production of twenty-three different categories of documents, covering the entire field of Wall to Wall’s operations. Josendis’s second set of requests, faxed forty-four minutes later, sought thirteen different admissions, most of which pertained to Wall to Wall’s vehicles, equipment, employees, job history, and work at the Miami Home. His third set of requests, sent around 3:43 p.m., included nine interrogatories pertaining to Wall to Wall’s customers, employees, and accounting practices.
The next day, February 4, 2009, Josendis moved the district court nunc pro tunc to extend the discovery period by four hours, i.e., to permit the discovery he had launched the afternoon of February 3, or, alternatively, for leave to conduct limited discovery pertaining only to Wall to Wall’s work at the Miami Home. Josendis sought discovery of the work done at the Miami Home based on 29 C.F.R. § 776.23. To summarize, Josendis claimed that, because the Miami Home was a hospital or institution for the care of the aged, it was an enterprise involved in interstate commerce for purposes of FLSA coverage, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(l)(B), and that evidence of Wall to Wall’s work at the Miami Home would accordingly help him demonstrate that he was subject to enterprise coverage by virtue of 29 C.F.R. § 776.23(c).16 The Miami Home’s financial records could also have helped Josendis to establish that Wall to Wall had at least $500,000 in gross sales in 2007.
Wall to Wall opposed Josendis’s motion on two grounds. First, the requests, including the subpoena Josendis intended to have issued to the Miami Home, were untimely.17 Second, it argued that the requests were unnecessarily voluminous insofar as Josendis sought information that was not necessary to challenge the basis of Wall to Wall’s motion for summary judgment — that Josendis could not establish FLSA coverage.
The court granted in part and denied in part Josendis’s nunc pro tunc motion and denied Josendis’s request for leave to subpoena the Miami Home’s records. To the [1304]*1304extent the court found Josendis’s discovery requests germane to Wall to Wall’s motion, it gave him leave to propound such requests. The court, however, tailored certain requests to the issues before the court: individual coverage and enterprise coverage. The court denied the motion as to the remainder of Josendis’s requests, describing those requests as “overbroad and irrelevant” — meaning they did not pertain to Josendis’s or Wall to Wall’s involvement in interstate commerce or to the amount of Wall to Wall’s gross receipts — or as “redundant.”18 The district court then construed Wall to Wall’s opposition to the discovery demands Josendis made after the February 3 deadline as a motion for a Rule 26(c) protective order with respect to “overbroad and irrelevant” or “redundant” requests the court disallowed.19 The court granted the protective order and, based on the scattershot nature of Josendis’s discovery demands, concluded that sanctions against Josendis’s attorney, Gary A. Costales, were called for. As the court stated, “[i]t is obvious that the drafting of [Josendis’s] instant discovery requests was done without any effort to constrain them within the bounds set for discovery at this time: responding to [Wall to Wall’s summary judgment motion].” The court subsequently ordered Costales to pay Wall to Wall $330 in attorney’s fees. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(3), 37(a)(5).20
Wall to Wall thereafter complied with the court’s instructions and completed, to the best of its ability, the ordered discovery.21 On March 5, 2009, after reviewing the discovery Wall to Wall provided, Josendis filed a supplement to his opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The supplement incorporated Josendis’s [1305]*1305earlier response to the motion and argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact under both theories of FLSA liability: individual and enterprise coverage. As to the former theory, Josendis argued that his use of Wall to Wall’s vehicles and the Global Positioning Satellite (“GPS”) units installed in them presented a material issue of fact regarding individual coverage. As to the latter theory, Josendis argued that issues of fact remained as to whether (1) Wall to Wall had two or more employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that had moved in or had been produced for commerce and (2) Wall to Wall grossed more than $500,000 per year in 2006, 2007, or 2008. He also argued that 29 C.F.R. § 776.23(c) precluded summary judgment on his regulatory claim of enterprise coverage.22
Josendis found support for these arguments in the factual allegations of the VAC,23 the discovery Wall to Wall provided, the affidavits of Troy Allen Whitten and Wilard Dulanto, and the inferences reasonably drawn from this body of evidence. In their affidavits, Whitten and Dulanto stated that they had witnessed Wall to Wall customers pay Acosta, Lim, or individuals cooperating with Acosta and Lim, for work done by Wall to Wall employees. Whitten added that, in a conversation with Acosta, Acosta told him that Wall to Wall stood to make $13,000 to $14,000 per apartment remodeled at the Miami Home and that Wall to Wall might be asked to remodel all of Miami Homes’ 101 apartments. Whitten said that he “believed” that in 2007 and 2008, Wall to Wall had “repaired or worked on at least thirty-one (31) [of those] apartments.” Dulanto made a similar statement of belief in his affidavit. Whitten also said that he had witnessed a Wall to Wall secretary ordering over the internet — from a source she described as being “outside the State of Florida” — parts for the GPS units installed in each of the company’s vehicles. Whit-ten lacked knowledge, though, of where the parts were actually manufactured, stored, or shipped.
On March 6, the day after filing his supplement, Josendis filed an affidavit augmenting what Whitten said about the GPS units. In his affidavit, Josendis stated that he “regularly drove company vans which [he] believed were owned by [Wall to Wall] during the time of [his] employment” in 2006 and 2007, that those vans were equipped with GPS units, and that he used a GPS unit every day.
The district court granted summary judgment to Wall to Wall on Count I of the VAC on March 30, 2009. Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 606 F.Supp.2d 1376 (S.D.Fla.2009). The court refused to consider many of the VAC’s factual allegations because they did not comport with Rule 56(e)’s personal knowl[1306]*1306edge requirement;24 two of Josendis’s sworn “facts” were prefaced with the phrase “[i]t is believed,” and the rest were qualified by Josendis’s statement that they were true “to the best of [his] knowledge and belief.” Id. at 1379-80 (emphasis added). After discarding these allegations, all that was left to support Josendis’s claim of individual coverage were his and Whitten’s affidavit statements regarding the use of Wall to Wall’s vehicles and GPS units. The court held that those statements were insufficient as a matter of law to establish individual coverage because they did not yield a permissible inference that Josendis engaged in interstate commerce when he used the vehicles or GPS units. Id. at 1383-84.
The district court also found nothing in the VAC and the affidavit Josendis attached to his supplemented opposition to Wall to Wall’s motion that called into question, much less controverted, Acosta’s affidavit statement that Wall to Wall had not grossed over $500,000 in sales in 2006, 2007, or 2008. Id. at 1380-81. Because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to that prerequisite for enterprise coverage, the court held that summary judgment was also warranted on that theory. Id. at 1381,1383.
The district court then addressed and discarded Josendis’s regulatory claim of enterprise coverage. Specifically, the court held that Josendis’s reliance on 29 C.F.R. § 776.23 was misplaced for two reasons: (1) the proof that the Miami Home was a hospital or home for the aged as described by 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(l)(B) was insufficient as a matter of law; and (2) section 776.23(c) was not entitled to Chevron deference because it concerned an unambiguous section of the FLSA. Id. at 1381-82. Having reached the foregoing holdings, the court entered a final judgment in favor of Wall to Wall.25
Josendis now appeals the district court’s ruling. As indicated in the introduction to this opinion, Josendis submits that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment, and that the court would have agreed had it afforded him the discovery he requested. He also appeals the court’s sanctions ruling against Costales.26 We turn first to the discovery and sanctions issues, then to the merits of the summary judgment disposition.
II.
The district court has broad discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 to compel or deny discovery; we therefore review the court’s discovery rulings for an abuse of that discretion. Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 243 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir.2001). “Discretion means the district court has a ‘range of choice, and that its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.’ ” Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. [1307]*13072005) (quoting Guideone Elite Ins. Co. v. Old Cutler Presbyterian Church, Inc., 420 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir.2005)). Accordingly, under “the abuse of discretion standard, we will leave undisturbed a district court’s ruling unless we find that the district court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.” Guideone, 420 F.3d at 1325. Moreover, discovery rulings will not be overturned “unless it is shown that [they] resulted in substantial harm to the appellant’s case.” Iraola & CIA S.A v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 325 F.3d 1274, 1286 (11th Cir.2003) (quoting Carmical v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 117 F.3d 490, 493 (11th Cir.1997) (citation and internal quotation mark omitted)).
First, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Josendis’s request to subpoena the Miami Home for the financial records arising out of its dealings with Wall to Wall. The court ordered that all discovery requests be submitted before noon on February 3, 2009. The court therefore had discretion to grant Wall to Wall a protective order in response to any discovery requests that were not submitted at or before that deadline. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b) (reserving for the district courts broad authority to control the scope of discovery). And though the court had the authority to grant a post hoc extension of the discovery deadline for good cause, it was under no obligation to do so; in fact, we have often held that a district court’s decision to hold litigants to the clear terms of its scheduling orders is not an abuse of discretion. E.g., Bearint ex rel. Bearint v. Dorell Juvenile Grp., Inc., 389 F.3d 1339, 1348-49 (11th Cir.2004) (up holding under an abuse of discretion standard a district court’s decision excluding an expert report disclosed after the deadline the court had established for its submission).
That premise is especially true when, as here, the party who seeks a reprieve from the court has not yet taken any discovery. Josendis’s original complaint was filed on July 25, 2008; the discovery deadline was February 3, 2009; and, in between, Josendis propounded no interrogatories or requests and scheduled no depositions to obtain evidence that he had to have known would be, by the terms of his complaint, relevant to his claims. As such, because the district court had no duty to permit any discovery, its decision to deny Josendis’s subpoena request as untimely noticed was not an abuse of discretion. See id.-, see also Corwin v. Walt Disney World Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1249 (11th Cir.2007) (indicating that a district court commits an abuse of discretion only where it has clearly acted contrary to the law or the facts).
Second, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying in part Josendis’s motion for additional time to begin discovery and granting Wall to Wall a protective order covering the denied discovery requests — in other words, the court was within the range of its broad discretion in declaring that the denied requests were either overbroad, irrelevant, or otherwise redundant. The court had previously ordered the parties to conduct only that discovery necessary to enable Josendis to respond to Wall to Wall’s summary judgment motion. The ordered discovery, then, was intentionally limited by the court to the issues raised in that motion; those issues — individual and enterprise coverage under the FLSA — defined the contours of permissible discovery. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d) (requiring district courts to give the parties “a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion” (emphasis added)). Any discovery requests that were not directly tied to individual and enterprise coverage accordingly exceeded the scope of the ordered [1308]*1308discovery and, cabined by the court’s discretion, were subject to denial and the issuance of a protective order. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)-(c); see also Washington v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 959 F.2d 1566, 1570-71 (11th Cir.1992) (finding no abuse of discretion when the district court denied discovery requests that were irrelevant to class certification).
As we explain in more detail below, the court correctly determined that the denied discovery requests were either outside the scope of its discovery order or otherwise flawed. At the very least, the court’s decision was within its “range of choice” allotted under the abuse of discretion standard. See Betty K Agencies, 432 F.3d at 1337. For that reason alone, we must uphold the district court’s decision to deny in part Josendis’s motion and grant the protective order.
1.
The court disallowed the following requests for production in Plaintiffs First Request for Production to Defendants as “overbroad” or “irrelevant,” Order at 2-3, Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., No. 0:08-cv-61175-WJZ, 2009 WL 290241 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2009):
1. Any and all documents that support, evidence, prove or relate to the allegations made in the [VAC].
2. Any and all documents that support, evidence, prove or relate to any of [Wall to Wall’s] affirmative defenses.
3. All of the income reporting documents submitted by [Wall to Wall] to the Internal Revenue Service regarding the Plaintiff for [three calendar years prior to the filing of Josendis’s original complaint on July 25, 2008 (the “relevant period of time”)].
4. All of the income reporting documents submitted by [Wall to Wall] to the Internal Revenue Service regarding all hourly employees who worked for [Wall to Wall] for the relevant period of time....
5. All of the income reporting documents submitted by [Wall to Wall] to the Internal Revenue Service regarding all employees who held the same position or similar position(s) as Plaintiff who worked for [Wall to Wall] for the relevant period of time....
6. All time sheets, time cards, time records, attendance records and documents which evidence the hours worked by all employees of [Wall to Wall] for the relevant period of time.
7. Any and all documents relating to any wage claim and wage and hour complaint filed by any of [Wall to Wall’s] former or current employees for alleged violations of the federal and/or state wage-hour statutes.
9. For each pay period commencing on the relevant period of time, all paychecks, pay reports, pay stubs, computer reports or printouts or other documents evidencing the amount paid to all employees of [Wall to Wall] for the relevant period of time.
10. All documents maintained pursuant to ... 29 C.F.R. § 516.2 [ (requiring employers to “maintain and preserve payroll or other records” pertaining to employees covered by the FLSA) ] relating to all employees.
11. All documents evidencing the reporting of the earnings of all employees of [Wall to Wall] to all third parties, which shall include, but shall not be limited to, insurance carriers, worker’s compensation carriers, insurance agents and/or representatives, federal, state and local taxing authorities and the Florida Unemployment Compensation Fund.
[1309]*130912. To the extent any part of the remuneration and/or compensation paid to [Wall to Wall’s] employees was not reflected in their respective paychecks, produce all documents evidencing the amount, date and nature and purpose of all such payments.
13. All documents pertaining the [sic] employees named in ... [the VAC].
15. All documents pertaining to [Wall to Wall’s] work at the kitchen remodeling projects mentioned in ... the [VAC],
16. All documents pertaining to vehicles owned or leased by [Wall to Wall] for [Wall to Wall’s] construction or related businesses.
21. All documents pertaining to any remodeling or construction work performed by [Wall to Wall] for the relevant time period.
23. All bank records pertaining to [Wall to Wall] for the relevant period of time.27
Record, vol. 1, no. 33, Exhibit A at 3-5.
Josendis argues that these requests could be grouped into three categories: (1) documents in which Wall to Wall reported its income to the federal government; (2) documents pertaining to the earnings of employees; and (3) documents concerning Wall to Wall’s past and present jobs. He also suggests that each of these document categories could have potentially led to the discovery of admissible evidence, namely circumstantial evidence that Wall to Wall had $500,000 or more in gross sales in any of the three years in which it employed Josendis. Presumably, Josendis reasons that, if he could have established that Wall to Wall’s expenditures had exceeded a cer[1310]*1310tain sum, he could have then argued that Wall to Wall must have met the statutory threshold for enterprise coverage. And seeing as he raised the possibility that Acosta had intentionally underreported Wall to Wall’s income in 2006, Josendis asks that we overrule the district court and order the court to grant him additional discovery.28
Because the district court accurately characterized the denied requests, however, we cannot do as he asks. For instance, request 1, which seeks every document that relates to any of the allegations made in the VAC, was fairly construed as over-broad. Request 2 was certainly irrelevant, as Wall to Wall never once raised the possibility of asserting an affirmative defense to Josendis’s claims. Requests B through 6 and 9 through 12 were also arguably irrelevant — they were aimed at subsidiary questions of how many hours Josendis and his fellow employees worked and how much they were paid, the answers to which would have little to nothing to do with interstate commerce or Wall to Wall’s gross sales. Indeed, evidence obtained by virtue of those requests would only have been relevant if the court eventually found that Josendis was a covered employee under one type of FLSA coverage and then certified a class encompassing all of Wall to Wall’s employees.
Furthermore, request 7 was entirely unmoored from issues of individual and enterprise coverage. Instead, it seeks information relating to potential past violations of wage-hour statutes, including violations of state laws outside the scope of the federal wage statute at issue here. And the remaining requests — 13, 15, 16, 21, and 23 — are all overbroad; each request solicits a broad spectrum of documents that, at first glance, would include a great number of materials unrelated to interstate commerce or the measure of Wall to Wall’s sales in any fiscal year.
In that sense, it does not matter that Josendis believes he might have obtained circumstantial evidence of Wall to Wall’s gross receipts from the documents he requested. The district court’s denial was not unreasonable based on the limitations it placed on discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) and its inherent power to control discovery under Rule 26. We will not upset a district court’s discovery ruling where, as now, its decision was within the realm of reasonable choices allotted to it. See Corwin, 475 F.3d at 1249; Betty K Agencies, 432 F.3d at 1337.
2.
The same is true in regard to the following requests for admissions:
1. [The attached are] pictures of some of the vehicles owned or leased by ... [Wall to Wall] ... at some point during 2005-2008.
2. At any time during 2005-2008, [Wall to Wall] leased more than five vans or other vehicles for its construction work.
3. At any time during 2005-2008, [Wall to Wall] leased more than eight vans or other vehicles for its construction work.
[1311]*13114. At any time during 2005-2008, [Wall to Wall] lease or leased [sic] more than ten vans or other vehicles for its construction work.
5. At any time during 2005-2008, [Wall to Wall] leased at least one other vehicle for its construction work.
12. [Wall to Wall] remodeled at least fifteen ... kitchens during 2008.
18. [Wall to Wall] remodeled at least fifteen ... kitchens during 2007.29
Record, vol. 1, no. 33, Exhibit C at 1-2.
The district court denied these requests as either “overbroad” or “irrelevant.” Order at 3, Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., No. 0: 08-cv-61175-WJZ, 2009 WL 290241 (S.D.Fla. Feb. 5, 2009). Josendis again claims, however, that had Wall to Wall been compelled to admit the foregoing facts he could have eventually proved that Wall to Wall’s gross receipts were in excess of the $500,000 statutory threshold. Yet again we see no error in the court’s characterizations of these requests. Requests 1 through 5 all deal with the vehicles Wall to Wall provided to its employees for their use in traveling to and from job sites. But any connection between Wall to Wall’s decision to lease vehicles and its gross receipts was, at best, tenuous.30 The court, then, made a permissible choice in denying Josendis’s motion as to requests 1 through 5.
Neither did the court abuse its discretion in deeming requests 12 and 13, both of which pertained to the number of kitchen renovations Wall to Wall employees performed during Josendis’s employment, irrelevant to the question of FLSA coverage. The issue was not whether Wall to Wall actually performed remodeling work, but whether Wall to Wall had grossed $500,000 or more in sales per year as a result of that work. For that reason, the [1312]*1312court’s decision on requests 12 and 13 was an acceptable exercise of its discretion. See Corwin, 475 F.3d at 1249; Betty K Agencies, 432 F.3d at 1337.
3.
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Josendis’s motion to compel as applied to the following interrogatories:
2. Please list the names of all businesses for which [Wall to Wall] performed any work, or provided services to, at any time between 2005-2008.
5. Has [Wall to Wall] ever leased or purchased any vehicles, or has some third party (or either individual Defendant) leased or purchased any vehicle for the use of [Wall to Wall], If so, please state the make, model and year of the vehicle, and the dates owned or leased.
6. Please provide the last known names, addresses and phone numbers for all of the individuals referenced in Plaintiffs complaint and alleged to be current or former employees of [Wall to Wall].
7. Provide the names, last known addresses and telephone numbers of all employees of [Wall to Wall] who worked for [Wall to Wall] at any time during the three years preceding the time that Plaintiffs Complaint was filed.
8.State the name, address and telephone number of all Certified Public Accounting firms, accounts, accounting services, bookkeeping services and payroll services who provided services to [Wall to Wall] during the relevant period of time and include the name of each individual accountant or bookkeeper who performed such services if the Certified Public Accounting firm, accounting firm or bookkeeping firm is or was a partnership, corporation or professional association.31
Record, vol. 1, no. 33, Exhibit B at 5, 8-11.
The court denied Josendis’s motion to compel as to each of these interrogatories because they were either overbroad, irrelevant, or “redundant to other discovery requests already allowed.” The court was correct that the denied interrogatories were not specifically tailored to the issues raised in Wall to Wall’s summary judgment motion. Interrogatories 1, 2, and 5, for example, were overbroad and irrelevant based on our prior discussion. Interrogatories 1 and 2 were also redundant based on the district court’s decision to compel Wall to Wall to respond in limited fashion to interrogatory 1, which requested that Wall to Wall provide the addresses of [1313]*1313all of its construction or remodeling jobs during the relevant time period, and to interrogatories 3 and 4, which requested that Wall to Wall list the clients for whom Wall to Wall and/or Josendis had performed any work between 2005 and 2008.
Interrogatories 6 and 7, which again sought information about other Wall to Wall employees employed at the same time as Josendis, were irrelevant for the same reasons that the just-discussed requests were irrelevant. Also, interrogatory 8, concerning Wall to Wall’s accounting practices, was redundant based on the court’s prior decision to compel Wall to Wall to produce “[a]ll records reflecting a summary of the gross income of [Wall to Wall] including, but not limited to, IRS tax records, bank statements, balance sheets and records of any financial audit(s).”32
Ultimately, then, we find nothing in the record to indicate that the district court abused its discretion in denying Josendis’s motion to compel. As applied to the above requests and interrogatories, the court’s order denying the motion was within the bounds of reason and the law, and we will not disturb it. See Corwin, 475 F.3d at 1249; Betty K Agencies, 432 F.3d at 1337. We now turn to the question of sanctions.
“[T]he standard of review for an appellate court in considering an appeal of sanctions under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 37 is sharply limited to a search for abuse of discretion and a determination that the findings of the trial court are fully supported by the record.” Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 775 F.2d 1440, 1447 (11th Cir.1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district court abuses its discretion only when it misapplies the law or bases its decision on findings of fact that are clearly erroneous. Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1137 n. 69 (11th Cir.2000). Therefore, we will not reverse the imposition of sanctions under Rule 37 unless we are “left with a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of relevant factors.” Dorey v. Dorey, 609 F.2d 1128, 1135-36 (5th Cir.1980) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 506 (4th Cir.1977)).33
A district court may award sanctions under Rule 37(a)(5)(B) only if, upon considering a Rule 26(c) motion for a protective order set against a Rule 37(a) motion to compel discovery, the court (1) denies the motion to compel because it was not “substantially justified,” and (2) issues the protective order.34 Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)(B). In that case, unless “other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust,” the court may award the prevailing party the “reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion” to compel, including attorney’s fees. Id. Those sanctions may issue against the party seeking discovery, that party’s attorney, or both. Id. Rule 37(a)(5)(C) similarly permits a court to [1314]*1314“apportion the reasonable expenses” incurred in opposing a motion to compel if the court denies in part and grants in part a party’s motion to compel.
In the context of these two rules, a motion to compel is “substantially justified” so long as “there is a genuine dispute, or if reasonable people could differ as to [the appropriateness of the contested action].” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (comparing Rule 37’s “substantially justified” language to a similar provision in the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)). Thus, as would be expected, the award of sanctions under Rule 37(a)(5) turns on the specifics of each individual case.
Here, the district court awarded $330, the amount of attorney’s fees incurred by Wall to Wall in opposing Josendis’s post-deadline discovery demands, in the form of sanctions against Costales. The court did so only after finding that Costales had “obviousfly]” drafted his discovery requests “without any effort to constrain them within the bounds set for discovery” by the court. Based on its impression of Costales’s work, the district court then determined that the requests were “not substantially justified” in light of the limitations imposed. Costales now argues that the court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions because the discovery requests should not have been denied or, alternatively, were made in good faith, as the court’s discovery order did not specifically indicate how far into the evidence it would allow Josendis to reach in opposing summary judgment. Costales also argues that his service as a member of the federal bar, during which time he had only once been sanctioned prior to this controversy, counsels against the imposition of sanctions in this case.
The record, however, fully supports the district court’s holding that the denied discovery requests were not “substantially justified.” As we previously explained, the court did not err in deeming those requests overbroad, irrelevant, or redundant. Neither do we believe that the district court’s finding that reasonable people could not differ as to the appropriateness of the denied requests was “clearly erroneous,” Mincey, 206 F.3d at 1137 n. 69, or a “clear error of judgment,” Dorey, 609 F.2d at 1136. Moreover, although we laud Costales for his prior service, past good behavior is no defense against present misconduct. Accordingly, we uphold the court’s imposition of sanctions against Costales and proceed to discuss the appropriateness of the court’s order granting summary judgment to Wall to Wall.
III.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and apply the same legal standards as the district court, “construing the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Centurion Air Cargo, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 420 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir.2005). We affirm a district court’s grant of summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c) (2009) (amended 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 [1315]*1315L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to rebut that showing by producing affidavits or other relevant and admissible evidence beyond the pleadings. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; see also Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1249 (11th Cir.2007) (explaining that evidence inadmissible at trial may not generally be considered at summary judgment). All affidavits must be based on personal knowledge and must set forth facts that would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322-23 (11th Cir.1999), and the non-moving party cannot satisfy its burden if the rebuttal evidence “is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative” of a disputed fact, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citation omitted). When the non-moving party fails under this rubric to “make a showing sufficient to establish” an essential element of its case, summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552; see also Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir.2001) (“[T]he plain language of Rule 56[ ] mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”(third alteration in original)).
There appears to be no dispute in this case that Josendis was an employee of Wall to Wall, an employer, or that Acosta and Lim would be derivatively liable for unpaid back wages and FLSA overtime if Josendis were entitled to recover against Wall to Wall. The question we must face, then, is whether Wall to Wall’s 2006 tax return35 combined with the factual statements contained in the VAC and the affidavits before the district court — those executed by Acosta, Josendis, Whitten, and Dulanto — would be (1) admissible at trial and (2) sufficiently probative of an essential element of his case to raise a genuine issue of material fact.36
As explained below, Josendis has failed to make a showing sufficient to survive summary judgment. In short, he has not satisfied his burden of coming forward with any admissible evidence beyond mere speculation to rebut Wall to Wall’s evidence on the essential elements of individual and enterprise coverage.
An employee is subject to individual coverage if he is directly and regularly “engaged in” interstate commerce. Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir.2006). As Thome explains, indirect or sporadic involvement in commerce is insufficient:
[F]or an employee to be “engaged in commerce” under the FLSA, he must be directly participating in the actual movement of persons or things in interstate commerce by (i) working for an instrumentality of interstate commerce, e.g., transportation or communication industry employees, or (ii) by regularly using the instrumentalities of interstate commerce in his work, e.g., regular and [1316]*1316recurrent use of interstate telephone, telegraph, mails, or travel.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 493-98, 63 S.Ct. 1248, 1249-52, 87 L.Ed. 1538 (1943)).
For Josendis to survive summary judgment, he needed to produce admissible evidence that he (1) worked directly for an instrumentality of interstate commerce, or (2) regularly used the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. See Corwin, 475 F.3d at 1249. Josendis was not working directly for an instrumentality of interstate commerce. Josendis would therefore have had to come forward with evidence, beyond mere speculation, that, as a part of his work duties, he repeatedly traveled to and from Wall to Wall job sites outside of Florida or used an item moving in interstate commerce. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Josendis did not make a showing that he directly engaged in interstate commerce as a part of his responsibilities and, thus, cannot survive summary judgment on this record. See Thorne, 448 F.3d at 1266 (“The Supreme Court has articulated that it is the intent of Congress to regulate only activities constituting interstate commerce, not activities merely affecting commerce.” (emphasis added)).
First, Josendis never traveled outside of Florida for purposes of his employment with Wall to Wall. In the affidavit attached to Wall to Wall’s summary judgment motion, Acosta declared that Josendis had no interaction with Wall to Wall’s customers and only performed construction and remodeling work within Florida. Josendis presented no evidence to dispute Acosta’s declaration. Because Josendis did not travel across state lines as part of his work for Wall to Wall, he cannot claim individual coverage based on any of the travel he completed.
Second, Josendis produced no evidence to indicate that he ever participated in the actual movement of any object in interstate commerce. As noted previously, Josendis never claimed that he used Wall to Wall’s vehicles to travel to a job site outside Florida. Instead, Josendis claimed only that Wall to Wall had purchased or leased vehicles that had, at some point, moved in interstate commerce and equipped those vehicles with GPS units that took parts ordered over the internet from other states.37 While the point of origin of these vehicles may be relevant under a theory of enterprise coverage, their origin is irrelevant to the issue of individual coverage — namely, whether Josendis himself directly participated in the actual movement of persons or things in interstate commerce. See id. at 1266. Furthermore, although parts for the GPS units may have come from outside Florida, Josendis did not show that he was directly involved in the acquisition or use of those parts; instead, Josendis’s own evidence shows that he used fully assembled GPS units entirely within Florida. Thus, Josendis was not participating in the “actual movement of persons or things in interstate commerce,” and is not covered individually by the FLSA. See id. at 1268 (holding that an employee engaged in restoration work for an enterprise that operated entirely intrastate was not individually covered under the FLSA based on use of goods that previously moved in interstate commerce). [1317]*1317In sum, Josendis produced nothing to create a material issue of genuine fact as to his “direct[] participation]” in interstate commerce under an individual coverage theory. Id. at 1266.
An enterprise like Wall to Wall is subject to the FLSA’s overtime wage provision, so long as it (1) has at least two employees engaged in interstate commerce or the production of goods for interstate commerce, or who handle, sell, or otherwise work on goods or materials that had once moved or been produced for in interstate commerce, and (2) has gross sales of at least $500,000 in sales annually. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(l)(A)(i)-(ii) (2006). Acosta’s affidavit was, once again, evidence in support of Wall to Wall’s position that none of Wall to Wall’s employees utilized goods or materials that had previously moved in interstate commerce and that Wall to Wall never grossed, at minimum, $500,000 in sales in 2006, 2007, or 2008. Therefore, to create a genuine issue of material fact, Josendis needed to provide concrete, admissible evidence that Wall to Wall met both statutory requirements.38 Josendis, however, did not make that showing.
At the outset, we hold that Josendis failed to provide any concrete evidence that Wall to Wall had gross sales of at least $500,000 in any one year. This alone means that his argument must fail. The district court aptly described the problem with Josendis’s opposition to Wall to Wall’s motion for summary judgment: in his opposition, Josendis principally relied on conjecture and speculation, not admissible evidence based on personal knowledge. For example, the VAC and the affidavits Josendis submitted to the district court do nothing more than describe how much Wall to Wall stood to make on each of its projects — evidence that, on its own, does not establish that Wall to Wall satisfied the statutory threshold. The VAC and the affidavits then extrapolate from that evidence a “belief’ that Wall to Wall’s gross sales met or exceeded $500,000 annually. Whatever the merit of Josendis’s belief, his showing before the district court was not enough to preclude summary judgment. Cf. Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir.2002) (interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s personal knowledge requirement to require more than affidavits based only on “information and belief’); Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 851 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that assertions of fact based “[u]pon information and belief’ are insufficient (alteration in original)).
The relevant factual allegations found in the VAC indicate that Wall to Wall employed twenty employees from 2006 through 2008, paid those employees $120 per week, utilized approximately ten vehicles, earned $56,000 for one project completed in 2007, charged approximately $8,000 for each of fifteen kitchen remodels performed by Josendis in 2007, and, as evidenced by Josendis’s knowledge that Acosta had received personal checks for Wall to Wall’s work, potentially underreported its income to the Internal Revenue Service in 2007. Each of these allegations was “true and correct ... to the best of [Josendis’s] knowledge and belief.” The [1318]*1318VAC then concluded with Josendis twice alleging that “[i]t is believed, based on [the foregoing allegations] that [Wall to Wall] had gross sales of more than ... $500,000 ... in [2007 and 2008].”
Whitten’s affidavit likewise provided some evidence that Acosta had been paid personally for Wall to Wall’s work, as Whitten stated that, at Acosta’s direction, he had personally cashed at least one check from a Wall to Wall client for $5,000. Furthermore, Whitten indicated that he “believe[d]” Wall to Wall had completed work on thirty-one apartments at the Miami Home at a minimum average cost of $13,000 to $14,000 per apartment.39 At most, this evidence establishes that Wall to Wall potentially earned $56,000 for one job in 2007; approximately $120,000 for kitchen remodels also in 2007; $5,000 for an unknown project at an unknown date; and about $434,000 for work at the Miami Home over a two-year period in 2007 and 2008.
But as Josendis and Whitten did not ground their projections in admissible evidence concretely establishing the true measure of Wall to Wall’s gross sales per year, nor did they explain how they came to their belief that Wall to Wall had earned $500,000 in any one of the relevant years, we cannot accept their word on the matter.40 Even accepting that the evidence establishes that Wall to Wall earned the amounts identified above, Josendis still fails to show that in any one year Wall to Wall met the $500,000 threshold; pointing to estimated income obtained at some unknown point over a two-year period was simply not sufficient.
Unreliable conjecture that Wall to Wall worked on a certain number of apartments, presented as a “belief’ without any basis in ascertainable fact, was not the type of admissible evidence required to survive a motion for summary judgment. See Corwin, 475 F.3d at 1249 (stating that evidence inadmissible at trial generally may not be considered at summary judgment). At the summary judgment stage, such “evidence,” consisting of one speculative inference heaped upon another, was entirely insufficient. See Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005). Absent more “significantly probative” evidence of Wall to Wall’s gross sales, Anderson, All U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511, Josendis cannot establish that Wall to Wall’s gross sales met the FLSA’s gross sales requirement for enterprise coverage, see 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(l)(A)(ii). This is true even when the evidence upon which Josendis relies is viewed in the light most favorable to him. See Centurion Air Cargo, 420 F.3d at 1149.
Having found that Josendis did not make a sufficient showing to establish that Wall to Wall’s annual gross sales reached the $500,000 statutory threshold, we need not dwell on the other element necessary to establish enterprise coverage — whether the use of the vehicles, parts for the GPS device, and any other object that Josendis claims he handled qualifies as a “good or material that has been moved” previously in interstate commerce. In Polycarpe v. E & S Landscaping Service, Inc., 616 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir.2010) (per curiam), this court carefully analyzed the language of [1319]*1319§ 203(s)(l)(A), providing the framework for any future analysis. In doing so, the Polycarpe court once more rejected the “coming to rest” doctrine as a basis for claiming that a good or material that had previously moved in interstate commerce can somehow lose its interstate character if it “comes to rest” prior to the intrastate purchase by a business. See id. at 1221 (“An erroneous view of FLSA enterprise coverage — one that hangs on what is called the ‘coming to rest’ doctrine — is at odds with this statutory text.”).
At the same time, however, the Polycarpe panel also highlighted the continued applicability of the “ultimate-consumer exception” found in the statutory text itself. Id. at 1222 (“Included in this definition of ‘goods’ is a clause often referred to as the ultimate-consumer exception.”); see also 29 U.S.C. § 203(i) (“‘Goods’ means goods (including ships and marine equipment), wares, products, commodities, merchandise, or articles or subjects of commerce of any character, or any part or ingredient thereof, but does not include goods after their delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor thereof." (emphasis added)). Congress failed to define the term “materials” in the FLSA, so we attempted to do so in Polycarpe. The Polycarpe panel concluded that the term “materials” in the FLSA means “tools or other articles necessary for doing or making something.” 616 F.3d at 1223-24 (noting that the best definition of materials is the one that does not “impliedly repeal” any of the statutory definition of “goods”). As that panel noted, the distinction between whether an object is a good, where the ultimate-consumer exception applies, or a material, where there is no exception, is a crucial one. See id. at 1222 (“We must be able to distinguish ‘goods’ from ‘materials’ to know whether the ultimate-consumer exception might apply: the exception applies to some ‘goods’ but never to ‘materials.’ ”).
Because we find, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to him, that Josendis failed to show that Wall to Wall generated gross sales of $500,000 in any one year, we need not engage in the herculean task of determining whether vehicles, such as cars and trucks; parts of a GPS unit; and other tools and supplies, such as paint, tape, drywall, or nails are best characterized as “goods” or, alternatively, “materials” under the FLSA. Likewise, we need not then determine whether the “goods” were subject to the ultimate-consumer exception. Josendis, therefore, failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to Wall to Wall’s sales, and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment.
Finally, we also concur in the district court’s rejection of Josendis’s regulatory argument. Josendis seeks to claim enterprise coverage based on 29 C.F.R.. § 776.23(c), which purports to bring “within the scope” of the FLSA all employees engaged in construction work, including maintenance and repair work, that is “closely or intimately related” to a covered enterprise. Josendis claims that this coverage is available to him by virtue of his remodeling work at the Miami Home, which he contends is an “enterprise engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce” under 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(l)(B), which defines a covered enterprise as one “engaged in the operation of a hospital, [or] an institution primarily engaged in the care of ... the aged ... who reside on the premises of such institution.” Josendis asserts that we must, under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, [1320]*1320848-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-83, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), defer to the DOL’s regulatory language and find enterprise coverage applicable here.
The district court disagreed with Josendis and refused to apply Chevron deference for two reasons. First, the court found insufficient evidence in the record to determine whether the Miami Home was a facility for interstate commerce pursuant to § 203(s)(l)(B) — that is, whether the Miami Home was a hospital or institution engaged in the care of aged individuals residing on its premises. Second, the district court held that, even assuming the Miami Home was an interstate facility, § 776.23(c) was not a binding interpretation of the statutory text.
While we express no opinion on the district court’s first ground for denying enterprise coverage under § 776.23(c), we find that the court correctly determined that Chevron deference is unwarranted. We apply Chevron deference when an agency properly exercises its authority, expressly or implicitly delegated by Congress, to interpret an ambiguous statute, and then promulgate rules and regulations carrying the force of law. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44, 104 S.Ct. at 2782; see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 2171, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (holding that Chevron deference applies “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority”). We do not apply Chevron deference, however, when a statutory command of Congress is unambiguous or the regulation is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82. Where the statutory language is clear, agency regulations have no effect. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 129 S.Ct. 1058, 1063-64, 172 L.Ed.2d 791 (2009) (holding that if the statutory text is unambiguous then we apply the statute according to its terms).
The FLSA’s text concerning enterprise coverage, at least as it relates to Josendis’s case, is clear and unambiguous. An employee must be employed “in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce” in order to be entitled to FLSA overtime under an enterprise coverage theory. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2006). We, like the district court, believe that this text can only be construed to cover employees actually employed by the covered enterprise; in any event, it cannot stretch so far as to accommodate employees employed by a third party that performs sporadic work for a covered enterprise.
Josendis was not employed in a covered enterprise;41 as we previously explained, [1321]*1321Wall to Wall was entitled to summary judgment because, as Josendis’s employer, it did not satisfy the statutory annual gross sales requirement found in 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(l)(A)(ii). Furthermore, Josendis never alleged that he was actually employed by the Miami Home — potentially a FLSA-covered enterprise pursuant to § 203(s)(l)(B). In fact, Josendis clearly characterized the work he completed at the Miami Home as being the work of Wall to Wall. Therefore, under the FLSA’s clear terms, Josendis’s regulatory theory fails, and summary judgment for Wall to Wall was also proper on that ground.
IV.
Having found no error in the district court’s discovery decisions, imposition of sanctions, or its order granting summary judgment in favor of Wall to Wall, we hereby AFFIRM the district court’s decision in this case.
AFFIRMED.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
662 F.3d 1292, 81 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 137, 18 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 577, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23003, 2011 WL 5589277, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/josendis-v-wall-to-wall-residence-repairs-inc-ca11-2011.