USCA11 Case: 20-13422 Date Filed: 09/13/2021 Page: 1 of 15
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-13422 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-23708-UU
JOE PYATT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
AECOM TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(September 13, 2021)
Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 20-13422 Date Filed: 09/13/2021 Page: 2 of 15
Joe Pyatt, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order granting
AECOM Technical Services’ motion for summary judgment in his employment
discrimination suit under the Florida Civil Rights Act. Mr. Pyatt also appeals the
denial of his motion to extend discovery. After careful review of the parties’ briefs
and the record, we affirm.
I
A
On July 7, 2017, AECOM hired Mr. Pyatt for an entry-level position after a
referral from one of its employees, Samuel Worthy, who met Mr. Pyatt at a college
fair. Mr. Worthy subsequently raised concerns about Mr. Pyatt turning in
unacceptable work product, failing to follow instructions, having problems
accepting and implementing feedback, and disregarding instructions. He relayed
these concerns to their supervisor, Gorky Charpentier, in emails dating from March
through April of 2018. On May 7, 2018, at a performance review, managers and
administrators at AECOM handed Mr. Pyatt a performance improvement plan
(“PIP”) addressing his performance and behavior issues.
On June 6, 2018, at another performance review, Mr. Pyatt was “belligerent
and argumentative” to his supervisor, Mr. Charpentier. The next day, Mr. Pyatt sent
an email to AECOM’s human resources department stating that on October 31,
2017—Halloween of the previous year—Mr. Worthy had brought a black mask to
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work that Mr. Pyatt considered to be “a notorious representation of black face which
is used to mock African Americans.” A member of AECOM’s employee relations
and compliance group, Teresa Pownall, was assigned to investigate the mask
incident and found no evidence of discrimination.
Mr. Pyatt’s poor work performance continued, and Mr. Charpentier discussed
it with him. Mr. Pyatt then sent an email to Ms. Pownall reporting Mr. Charpentier
for “unethical behavior.” Ms. Pownall once again investigated the incident but
found no evidence to substantiate Mr. Pyatt’s claim of unethical behavior. On
September 11, 2018, Ms. Pownall spoke with Mr. Pyatt, who informed her that he
had been working with a different project manager. He described work as calm and
claimed things were on a “corrective measure.”
On October 1, 2018, Mr. Pyatt had car trouble after leaving work. He asked
the security guard to use the phone to call for assistance. Mr. Pyatt waited in the
lobby and was seen slouching by the security guard who approached him and
informed him he could not sleep there. Mr. Pyatt asserts that the security guard
threatened to call the police on him.
Witnesses explained that Mr. Pyatt was yelling and acting aggressive towards
the security guard. Ms. Pownall’s investigation revealed that a witness advised
security personnel at the building next door to contact 911 “due to security and safety
concerns.” As a result of Ms. Pownall’s investigation, Carlos Garcia, AECOM’s
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Vice President, Florida Transportation State Lead, telephoned Mr. Pyatt on October
9, 2018, and terminated his employment. Neither Mr. Charpentier nor Mr. Worthy
participated in the decision to terminate Mr. Pyatt.
B
Mr. Pyatt filed an action in Florida state court in January of 2019 asserting
claims for race discrimination and retaliation against AECOM. AECOM removed
the case from state court to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1332. On November 12, 2019, Mr. Pyatt filed a second amended complaint
in the district court adding two counts to his original claims.1
In the parties’ joint scheduling report, Mr. Pyatt sought to limit the time to
respond to interrogatories and requests for admission to two weeks and proposed a
trial date in April of 2020. AECOM proposed that trial be held later, in September
of 2020. In December of 2019, the district court issued a scheduling order providing
that all discovery must be completed by April 3, 2020, and setting trial for July of
2020. The order provided that “[t]o the extent this Order conflicts with the Local
Rules, this order supersedes them.” The time allotted for discovery fell between the
1 The only relevant claim on appeal is Mr. Pyatt’s race discrimination claim as set forth in Count One. Mr. Pyatt also alleged retaliation (Count Two), harassment and a hostile work environment (Count Three), and wrongful termination (Count Four). The district court dismissed Counts Three and Four with prejudice, and it granted summary judgment to AECOM on Count Two. On appeal, Mr. Pyatt does not challenge these rulings. Accordingly, any issues relating to Counts Two, Three, and Four are abandoned. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). 4 USCA11 Case: 20-13422 Date Filed: 09/13/2021 Page: 5 of 15
“standard” and “express” tracks set out in the Local Rules and did not specify
whether the case had been assigned to either track.
On March 2, 2020, Mr. Pyatt filed his first motion to extend discovery,
arguing that he was still collecting documents, was forced to change his strategy,
and would need to subpoena additional witnesses. In a paperless order, the district
court denied that motion. It ordered the parties to appear before a magistrate judge
for a discovery conference to resolve any outstanding discovery issues. That
conference took place in March of 2020.
On April 14, 2020, Mr. Pyatt filed a second motion to extend discovery
arguing that discovery was not complete and that he needed to submit additional
discovery requests to prove key material facts in his case. The district court denied
the motion, concluding that Mr. Pyatt’s arguments did not establish good cause to
warrant a delay.
AECOM moved for summary judgment, asserting that Mr. Pyatt could not
establish a prima facie case of race discrimination or demonstrate pretext. In
support, AECOM submitted declarations by Mr. Garcia, Mr. Worthy, Mr.
Charpentier, and Ms. Pownall as well as a statement of undisputed material facts.
First, AECOM argued that it fired Mr. Pyatt for his poor performance and his
altercation with a building security guard, both of which were justified. Mr. Pyatt’s
argument that AECOM’s criticism of his job performance constituted an adverse
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employment action was insufficient to support a discrimination claim, and Mr. Pyatt
could not identify a similarly situated non-African-American employee who was not
terminated for engaging in an altercation. Second, AECOM argued that the only
evidence of alleged discrimination that Mr. Pyatt identified was that Mr. Worthy
brought a black Halloween mask to the office. Moreover, it noted that Mr. Pyatt
conceded that Mr. Garcia, not Mr. Worthy, fired him, and there was no evidence of
any discriminatory animus by Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Pyatt opposed the motion, responding that he brought forth substantial
evidence to prove his claim and to demonstrate that he was treated differently than
other employees with regards to using paid time off when not given any work. He
attached several exhibits, including company emails and memoranda, a summary of
audio recordings, discovery requests and responses, and pages from his deposition.
In a deposition, an AECOM employee stated that he came to the office
frequently on weekends and could charge overtime if it was work-related. The
employee also said that he saw Mr. Pyatt at the office on weekends several times.
Mr. Pyatt referred to “material facts” but did not respond to AECOM’s statement of
undisputed material facts or submit a statement of his own. He referenced audio
recordings which were not provided to the district court.
The district court granted AECOM’s motion. It concluded that (1) Mr. Pyatt
failed to establish that he was treated less favorably than a similarly situated
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individual outside his protected class; (2) AECOM presented legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons supported by unrefuted evidence for terminating him; and
(3) Mr. Pyatt failed to establish that those reasons were merely pretext for racial
discrimination.
II
We review a district court’s application of its local rules for abuse of
discretion. See Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1267 n.22 (11th Cir. 2008). In
doing so, we give “great deference to a district court’s interpretation” of its rules.
See Clark v. Hous. Auth. of Alma, 971 F.2d 723, 727 (11th Cir. 1992).
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to extend discovery for an
abuse of discretion. See Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d
1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 2011). Generally, we review pro se pleadings liberally.
Nevertheless, a district court’s discovery rulings “will not be overturned unless it is
shown that they resulted in substantial harm to the appellant’s case.” Id. at 1307
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Harrison v. Culliver, 746
F.3d 1288, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that a party must show, “beyond
conclusory assertions, how the court’s ruling resulted in substantial harm to his
case”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment. See
Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010). The question
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is whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, shows that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. at 1263–64.
III
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), the district court must issue a
scheduling order that limits the time to complete discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(3). Local Rule 16.1 for the Southern District of Florida governs pretrial
procedure in civil actions and provides for three case management tracks: expedited,
standard, and complex. See S.D. Fla. L.R. 16.1(a)(2). The expedited track, for non-
complex cases that can be tried in one to three days, provides that discovery shall be
completed between 90 to 179 days from the scheduling order. See S.D. Fla. L.R.
16.1(a)(2)(A). The standard track case, for cases requiring three to ten days of trial,
provides for discovery to be completed within 180 to 269 days. See S.D. Fla. L.R.
16.1(a)(2)(B). Local Rule 16.1 states that, in determining which track to assign a
case, the court will consider certain factors, including “the complexity of the case,
[the] number of parties, [the] number of expert witnesses, [the] volume of evidence,
[any] problems locating or preserving evidence, [the] time estimated by the parties
for discovery and [the] time reasonably required for trial, among other factors.” S.D.
Fla. L.R. 16.1(a)(3).
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Mr. Pyatt argues, for the first time on appeal, that the district court incorrectly
applied Local Rule 16.1(a)(2)(B) when issuing the scheduling order. Mr. Pyatt states
that he was entitled to 180 to 269 days to complete discovery from the date of the
December 2019 scheduling order under Local Rule 16.1(a)(2)(B).
AECOM responds that Mr. Pyatt never raised this argument before the district
court and, thus, has forfeited it. Moreover, it asserts that Mr. Pyatt invited the alleged
error because he asked for a shorter period for discovery. Substantively, AECOM
contends that the district court properly applied Local Rule 16.1.
Because Mr. Pyatt raises this issue for the first time on appeal, he has forfeited
it. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330–31 (11th Cir.
2004). In any event, when the district court set the discovery deadline for April 3,
2020, it correctly considered the parties’ joint planning and scheduling report,
including Mr. Pyatt’s specific request that the court shorten the discovery period and
schedule trial for April of 2020. Therefore, even if the issue were not forfeited, Mr.
Pyatt failed to explain how the district court abused its discretion.
IV
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, the district court’s scheduling order
“may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 16(b)(4) (emphasis added). To establish good cause, a party seeking an extension
of a scheduling order must establish that it was unable to meet the applicable
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deadlines “despite due diligence;” otherwise, modification is precluded. See Sosa v.
Airprint Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1418 (11th Cir. 1998). “[W]e have often held that
a district court’s decision to hold litigants to the clear terms of its scheduling orders
is not an abuse of discretion.” Josendis, 662 F.3d at 1307 (“[T]hough the court had
the authority to grant a post hoc extension of the discovery deadline for good cause,
it was under no obligation to do so.”). See also Bearint ex rel. Bearint v. Dorell Juv.
Grp., Inc., 389 F.3d 1339, 1348–49 (11th Cir.2004) (upholding a district court’s
decision to exclude an expert report disclosed after the deadline expired for
submission). We construe pro se pleadings liberally, but nevertheless require pro se
parties to follow procedural rules. See Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th
Cir. 2007).
Mr. Pyatt argues that the court erred in denying his second motion to extend
discovery because he did not have 14 months to complete discovery, as his case was
not removed to federal court until September of 2019, and he was unable to enforce
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or subpoena out-of-state witnesses prior to that
date. Mr. Pyatt asserts that limiting the discovery period also violated his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process. He contends that the district court should have
applied a proportionality standard in the discovery process and considered that the
cost of discovery to AECOM was negligible because the documents were easily
accessible to it.
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AECOM responds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
both requests for extensions of the scheduling order. It argues that Mr. Pyatt did not
provide any good cause or valid reason for why he failed to complete discovery
during the 14-month discovery period. AECOM contends that Mr. Pyatt never
argued below that he could not enforce the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prior to
removal or that the state court did not have jurisdiction to subject out-of-state
witnesses to discovery, and those arguments are being raised for the first time on
appeal. Further, AECOM asserts that these arguments lack merit as the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure permit discovery, and Mr. Pyatt never subpoenaed any out-
of-state witnesses.
Mr. Pyatt replies that the issue is not whether the district court abused its
discretion in the denial of the motions to extend discovery, but whether the
procedural rules in place violate his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
Mr. Pyatt says that he did need to subpoena out-of-state witnesses, as Ms. Pownall
and the investigator assigned to his case were out-of-state.
To support his second motion to extend discovery, Mr. Pyatt argued only that
the discovery necessary to prove key material facts in his case was not completed.
He failed to explain, however, why he was unable to complete discovery prior to
expiration of the scheduling order deadlines and did not address due diligence. See
Sosa, 133 F.3d at 1419 (concluding that a party’s lack of steps taken to acquire the
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information earlier in the discovery period was a factor indicating a lack of diligence
in pursuing a claim). He also failed to raise any argument about his rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment until this appeal, and this argument is thus forfeited. See
Access Now, 385 F.3d at 1330.
Even if Mr. Pyatt had established good cause, the decision to modify a final
scheduling order was ultimately at the discretion of the district court. See Josendis,
662 F.3d at 1307. Since Mr. Pyatt failed to show good cause for the extension, the
district court did not err when it denied Mr. Pyatt’s second motion to extend
discovery. See id.
V
A motion for summary judgment should be granted when “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
“Summary judgment is improper [i]f a reasonable fact finder could draw more than
one inference from the facts, and that inference creates a genuine issue of material
fact.” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation and internal
quotation omitted).
Under the Florida Civil Rights Act, an employer may not discriminate based
on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. See
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Fla. Stat. §§ 760.01(b), 760.10. “Because the FCRA is modeled on Title VII, Florida
courts apply Title VII caselaw when they interpret the FCRA.” Jones v. United
Space All., LLC, 494 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007). When a plaintiff relies on
circumstantial rather than direct evidence to establish discrimination, we generally
apply the burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d
791, 798 (11th Cir. 2000).
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) he belongs to
a protected class, (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) he was
qualified to perform the job in question, and (4) his employer treated similarly
situated employees outside of the class more favorably. See Lewis v. City of Union
City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220–21 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc); Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 232 F.3d 836, 842–43 (11th Cir. 2000). To satisfy the fourth prong, the
plaintiff must establish that a comparator is “similarly situated in all material
respects,” such that, objectively, the plaintiff and comparator “cannot reasonably be
distinguished.” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1218, 1227–28 (internal quotations omitted). A
similarly situated comparator will ordinarily have engaged in the same basic
misconduct as the plaintiff, been subject to the same employment policy, guideline,
or rule, shared the same supervisor, and shared the plaintiff’s employment or
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disciplinary history. See id. (noting, however, that a discrepancy between formal
job titles is generally unnecessary).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the
defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Id. at
1221. If the defendant carries that burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that “the defendant's proffered reason was merely a pretext for unlawful
discrimination.” Id. at 1220–21 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Holifield, 115
F.3d at 1561–62).
Here, Mr. Pyatt failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.
Specifically, Mr. Pyatt did not present evidence to show (or permit a jury to find)
that other similarly situated employees were treated differently by AECOM. See id.
at 1221. Mr. Pyatt does not advance any evidence, nor could we find any in the
record, to suggest that other AECOM employees had aggressive incidents at the
office and were not terminated. Hence, under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
Mr. Pyatt cannot satisfy the first prong of the prima facie standard, and we affirm
the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this ground. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. 411 U.S. at 803.
VI
We affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Pyatt’s second motion to extend
discovery and grant of summary judgment in favor of AECOM.
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AFFIRMED.