Qtaish v. Bronzeville Park Nursing and Living Center

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: October 19, 2023
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-2523
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

INEZ QTAISH, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-02523 (UNA) v. ) ) BRONZEVILLE PARK ) NURSING AND LIVING CENTER, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se complaint, ECF No.

1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. For the reasons

explained below, the IFP application will be granted, and this matter will be dismissed without

prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of the District of Columbia, sues Bronzeville Park Skilled Nursing and

Living Center and Symphony Bronzeville, both located in Chicago, Illinois, as well as the state of

Illinois. The complaint is quite difficult to follow and contains a litany of grievances and personal

ruminations. Plaintiff appears to allege that she was injured at the Bronzeville Park Nursing

Facility, and that she was a victim of medical malpractice at Trinity Hospital, also in Chicago. She

also takes issue with the alleged termination of her worker’s compensation benefits by the state of

Illinois and contends that her lack of success arises from legal malpractice. It is unclear how most

of these claims are connected to one another or to the named Defendants.

The allegations from there become even less cognizable. Plaintiff contends that she had a

“microchip implanted inside of” her, that unnamed individuals are attempting to murder her, and

that she has been targeted for “not being gay.” The relief sought is unspecified, but she has filed

1 a baseless motion, ECF No. 3, asking to “be separated from the LGBT community[.]” Plaintiff

faces hurdles here that she cannot overcome.

First, pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v.

Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s

jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Ciralsky v.

CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that Defendants receive

fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate

defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D.

497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). “When a pleading “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are

neither plainly nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp

harangues and personal comments [,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v.

D.C., 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021, 2017 WL

5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). “A confused and rambling narrative of charges and conclusions

. . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F.

Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The instant

complaint falls squarely within this category.

To that end, the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set

forth generally at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction is

available only when a “federal question” is presented or the parties are of diverse citizenship and

the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. As discussed, a plaintiff seeking relief in the district

2 court must at least plead facts that bring the suit within the court's jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a), and failure to plead such facts warrants dismissal of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to raise any federal question. And, while Plaintiff and

Defendants appear to be of diverse citizenship, this matter presents no connection to the District

of Columbia whatsoever. Venue in a civil action is proper only in (1) the district where any

Defendant resides, if all Defendants reside in the same state in which the district is located, (2) in

a district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred

(or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated), or (3) in a district

in which any Defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be

brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (providing dismissal for improper

venue). None of the Defendants are located here and none of the acts or omissions giving rise to

this case, as far as they can even be understood, occurred in this District.

For all of these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s motion, ECF

No. 3, is denied. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

Date: October 19, 2023 ___________________________ JIA M. COBB United States District Judge