SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
Randall Rex brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) against Loveland police officer John Tee-ples and Chief Deputy District Attorney Donald Johnson. Rex contends that his constitutional rights were violated when Teeples improperly imprisoned him by placing him on a seventy-two hour mental hold, and when Teeples and Johnson coerced his involuntary confession. The district court granted Johnson’s motion for summary judgment, concluding as a matter of law that Johnson was entitled to absolute pros-ecutorial immunity. The court subsequently granted summary judgment for Teeples, holding that Rex’s claims were cognizable only under state tort law and did not rise to constitutional violations. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I.
BACKGROUND
The record in this, case is scant. Defendants presented little evidence to support their motions for summary judgment, and we must draw our recitation of the facts primarily from the pleadings and related state court opinions. Moreover, we must view the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Rex as the party opposing the summary judgment motion. Lindley v. Amoco Production Co., 639 F.2d 671, 672 (10th Cir.1981); 10 C. Wright, A: Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2716 at 643 (2d ed. 1983). In his complaint Rex alleges that he was brought to McKee Medical Center in Love-land; Colorado at about 1:30 p.m. September 14, 1977, after he had attempted to commit suicide by carbon monoxide poisoning. While Rex was hospitalized on September 14, Teeples represented himself to Rex as a minister as well as a police officer and questioned him about a recent kidnapping. Rex alleges that Teeples conspired with Dr. Howard Franklin, who was in charge of the Medical Center emergency room, to place Rex under a seventy-two hour mental hold because Teeples had no [842]*842probable cause to arrest Rex and wanted to question him further. Under Teeples’ direction, Rex was transferred at about midnight on September 14 to Poudre Valley Hospital in Fort Collins.
On September 15 in Rex’s hospital room, Teeples and Johnson began a second interrogation which they taped. Johnson testified in the summary judgment hearing that his only responsibility had been to make certain that Rex was properly advised of his rights and that Rex had waived them, although Johnson also stated that he had been present for at least forty-five minutes of the four to five hour interrogation and had asked some questions. Rex alleges that Johnson and Teeples took advantage of his confused mental state during this questioning, deceived him into believing he was not a suspect, induced him to talk without the assistance of an attorney, and coerced him into telling them what they wanted to hear. On September 16, Rex was transferred to the Larimar County jail, and on September 19 a criminal information was filed charging Rex with attempted murder, second degree kidnapping, and third degree sexual assault.
The sexual assault charge was dismissed after a preliminary hearing. Rex’s first trial on the remaining counts ended in a mistrial. Following a new trial, Rex was convicted. The second degree murder count was dismissed in post-trial proceedings, and Rex’s conviction on the count of second degree kidnapping was reversed on appeal. People v. Rex, 636 P.2d 1282 (Colo. Ct.App.1981). The Colorado court concluded that Rex’s statements during the September 15 interrogation were involuntary as a matter of law because “the police took advantage of [his] confused mental state and deceived him into believing that he was not a suspect in a crime.” Id. at 1284. Following a third trial at which the involuntary statements were not introduced, Rex was again convicted of second degree kidnapping. That conviction was reversed on appeal for reasons not relevant to the issues before us. See People v. Rex, 689 P.2d 669 (Colo.Ct.App., 1984), reported in 13 Colo.Law. 1051 (1984).
II.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR TEEPLES
Rex alleges that Teeples deprived him of his constitutional rights by Teeples’ actions involving the imposition of the mental hold and by his participation in obtaining the involuntary statements. The district court held that these claims do not assert constitutional deprivations remediable under section 1983. We disagree.
A. The Mental Hold
Colorado law provides an emergency procedure under which a peace officer may, upon probable cause, place a person in an appropriate facility for a seventy-two hour treatment and evaluation when that person “appears to be mentally ill and, as a result of such mental illness, appears to be an imminent danger to others or to him-self____” Colo.Rev.Stat. § 27-10-105 (1973).1 Rex alleges in his complaint that Teeples had Rex placed on mental hold not because he appeared to be an imminent danger to himself or others, but because Teeples suspected Rex of a crime.
The propriety of the mental hold was not addressed in the proceedings below. The record is absolutely devoid of anything on this issue except Rex’s allegation that Teeples conspired with the doctor to hold Rex for an improper purpose, an allegation that we must accept as true. Notably absent is any affidavit from either the doctor or Teeples describing why Rex was placed on mental hold. If, as Rex alleges, Teeples deprived Rex of his freedom by placing him under a mental hold without the probable cause required by state law and for an improper purpose, Rex was denied his liberty without due process, an injury to his constitutional rights for [843]*843which section 1983 provides a remedy. See, e.g., Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605, 609-11 (10th Cir.1979). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings on this claim.
B. The Involuntary Statements
We also conclude that Rex has stated a constitutional claim arising from the September 15 interrogation. Extracting an involuntary confession by coercion is a due process violation. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-15, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 1343-44, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963); and Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-23, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 1205-07, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959). This is so notwithstanding the coercion is psychological rather than physical. See Spa-no, 360 U.S. at 323, 79 S.Ct. at 1207; Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 944-45 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894, 93 S.Ct. 175, 34 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972). Consequently, extracting an involuntary confession is actionable under section 1983. Id.; Kerr v. City of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134, 1138 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 833, 91 S.Ct. 66, 27 L.Ed.2d 64 (1970); Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124, 128 (5th Cir.1955).
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SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
Randall Rex brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) against Loveland police officer John Tee-ples and Chief Deputy District Attorney Donald Johnson. Rex contends that his constitutional rights were violated when Teeples improperly imprisoned him by placing him on a seventy-two hour mental hold, and when Teeples and Johnson coerced his involuntary confession. The district court granted Johnson’s motion for summary judgment, concluding as a matter of law that Johnson was entitled to absolute pros-ecutorial immunity. The court subsequently granted summary judgment for Teeples, holding that Rex’s claims were cognizable only under state tort law and did not rise to constitutional violations. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I.
BACKGROUND
The record in this, case is scant. Defendants presented little evidence to support their motions for summary judgment, and we must draw our recitation of the facts primarily from the pleadings and related state court opinions. Moreover, we must view the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Rex as the party opposing the summary judgment motion. Lindley v. Amoco Production Co., 639 F.2d 671, 672 (10th Cir.1981); 10 C. Wright, A: Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2716 at 643 (2d ed. 1983). In his complaint Rex alleges that he was brought to McKee Medical Center in Love-land; Colorado at about 1:30 p.m. September 14, 1977, after he had attempted to commit suicide by carbon monoxide poisoning. While Rex was hospitalized on September 14, Teeples represented himself to Rex as a minister as well as a police officer and questioned him about a recent kidnapping. Rex alleges that Teeples conspired with Dr. Howard Franklin, who was in charge of the Medical Center emergency room, to place Rex under a seventy-two hour mental hold because Teeples had no [842]*842probable cause to arrest Rex and wanted to question him further. Under Teeples’ direction, Rex was transferred at about midnight on September 14 to Poudre Valley Hospital in Fort Collins.
On September 15 in Rex’s hospital room, Teeples and Johnson began a second interrogation which they taped. Johnson testified in the summary judgment hearing that his only responsibility had been to make certain that Rex was properly advised of his rights and that Rex had waived them, although Johnson also stated that he had been present for at least forty-five minutes of the four to five hour interrogation and had asked some questions. Rex alleges that Johnson and Teeples took advantage of his confused mental state during this questioning, deceived him into believing he was not a suspect, induced him to talk without the assistance of an attorney, and coerced him into telling them what they wanted to hear. On September 16, Rex was transferred to the Larimar County jail, and on September 19 a criminal information was filed charging Rex with attempted murder, second degree kidnapping, and third degree sexual assault.
The sexual assault charge was dismissed after a preliminary hearing. Rex’s first trial on the remaining counts ended in a mistrial. Following a new trial, Rex was convicted. The second degree murder count was dismissed in post-trial proceedings, and Rex’s conviction on the count of second degree kidnapping was reversed on appeal. People v. Rex, 636 P.2d 1282 (Colo. Ct.App.1981). The Colorado court concluded that Rex’s statements during the September 15 interrogation were involuntary as a matter of law because “the police took advantage of [his] confused mental state and deceived him into believing that he was not a suspect in a crime.” Id. at 1284. Following a third trial at which the involuntary statements were not introduced, Rex was again convicted of second degree kidnapping. That conviction was reversed on appeal for reasons not relevant to the issues before us. See People v. Rex, 689 P.2d 669 (Colo.Ct.App., 1984), reported in 13 Colo.Law. 1051 (1984).
II.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR TEEPLES
Rex alleges that Teeples deprived him of his constitutional rights by Teeples’ actions involving the imposition of the mental hold and by his participation in obtaining the involuntary statements. The district court held that these claims do not assert constitutional deprivations remediable under section 1983. We disagree.
A. The Mental Hold
Colorado law provides an emergency procedure under which a peace officer may, upon probable cause, place a person in an appropriate facility for a seventy-two hour treatment and evaluation when that person “appears to be mentally ill and, as a result of such mental illness, appears to be an imminent danger to others or to him-self____” Colo.Rev.Stat. § 27-10-105 (1973).1 Rex alleges in his complaint that Teeples had Rex placed on mental hold not because he appeared to be an imminent danger to himself or others, but because Teeples suspected Rex of a crime.
The propriety of the mental hold was not addressed in the proceedings below. The record is absolutely devoid of anything on this issue except Rex’s allegation that Teeples conspired with the doctor to hold Rex for an improper purpose, an allegation that we must accept as true. Notably absent is any affidavit from either the doctor or Teeples describing why Rex was placed on mental hold. If, as Rex alleges, Teeples deprived Rex of his freedom by placing him under a mental hold without the probable cause required by state law and for an improper purpose, Rex was denied his liberty without due process, an injury to his constitutional rights for [843]*843which section 1983 provides a remedy. See, e.g., Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605, 609-11 (10th Cir.1979). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings on this claim.
B. The Involuntary Statements
We also conclude that Rex has stated a constitutional claim arising from the September 15 interrogation. Extracting an involuntary confession by coercion is a due process violation. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-15, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 1343-44, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963); and Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-23, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 1205-07, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959). This is so notwithstanding the coercion is psychological rather than physical. See Spa-no, 360 U.S. at 323, 79 S.Ct. at 1207; Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 944-45 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894, 93 S.Ct. 175, 34 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972). Consequently, extracting an involuntary confession is actionable under section 1983. Id.; Kerr v. City of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134, 1138 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 833, 91 S.Ct. 66, 27 L.Ed.2d 64 (1970); Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124, 128 (5th Cir.1955).
In this case Rex alleged that the improper interrogation took place while he was under the influence of carbon monoxide poisoning, and that defendants misled him and coerced his statements from him. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed his conviction on this ground, concluding that the police had taken advantage of his mental state and had deceived him. We believe there are factual issues precluding summary judgment on this claim, particularly when we view the transcript of the taped interrogation most favorably to Rex. Indeed, at the summary judgment hearing Johnson conceded that nothing in the transcript establishes that Rex waived his right to an attorney and asked defendants to come back and talk to him. Johnson stated the existence of waiver was a matter of his, Johnson’s, credibility because he knew what had happened there that day. Rec., vol. II, at 35. Moreover, the transcript shows that Rex repeatedly said, “If I do make an attempt to incriminate myself at any time, I wish you’d get me a lawyer.” Rec., supp. vol. I, at 22, 27. Under these circumstances, the issues involving the vol-untariness of the statements are particularly inappropriate for resolution by summary judgment. Accordingly, we conclude that Rex has stated a constitutional due process claim arising out of the alleged coerced confession. The summary judgment on this ground is reversed.
III.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR JOHNSON
In view of our conclusion in Part IIB supra that Rex has alleged a constitutional claim arising from the September 15 interrogation, we must address the district court’s conclusion that Johnson, as a deputy district attorney, was absolutely immune for his part in obtaining the allegedly involuntary confession.
A prosecutor is absolutely immune only for those activities “intimately associated” with “initiating a prosecution [and] presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 984, 995, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). Absolute prosecutorial immunity extends no further than necessary to protect those activities. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2735, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Consequently, a prosecutor acting as an investigator has only qualified immunity. See id. ASI U.S. at 811 n. 16, 102 S.Ct. at 811 n. 16. Although identifying those acts entitled to absolute immunity is not always easy, the determinative factor is “advocacy” because that is the prosecutor’s main function and the one most akin to his quasi-judicial role. See, e.g., Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435, 437 (10th Cir.1983); Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 500-02 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 104 S.Ct. 1593, 80 L.Ed.2d 125 (1984).
In Atkins v. Banning, 556 F.2d 485, 488 (10th Cir.1977), this court distinguished between the prosecutor’s quasi-judicial role warranting absolute immunity, and his “po[844]*844lice-related” work not accorded such immunity. We there cited cases making this distinction: Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 609 (7th Cir.1973) (planning a raid to obtain evidence of criminal activity not covered by prosecutorial immunity), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917, 94 S.Ct. 1413, 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 91 (D.C.Cir.1974) (prosecutorial immunity not available when a civil rights claim “focuses on a prosecutor’s actions in the course of directing police investigative activity”); and Weathers v. Ebert, 505 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir.1974) (“Making an arrest is a police function, not a judicial one ____”), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 975, 96 S.Ct. 1480, 47 L.Ed.2d 745 (1976). Other courts have held that the preliminary gathering of evidence which may blossom into a potential prosecution is investigatory activity receiving only a qualified immunity. McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309, 320 (D.C.Cir.1982). “[A] prosecutor who assists, directs or otherwise participates with, the police in obtaining evidence prior to an indictment undoubtedly is functioning more in his investigative capacity than in his quasi-judicial capacities____” Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 505 (5th Cir.1980).
We conclude that giving Miranda warnings to a general suspect and participating in his interrogation is “police-related” work and does not fall within the category of a prosecutor’s quasi-judicial functions. Accordingly, Johnson is entitled only to qualified immunity with respect to Rex’s claims arising from the alleged coerced confession.
Under Harlow, summary judgment in favor of a defendant seeking qualified immunity is appropriate only if the constitutional standards governing the challenged conduct were not clearly established. 457 U.S. at 818-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2738-39. In this case the law with respect to involuntary confessions and the ability to knowingly waive constitutional rights was clear at the time the questioning took place. The grant of summary judgment in favor of Johnson is reversed.
This action is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.