HINES, Justice.
This Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Rasnick v. Krishna Hospitality, Inc., 302 Ga. App. 260 (690 SE2d 670) (2010), to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding as a matter of law that the defendant motel had no duty to comply with the plaintiffs requests to attempt a rescue of her husband from his medical peril. Finding no error in the judgment of the Court of Appeals, we affirm.
The facts as stated by the Court of Appeals included the following. Virginia Rasnick (“Rasnick”) and her 77-year-old husband, Sidney Rasnick, lived in Texas. While on a work assignment in Georgia, Mr. Rasnick stayed at the Motel Jesup, which was owned and operated by Krishna Hospitality, Inc. (“Krishna”). He checked into the motel on March 6, 2006, and for a number of days thereafter reported to work and spoke with his wife several times a day. On the morning of March 13, a motel housekeeper found Mr. Rasnick lying on the floor of his motel room, unable to get up. The housekeeper informed the owner, who called 911. At about 12:30 p.m., an ambulance transported Mr. Rasnick to a nearby hospital, where he died a short time later. An autopsy revealed that he died from a combination of untreated coronary artery disease and enlargement of his heart. A cardiologist opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Mr. Rasnick would have survived had he received medical treatment on the evening of March 12.
Rasnick filed the present wrongful death action against Krishna, alleging, inter alia, negligence in that Rasnick had made numerous telephone calls to the motel the night before her husband died, and when she was unable to reach him, she alerted the motel operators of the possibility that her husband was in need of medical aid. However, the motel operators refused to comply with her requests to check on him. Rasnick maintained that the failure of Krishna’s personnel to heed her expressed concern amounted to a breach of [566]*566duty to render aid to a paying guest.1
Krishna moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that Georgia law did not impose a duty on it to investigate Mr. Rasnick’s condition and render or summon medical aid, if needed. The trial court granted Krishna’s motion for summary judgment, determining that Krishna had no legal duty to comply with Rasnick’s requests to check on her husband, and thus, there was no legal duty sufficient to support liability in negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding as a matter of law that Krishna had no duty to comply with Rasnick’s requests to attempt the possibly-needed rescue of her husband. Rasnick v. Krishna Hospitality, supra at 266 (1).
In order to have a viable negligence action, a plaintiff must satisfy the elements of the tort, namely, the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant, a breach of that duty, causation of the alleged injury, and damages resulting from the alleged breach of the duty. John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 278 Ga. 747, 751 (604 SE2d 822) (2004). The legal duty is the obligation to conform to a standard of conduct under the law for the protection of others against unreasonable risks of harm. Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 200 (296 SE2d 693) (1982). This legal obligation to the complaining party must be found, the observance of which would have averted or avoided the injury or damage; the innocence of the plaintiff is immaterial to the existence of the legal duty on the part of the defendant in that the plaintiff will not be entitled to recover unless the defendant did something that it should not have done, i.e., an action, or failed to do something that it should have done, i.e., an omission, pursuant to the duty owed the plaintiff under the law. City of Douglasville v. Queen, 270 Ga. 770 (1) (514 SE2d 195) (1999). The duty can arise either from a valid legislative enactment, that is, by statute, or be imposed by a common [567]*567law principle recognized in the caselaw. Murray v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 284 Ga. App. 263, 272 (4) (644 SE2d 290) (2007). In order to proceed on a tort claim based upon a failure to render aid, the plaintiff, as a threshold matter, must demonstrate that the defendant had a legal duty to render aid; even the actor’s realization that some action on his or her part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not, in and of itself, impose upon the actor the duty to undertake such action. Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 631, n. 2 (697 SE2d 779) (2010). The existence of a legal duty is a question of law for the court. City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26, 27 (1) (426 SE2d 861) (1993).
1. The gravamen of Rasnick’s claim of negligence is Krishna’s failure to act in response to her requests to check on her husband; thus, Rasnick has to show that Krishna had a legal obligation, i.e., a duty, to do so. But, this she cannot do. The Court of Appeals correctly cited the general principle that, “a person is under no duty to rescue another from a situation of peril which the former has not caused.” City of Douglasville v. Queen, supra at 773 (3). And, it noted that there is no evidence that Krishna caused Mr. Rasnick’s alleged underlying medical problems. Yet, Rasnick argues that there is the duty to investigate when it reasonably appears that a guest may be in need of assistance, that to summon aid is part of the basic duty of an innkeeper to protect guests from danger, and that this is not a new duty, but one with long support in the law. She cites Hillinghorst v. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 104 Ga. App. 731 (122 SE2d 751) (1961) and Newtown v. Candace, Inc., 94 Ga. App. 385 (94 SE2d 739) (1956); however, these cases do not provide support for Rasnick’s contention. They involve the well-settled principle that innkeepers have the duty to exercise ordinary care to provide their guests with premises that are reasonably safe for the guests’ use and occupancy. See OCGA § 51-3-1.2 Yet, Rasnick urges that inasmuch as danger for a motel guest can be external, like menace from criminal elements as in Newtown v. Candace, or internal, like smoke in the facility, such internal danger would include the occasion in which a guest becomes debilitated by a medical condition; thus, she maintains that the obligation at issue here is simply an application of the existing duty to ensure reasonably safe premises.
But, contrary to Rasnick’s argument, the alleged negligence in her suit cannot be credibly cast as a condition of the premises or akin [568]*568to a premises hazard like a smoke-filled building. Because any risk or •problem stemming from a medical condition unrelated to and not caused by the guest’s stay at the facility is not internal to the premises but rather internal to the guest.
2. Rasnick next requests that this Court explicitly adopt Section 314A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), which is entitled “Special Relations Giving Rise to Duty to Aid or Protect,” and provides:
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action
(a) to protect them from unreasonable risk of physical harm, and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others.
(2)
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HINES, Justice.
This Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Rasnick v. Krishna Hospitality, Inc., 302 Ga. App. 260 (690 SE2d 670) (2010), to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding as a matter of law that the defendant motel had no duty to comply with the plaintiffs requests to attempt a rescue of her husband from his medical peril. Finding no error in the judgment of the Court of Appeals, we affirm.
The facts as stated by the Court of Appeals included the following. Virginia Rasnick (“Rasnick”) and her 77-year-old husband, Sidney Rasnick, lived in Texas. While on a work assignment in Georgia, Mr. Rasnick stayed at the Motel Jesup, which was owned and operated by Krishna Hospitality, Inc. (“Krishna”). He checked into the motel on March 6, 2006, and for a number of days thereafter reported to work and spoke with his wife several times a day. On the morning of March 13, a motel housekeeper found Mr. Rasnick lying on the floor of his motel room, unable to get up. The housekeeper informed the owner, who called 911. At about 12:30 p.m., an ambulance transported Mr. Rasnick to a nearby hospital, where he died a short time later. An autopsy revealed that he died from a combination of untreated coronary artery disease and enlargement of his heart. A cardiologist opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Mr. Rasnick would have survived had he received medical treatment on the evening of March 12.
Rasnick filed the present wrongful death action against Krishna, alleging, inter alia, negligence in that Rasnick had made numerous telephone calls to the motel the night before her husband died, and when she was unable to reach him, she alerted the motel operators of the possibility that her husband was in need of medical aid. However, the motel operators refused to comply with her requests to check on him. Rasnick maintained that the failure of Krishna’s personnel to heed her expressed concern amounted to a breach of [566]*566duty to render aid to a paying guest.1
Krishna moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that Georgia law did not impose a duty on it to investigate Mr. Rasnick’s condition and render or summon medical aid, if needed. The trial court granted Krishna’s motion for summary judgment, determining that Krishna had no legal duty to comply with Rasnick’s requests to check on her husband, and thus, there was no legal duty sufficient to support liability in negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding as a matter of law that Krishna had no duty to comply with Rasnick’s requests to attempt the possibly-needed rescue of her husband. Rasnick v. Krishna Hospitality, supra at 266 (1).
In order to have a viable negligence action, a plaintiff must satisfy the elements of the tort, namely, the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant, a breach of that duty, causation of the alleged injury, and damages resulting from the alleged breach of the duty. John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 278 Ga. 747, 751 (604 SE2d 822) (2004). The legal duty is the obligation to conform to a standard of conduct under the law for the protection of others against unreasonable risks of harm. Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 200 (296 SE2d 693) (1982). This legal obligation to the complaining party must be found, the observance of which would have averted or avoided the injury or damage; the innocence of the plaintiff is immaterial to the existence of the legal duty on the part of the defendant in that the plaintiff will not be entitled to recover unless the defendant did something that it should not have done, i.e., an action, or failed to do something that it should have done, i.e., an omission, pursuant to the duty owed the plaintiff under the law. City of Douglasville v. Queen, 270 Ga. 770 (1) (514 SE2d 195) (1999). The duty can arise either from a valid legislative enactment, that is, by statute, or be imposed by a common [567]*567law principle recognized in the caselaw. Murray v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 284 Ga. App. 263, 272 (4) (644 SE2d 290) (2007). In order to proceed on a tort claim based upon a failure to render aid, the plaintiff, as a threshold matter, must demonstrate that the defendant had a legal duty to render aid; even the actor’s realization that some action on his or her part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not, in and of itself, impose upon the actor the duty to undertake such action. Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 631, n. 2 (697 SE2d 779) (2010). The existence of a legal duty is a question of law for the court. City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26, 27 (1) (426 SE2d 861) (1993).
1. The gravamen of Rasnick’s claim of negligence is Krishna’s failure to act in response to her requests to check on her husband; thus, Rasnick has to show that Krishna had a legal obligation, i.e., a duty, to do so. But, this she cannot do. The Court of Appeals correctly cited the general principle that, “a person is under no duty to rescue another from a situation of peril which the former has not caused.” City of Douglasville v. Queen, supra at 773 (3). And, it noted that there is no evidence that Krishna caused Mr. Rasnick’s alleged underlying medical problems. Yet, Rasnick argues that there is the duty to investigate when it reasonably appears that a guest may be in need of assistance, that to summon aid is part of the basic duty of an innkeeper to protect guests from danger, and that this is not a new duty, but one with long support in the law. She cites Hillinghorst v. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 104 Ga. App. 731 (122 SE2d 751) (1961) and Newtown v. Candace, Inc., 94 Ga. App. 385 (94 SE2d 739) (1956); however, these cases do not provide support for Rasnick’s contention. They involve the well-settled principle that innkeepers have the duty to exercise ordinary care to provide their guests with premises that are reasonably safe for the guests’ use and occupancy. See OCGA § 51-3-1.2 Yet, Rasnick urges that inasmuch as danger for a motel guest can be external, like menace from criminal elements as in Newtown v. Candace, or internal, like smoke in the facility, such internal danger would include the occasion in which a guest becomes debilitated by a medical condition; thus, she maintains that the obligation at issue here is simply an application of the existing duty to ensure reasonably safe premises.
But, contrary to Rasnick’s argument, the alleged negligence in her suit cannot be credibly cast as a condition of the premises or akin [568]*568to a premises hazard like a smoke-filled building. Because any risk or •problem stemming from a medical condition unrelated to and not caused by the guest’s stay at the facility is not internal to the premises but rather internal to the guest.
2. Rasnick next requests that this Court explicitly adopt Section 314A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), which is entitled “Special Relations Giving Rise to Duty to Aid or Protect,” and provides:
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action
(a) to protect them from unreasonable risk of physical harm, and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others.
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests.
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty to members of the public who enter in response to his invitation.
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection is under a similar duty to the other.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In support of engrafting Section 314A into Georgia law, Rasnick cites caselaw in other states which have considered the duty set out in the Restatement provision. But, the cited cases are distinguishable from the circumstances in this case. They involve situations in which the owner or operator of the premises had knowledge that its invitee was in imminent danger because of observation of the physical peril; no manner of investigation or inquiry was at issue. See, e.g., Baker v. Fenneman & Brown Properties, 793 NE2d 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (restaurant had a duty to provide reasonable assistance to customer who while paying cashier fell to floor, lost consciousness and began having convulsions); Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 633 A2d 84 (Md. 1993) (store owner had legal duty to call police when off-duty police officer was injured during assault in store parking lot); Drew v. LeJay’s Sportsmen’s Café, Inc., 806 P2d 301 (Wyo. 1991) (restaurant owner had duty to patron to summon medical assistance within reasonable time when patron choked on food and was in imminent need of medical assistance); Miller v. McDonalds Corp., 439 So2d 561 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (customer in hamburger restaurant involved in [569]*569argument with manager over alleged shortchanging shot by another customer; business owner has duty to exercise reasonable care to protect those who enter business); Starling v. Fisherman’s Pier, Inc., 401 So2d 1136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (drunken, passed out customer was left alone lying on a commercial pier in early hours of the morning close to the ocean and in imminent danger of rolling over unrestrained into water with full knowledge of operator’s employee and customer drowned; owner or operator of premises had duty to take at least minimal steps to safeguard inert figure); Hovermale v. Berkeley Springs Moose Lodge No. 1483, 271 SE2d 335 (W.Va. 1980) (action by widow against fraternal organization for wrongful death of member, who died of heart attack after being placed by fellow members in his automobile in parking lot; organization’s duty to render aid to ill or injured person).
The rights, duties, and liabilities of innkeepers are set forth in Article 1 of Chapter 21 of Title 43. See OCGA § 43-21-1 et seq. These statutes do not impose upon innkeepers the duty to rescue and do not expand an innkeeper’s duty of care for the personal safety of its guests beyond that required in our State’s caselaw. The General Assembly could have given innkeepers the duty to “investigate” or “check on” a guest, but it chose not to do so. And sound arguments can be made for that choice.
To require that an innkeeper monitor in any manner the possible health problems of a guest, which are not caused by or are unrelated to the stay at the facility, is not only unwarranted as a matter of law but unworkable as a matter of fact and practicality. Pretermitting significant policy considerations including the potential fiscal impact on the hotel/motel industry, threshold issues would include questions involving the scope of the duty and possible triggering events. What type of inquiry would or should cause the innkeeper to inquire into the guest’s state of health and from whom? Would the triggering inquiry have to be from a family member or would a friend or colleague or anyone with ostensible concern about the guest’s health situation suffice? Such questions become crucial because issues implicating the guest’s privacy are extant.
The Court of Appeals noted Rasnick’s claim that Krishna had “reasonable information suggesting the guest may need medical assistance,” thereby raising the matter of foreseeability, but it accurately concluded that such circumstance does not mandate the expansion of traditional tort concepts. See CSX Transp. v. Williams, 278 Ga. 888, 890 (608 SE2d 208) (2005); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 257 Ga. 131, 133 (356 SE2d 198) (1987); Murray v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., supra at 272 (4). This is so because the notion of legal duty must be tailored so that the “consequences of wrongs are limited to a controllable degree.” CSX Transp. v. Williams, supra at 890. While [570]*570issues of morality and humanity are certainly raised by the circumstances of this case, a moral or humane obligation does not compel the existence of a legal duty, the breach of which portends liability. See Lucas v. Cranshaw, 289 Ga. App. 510, 514, n. 14 (659 SE2d 612) (2008); McGarrah v. Posig, 280 Ga. App. 808, 810 (635 SE2d 219) (2006). To conclude otherwise in this case would be an epitomization of the adage “bad facts make bad law.” In light of a legislative reluctance to do so and in recognition of clear considerations of policy and pragmatism, we decline to judicially engraft into the caselaw of this State, the additional duty upon innkeepers to investigate or check on their guests to determine if they are in medical need, as urged by Rasnick. This holding is sufficient to decide this case, and thus, we need not determine now whether any duty to render or summon medical aid as may be set forth in Section 314A (2) should be adopted in Georgia.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals stands.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, C. J., Carley, P. J., and Benham, J., who dissent.