CSX CORPORATION v. THEARTIS OGLESBY

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: June 6, 2024
• Docket: A24A0027
• Status: Published

Opinion

FIFTH DIVISION MERCIER, C. J., MCFADDEN, P. J., and RICKMAN, J.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

June 6, 2024

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A24A0027. CSX CORPORATION et al. v. OGLESBY.

RICKMAN, Judge.

In this interlocutory appeal, CSX Corporation and CSX Transportation, Inc.

(collectively “CSXT”) appeal from the trial court’s order granting in part and

denying in part CSXT’s motion for summary judgment on negligence claims brought

against CSXT by Theartis Oglesby, who alleged that he had been injured when moving

a railcar. On appeal, CSXT contends, inter alia, that the trial court erred in finding

that CSXT had a legal duty to Oglesby to spot (park) the railcar in a particular

location. For the reasons that follow, we agree and reverse.

“[T]o prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must

demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact, so that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cowart v.

Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 623 (1) (a) (697 SE2d 779) (2010). This Court reviews an order

granting or denying summary judgment de novo and views “the evidence, and all

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the

nonmovant.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 624 (1) (a).

So viewed, the record shows that, in 2016, Oglesby worked as a supervisor at

Southland Wood Products. Southland was owned by the same family that owned

Griffin Lumber Company. Griffin shipped lumber products by rail, and CSXT

delivered railcars to Griffin once or twice a week.

The Griffin facility is served by a sidetrack that extends from CSXT’s main line

into Griffin’s property. A storage track extends from the sidetrack in the middle of

Griffin’s property. When CSXT delivers a railcar to Griffin, the CSXT engineer uses

the engine to push the railcar from CSXT’s mainline to the sidetrack and then to the

storage track. The engineer operates the engine while the CSXT conductor is on the

ground directing the engineer where to stop the car. After the railcar is stopped on the

storage track, the conductor applies the hand brake. The hand brake is located on an

elevated platform on one end of the railcar. It is manually operated by turning the

2 brake wheel clockwise, which tightens a chain and applies the railcar’s brakes. The

hand brake is released either by turning the wheel counterclockwise or pulling the

quick release lever next to the wheel. After the conductor applies the hand brake to a

car on the storage track, he instructs the engineer to push the railcar to test the brake.

The hand brake is applied and working effectively if the railcar’s wheels slide on the

rail rather than turn. If the hand brake is working properly, the conductor uncouples

the railcar from the train, which automatically applies the railcar’s air brake.

The Griffin storage track has a fall protection system consisting of four poles

next to the track with a wire running between the top of them. The fall protection

system is used by Griffin or Southland employees while putting a tarp over a loaded

railcar. The four poles create three slots for railcars to be spotted on the storage track.

The railcars must be spotted between the fall protection poles so the cars can be

loaded with a forklift. CSXT’s longtime conductor who regularly went to Griffin

testified he knew to spot railcars between the fall protection poles and that is what he

always did. The conductor also testified that anytime he interacted with Griffin

employees, they indicated that the railcars were in an appropriate location.

3 Oglesby testified that he was involved in moving railcars the entire time he was

employed at Southland. According to Oglesby, “a lot of times” a railcar that had been

spotted on the storage track needed to be moved to center it between the poles.

Oglesby’s supervisor estimated that railcars that had been spotted on the storage track

needed to be moved approximately two to three times per year. Oglesby testified that

the procedure for moving the railcars was to release the railcar’s air brakes, let the

railcar roll, and apply the hand brake to stop the railcar.

The engineer who regularly delivered railcars to Griffin testified that the only

situation in which he had known Griffin or Southland employees to move railcars was

if three cars had been delivered, which was not often. According to the engineer, they

could not spot more than two cars on the storage track because they were not allowed

to spot a car near the end of the track, so if Griffin was getting three cars delivered,

one of the cars would be spotted on the sidetrack. The engineer testified that he had

seen Griffin or Southland employees use a front-end loader to move a railcar that had

been spotted on the sidetrack. The conductor also testified that he had seen someone

at Griffin moving a railcar with a front-end loader. The conductor testified that he had

never seen Griffin or Southland employees moving railcars using the hand brake.

4 In September 2016, Oglesby attempted to move a railcar that had been spotted

on the storage track. At his deposition, Oglesby could not recall where the railcar was

spotted on the storage track or how far it needed to be moved. Oglesby mounted the

railcar’s brake platform and another employee released the railcar’s air brake. Oglesby

testified that the railcar started moving towards the end of the track, and he could not

stop the railcar using the hand brake. He could not remember if he turned the hand

brake clockwise or counterclockwise. The railcar struck a metal block located at the

end of the track. Oglesby was thrown from the railcar and broke his foot upon hitting

the ground.

Oglesby filed a complaint against CSXT, asserting that CSXT was negligent in

spotting the railcar in a place that required Oglesby to move the railcar and that the

hand brake was defective. CSXT filed a motion for summary judgment. CSXT

maintained that it was entitled to summary judgment on the negligent spotting claim

because it did not have a duty to spot the railcar in a particular location, CSXT could

not have reasonably foreseen that Southland employees would attempt to move the

railcar using the hand brake, and CSXT’s spotting of the railcar was not the proximate

cause of Oglesby’s injury. CSXT also contended that summary judgment should be

5 granted on Oglesby’s claim that the hand brake was defective because there was no

evidence supporting that claim.

After a hearing, the trial court granted CSXT’s motion for summary judgment

as to Oglesby’s claim that the hand brake was defective, but denied the motion as to

the negligent spotting claim. The trial court found that CSXT owed a duty to protect

Oglesby from “unreasonable risks of harm and take precautions commensurate with

the danger inherent in moving or otherwise loading and unloading railcars to reduce

the risk of foreseeable injury to [Oglesby].” The trial court also found that a jury issue

existed as to foreseeability and proximate cause. The trial court certified its decision

for immediate review, and this Court subsequently granted CSXT’s application for

interlocutory appeal. This appeal followed.

1. CSXT contends that the trial court erred by holding that CSXT can be liable

to its customer’s employee who is injured while moving a non-defective railcar based

on the location where the railcar is spotted by CSXT at the customer’s facility.

The essential elements of a negligence claim are the existence of a legal duty; breach of that duty; a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury; and damages. Thus, the threshold issue in a negligence action is whether and to what extent the defendant owes a legal duty to the plaintiff. This issue is a question of law.

6 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dutt v. Mannar and Co., 354 Ga. App. 565, 566

(2) (841 SE2d 132) (2020). A “legal duty” is the “obligation to conform to a standard

of conduct under the law for the protection of others against unreasonable risks of

harm.” Rasnick v. Krishna Hospitality, Inc., 289 Ga. 565, 566 (713 SE2d 835) (2011).

A legal duty sufficient to support liability in negligence is either a duty imposed by a valid statutory enactment of the legislature or a duty imposed by a recognized common law principle declared in the reported decisions of our appellate courts. In the absence of a legally cognizable duty, there can be no fault or negligence.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dutt, 354 Ga. App. at 566 (2). There is no general

legal duty “to all the world not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm.”

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dept. of Labor v. McConnell, 305 Ga. 812, 816 (3)

(a) (828 SE2d 352) (2019).

In his complaint, Oglesby claimed that CSXT was negligent in “negligently

dropping [the] flat bed rail car in a location where it would have to be manually moved

to safely offload the cargo therein;” thus, Oglesby “has to show that [CSXT] had a

legal obligation, i.e., a duty” to him to spot the railcar where it would not need to be

moved. Rasnick, 289 Ga. at 567 (1).

7 Under current Georgia law, a railroad has a duty to furnish railcars that are

reasonably safe for their intended use. Weeks v. Pollard, 65 Ga. App. 377, 389 (16 SE2d

225) (1941). In Brown v. Southern R. Co., 114 Ga. App. 429 (151 SE2d 519) (1966), this

Court explained that:

[a] railroad company which is a common carrier, if either the initial or the ultimate carrier, transporting a car containing freight, owes a duty to the consignee or his servant, when either the consignee or his servant is engaged in the business of unloading the car, after it has arrived at its destination. This duty is to see that the car and its devices for unloading it are reasonably safe for such purpose. This is true, although the journey of the car is ended, and it has been switched upon a side-track belonging to the consignee.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 430-431 (1). And in Butler v. Central of Ga.

R. Co., 87 Ga. App. 492 (74 SE2d 395) (1953), this Court stated that:

[t]he ultimate carrier is under the duty to inspect a railroad car it receives in shipment to ascertain whether the car and its unloading devices are reasonably safe; and if, on examination, it is discovered that the car or any part of its unloading devices is unsafe, it is the carrier’s duty to make the necessary repairs or correct the unsafe condition or to notify the consignee of the dangerous defects or condition.

8 Id. at 494. CSXT maintains that the trial court improperly expanded the duty of a

delivering railroad without a statutory or common law basis.

In support of his claim that CSXT had a legal duty to him to spot the railcar

where it would not need to be moved, Oglesby makes three arguments. First, relying

on Alexander v. Harnick, 142 Ga. App. 816, 817 (3) (237 SE2d 221) (1977), he argues

that CSXT owed a legal duty to him because it created a situation of peril that caused

Oglesby harm. In Alexander, this Court considered whether the owner of a houseboat

that had no throwable life preservers on board, in violation of the Georgia Boat Safety

Act, could be held liable for his failure to rescue a guest who apparently jumped into

the water from the houseboat. Id. The Court recognized the general principle that a

person has no duty to rescue another from a situation of peril which the person did not

cause, but held that “[i]f the defendant’s own negligence has been responsible for the

plaintiff’s situation, a relation has arisen which imposes a duty to make a reasonable

effort to give assistance, and avoid any further harm.” (Citations and punctuation

omitted.) Id. Here, because Oglesby’s negligence claim is not based on a failure to

render aid, the common law principle articulated in Alexander is inapplicable.

Oglesby also relies on two Federal Employer’s Liability Act (“FELA”) cases,

9 Ga. Southern & Florida R. Co. v. Peters, 284 Ga. App. 139, 145 (2) (643 SE2d 786)

(2007) and Zeagler v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 317 Ga. App. 302 (730 SE2d 657)

(2012), to argue that CSXT owed Oglesby a duty of exercising ordinary care in

delivering the railcar so it would not need to be relocated. However, because Oglesby

was not a railroad employee, FELA, 45 USC § 51 et seq., which “provides a federal

tort remedy for railroad employees injured on the job,” Zeagler, 317 Ga. App. at 303,

is not applicable here.

Finally, Oglesby cites Walker v. CSX Transportation, Inc., No.

1:07-CV-1622-GET, 2010 WL 11506865 (N.D. Ga., July 29, 2010) and Seaboard Air

Line R. v. Baker, 17 Ga. App. 529 (87 SE 828) (1916), but neither case establishes a

legal duty for a railroad to spot a railcar in a particular location.

In Walker, the district court stated that: “Under Georgia law, the carrier who

furnishes the car on the occasion in question has the duty to exercise ordinary care to

see that the car and its unloading appliances are in a reasonably safe condition to be

used by the consignee or his servants while unloading the car.” (Citation,

punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Walker, 2010 WL 11506865 at *8. The district

court went on to state that “[i]f the car is suitable and reasonably safe when it leaves

10 the possession and control of the railroad, . . . it has exercised due care.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Id.

In Seaboard Air Line R., a railcar that the plaintiff had been loading for a shipper

“was struck at the other end by cars moved by one of the defendant’s engines to and

upon this track without notice or warning to him, and not within his field of

vision.”Seaboard Air Line R., 17 Ga. App. at 529-530. The Court of Appeals held, in

part, as follows:

When the defendant placed a car on its side-track to be loaded by the shipper, it did so with knowledge that the shipper and his employees would be engaged in and about the car from time to time until the completion of the loading; and this knowledge carried with it a corresponding duty, in operating and moving this particular car, or other cars upon the same track, to do so in such a manner as would not endanger the safety of those engaged in loading the car, and to give them notice or warning. Servants of shippers or consignees of goods, while loading or unloading the goods from or upon cars on a side-track of the railroad carrier, with its consent, express or implied, are not trespassers or bare licensees, and the railroad company is bound to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to them while they are so engaged.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 530. Although the Court of Appeals

referred to the railroad’s obligation to “exercise ordinary care to avoid injury” to the

11 shipper’s employees, the specific duty identified by the Court was a “duty, in

operating and moving this particular car, or other cars upon the same track, to do so

in such a manner as would not endanger the safety of those engaged in loading the car,

and to give them notice or warning.” Id. The Court did not consider whether the

railroad had a duty to spot a railcar in a particular location.

Given that Oglesby cannot prove a key element of his negligent spotting claim,

namely that CSXT had a legal duty to him imposed by statute or a recognized

common law principle to spot the railcar where it would not need to be moved, we

reverse the trial court’s denial of CSXT’s motion for summary judgment on the

negligent spotting claim. See Rasnick, 289 Ga. at 567 (1); Dutt, 354 Ga. App. at 566

(2).

2. Given our holding in Division 1, we need not address CSXT’s remaining

enumerations of error.

Judgment reversed. Mercier, C. J. concurs and McFadden, P.J. dissents.

12 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia

A24A0027. CSX CORPORATION et al. v. OGLESBY.

MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge, dissenting.

Our courts have said many times and in many ways that a railroad owes a duty

to employees of its customers who are engaged in loading or unloading railcars

brought to the customer’s property for that purpose. At issue today is the scope of

that duty.

Theartis Oglesby’s employer had constructed a fall protection system to allow

its employees to safely load and unload railcars. That system worked only if the

railcars were placed, or spotted, in the right location. Repeatedly, over years, the

13 defendants, collectively CSXT, spotted railcars in the wrong location. When CSXT

spotted railcars in the wrong location, the customer had to move them. There is

evidence of record that, when the customer had to move them, the process was more

dangerous. And there is evidence that Oglesby was injured as a consequence.

The majority reverses on the basis that Oglesby has failed to cite a white-horse

case. For the majority, his burden was to cite case law holding that CSXT “had a duty

to spot a railcar in a particular location.” I disagree. The duty is not so narrow.

I would affirm the partial denial of summary judgment to CSXT, so I

respectfully dissent.

This is a negligence action. The legal duty enforced in negligence actions “is

the obligation to conform to a standard of conduct under the law for the protection of

others against unreasonable risks of harm.” Rasnick v. Krishna Hospitality, 289 Ga.

565, 566 (713 SE2d 835) (2011). “Negligence consists of exposing another to whom

one owes a duty . . . to a foreseeable, unreasonable probability of harm.” Ellington v.

Tolar Constr. Co., 237 Ga. 235, 238 (III) (227 SE2d 336) (1976).

CSXT owed Oglesby that duty. Under Georgia law, a railroad company

furnishing a railcar to a customer for loading or unloading has a duty “to see that the

14 car and its devices for [loading or] unloading it are reasonably safe for such purpose.”

Weeks v. Pollard, 65 Ga. App. 377, 388 (16 SE2d 225) (1941). See, e. g., Brown v.

Southern R. Co., 114 Ga. App. 429, 430-431 (1) (151 SE2d 519) (1966) (a railroad

company owes a duty to a consignee or its servant to see that a railcar that was

delivered to the consignee is reasonably safe for unloading, even if it is on the

consignee’s property); Butler v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 87 Ga. App. 492, 494 (74 SE2d

395) (1953) (a railroad company has a duty to ascertain if its railcar and unloading

devices are reasonably safe and, if not, to “correct the unsafe condition”); Seaboard

Air-Line R. v. Baker, 17 Ga. App. 529, 530 (87 SE 828) (1916) (a railroad company’s

knowledge that a shipper and its employees would be engaged with a railcar placed on

a side track for loading carried with it a duty to operate and move the car in a way that

would not endanger their safety).

The purpose of this duty is to assure “that [the customer’s] servants, while

themselves exercising ordinary care, can proceed with the work of unloading the car

with reasonable safety.” Atlanta & West Point R. Co. v. Creel, 77 Ga. App. 77, 83 (2)

(47 SE2d 762) (1948) (punctuation omitted).

15 This duty is not limited to supplying non-defective cars and devices. It entails

a duty to “operat[e] and mov[e]” railcars in “a manner as would not endanger the

safety of those engaged in loading the car.” Seaboard Air-Line R., 17 Ga. App. at 530.

It is true that under Georgia law “[t]here is no general legal duty to all the world

not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm.” Williams v. Kasulka Properties,

370 Ga. App. 653, 658 (3) (898 SE2d 843) (2024). Accord Maynard v. Snapchat, Inc.,

357 Ga. App. 496, 499 (851 SE2d 128) (2020), rev’d,, 313 Ga. 533 (870 SE2d 739)

(2022). But where — as here — a common law duty does run, our law does not

require authority directly on point. Our law does not presuppose “blanket

exception[s]” that bar recovery under recognized common law duties, unless a

plaintiff can cite case law on all fours. Maynard, 313 Ga. at 545 (c), (d). On the

contrary, it is CSXT’s burden, as the movant on summary judgment, to show that it

fell within an exception to the general duty. See generally Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga.

622, 623 (1) (a) (697 SE2d 779) (2010) (the moving party on summary judgment has

the burden of demonstrating that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law). It has

not done so.

16 Oglesby “asserted a conventional [negligence] claim based on [an] ordinary .

. . duty recognized under our decisional law[.]” Maynard, 313 Ga. at 545 (4) (b). And

he pointed to evidence that CSXT knew railcars should be spotted in the designated

fall-protection area for safety reasons and knew that, if railcars were not spotted in that

area, its customer’s employees, such as Oglesby, would have to move the railcars

before loading them.

So I would affirm the trial court’s finding that CSXT owed Oglesby a duty in

connection with the spotting of the railcar. I also agree with the trial court’s findings

that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the other elements of Oglesby’s

negligence claim related to the spotting of the railcar and would affirm the denial of

summary judgment as to that claim as well.