Ralph Feffer & Sons v. United States

166 Ct. Cl. 506, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 107, 1964 WL 8595
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJune 12, 1964
DocketCong. No. 5-60
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 166 Ct. Cl. 506 (Ralph Feffer & Sons v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ralph Feffer & Sons v. United States, 166 Ct. Cl. 506, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 107, 1964 WL 8595 (cc 1964).

Opinion

Davis, Judge,

delivered tbe opinion of the court:

This reference1 from the Senate involves the destruction of 250 tons of cottonseed allegedly caused by an inspector of the United States Department of Agriculture. Plaintiff, Balph Feffer and Sons, is a partnership seeking recovery on behalf of an Arizona corporation, the Delinking and Seed Treating Company;2 plaintiff’s partners appear to be the sole (or major) stockholders of that corporation (see finding 1). The asserted basis of the Government’s liability is a supposedly negligent misrepresentation of a Department of Agriculture inspector, in late 1952 or January 1953, relating to the heat to which cottonseed could be subjected to eradicate pink bollworm infestation without, at the same time, harming the viability of the seed.

[508]*508Considered in its legal setting, tbe claim, sounding in tort, would clearly fail under tbe applicable statutes of limitation and would also fall because it does not present any actionable wrong. Tbe bill for plaintiffs relief (S. 2243) was not introduced in the Senate until June 24, 1959, and the petition in this court was not bled until September 3,1960. Tbe two-year statute of tbe Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)) and tbe six-year independent statute for suits in the Court of Claims (28 U.S.C. § 2501) both bar tbe claim, tbe critical events having occurred more than six years prior to the introduction of the bill (if that is assumed to stop the running of limitations). Moreover, recovery against tbe United States under tbe Tort Claims Act for negligent or willful misrepresentations is expressly precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (b). E.g., United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961); O'Donnell v. United States, ante, p. 109. Accordingly, we must bold that plaintiff and tbe Delinting Co. have no legal claim under existing law.

“On tbe other band, to tbe extent that we are asked to consider tbe claim in its ‘equitable’ facets — with that somewhat special meaning which has heretofore been given that term in Congressional reference cases — we are freer to comment upon tbe content and application of tbe legal rules which would control tbe legal claim.” Estate of Fairbank v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 1, 8-9 (1964). Tbe next question, therefore, is whether tbe time-bar ought in good conscience to be lifted. Our Trial Commissioner has made no findings on that point nor has plaintiff proposed any such findings or excepted to tbe Commissioner’s failure to cover that issue. Plaintiff and tbe Delinting Co. have elected to stand on the Commissioner’s report and have submitted their case to the court without brief or argument. Nothing has been brought to our attention excusing the more than six-year delay in taking steps to protect the claim. Accordingly, we cannot say that the time-bar ought, in equity, to be removed. See Group v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 612, 616 (1964); Estate of Fairbank v. United States, supra, p. 11.

Despite plaintiff’s lack of a showing that its delay should be forgiven, we go on to consider the circumstances of its claim because the Senate, in making this reference through [509]*509Senate Kesolution No. 140, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., was primarily concerned with the factual dispute between the Department of Agriculture and the plaintiff relating to the material happenings in late 1952 and early 1953. The Keport of the Judiciary Committee emphasizes that “since there is definite conflict as to the facts of how the cottonseed was damaged, the committee is of the view that this matter is one properly to be determined by the Court of Claims and a report rendered to the Congress thereon.” S. Rep. No. 1433, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960).

The United States Department of Agriculture, with power to regulate the movement of infested plants and plant products in interstate commerce, also cooperates with local authorities with respect to control of the intrastate transfer of such plants. That was the situation in Arizona, in late 1952 and early 1953, after pink bollworm infestation of cottonseed had been discovered in several of the counties of that State. George B. Ray was a Department of Agriculture area inspector whose jurisdiction included Arizona although his headquarters were located in El Paso, Tex. He was in charge of the Pink Bollworm Control Project of the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine for his area and one of his duties was to see that cottonseed infested with pink bollworm was treated in accordance with state and federal regulations to eliminate the condition. Mr. Ray is the Government official who is claimed to haye caused the damage to plaintiff and the Delinting Co.

Sometime in December 1952, Ralph B. Feffer, Sr., president of the Delinting Co., learned that cottonseed from an area of Arizona infested with pink bollworm had been shipped to his company’s delinting plant. An Arizona official (the County Extension Entomologist) informed him that the seed would have to be sterilized or fumigated before it could be removed from the plant. The Delinting Co. was not in the business of treating cottonseed for pink bollworm. Its plant, insofar as pertinent here, was used only to delint cottonseed (i.e., to remove the outer fuzz from the seed), a procedure which improves the planting and germinating qualities. In accomplishing this, the company used a sul-[510]*510pburic acid batb technique it had developed, the details of which were its trade secret.3 Used in the process was a dryer which removed the moisture from the seed after it had been run through the acid bath and washed with water. For the 1952-1953 delinting season, a new dryer had been installed at the plant, apparently because it had a greater capacity than the older equipment.4

In the latter part of December 1952, George McLain, Ray’s subordinate, visited the Delinting Co. plant in connection with the infested seed which had been delivered. State and federal regulations for sterilizing cottonseed for pink bollworm required that the seed be heated to a temperature of 150 degrees F. for a period of at least thirty seconds or, otherwise, be fumigated with methyl bromide. Mr. Feffer discussed the acid bath process with Mr. McLain for the purpose of having that technique approved for the elimination of the bollworm. McLain told him that approval for any equipment or process would have to come from his superior, Mr. Ray. McLain and Feffer also seem to have discussed the dryer as a method of sterilization.

The record is not entirely clear whether it was before or after this meeting with McLain that Mr. Feffer ordered a larger burner for the dryer. The burner was ordered on December 22d or 23d and installed prior to December 30th. It is reasonable, however, to conclude that the new burner was purchased because Mr. Feffer believed it was necessary in order to have the dryer approved as a bollworm sterilizer. We say this because the purchase appears to have been the outcome of Mr. Feffer’s learning, from McLain, of the state [511]

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Bluebook (online)
166 Ct. Cl. 506, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 107, 1964 WL 8595, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ralph-feffer-sons-v-united-states-cc-1964.