[7]*7Mr. Justice Hall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the trial court the parties appear in reverse order to their appearance here. We refer to Grand Carniolian Slovenian Catholic Union of the United States of America as “Union” and to the City of Pueblo as the “City.”
To better understand and resolve the question presented by this writ of error, some of the background material antedating the bringing of this action should be considered.
From the record before this court it appears that during the period 1917 to 1938, the City of Pueblo, a home rule city, had created twenty-eight paving districts and caused paving to be laid therein. In order to finance the cost of the construction, Pueblo had caused to be issued and disposed of special improvement bonds of each district. The bonds, some bearing 5% interest, others 6% interest, were payable out of assessments levied against the properties abutting on or adjacent to the paving projects.
Due to adverse economic conditions existing in Pueblo during the 20s and early 30s, owners of much of the property assessed with the costs of the paving improvements were unable to pay their assessments. Others failed to pay because their assessments exceeded the values of their properties. For these and other reasons collections of assessments fell far short of interest and redemption requirements, the extent of the shortages varying from one district to another.
By the year 1938 all twenty-eight districts were in arrears in the payment of interest or the redemption of bonds, or both; there had been much litigation involving the propriety and legality of assessments, alleged failure of the City to perform its duties, etc. As a result, the general credit standing of Pueblo had been seriously impaired; the City, the bondholders and the property owners subject to assessment were equally unhappy with their respective plights.
[8]*8In an effort to remedy the chaotic condition then prevalent, the City, on October 26, 1938, adopted Ordinance No. 1373, which provided for the refunding of all of the bonds of the twenty-eight districts then outstanding; the bonds of the twenty-eight districts were to be accepted in exchange for refunding bonds bearing 4% interest. The refunding bonds were to become due and payable November 1, 1953. Refunding bonds were issued in the total amount of $879,000.00 and the same given in exchange for all of the outstanding bonds of the twenty-eight districts. As of February 28, 1952, the date of the original filing of this action, refunding bonds totaling $414,000.00 had been redeemed, leaving refunding bonds with a face value of $465,000.00 unredeemed.
Ordinance No. 1373 provided that the refunding bonds and interest thereon should be paid from the “Refunding Improvement Bond Fund”:
“Said Refunding Improvement Bonds and the interest thereon shall be payable in regular numerical order out of a fund hereby created and designated ‘Refunding Improvement Bond Fund’ which shall contain the receipts from paid and unpaid assessments levied against property in districts, the bonds of which are to be refunded as herein provided, plus paid and unpaid interest and penalties on said assessments, plus the proceeds derived and to be derived from the sale of tax certificates and property now and hereafter held by the City for delinquent assessments on said Districts, * *
In other words, the refunding bonds and interest were to be paid out of a fund made up of: (1) receipts from paid and unpaid assessments of the twenty-eight districts; (2) paid and unpaid interest and penalties on such assessments; (3) proceeds derived and to be derived from the sale of tax sale certificates on property now held by the City for delinquent assessments; and (4) such receipts as may he derived from a general tax levy, not exceeding 3 mills, as might he assessed against [9]*9all property in Pueblo, as provided by Section 12, Article IV, of the Pueblo City Charter.
This ordinance contained adequate provisions for the redemption of all of the refunding bonds prior to maturity. However, Pueblo’s paving problems were not at an end.
In October 1940, pursuant to Ordinance No. 1373, Pueblo undertook to levy a tax of .04 mills against all taxable property in Pueblo, the proceeds to go to the Bond Fund as above provided. Certain property owners brought suit to enjoin the levy of this tax and to have the mill levy provision of the ordinance declared void. They were successful in their contention that this provision of the ordinance providing for a general tax levy was void. Flanders v. Pueblo, 114 Colo. 1, 160 P. (2d) 980. Thus Pueblo was left with a refunding ordinance which did not make adequate provision for redemption of the bonds.
After meeting this setback, Flanders v. Pueblo (May 21, 1945), Pueblo undertook to carry on under Ordinance No. 1373, as emasculated. The bread and butter revenue provision of the ordinance having been eliminated, they were doomed for failure. A flood of litigation followed. Bondholders and property owners subject to assessments were equally critical of Pueblo and its efforts in their behalf. None were getting the relief contemplated by Ordinance No. 1373 prior to its emasculation.
Union on February 28, 1952, brought a class action in behalf of itself and all other holders of refunding bonds issued pursuant to Ordinance No. 1373 adopted by the City on October 26, 1938. In this suit Union sought to have a receiver appointed for the purpose of marshaling and distributing to the holders of refunding bonds all assets set up by Ordinance No. 1373 for the purpose of paying interest upon and redeeming said bonds so issued. On February 28, 1953, a receiver was appointed for such purposes and ever since said date he has been and is now so functioning.
[10]*10Soon after the appointment of the receiver differences arose between the receiver and the City as to the rights and duties conferred and imposed upon the bondholders and the City by Ordinance No. 1373. Some of those disputes have been resolved and the resolution thereof accepted by both. One specific question has been in dispute since April 1954 and that is over the question whether the City is answerable for its actions or failures to act with reference to the twenty-eight original paving districts prior to the adoption of Ordinance No. 1373, adopted October 26, 1938, or is it answerable only to the extent of accounting to the receiver for the actual assets enumerated in the ordinance and held by the City in its fiduciary capacity.
Seeking to have this dispute resolved, the receiver, on April 24, 1954, filed a petition with the trial court in which he requested a court order:
“1. That Pueblo, a municipal corporation, be required to furnish the Receiver heretofore appointed with a detailed statement of all moneys received and disbursed by Pueblo, a municipal corporation, as trustee, in the above entitled matter.
“2. That Pueblo, a municipal corporation, furnish your Receiver with a complete list of all Treasurer’s Certificates of Purchase received by Pueblo that have not heretofore been assigned to the Receiver by Pueblo, a municipal corporation.
“3.
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[7]*7Mr. Justice Hall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the trial court the parties appear in reverse order to their appearance here. We refer to Grand Carniolian Slovenian Catholic Union of the United States of America as “Union” and to the City of Pueblo as the “City.”
To better understand and resolve the question presented by this writ of error, some of the background material antedating the bringing of this action should be considered.
From the record before this court it appears that during the period 1917 to 1938, the City of Pueblo, a home rule city, had created twenty-eight paving districts and caused paving to be laid therein. In order to finance the cost of the construction, Pueblo had caused to be issued and disposed of special improvement bonds of each district. The bonds, some bearing 5% interest, others 6% interest, were payable out of assessments levied against the properties abutting on or adjacent to the paving projects.
Due to adverse economic conditions existing in Pueblo during the 20s and early 30s, owners of much of the property assessed with the costs of the paving improvements were unable to pay their assessments. Others failed to pay because their assessments exceeded the values of their properties. For these and other reasons collections of assessments fell far short of interest and redemption requirements, the extent of the shortages varying from one district to another.
By the year 1938 all twenty-eight districts were in arrears in the payment of interest or the redemption of bonds, or both; there had been much litigation involving the propriety and legality of assessments, alleged failure of the City to perform its duties, etc. As a result, the general credit standing of Pueblo had been seriously impaired; the City, the bondholders and the property owners subject to assessment were equally unhappy with their respective plights.
[8]*8In an effort to remedy the chaotic condition then prevalent, the City, on October 26, 1938, adopted Ordinance No. 1373, which provided for the refunding of all of the bonds of the twenty-eight districts then outstanding; the bonds of the twenty-eight districts were to be accepted in exchange for refunding bonds bearing 4% interest. The refunding bonds were to become due and payable November 1, 1953. Refunding bonds were issued in the total amount of $879,000.00 and the same given in exchange for all of the outstanding bonds of the twenty-eight districts. As of February 28, 1952, the date of the original filing of this action, refunding bonds totaling $414,000.00 had been redeemed, leaving refunding bonds with a face value of $465,000.00 unredeemed.
Ordinance No. 1373 provided that the refunding bonds and interest thereon should be paid from the “Refunding Improvement Bond Fund”:
“Said Refunding Improvement Bonds and the interest thereon shall be payable in regular numerical order out of a fund hereby created and designated ‘Refunding Improvement Bond Fund’ which shall contain the receipts from paid and unpaid assessments levied against property in districts, the bonds of which are to be refunded as herein provided, plus paid and unpaid interest and penalties on said assessments, plus the proceeds derived and to be derived from the sale of tax certificates and property now and hereafter held by the City for delinquent assessments on said Districts, * *
In other words, the refunding bonds and interest were to be paid out of a fund made up of: (1) receipts from paid and unpaid assessments of the twenty-eight districts; (2) paid and unpaid interest and penalties on such assessments; (3) proceeds derived and to be derived from the sale of tax sale certificates on property now held by the City for delinquent assessments; and (4) such receipts as may he derived from a general tax levy, not exceeding 3 mills, as might he assessed against [9]*9all property in Pueblo, as provided by Section 12, Article IV, of the Pueblo City Charter.
This ordinance contained adequate provisions for the redemption of all of the refunding bonds prior to maturity. However, Pueblo’s paving problems were not at an end.
In October 1940, pursuant to Ordinance No. 1373, Pueblo undertook to levy a tax of .04 mills against all taxable property in Pueblo, the proceeds to go to the Bond Fund as above provided. Certain property owners brought suit to enjoin the levy of this tax and to have the mill levy provision of the ordinance declared void. They were successful in their contention that this provision of the ordinance providing for a general tax levy was void. Flanders v. Pueblo, 114 Colo. 1, 160 P. (2d) 980. Thus Pueblo was left with a refunding ordinance which did not make adequate provision for redemption of the bonds.
After meeting this setback, Flanders v. Pueblo (May 21, 1945), Pueblo undertook to carry on under Ordinance No. 1373, as emasculated. The bread and butter revenue provision of the ordinance having been eliminated, they were doomed for failure. A flood of litigation followed. Bondholders and property owners subject to assessments were equally critical of Pueblo and its efforts in their behalf. None were getting the relief contemplated by Ordinance No. 1373 prior to its emasculation.
Union on February 28, 1952, brought a class action in behalf of itself and all other holders of refunding bonds issued pursuant to Ordinance No. 1373 adopted by the City on October 26, 1938. In this suit Union sought to have a receiver appointed for the purpose of marshaling and distributing to the holders of refunding bonds all assets set up by Ordinance No. 1373 for the purpose of paying interest upon and redeeming said bonds so issued. On February 28, 1953, a receiver was appointed for such purposes and ever since said date he has been and is now so functioning.
[10]*10Soon after the appointment of the receiver differences arose between the receiver and the City as to the rights and duties conferred and imposed upon the bondholders and the City by Ordinance No. 1373. Some of those disputes have been resolved and the resolution thereof accepted by both. One specific question has been in dispute since April 1954 and that is over the question whether the City is answerable for its actions or failures to act with reference to the twenty-eight original paving districts prior to the adoption of Ordinance No. 1373, adopted October 26, 1938, or is it answerable only to the extent of accounting to the receiver for the actual assets enumerated in the ordinance and held by the City in its fiduciary capacity.
Seeking to have this dispute resolved, the receiver, on April 24, 1954, filed a petition with the trial court in which he requested a court order:
“1. That Pueblo, a municipal corporation, be required to furnish the Receiver heretofore appointed with a detailed statement of all moneys received and disbursed by Pueblo, a municipal corporation, as trustee, in the above entitled matter.
“2. That Pueblo, a municipal corporation, furnish your Receiver with a complete list of all Treasurer’s Certificates of Purchase received by Pueblo that have not heretofore been assigned to the Receiver by Pueblo, a municipal corporation.
“3. That Pueblo, a municipal corporation, furnish your Receiver with (a) a list of all Treasurer’s Certificates of Purchase sold by Pueblo; (b) a list of all certificates of Purchase redeemed by the owners of the property upon which the certificates were issued; (c) a list of all Certificates of Purchase compromised by the City for less than the face value plus interest, and the date., of compromise and the amount received.
“4. That Pueblo, a municipal corporation, furnish your Receiver with a detailed description of all real estate obtained by the City of Pueblo by tax deed or other[11]*11wise on which have been issued Treasurer’s Certificates of Purchase to the City of Pueblo as Trustee of the Refunding Bond issue and the dates when purchased.”
On April 28, 1954, the trial judge sustained this petition and ordered the City to furnish the requested information. Due to various extenuating circumstances this information was not promptly furnished and many hearings and postponements were had. On December 10, 1957, after further arguments the trial court made rather exhaustive findings, some of which dealt with matters not before the court, and directed the receiver:
“ * * * to take appropriate action in accordance with the findings made herein.”
The City by timely and appropriate proceedings sought to have the findings and judgment altered and amended. This effort proved fruitless, whereupon the City sued out this writ of error.
The parties agree that the judgment of December 10, 1957, is a final judgment and appealable, and we so treat it.
The following, we believe, is a fair statement of the question propounded to and resolved by the trial court and now by writ of error presented to this court for answer:
IS PUEBLO UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ORDINANCE NO. 1373 OBLIGATED TO ACCOUNT FOR ALL OF ITS ACTS OF OMISSION OR COMMISSION WITH REFERENCE TO THE AFFAIRS OF EACH OF THE TWENTY-EIGHT PAVING DISTRICTS FROM AND AFTER THE RESPECTIVE DATES OF THEIR CREATION, OR IS IT ONLY OBLIGATED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE CASH ON HAND, TAX SALE CERTIFICATES ON HAND AND PROPERTIES ACQUIRED PRIOR TO 1938 AND ITS ACTS SUBSEQUENT TO 1938?
Haying in mind the foregoing background, it seems likely that the holders of bonds in the twenty-eight defaulted districts and the City intended to start anew [12]*12rather than to perpetuate over twenty years of past frustration. As pointed out, the 1938 ordinance made ample provision for meeting all of the obligations of the refunding bonds — even if nothing were received from unpaid assessments, sale of tax sale certificates or properties deeded to the City, the mill levy provision of the ordinance afforded ample assurance that all obligations would be met and paid. There can be little, if any, doubt of the fact that this mill levy provision of the ordinance loomed large as an inducement to the holders of old bonds to exchange them for the new.
Holders of old bonds in accepting bonds with a lower interest rate and a later maturity date must have contemplated getting something different and better than that which they had. By the same reasoning, the City in assuming new and greater obligations must have contemplated some advantages for itself and that consisted of a lower interest rate, deferred maturity dates and relief from answerability for its actions or omissions to act prior to October 24, 1938.
The fact that the mill levy provision of the ordinance was, on May 21, 1945, held unconstitutional and as a consequence thereof anticipated revenue for payment of interest and redemption of bonds was not forthcoming from that source sheds no light on the October 26, 1938, intention of the parties, when Ordinance No. 1373 was adopted and new bonds issued in exchange for the old.
To hold, as the trial court did, that the adoption of Ordinance No. 1373 did not define the rights and duties of the City and bondholders who surrendered their old bonds in exchange for 1938 refunding bonds, would defeat the very purposes of the refunding operation.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the trial court to set aside and vacate any and all orders entered directing the City to answer for anything prior to October 26, 1938. By the same reasoning, we hold that the City is precluded from making claim against the receiver for [13]*13any claims that it may have arising prior to October 26, 1938.
We note that the receiver has been functioning for nearly eight years and, though he has been confronted with numerous complex problems, it would seem that with this present problem resolved he could and should bring his stewardship to an early end so that the City, bondholders and property owners may be freed of the uncertainty of their respective rights and duties in the matter.
Mr. Chief Justice Sutton, Mr. Justice Frantz and Mr. Justice Doyle specially concur.
Mr. Justice Moore, Mr. Justice Knauss and Mr. Justice Day dissent.