2026 CO 19
Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction Company, LLC, Petitioner
v.
Regional Rail Partners; Balfour Beatty Infrastructure, Inc.; Graham Contracting Ltd.; Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America; Balfour Beatty, LLC; and Graham Business Trust. Respondents
No. 24SC537
Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc
April 6, 2026
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Case No. 22CA2154
2
Attorneys for Petitioner: Berg Hill Greenleaf Ruscitti LLP
Giovanni M. Ruscitti Rudy E. Verner Jack P. Storti Lawrence
Myers Boulder, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondents: Martin Hild P.A. Ll. Rhyddid
Watkins Aurora, Colorado
Connelly Law, LLC Sean Connelly Denver, Colorado
3
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Associated General Contractors of
Colorado and Colorado Contractors Association: Polsinelli PC
Stephen D. Gurr Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Independent Electrical
Contractors Rocky Mountain: Hassan & Cables, LLC John L.
Skari, Jr. Boulder, Colorado
4
JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE MARQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD,
JUSTICE SAMOUR, JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, and JUSTICE BLANCO
joined.
5
OPINION
GABRIEL, JUSTICE
¶1
In this dispute arising from a subcontractor's filing of
a verified statement of claim under the Colorado Public Works
Act, §§ 38-26-101 to -110, C.R.S. (2025), we
granted certiorari to consider whether (1) disputed or
unliquidated amounts, including delay and disruption damages,
may lawfully be included in a verified statement of claim;
and (2) the penalty for filing an excessive claim under the
Act is a claimant's forfeiture of all of its legal rights
and remedies for the amount claimed, or only its statutory
rights and remedies.[1]
¶2
We now conclude that disputed or unliquidated amounts may
lawfully be included in a verified statement of claim,
provided that the amounts otherwise fall
6
within the statutory constraints of the Public Works Act, and
that, on the facts presented, the trial court did not err in
finding that Wadsworth's verified statement of claim was
not excessive. We further conclude that a claimant who files
an excessive claim forfeits only the statutory rights and
remedies created by the Public Works Act and not all rights
and remedies otherwise available at law.
¶3
Accordingly, we reverse the division's judgment and
remand this case to the division to allow it to address the
additional issues raised in Wadsworth's cross-appeal that
the division did not previously address.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶4
In 2013, the Regional Transportation District
("RTD") contracted with Regional Rail Partners to
design and build the North Metro Rail Line public works
project between Thornton and Denver's Union Station. The
primary contract for this project was valued at over $343
million. Regional Rail then entered into a subcontract with
Wadsworth for work related to portions of the rail line. The
original subcontract price was $29 million, but, following
change orders, Wadsworth was to be paid over $60 million.
¶5
The project was impacted by a number of delays and
disruptions that significantly expanded both the
project's timeline and associated costs. Wadsworth hired
an expert to undertake an analysis of the costs and damages
that Wadsworth had incurred due to these delays and
disruptions. The expert
7
subsequently delivered a report concluding that Regional Rail
owed Wadsworth approximately $12.4 million due to the
"ongoing delays, disruptions and changes incurred by it
at the project."
¶6
Pursuant to section 38-26-107(1), C.R.S. (2025), of the
Public Works Act, Wadsworth filed a verified statement of
claim with RTD. In this verified statement of claim,
Wadsworth alleged that Regional Rail owed it nearly $15.8
million for the labor, materials, or other supplies that
Wadsworth had provided in connection with the project. Upon
receipt of this verified statement of claim, Regional Rail
took issue with a contractual retention amount that it
asserted was not yet owed. Wadsworth then amended its
verified statement of claim to remove this retention amount,
and the amendment reduced the claimed amount to approximately
$12.8 million (comprising the $12.4 million from the expert
report and additional amounts that came due after the report
was served).
¶7
In response to Wadsworth's amended verified statement of
claim (for convenience and consistency with the statutory
language, we will hereafter refer to the amended verified
statement of claim as the "verified statement of
claim"), Regional Rail filed an ex parte petition in the
Adams County District Court, pursuant to section 38-26-108,
C.R.S. (2025), to substitute a corporate surety bond issued
by Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America as
security in place of the verified statement of claim. In this
petition, Regional Rail also requested
8
that the court release the verified statement of claim. The
court granted Regional Rail's petition.
¶8
A few months later, Wadsworth initiated this action in the
Denver District Court. In its complaint, as subsequently
amended, Wadsworth asserted a variety of claims against
defendants Regional Rail Partners, Balfour Beatty
Infrastructure, Inc., Graham Contracting Ltd., Travelers
Casualty and Surety Company of America, Balfour Beatty, LLC,
and Graham Business Trust (collectively,
"Defendants") seeking unpaid costs. These claims
included a common law claim for breach of contract, a
statutory claim for relief under the corporate surety
substitution bond, and a statutory claim for failure to pay
construction funds. In support of these claims, Wadsworth
principally alleged that Regional Rail had caused numerous
project delays, all of which impacted Wadsworth's ability
to complete its work and caused Wadsworth to sustain
additional costs.
¶9
Defendants answered, asserting a number of affirmative
defenses as well as counterclaims. As pertinent here,
Defendants alleged that Wadsworth had contributed to the
delays underlying its asserted damages. Additionally,
Defendants raised as both an affirmative defense and as a
counterclaim that Wadsworth's verified statement of claim
was excessive under section 38-26-110, C.R.S. (2025), and
that Wadsworth had thus forfeited all rights to the amounts
claimed in its verified statement of claim.
9
¶10
The case proceeded to a ten-day bench trial, after which the
trial court issued extensive and detailed findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The court ultimately determined that
Regional Rail had not established that Wadsworth's
verified statement of claim was excessive and that
"there was a reasonable possibility the amount
[Wadsworth] sought in the [verified statement of claim] was
due." The trial court further found that Regional Rail
had delayed and disrupted Wadsworth's work. The court
thus awarded Wadsworth over $3.7 million in damages,
including delay and disruption damages, and over $1.9 million
in unpaid construction funds, which were to be paid no later
than ten days after Regional Rail's receipt of such funds
from RTD.
¶11
Regional Rail then appealed, arguing, as pertinent here, that
the trial court had erred in finding that Wadsworth's
verified statement of claim was not excessive and in thus
concluding that Wadsworth's claims were not forfeited
under section 38-26-110. Wadsworth, in turn, cross-appealed,
arguing, in pertinent part, that the trial court had erred in
(1) declining to award Wadsworth prejudgment interest; (2)
denying Wadsworth penalty interest under the Prompt Payment
Act; and (3) finding that Regional Rail did not owe final
payment to Wadsworth until after RTD had issued final payment
to Regional Rail, as opposed to after RTD had issued payment
for Wadsworth's work.
10
¶12
A division of the court of appeals subsequently reversed the
trial court's decision regarding Wadsworth's verified
statement of claim. Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr. Co. v.
Reg'l Rail Partners, 2024 COA 78, ¶¶ 43,
68, 558 P.3d 641, 650, 653. In so ruling, the division
initially observed that it could discern no support in the
record for the trial court's conclusion that there was a
reasonable possibility that the sum claimed in the verified
statement of claim was due. Id. at ¶ 35, 558
P.3d at 649. This was particularly true given (1) the
substantial disparity between the amount claimed and the
amount proved at trial and (2) the lack of any discussion
regarding the evidence purportedly establishing that the
amount claimed was for labor, materials, sustenance, or other
supplies and that it was due at the time Wadsworth filed its
verified statement of claim. Id. Indeed, in the
division's view, the record unequivocally established no
reasonable possibility that the amount claimed was due.
Id. at ¶ 36, 558 P.3d at 649. In support of
this conclusion, the division observed that although
Wadsworth's expert had testified regarding how he had
calculated the $12.4 million of the claimed amount, Wadsworth
had presented no evidence as to the basis for the remaining
amount claimed. Id. The division further observed
that the bulk of the $12.4 million that Wadsworth had
itemized was for delays, disruptions, and other problems
associated with the project. Id. at ¶ 37, 558
P.3d at 649. The division believed that these items included
amounts for lost profits, contractual markups, nonrental
equipment costs, and
11
"extended overhead" that did not fall within the
types of costs covered by section 38-26-107(1). Ralph L.
Wadsworth Constr. Co., ¶ 37, 558 P.3d at 649. And
the division noted that the parties were vigorously disputing
who had caused the delays, thus undermining any assertion
that Wadsworth's unliquidated claim for delay damages was
"due" at the time Wadsworth filed its verified
statement of claim. Id. at ¶ 38, 558 P.3d at
649-50.
¶13
The question thus became whether Wadsworth knew that it had
included in its verified statement of claim amounts that did
not fall within the statute. Id. at ¶ 40, 558
P.3d at 650. The division concluded that the record
unequivocally established that it did. Id. In
support of this determination, the division observed that
Wadsworth's president had acknowledged that the amount
claimed included amounts "in excess of the agreed to
change orders" and purportedly included lost profits.
Id. at ¶ 41, 558 P.3d at 650. Thus, in the
division's view, by Wadsworth's own admission, it
knew that its claim included change orders that Wadsworth was
seeking but to which Regional Rail had not agreed, as well as
unliquidated claims for damages that Wadsworth had not yet
proved. Id. at ¶ 42, 558 P.3d at 650.
¶14
The division thus concluded that, as a matter of law, the
evidence established that (1) Wadsworth's verified
statement of claim was for an amount greater than the amount
due; (2) there was no reasonable possibility that the amount
claimed was due; and (3) Wadsworth knew this when it filed
its verified
12
statement of claim. Id. at ¶ 43, 558 P.3d at
650. Wadsworth's verified statement of claim was
therefore excessive, and, as a result, Wadsworth had
forfeited its entire claim. Id.
¶15
Accordingly, the division reversed the trial court's
judgment "to the extent it awarded Wadsworth any amount
included in its amended verified statement of claim."
Id. at ¶ 68, 558 P.3d at 653. In light of this
conclusion, the division did not need to reach three of
Wadsworth's issues on cross-appeal. Id. at
¶ 61, 558 P.3d at 653.
¶16
Wadsworth then petitioned for certiorari review, and we
granted its petition.
II.
Analysis
¶17
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review
and principles of statutory construction. We then apply these
legal principles to determine whether disputed or
unliquidated amounts may be included in a verified statement
of claim. Concluding that they may be, we consider whether
Wadsworth's verified statement of claim constituted an
excessive claim under the Public Works Act. We end by
addressing the proper construction of the Act's
forfeiture provision regarding excessive claims, section
38-26-110.
13
A.
Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory
Construction
¶18
We review questions of statutory construction de novo.
People in Int. of B.C.B., 2025 CO 28, ¶ 24, 569
P.3d 74, 79. When interpreting statutes, we seek to determine
and effectuate the legislature's intent. Id. In
doing this, we apply words and phrases in accordance with
their plain and ordinary meanings, and we consider the entire
statutory scheme to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible
effect to all of its parts. Id. Moreover, we avoid
constructions that would render any statutory words or
phrases superfluous or that would lead to illogical or absurd
results. Id.
¶19
In construing a statute, we respect the legislature's
choice of language. Id. at ¶ 25, 569 P.3d at
79. Accordingly, we may not add words to a statute or
subtract words from it. Id.
¶20
If the statutory language is unambiguous, then we will apply
it as written and need not resort to other rules of statutory
construction. Id. at ¶ 26, 569 P.3d at 79. If,
however, a statute is ambiguous (i.e., reasonably susceptible
of multiple interpretations), then we may consider other
tools of statutory interpretation, including the consequences
of a given construction, the goals to be achieved by the
statute, and the statute's legislative history.
People v. Hudson, 2025 CO 52, ¶ 15, 576 P.3d
131, 134.
14
¶21
Finally, we defer to the trial court's factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. French v. Centura
Health Corp., 2022 CO 20, ¶ 24, 509 P.3d 443, 449.
Accordingly, we will not overturn a trial court's factual
findings unless they are unsupported by the record. Lo
Viento Blanco, LLC v. Woodbridge Condo. Ass'n, 2021
CO 56, ¶ 17, 489 P.3d 735, 740-41.
B.
Disputed or Unliquidated Amounts
¶22
We begin by addressing Wadsworth's contention that the
plain language of section 38-26-107 of the Public Works Act
allows a verified statement of claim to contain disputed or
unliquidated amounts, including delay and disruption damages.
To the extent that disputed or unliquidated amounts,
including delay and disruption damages, fall within the
limitations set forth in sections 38-26-107 and 38-26-110, we
agree.
¶23
The Public Works Act creates a remedy designed to protect
suppliers of labor and materials for public works projects
because the benefits of the Colorado Mechanics' Lien Act
do not apply to projects constructed by governmental
agencies. W. Metal Lath, a Div. of Triton Grp., Ltd. v.
Acoustical &Constr. Supply, Inc., 851 P.2d 875, 877
(Colo. 1993). In particular, section 38-26-107 establishes
the right of a contractor or subcontractor on a public works
project to file a verified statement of claim that operates
as a lien against retained contract funds. W. Metal
Lath, 851 P.2d at 877.
15
¶24
Section 38-26-107(1) provides, in pertinent part:
Any person . . . that has furnished labor, materials,
sustenance, or other supplies used or consumed by a
contractor or his or her subcontractor in or about the
performance of the work contracted to be done or that
supplies laborers, rental machinery, tools, or equipment to
the extent used in the prosecution of the work whose claim
therefor has not been paid by the contractor or the
subcontractor may, at any time up to and including the time
of final settlement for the work contracted to be done, file
with the board, officer, person, or other contracting body by
whom the contract was awarded a verified statement of the
amount due and unpaid on account of the claim.
¶25
Upon the filing of such a claim, the public entity must
withhold from all payments to its contractor sufficient funds
to ensure the payment of such claims until the claims have
been paid or the claims, as filed, have been withdrawn.
§ 38-26-107(2).
¶26
Pursuant to the above-quoted statutory language, a contractor
or subcontractor may file a verified statement of claim for a
broad category of unpaid costs related to the scope of
contracted work, namely, "labor, materials, sustenance,
or other supplies" or the provision of any
"laborers, rental machinery, tools, or equipment."
§ 38-26-107(1). Thus, the plain language of section
38-26-107 provides that unpaid costs that fall within these
categories and that were "used in the prosecution of the
work" may be included in a verified statement of claim.
Id. ¶27 Section 38-26-110 places additional
restrictions on a claimant's right to file such a claim.
Under that section, a claimant will forfeit certain rights
and remedies
16
if its verified statement of claim is excessive. Section
38-26-110(1) thus provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who files a verified statement of a claim or
asserts a claim against a principal or surety that has
furnished a bond under this article for an amount greater
than the amount due without a reasonable possibility that the
amount claimed is due and with the knowledge that the amount
claimed is greater than the amount due, and that fact is
demonstrated in any proceedings under this article, shall
forfeit all rights to the amount claimed ....
¶28
To prove that a verified statement of claim is excessive, a
challenging party must therefore demonstrate that, at the
time of filing, (1) the claim was for an amount greater than
the amount due; (2) there is no reasonable possibility that
the amount claimed was due; and (3) the claimant knew that
the amount claimed was greater than the amount due.
Id.; cf. E.B. Roberts Constr. Co. v. Concrete
Contractors, Inc., 704 P.2d 859, 864 (Colo. 1985)
(noting that when determining whether a lien is excessive
under the Mechanics' Lien Act, "the matter must be
viewed in light of the information available to the lien
claimant at the time of filing the lien statement").
¶29
In sum, when read together, sections 38-26-107 and 38-26-110
allow contractors and subcontractors to file a verified
statement of claim for any unpaid costs for labor, materials,
sustenance, rental machinery, tools, equipment, or other
supplies used in the provision of the contracted work, as
long as there was either a reasonable possibility at the time
of filing that the amount claimed was due or
17
the claimant did not know at the time of filing that the
amount claimed was greater than the amount due. Nowhere,
however, does the statutory language prohibit a claimant from
including disputed or unliquidated amounts in a verified
statement of claim. Nor do we perceive any inconsistency in
recognizing that an amount may be disputed or not yet
determined and still have a reasonable possibility of being
due.
¶30
In reaching this conclusion, we respectfully disagree with
the division's contrary interpretation.
¶31
The division stated that section 38-26-110 bars a person
"from claiming an amount 'greater than the amount
due,'" Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr. Co.,
¶ 27, 558 P.3d at 648 (quoting section 38-26-110(1)),
but this oversimplifies the statutory command. That a claimed
amount is greater than the amount due is not alone sufficient
to establish that the claim is excessive. For example, a
subcontractor could file a claim for an amount ultimately
determined not to be due, but if the subcontractor did not
know that the amount claimed was greater than what was due at
the time it filed its verified statement of claim, then the
claim would not be excessive under section 38-26-110. Cf.
E.B. Roberts Constr. Co., 704 P.2d at 864 (upholding a
trial court's finding that a lien was not excessive at
the time it was filed, even though the court ultimately
awarded less than the lien claimed, because the evidence was
sufficient to allow the court to conclude that the claimants
had
18
used the information available at the time of filing and
selected a valuation method that, although abandoned at
trial, was reasonable under the circumstances); Galiant
Homes, LLC v. Herlik, 2025 COA 3, ¶ 34, 565 P.3d
1109, 1118 (construing parallel language under the
Mechanics' Lien Act and reaching the same conclusion).
¶32
We likewise are unpersuaded by the division's view that
the statutory term "due" necessarily excludes
disputed claims. Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr. Co.,
¶¶ 27, 38, 558 P.3d at 648, 649-50. To reach its
conclusion, the division relied on Byerly v. Bank of
Colorado, 2013 COA 35, 411 P.3d 732, Ralph L.
Wadsworth Constr. Co., ¶ 27, 558 P.3d at 648, but
that case is distinguishable. Byerly concerned a
mechanic's lien for amounts allegedly due under a
contract that premised a developer's duty to pay a
contractor on a number of conditions precedent.
Byerly, ¶ ¶ 6-7, 36, 411 P.3d at 734, 738.
In that case, however, the contractor knew that the
conditions precedent had not been satisfied at the time the
contractor filed its lien, but the contractor filed the lien
anyway. Id. at ¶¶ 37-38, 411 P.3d at 739.
In these circumstances, the division concluded that there was
no reasonable possibility that the lien amount was due at the
time the contractor filed the lien and that the contractor
had knowingly filed a lien for an amount greater than the
amount then due. Id. at ¶ 40, 411 P.3d at 739.
Accordingly, the division determined that the contractor had
filed an excessive lien. Id. at ¶ 43, 411 P.3d
at 740.
19
¶33
A dispute concerning the amount that is owed under a
contract, which is the question before us here, is not the
same as a scenario in which contracted amounts are premised
on conditions precedent and the contractor knows that the
conditions have not been satisfied. A disputed or
unliquidated amount seeks to clarify what, if
anything, is due. Conditions precedent, in contrast, address
when an amount is due. Thus, a disputed or
unliquidated amount may still be "due" even if it
is yet undetermined.
¶34
Lastly, we note that reading section 38-26-110 to prohibit a
verified statement of claim from including any disputed
amounts, as the division did, would conflict with the very
purpose of the statute. The Public Works Act was enacted by
the Colorado General Assembly "to protect
contractors who supply labor and materials to public works
projects." City of Westminster v. Brannan Sand
&Gravel Co., 940 P.2d 393, 395 (Colo. 1997)
(emphasis added). Moreover, "[a] substantial source of
disputes in construction projects is nonpayment of those
persons who provide material and labor to the project."
1C Stephen A. Hess, Colorado Practice Series: Methods of
Practice § 56:1, Westlaw (7th ed. database updated
June 2025). Accordingly, the Public Works Act created
remedies for claimants like Wadsworth who have claims for
nonpayment arising from the provision of labor and materials
on a public works project, even if those claims are disputed.
See W. Metal Lath, 851 P.2d at 877 (listing the
remedies created for
20
contractors and subcontractors on public works projects,
including section 38-26-107's "right to establish a
lien against retained contract funds").
¶35
On this point, we note that the division itself appears to
have acknowledged that section 38-26-107 provides a remedy
regarding disputed amounts. Specifically, in its opinion, the
division observed that when a public entity receives a
verified statement of claim, the entity "must withhold
from any payments to the contractor the amount claimed by the
subcontractor until any disputes between the contractor
and subcontractor are resolved." Ralph L.
Wadsworth Constr. Co., ¶ 18, 558 P.3d at 647
(emphasis added).
¶36
For these reasons, we conclude that, as long as the amounts
claimed to be due constitute labor, materials, sustenance,
rental machinery, tools, equipment, or other supplies used in
the prosecution of the work, disputed or unliquidated amounts
may be included in a verified statement of claim. The
question thus becomes whether delay and disruption damages
fall within the foregoing statutory categories. We turn next
to that question.
¶37
Beginning, as we must, with the statutory language, we note
that the text of the pertinent statutory sections neither
expressly nor implicitly precludes a claim for delay and
disruption damages. §§ 38-26-107(1), 38-26-110(1).
Accordingly, applying the plain language of these provisions,
we conclude that delay and disruption damages may be included
in a verified statement of claim. Such
21
claimed damages must, however, fall within the strictures of
section 38-26-107 and not otherwise violate the limitations
set forth in section 38-26-110. Thus, delay and disruption
damages may be included as long as they constitute claims for
labor, materials, sustenance, rental machinery, tools,
equipment, or other supplies used or consumed by a contractor
or subcontractor in the performance or prosecution of the
contracted work. See also Hess, supra, at
§ 56:29 (noting that, if a contracting party has
negligently caused delay in contract performance, then a
contractor may recover damages for "increased impact
costs of labor, materials, equipment . . . and other costs
attributable to the project delay"); 6 Philip L. Bruner
&Patrick J. O'Connor, Jr., Bruner
&O'Connor on Construction Law § 15:106,
Westlaw (database updated Jan. 2026) (noting that disruption
damages are concerned with "unanticipated compensable
increases in costs incurred to perform any given work
activity or activities" resulting from a "loss of
efficiency" on a project); W. Stephen Dale & Robert
M. D'Onofrio, Construction Schedule Delays
§§ 4:1, 4:7-4:10, 4:12, Westlaw (database updated
Sept. 2025) (detailing common types of delay damages,
including additional costs for labor, materials, and
equipment, and also observing that project disruptions, as
distinct from delays, can lead to "increased labor and
equipment costs due to the lack of productivity").
¶38
Because the statute mandates that amounts claimed must be
related to costs used in the performance or prosecution of a
project's work, however, purely
22
consequential damages related to delays or disruptions, such
as damages for lost profits or idle time, do not fall within
the pertinent statutory restrictions and thus may not be
included. See § 38-26-107(1); cf. In re
Regan, 151 P.3d 1281, 1285 (Colo. 2007) (opining, based
on similar language in the Mechanics' Lien Act, that
"those who have a lien are laborers and material
suppliers who have added value to [the] property");
Tabor v. Armstrong, 12 P. 157, 160 (Colo. 1886)
(noting that under the Mechanics' Lien Act, a
landowner's liability is limited to those cases in which
a lien is claimed for "labor actually performed" on
a building and "materials actually furnished
therefor" and that the claimant's demand for payment
must derive from the actual performance of the work).
¶39
Here, we acknowledge that the expert report that Wadsworth
filed in support of its verified statement of claim did not
always expressly state that the claimed amounts constituted
costs associated with labor, materials, or other statutorily
identified categories. The trial court, however, reviewed
Wadsworth's verified statement of claim and found that
there was a reasonable possibility that the amount sought was
due under the statute. Inherent in this finding is that the
amounts included did not otherwise contravene the statutory
requirements of section 38-26-107. Because we cannot say that
the trial court's finding in this regard was unsupported
by evidence in the record, we must defer to it.
French, ¶ 24, 509 P.3d at 449; Lo Viento
Blanco, ¶ 17, 489 P.3d at 740-41. Accordingly, we
23
will not disturb the trial court's finding that
Wadsworth's verified statement of claim was not excessive
due to its inclusion of delay and disruption damages.
¶40
In so concluding, we are unpersuaded by Regional Rail's
contention that Wadsworth's claim included lost profits,
idle time, or other unrecoverable costs. After a thorough
review of the evidence, the trial court did not make any
findings that would support the argument that Wadsworth's
claims consisted of unrecoverable consequential damages.
Moreover, the damages that the trial court ultimately awarded
Wadsworth consisted of delay damages, lost productivity
damages, specific issue damages, and unpaid contract
balances. For the reasons set forth above, each of these
items can properly constitute costs for labor, materials,
sustenance, rental machinery, tools, equipment, or other
supplies used in the performance or prosecution of the
project, and none necessarily comprise unrecoverable
consequential damages.
¶41
Accordingly, we conclude that under the Public Works Act,
disputed or unliquidated amounts, including delay and
disruption damages, may be included in a verified statement
of claim, provided that they constitute labor, materials,
sustenance, rental machinery, tools, equipment, or other
supplies used in the performance or prosecution of the
project and are not otherwise excessive under section
38-26-110. We thus further conclude that the division erred
in finding that Wadsworth's verified statement of claim
was excessive as a matter of law.
24
C.
Penalty for Excessive Claims
¶42
We next address Wadsworth's contention that the division
erred in concluding that a claimant who violates section
38-26-110 by filing an excessive verified statement of claim
forfeits any and all rights and legal remedies to the amounts
claimed. Again, we agree.
¶43
As discussed above, section 38-26-110(1) provides that if a
claimant violates the statute and files an excessive claim,
then the claimant "shall forfeit all rights to the
amount claimed and shall be liable . . . in an amount equal
to all costs and all attorney fees reasonably incurred."
Defendants contend that the plain language of this statute
requires a claimant's forfeiture of any and all rights
and remedies to the amount claimed, including both
statutorily created rights and other legal avenues of relief.
Wadsworth, in contrast, asserts that the forfeiture of
"all rights to the amount claimed," when read
within the context of the entire statutory scheme, means that
a claimant who is found to have filed an excessive claim
forfeits only the statutory rights and remedies afforded by
the Public Works Act.
¶44
As an initial matter, we conclude that the statute is
reasonably susceptible of the interpretations proffered by
both Defendants and Wadsworth. As Defendants assert,
"all rights to the amount claimed" could reasonably
be construed to refer to any and all rights afforded under
the law to the amounts claimed to be due in the verified
statement of claim. As Wadsworth contends,
25
however, "all rights" could also reasonably be
construed to mean any and all rights afforded by the Public
Works Act. Accordingly, we conclude that the statutory
language is ambiguous, see Hudson, ¶ 15, 576
P.3d at 134, and we therefore turn to other tools of
statutory construction to discern the legislature's
intent.
¶45
We begin with legislative history. As noted above, the Public
Works Act was enacted to provide similar remedies for those
who supply labor and materials to public works projects as
the remedies provided by the Mechanics' Lien Act for
those who supply labor and materials to private works
projects. See South-Way Constr. Co. v. Adams
City Serv., 458 P.2d 250, 251 (Colo. 1969) (noting that
because the benefits of the Colorado Mechanics' Lien Act
do not apply to projects constructed by governmental
agencies, "a remedy similar to our mechanic's [sic]
lien statute was provided by the legislature for the
protection of those furnishing supplies or material for such
projects," and that the Public Works Act "stands in
lieu of the mechanic's [sic] lien statute").
Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to look to case law
construing the corresponding language of the Mechanics'
Lien Act for guidance as to the legislature's intent
here.
¶46
Section 38-22-128, C.R.S. (2025), of the Mechanics' Lien
Act provides that a person who files an excessive lien
"shall forfeit all rights to such lien." We have
construed this language to mean that a claimant who files an
excessive lien forfeits
26
only mechanics' lien rights and remedies, nothing more.
See E.B. Roberts Constr. Co., 704 P.2d at 863-64.
¶47
Section 38-26-110's legislative history confirms the
legislature's intent to mirror these restrictions. At
both Senate and House committee hearings on the then-proposed
legislation, proponents consistently characterized section
38-26-110 as establishing the same limitations on claims
under the Public Works Act as existed for liens under the
Mechanics' Lien Act. See, e.g., Hearing on S.B.
070 before the S. Bus. Affs. &Lab. Comm., 64th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Sess. (Jan. 27, 2003) (statement of bill sponsor
Senator Doug Lamborn that "Senate Bill 70 will give to
public works projects the same requirements that are now
found in our laws concerning private works projects" and
testimony of John Bachmann, a representative from the
Colorado Contractors Association, that section 38-26-110 is
"exactly the same provision that's imposed upon an
overstating claimant under the general Mechanics' Lien
statute"); Hearing on S.B. 070 before the H. Bus. Affs.
&Lab. Comm., 64th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Mar. 11, 2003)
(statement of bill sponsor Representative Bob McCluskey
stating that the penalty created by section 38-26-110
"highlights what we've done in the Mechanics'
Lien already").
¶48
The intent to mirror the Mechanics' Lien Act's
penalty provision is further supported by the
legislation's title, "An Act Concerning Payment
Procedures for a Public Works Construction Project, and, in
Connection Therewith, Creating
27
Requirements for Contractors' Bonds that Are
Consistent with Existing Mechanics' Liens
Requirements Applicable to Private Projects." Ch.
254, sec. 2, § 38-26-110, 2003 Colo. Sess. Laws 1690,
1690-92 (emphases added); see also Frazier v.
People, 90 P.3d 807, 811 (Colo. 2004) (noting that
although a statute's title is not dispositive of
legislative intent, it can serve as a useful aid in
construing a statute).
¶49
In sum, the legislative history of section 38-26-110 suggests
a legislative intent that the scope of the forfeiture under
the Public Works Act would mirror the scope of the forfeiture
under the Mechanics' Lien Act and that, therefore, a
claimant who files an excessive verified statement of claim
forfeits only the statutory rights and remedies afforded by
the statute.
¶50
Consistent with this conclusion, the legislative history
further emphasizes the legislature's intent in section
38-26-110 to deter claimants from filing claims under the
statute in bad faith, just as the Mechanics'
Lien statute has historically been understood.
Compare Hearing on S.B. 070 before the S. Bus. Affs.
&Lab. Comm., 64th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Jan. 27, 2003)
(Bill sponsor Senator Doug Lamborn noting that section
38-26-110 "would just make it less likely that a
subcontractor would inflate or overstate a claim because the
penalties would be a little more stringent on that kind of
bad faith action"), with Honnen Equip. Co. v. Never
Summer Backhoe Serv., Inc., 261 P.3d 507, 512 (Colo.App.
2011) (construing the purpose of the Mechanics' Lien
Act's excessive claim provision as intending to
28
"punish[] and deter[] those who knowingly or deceptively
claim amounts that are not due"); cf. Barnes v.
Colo. Springs &C. C. D. Ry. Co., 94 P. 570, 573
(Colo. 1908) (concluding that under the Mechanics' Lien
Act, a claim of a lien for nonlienable articles "will
not vitiate the claim, if it was not willfully false").
The legislature thus signaled its intent in the Public Works
Act to provide contractors and subcontractors on public works
projects with expanded protections under the law by means of
statutory remedies while establishing guardrails to prevent
claims made in bad faith.
¶51
We are not persuaded otherwise by Defendants' reliance on
the differences between the language used in the
Mechanics' Lien Act, which, as noted above, provides that
a claimant who files an excessive lien forfeits "all
rights to such lien," § 38-22-128
(emphasis added), and the language used in the Public Works
Act, which provides that a claimant who files an excessive
claim forfeits "all rights to the amount
claimed," § 38-26-110(1) (emphasis added). The
different language was necessary because a mechanic's
lien cannot be filed against a public property and thus the
Mechanics' Lien Act cannot apply to public works
projects. See City of Westminster, 940 P.2d at
395-96; W. Metal Lath, 851 P.2d at 877. Accordingly,
the legislature substituted "the amount claimed" (a
reference to the verified statement of claim) for "such
lien" (referring to the corresponding lien under the
Mechanics' Lien Act). We perceive no intent, however, to
undermine the legislative goal of
29
creating statutory remedies for contractors and
subcontractors on public works projects that parallel those
available to contractors and subcontractors on private
projects, including the right to file a verified statement of
claim that mirrors a mechanic's lien established by the
Mechanics' Lien Act. Nor do we perceive anything in the
legislative history to suggest that the legislature intended
to alter the scope of the statutory forfeiture.
¶52
The goals that the legislature sought to achieve by enacting
the Public Works Act further support our determination that
the statutory forfeiture in section 38-26-110 is limited
solely to the statutory rights and remedies available under
that Act. As noted above, the Public Works Act was enacted to
protect suppliers of labor and materials for public
works projects by providing them with statutory remedies for
amounts due and unpaid. W. Metal Lath, 851 P.2d at
877. To construe section 38-26-110 to punish contractors and
subcontractors by stripping them of any and all avenues of
relief would be contrary to this statutory purpose and
undermine the legislative goals of the statute.
¶53
Finally, as noted above, we must construe statutes to avoid
illogical and absurd results. B.C.B., ¶ 24, 569
P.3d at 79. Interpreting section 38-26-110 as Defendants
suggest would lead to just such results. Rather than
discouraging claimants from filing excessive claims in bad
faith, claimants would likely be deterred from exercising
their statutory remedies at all, lest they risk losing all
30
avenues for being made whole. Reading section 38-26-110 as
requiring forfeiture of only statutory rights and remedies
available under the Public Works Act thus better supports the
legislature's intent and the purposes of that Act. Under
such a construction, claimants will properly be deterred from
filing excessive claims, but without the fear of losing all
opportunity for recovery based on what might turn out to be
the erroneous exercise of their statutory rights and
remedies.
¶54
Accordingly, we conclude that section 38-26-110's penalty
for excessive claims is a claimant's forfeiture only of
its statutory rights and remedies under the Public Works Act.
III.
Conclusion
¶55
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that disputed or
unliquidated amounts, including delay and disruption damages,
may lawfully be included in a verified statement of claim,
provided that the claimed amounts otherwise fall within the
statutory constraints of the Public Works Act. Thus, disputed
or unliquidated amounts may lawfully be included when the
claimed amounts represent labor, materials, sustenance,
rental machinery, tools, equipment, or other supplies used in
the prosecution of the work, and the inclusion of such
amounts does not constitute an excessive claim under section
38-26-110. Applying that determination to the facts presented
here, we further conclude that the trial court did not
clearly err in finding that Wadsworth's verified
statement of claim
31
was not excessive. Finally, we conclude that a claimant who
files an excessive claim pursuant to section 38-26-110 of the
Public Works Act forfeits only the statutory rights and
remedies created by the Act and not all rights and remedies
otherwise available at law.
¶56
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the division below
and remand this case to the division with instructions to
consider the additional issues that Wadsworth raised in its
cross-appeal below and that the division did not address.
---------
Notes:
[1] Specifically, we granted certiorari to
review the following issues:
1. Whether a claimant who files an excessive verified
statement of claim under the Colorado Public Works Act,
§§ 38-26-101 to -110, C.R.S. (2024), forfeits both
its statutory remedies and all other available legal remedies
or, as with an excessive lien claimant under the General
Mechanics' Lien Act, forfeits its statutory remedies
only.
2. Whether a verified statement of claim under the
Colorado Public Works Act may lawfully include disputed
amounts, such as additional costs incurred by a subcontractor
due to project delays and disruptions, or whether such claims
are limited to undisputed, liquidated amounts.
In its briefing before us, petitioner Ralph L.
Wadsworth Construction Company, LLC ("Wadsworth")
addressed these issues in reverse order, and we will do the
same.