1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 J. JESUS RAMOS RODRIGUEZ, No. 2:24-cv-1025 KJM DB PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 14 MARIA XOCHITL MEJIA TORRES, et al., 15 16 Defendants. 17 On April 5, 2024, plaintiff J. Jesus Ramos Rodriguez commenced this action by filing a 18 complaint and paying the applicable filing fee. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. 19 Accordingly, the matter has been referred to the undersigned for all purposes encompassed by 20 Local Rule 302(c)(21). Plaintiff’s complaint appears to concern a divorce. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) 21 at 6.1) 22 Jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry that must precede the adjudication of any case before 23 the district court. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 24 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may adjudicate 25 only those cases authorized by federal law. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 26 27 1 Page number citations such as this are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 28 system and not to the page numbers assigned by the parties. 1 377 (1994); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992). “Federal courts are presumed 2 to lack jurisdiction, ‘unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.’” Casey v. Lewis, 3 4 F.3d 1516, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 4 546 (1986)). 5 Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by the court at any time during the 6 proceedings. Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computer Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 7 1996). A federal court “ha[s] an independent obligation to address sua sponte whether [it] has 8 subject-matter jurisdiction.” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999). It is the 9 obligation of the district court “to be alert to jurisdictional requirements.” Grupo Dataflux v. 10 Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004). Without jurisdiction, the district court 11 cannot decide the merits of a case or order any relief. See Morongo, 858 F.2d at 1380. 12 The basic federal jurisdiction statutes are 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, which confer 13 “federal question” and “diversity” jurisdiction, respectively. Federal jurisdiction may also be 14 conferred by federal statutes regulating specific subject matter. “[T]he existence of federal 15 jurisdiction depends solely on the plaintiff’s claims for relief and not on anticipated defenses to 16 those claims.” ARCO Envtl. Remediation, LLC v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality, 213 F.3d 17 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000). 18 District courts have diversity jurisdiction only over “all civil actions where the matter in 19 controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs,” and the action 20 is between: “(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a 21 foreign state; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are 22 additional parties; and (4) a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different 23 States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. “To demonstrate citizenship for diversity purposes a party must (a) be 24 a citizen of the United States, and (b) be domiciled in a state of the United States.” Lew v. Moss, 25 797 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986). “Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity between 26 the parties-each defendant must be a citizen of a different state from each plaintiff.” In re 27 Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litigation, 549 F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008). 28 //// 1 The complaint fails to contain sufficient allegations to support either federal question or 2 diversity jurisdiction. Moreover, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine a federal district court is 3 precluded from hearing “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by 4 state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting 5 district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 6 Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies not only to final state 7 court orders and judgments, but to interlocutory orders and non-final judgments issued by a state 8 court as well. Doe & Assoc. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); 9 Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1986). 10 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits “a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state 11 court,” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003), and “may also apply where the parties 12 do not directly contest the merits of a state court decision, as the doctrine prohibits a federal 13 district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a 14 state court judgment.” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A suit brought in federal district court is a ‘de facto appeal’ 16 forbidden by Rooker-Feldman when ‘a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly 17 erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that 18 decision.’” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d 19 at 1164); see also Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman 20 doctrine bars federal courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a proceeding in 21 ‘which a party losing in state court’ seeks ‘what in substance would be appellate review of the 22 state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state 23 judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’”) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 24 997, 1005-06 (1994), cert. denied 547 U .S. 1111 (2006)). “Thus, even if a plaintiff seeks relief 25 from a state court judgment, such a suit is a forbidden de facto appeal only if the plaintiff also 26 alleges a legal error by the state court.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 J. JESUS RAMOS RODRIGUEZ, No. 2:24-cv-1025 KJM DB PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 14 MARIA XOCHITL MEJIA TORRES, et al., 15 16 Defendants. 17 On April 5, 2024, plaintiff J. Jesus Ramos Rodriguez commenced this action by filing a 18 complaint and paying the applicable filing fee. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. 19 Accordingly, the matter has been referred to the undersigned for all purposes encompassed by 20 Local Rule 302(c)(21). Plaintiff’s complaint appears to concern a divorce. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) 21 at 6.1) 22 Jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry that must precede the adjudication of any case before 23 the district court. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 24 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may adjudicate 25 only those cases authorized by federal law. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 26 27 1 Page number citations such as this are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 28 system and not to the page numbers assigned by the parties. 1 377 (1994); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992). “Federal courts are presumed 2 to lack jurisdiction, ‘unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.’” Casey v. Lewis, 3 4 F.3d 1516, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 4 546 (1986)). 5 Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by the court at any time during the 6 proceedings. Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computer Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 7 1996). A federal court “ha[s] an independent obligation to address sua sponte whether [it] has 8 subject-matter jurisdiction.” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999). It is the 9 obligation of the district court “to be alert to jurisdictional requirements.” Grupo Dataflux v. 10 Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004). Without jurisdiction, the district court 11 cannot decide the merits of a case or order any relief. See Morongo, 858 F.2d at 1380. 12 The basic federal jurisdiction statutes are 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, which confer 13 “federal question” and “diversity” jurisdiction, respectively. Federal jurisdiction may also be 14 conferred by federal statutes regulating specific subject matter. “[T]he existence of federal 15 jurisdiction depends solely on the plaintiff’s claims for relief and not on anticipated defenses to 16 those claims.” ARCO Envtl. Remediation, LLC v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality, 213 F.3d 17 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000). 18 District courts have diversity jurisdiction only over “all civil actions where the matter in 19 controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs,” and the action 20 is between: “(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a 21 foreign state; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are 22 additional parties; and (4) a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different 23 States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. “To demonstrate citizenship for diversity purposes a party must (a) be 24 a citizen of the United States, and (b) be domiciled in a state of the United States.” Lew v. Moss, 25 797 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986). “Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity between 26 the parties-each defendant must be a citizen of a different state from each plaintiff.” In re 27 Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litigation, 549 F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008). 28 //// 1 The complaint fails to contain sufficient allegations to support either federal question or 2 diversity jurisdiction. Moreover, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine a federal district court is 3 precluded from hearing “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by 4 state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting 5 district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 6 Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies not only to final state 7 court orders and judgments, but to interlocutory orders and non-final judgments issued by a state 8 court as well. Doe & Assoc. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); 9 Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1986). 10 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits “a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state 11 court,” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003), and “may also apply where the parties 12 do not directly contest the merits of a state court decision, as the doctrine prohibits a federal 13 district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a 14 state court judgment.” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A suit brought in federal district court is a ‘de facto appeal’ 16 forbidden by Rooker-Feldman when ‘a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly 17 erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that 18 decision.’” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d 19 at 1164); see also Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman 20 doctrine bars federal courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a proceeding in 21 ‘which a party losing in state court’ seeks ‘what in substance would be appellate review of the 22 state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state 23 judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’”) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 24 997, 1005-06 (1994), cert. denied 547 U .S. 1111 (2006)). “Thus, even if a plaintiff seeks relief 25 from a state court judgment, such a suit is a forbidden de facto appeal only if the plaintiff also 26 alleges a legal error by the state court.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). 27 [A] federal district court dealing with a suit that is, in part, a forbidden de facto appeal from a judicial decision of a state court 28 must refuse to hear the forbidden appeal. As part of that refusal, it 1 must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in 2 its judicial decision. 3 Doe, 415 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158); see also Exxon, 544 US. at 286 n. 1 (“a 4 district court [cannot] entertain constitutional claims attacking a state-court judgment, even if the 5 state court had not passed directly on those claims, when the constitutional attack [is] 6 ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment’) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n. 4 16)); Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898, 900 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003) (“claims raised in the 8 federal court action are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s decision such that the 9 adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to 10 interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules”) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16, 11 485). 12 Here, the complaint’s allegations are sparse and difficult to decipher. However, the 13 complaint alleges that plaintiff needs “help due to divorce” and to prevent “a collapse in 14 family[.]” (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 6.) Disputes over marital dissolution fall squarely within the 15 Rooker-Feldman bar. See, e.g., Moor v. Cnty. of Butte, 547 Fed. Appx. 826, 829 (9th Cir. 2013) 16 (affirming dismissal of suit concerning state court divorce and child custody proceedings on 17 Rooker-Feldman grounds); Gomez v. San Diego Family Ct., 388 Fed. Appx. 685 (9th Cir. 2010) 18 (affirming dismissal of state court custody decision on Rooker-Feldman grounds); Sareen v. 19 Sareen, 356 Fed. Appx. 977 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of action alleging constitutional 20 violation in state court child custody action on Rooker-Feldman grounds). 21 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within fourteen (14) days of the date of this 22 order plaintiff shall show cause in writing as to why this action should not be dismissed due to a 23 lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 24 Dated: April 24, 2024 25 26 | DLB:6 DB/orders/orders.pro se/rodriguez.jx.osc ORAUH BARNES 27 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28