Ralon v. Kaiser Permanente Hospital

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedDecember 2, 2024
Docket3:23-cv-03344
StatusUnknown

This text of Ralon v. Kaiser Permanente Hospital (Ralon v. Kaiser Permanente Hospital) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ralon v. Kaiser Permanente Hospital, (N.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 DOMITILA PELAEZ RALON, 7 Case No. 23-cv-03344-JCS Plaintiff, 8 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 9 LEAVE TO FILE THIRD AMENDED KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, COMPLAINT 10 INC., et al., Re: Dkt. No. 55 11 Defendants.

12 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint (“Motion”) and 15 Defendants have filed a response. The Motion is suitable for determination without oral 16 argument. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons stated below, the Motion is DENIED.1 17 II. BACKGROUND 18 On February 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed the second amended complaint (“SAC”), which is the 19 operative complaint in the case. In it, she sues Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. and Kaiser 20 Foundation Hospitals (“Kaiser”) under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 21 2000d. She asserts that Kaiser discriminated against her on the basis or race and national origin 22 when Kaiser doctor Rana Tabrizi removed only part of a breast tumor on March 27, 2023 and on 23 May 3, 2023 when Dr. Tabrizi allegedly “expelled” Plaintiff from the surgery waiting area when 24 she was waiting for breast surgery. Documents attached to the SAC as exhibits appear to be 25 paperwork associated with procedures that were performed on those two dates, namely, a 26 lumpectomy on March 27, 2023 and an excision on May 3, 2023. 27 1 The Motion is difficult to follow; some of the exhibits in the documents Plaintiff has filed 2 appear to be exhibits to the Motion while others appear to be exhibits to the proposed third 3 amended complaint (“TAC”), which is itself an exhibit. As best the Court can make out, Plaintiff 4 seeks to add Dr. Tabrizi as a defendant, along with two other doctors (Dr. Odele and Dr. Le), who 5 appear to have ordered a mammogram and breast ultrasound or interpreted the results of those 6 tests on July 18, 2024. See dkt. no. 55 at ECF pp. 17-23 (“Exhibit 3”). Although Exhibit 3 states 7 that these tests revealed “no signs of breast cancer”, Plaintiff alleges that her tumor was not fully 8 removed, that it has metastasized and become cancerous, and that the cancer is now travelling in 9 her bloodstream. She seeks to assert claims against the three doctors for race discrimination under 10 Title VI. She also seeks to “add a medical record” from February 1, 2020. Dkt. no. 55 at ECF p. 11 4. 12 In a separate document that is included with the Motion papers, Plaintiff states that she 13 “rejects all questions” from Kaiser’s lawyers in Kaiser’s Request for Production of Documents, 14 Set One, Interrogatories, Set One, and Requests for Admission[s], Set One. Dkt. no, 55 at ECF p. 15 32. It appears that she believes that all relevant documents and information are already in Kaiser’s 16 possession. See id. (stating that “all my source of information is down there”). 17 III. ANALYSIS 18 A. Legal Standards 19 After a party has amended a pleading once as a matter of course, it may only amend further 20 after obtaining leave of the court, or by consent of the adverse party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). 21 Generally, Rule 15 advises the court that “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” 22 This policy is “to be applied with extreme liberality.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 23 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 24 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990)). However, leave to amend should not be “granted automatically.” 25 Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir.1990). Rather, courts in the Ninth 26 Circuit consider five factors in determining whether to grant leave to amend: 1) bad faith, 2) undue 27 delay, 3) prejudice to the opposing party, 4) futility, and 5) any previous opportunities to amend. 1 1051, 1055 (9th Cir.2009); Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir.2004). 2 It is well-established that “futility of amendment alone can justify the denial of a motion.” 3 Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1055; Buckley, 356 F.3d at 1077; Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th 4 Cir. 2004). A proposed amendment is futile if it would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure 5 to state a claim. Miller v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 10–00264 WHA, 2010 WL 2198204, at *3 (N.D. 6 Cal. May 28, 2010). 7 Further, when a request for leave to amend requires the Court to change the schedule of the 8 case, Rule 16(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure comes into play. Johnson v. Mammoth 9 Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). Rule 16(b)(4) provides that scheduling 10 orders “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 16(b)(4). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Johnson: 12 “A court’s evaluation of good cause is not coextensive with an inquiry into the propriety of the amendment under ... Rule 15.” [Forstmann 13 v. Culp, 114 F.R.D. 83, 85 (M.D.N.C. 1987)]. Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy which focuses on the bad faith of the party 14 seeking to interpose an amendment and the prejudice to the opposing party, Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” standard primarily considers the 15 diligence of the party seeking the amendment. The district court may modify the pretrial schedule “if it cannot reasonably be met despite 16 the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 advisory committee's notes (1983 amendment); Harrison Beverage 17 Co. v. Dribeck Importers, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 463, 469 (D.N.J.1990); Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 132 F.R.D. 213, 217 18 (N.D.Ind.1990); Forstmann, 114 F.R.D. at 85; 6A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1522.1 at 231 (2d ed. 1990) 19 (“good cause” means scheduling deadlines cannot be met despite party’s diligence). Moreover, carelessness is not compatible with a 20 finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief. Cf. Engleson v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 972 F.2d 1038, 1043 (9th 21 Cir.1992) (carelessness not a ground for relief under Rule 60(b)); Martella v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 448 F.2d 729, 730 (9th 22 Cir.1971) (same), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974, 92 S.Ct. 1191, 31 L.Ed.2d 248 (1972); Smith v. Stone, 308 F.2d 15, 18 (9th Cir.1962) 23 (same). Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a 24 motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. See Gestetner Corp. v. Case Equip. Co., 108 25 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D.Me.1985). If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end. 26 27 Id. 1 B.

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